The Polymarket market for 'Will Iran close its airspace by July 15?' has resolved to YES as of July 4, 2026, with a consensus of credible reporting confirming a general closure of Iranian airspace (Tehran FIR) that meets the definition in the question. The resolution source is the UMA optimistic oracle and news consensus, indicating the event has already occurred.
The market has already resolved YES based on official information and consensus reporting, confirming that Iran initiated a general airspace closure by July 15, 2026. Historical precedents and the resolution source from the UMA optimistic oracle confirm this outcome.
The market has already been officially resolved as 'YES' by the UMA optimistic oracle, which serves as the final settlement layer for this prediction market. Historical data and market records confirm that the event has occurred and the market is closed.
Recent historical data shows that Iran has closed its airspace multiple times in 2026, but these closures have been sporadic and not consistent. The most recent closure was in February 2026, and there have been no indications of an imminent closure by July 15. The base rate for such closures is low, and there is no specific evidence to suggest a closure is likely in the near future.
The market has already resolved to 'Yes' according to the UMA optimistic oracle, with resolution based on credible reporting from sources like Reuters. Historical data confirms that Iran initiated a major closure of its airspace not due to weather conditions, meeting the defined criteria for a general closure. The event has occurred and been verified as of the resolution date.
The market has resolved to 'Yes' as of the relevant date, indicating Iran closed its airspace by July 15.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Israeli leadership has repeatedly and recently stated that forces will not withdraw from Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed, a condition unlikely to be met by July 31. With under a month remaining and no diplomatic breakthrough in sight, the odds of a formal announcement of full withdrawal are low. Prediction markets at 5-15% align with this assessment, but given the strong rhetoric and short timeline, 10% is a well-calibrated estimate.
Current statements from Israeli leadership, including Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Katz, emphasize that Israeli forces will remain in southern Lebanon indefinitely until Hezbollah is disarmed and northern Israeli communities are secured. Although there is mention of a pilot withdrawal program in some areas, the overall policy strongly resists full withdrawal by July 31, 2026. Prediction markets and trading volumes also reflect a low probability (~15%) of full withdrawal by that date.
The Israeli government, including Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Katz, has explicitly stated that the IDF will maintain its presence in southern Lebanon indefinitely until Hezbollah is disarmed and the security of northern Israeli residents is guaranteed [jpost.com]. Despite minor tactical adjustments, there is no indication of a full withdrawal of ground forces by the end of July 2026, and the current political stance remains firmly opposed to such a move [hkimarket.com].
The current market probability on Polymarket is 15%, reflecting the collective assessment of traders. Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Katz, have stated that Israeli forces will remain in Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed, indicating no imminent withdrawal. Limited tactical pullbacks do not signify a full withdrawal, and diplomatic efforts have not altered Israel's security zone policy.
As of July 4, 2026, prediction markets such as Polymarket and iMarket price the probability of Israel withdrawing from Lebanon by July 31, 2026, at around 15% [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/israel-withdraws-from-lebanon-by). This reflects current trader sentiment based on available public information. Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Katz, have stated that ground forces will remain in southern Lebanon indefinitely until Hezbollah is disarmed, which is a condition not expected to be met by the deadline [jpost.com](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-901080). While limited tactical withdrawals have occurred, no official announcement of full withdrawal has been made, and official policy opposes withdrawal without security guarantees. Therefore, the probability of a full announced withdrawal by July 31 remains low.
Israeli government has stated troops will remain indefinitely to counter Hezbollah, and market odds are low.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
timeout after 30000ms
Prediction markets and aggregated data from PolyFundr and Polymarket indicate a roughly 76% chance that total commitments will exceed $25M. The sale is active and commitments are steadily increasing, with strong market confidence reflected in high probabilities for lower thresholds and a still substantial probability for the $25M mark. No indications of cancellation or hold have been reported, supporting a positive outcome.
Prediction markets currently show a strong consensus that the Laso Finance raise will exceed the $25M threshold, with aggregated data from platforms like PolyFundr indicating a probability of approximately 76%. Given the active nature of the raise and the historical performance of similar MetaDAO projects, it is highly likely that the commitment total will reach the required amount before the July 31, 2026 deadline.
Prediction markets like Polymarket and PolyFundr show a consensus probability of around 76% for the total commitments exceeding $25M, based on trader sentiment and historical data. The high volume and consistent pricing across different platforms suggest strong confidence in this outcome.
Prediction markets such as PolyFundr and Polymarket show the probability of exceeding $25M in commitments is around 76% [polyfundr.com](https://polyfundr.com/event/total-commitments-for-the-laso-finance-public-sale-on-metadao) and 76%-82% [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/total-commitments-for-the-laso-finance-public-sale-on-metadao), reflecting crowd-sourced expectations. The sale is active with verifiable commitments tracked on the official page, and no cancellation has been reported. Given the current trajectory and market sentiment, the likelihood of hitting the $25M threshold before July 31, 2026, is substantial but not certain.
Based on Polymarket odds, the chance of total commitments exceeding $25M is 76%.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
The Polymarket crowd currently assigns only an 8-10% probability to this event, and the market has seen significant volume ($5.9M), indicating informed trading. The 7-day moving average of transit calls needs to reach 60 by July 15, which is a high bar given recent disruptions in the region (e.g., Iran-Israel tensions, Houthi attacks). With only 11 days left, a rapid and sustained recovery to that level is unlikely based on current traffic data trends.
The current prediction market on Polymarket assigns about a 10% chance that Strait of Hormuz traffic will return to normal levels (7-day average of 60 or more transit calls) by July 15, 2026. This low probability reflects ongoing disruptions or uncertainties affecting traffic, and the market's collective wisdom incorporates recent data and geopolitical factors. Given the complexity and volatility of the region, a low chance of full normalization by the deadline is reasonable.
The market sentiment on Polymarket has shifted significantly toward 'No', with current odds hovering around 8%. Given the proximity to the July 15 deadline and the lack of reported data indicating a surge in transit calls to the required 7-day moving average of 60, it is highly unlikely that traffic will return to that threshold in the remaining time.
The prediction markets on Polymarket show varying probabilities, with the most recent data indicating a 38% chance of the event occurring. However, considering the historical data and the current geopolitical situation in the Strait of Hormuz, a more conservative estimate is appropriate. The key factors include the recent disruptions and the time required for traffic to return to normal levels.
timeout after 30000ms
Based on the market's varying probabilities and the resolution criteria, an independent estimate is formed.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
The Polymarket crowd prices this at 27-31%, but given only ~27 days remain until July 31 and current transit calls are likely well below the 60 threshold (as implied by low odds), a rapid sustained recovery is needed. Without a clear catalyst to normalize traffic sharply, the probability is slightly below market consensus at 25%.
The current prediction market on Polymarket, which aggregates diverse trader insights and real-time data, assigns about a 27% chance that Strait of Hormuz traffic will return to normal levels by July 31, 2026. Given the geopolitical volatility in the region and the specific threshold of a 7-day moving average of 60 transit calls, the relatively low market probability reflects ongoing uncertainties and disruptions. Without strong evidence of imminent stabilization or increased shipping activity, the probability remains below one-third.
The market for this event shows significant skepticism, with crowd-sourced probabilities on major prediction platforms hovering between 27% and 31%. Given the current geopolitical climate and the specific requirement for a 7-day moving average of 60 transit calls in the IMF Portwatch data, the likelihood of reaching this threshold by the end of July remains low, as there is no clear indication of a rapid, sustained recovery in shipping volumes to that specific level.
The current crowd-sourced probability on Polymarket is around 27-31% for the event to resolve to 'Yes' [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-31) [polymarket.copilot.markets](https://polymarket.copilot.markets/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-31). Given the uncertainty and the specific threshold of 60 for the 7-day moving average, I adjust slightly upwards to 35% considering the potential for recovery in shipping traffic and the possibility of data revisions within the market's timeframe.
The current prediction market odds, based on aggregated trader behavior and information, indicate a 27% chance of traffic returning to the defined normal level by July 31, 2026. This reflects a well-informed consensus that incorporates base rates of shipping activity, ongoing regional tensions, and actual IMF Portwatch data releases. Given the high trading volume and liquidity, the market probability serves as a reliable proxy for the true likelihood.
The current Polymarket crowd-sourced probability for the 'Yes' outcome is 27%, based on market trading activity as of the search date.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The Strait of Hormuz is currently severely disrupted with traffic plunging to about 12 ships/day from a prewar baseline of 93-100/day, as reported by multiple sources [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-7-20260625174256255) and [manifold.markets](https://manifold.markets/BillClintonBubba/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-h8dyOt6Nq9). To reach a 7-day moving average of 60 by July 7, traffic would need to immediately surge to ~60+ daily and sustain that for nearly a week, which is extremely unlikely given the current geopolitical stalemate (Iran re-closed the strait on Jun 22) and the short time window (only ~3 days left until the resolution date). The Polymarket crowd also prices this at just 1%, reflecting a consensus view that the threshold cannot be met.
Current data and expert analysis indicate that traffic in the Strait of Hormuz has significantly decreased due to recent closures and conflicts, with daily ship arrivals far below the normal threshold of 60. The 7-day moving average required to declare traffic 'normal' is unlikely to be reached by July 7, given the short timeframe and the low baseline traffic levels. Market sentiment also reflects a very low probability (around 1%) for traffic returning to normal by this date, supporting a low but non-zero chance due to potential rapid ceasefire and reopening.
The current 7-day moving average of transit calls in the Strait of Hormuz is significantly below the threshold of 60, having dropped to approximately 12-20 calls per day following recent geopolitical tensions. Given that only a few days remain until the July 7 deadline, it is mathematically impossible for the 7-day moving average to recover to 60, as the average is heavily weighted by the recent period of low traffic.
The current Polymarket crowd-sourced probability is 1% for 'Yes' [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-7-20260625174256255). However, a Manifold user estimates a 9% chance, considering the potential for a rapid rebound in traffic if a durable ceasefire is achieved [manifold.markets](https://manifold.markets/BillClintonBubba/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-h8dyOt6Nq9). Given the recent disruptions and the short timeframe, a conservative estimate of 5% seems reasonable.
The current 7-day moving average of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz remains far below the prewar baseline of ~93–100 ships per day, with recent averages around 12–20. A return to a 7-day average of 60 or more by July 7, 2026, would require both a rapid and sustained reopening and a surge in traffic. While a brief rebound occurred after a June 17 Memorandum of Understanding, traffic did not approach normal levels [Manifold](https://manifold.markets). Given the ongoing regional tensions and the mathematical challenge of raising a 7-day average from a low base, the probability remains low but not negligible if a durable ceasefire enables a swift recovery in the final days. The Polymarket price suggests a 1% chance, but independent analysis incorporating recent dynamics points to a slightly higher likelihood [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com).
Current Polymarket crowd-sourced probability is 1%, but considering the significant drop in traffic and limited time, the actual chance is lower. A 7-day moving average of 60 is hard to reach from the current low levels in the remaining time.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Multiple authoritative sources (AA.com.tr, Al Jazeera, CNA, Al-Monitor) confirm the next round of US-Iran talks is planned after former Supreme Leader Khamenei's burial on July 9, 2026. However, no source states the talks will definitely begin by July 10. Mediators say 'at the earliest possible time' but have not set a specific date. Given the logistical challenges and Iran's post-funeral calendar, a start by July 10 is possible but unlikely: base rate for such tight follow-ups is low. I estimate 25% probability.
Current reports indicate that the next round of US-Iran talks is expected to occur in Doha in the third week of July, after the funeral of Iran's late Supreme Leader on July 9. Both sides have made positive progress in indirect technical talks but have not scheduled a formal senior-level round before July 10. Given the timing and statements from mediators, a formal senior-level meeting by July 10 is unlikely but not impossible.
While recent technical talks in Doha have occurred, they are explicitly described as technical and staff-level, which are excluded by the criteria. Furthermore, Iranian officials have publicly rejected the idea of direct negotiations, and the focus remains on the funeral of the late Supreme Leader, which concludes on July 9. Given the short window remaining until July 10 and the current emphasis on technical implementation rather than senior-level peace negotiations, a qualifying meeting is unlikely.
The sources indicate that the US and Iran are expected to hold direct talks in Doha in the third week of July 2026, with both sides showing positive responses and readiness for the talks. The next meeting is scheduled to be held as soon as possible after the funeral of the former Iranian Supreme Leader, which is expected to conclude by early July. The mediators from Qatar and Pakistan have reported positive progress in the discussions, and both sides have agreed to continue the talks. The key factors include the readiness of both sides, the positive responses from mediators, and the scheduled timing of the talks.
Multiple sources including [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/us-israel-iran-war/us-iran-expected-to-hold-direct-talks-in-doha-in-3rd-week-of-july-sources/3984302), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/2/us-iran- talks-in-doha-what-were-the-outcomes-and-whats-next), and [channelnewsasia.com](https://www.channelnewsasia.com/world/iran-us-indirect-talks-ali-khamenei-funeral-6227026) report that the next round of indirect US-Iran talks is scheduled for shortly after the funeral of former Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, which concludes on July 9, 2026. The meeting will be held in Doha, mediated by Qatar and Pakistan, and involves senior technical teams authorized by both governments. Although the talks are indirect, they are part of a formal diplomatic process and meet the criteria for a qualifying senior-level diplomatic meeting. Given the coordination already in place and public confirmation from mediators, the likelihood of the meeting occurring by July 10 is high.
US and Iran are expected to hold direct talks in Doha in the 3rd week of July, with both sides showing positive responses, but there are still differences to resolve.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Senior-level indirect talks already took place in Doha in early July, and mediators explicitly plan a follow-up round after the funeral. Base rates from similar diplomatic processes (e.g., US-Iran talks in 2025) favor continuation within weeks. The high market probability (~90%) and clear public statements from both sides make a meeting by July 31 very likely, though there is a small risk of slippage past the deadline.
Recent indirect talks between the US and Iran, mediated by Qatar and Pakistan, have shown positive progress and established communication channels, indicating a willingness to engage diplomatically. The market odds and credible sources suggest a high likelihood of a formal senior-level meeting occurring by July 31, 2026, especially given the momentum from the June 22 Switzerland talks and ongoing mediation efforts. However, the complexity of issues and the need for official acknowledgment keep the probability below certainty.
Recent indirect talks in Doha have established a functional communication channel and a commitment from both sides to continue negotiations following the funeral of the late Supreme Leader. Given that mediators are actively facilitating these discussions and both parties have expressed a willingness to continue the diplomatic process to address major issues like the nuclear program and regional security, a formal senior-level round is highly likely to be convened before the end of July.
Recent diplomatic engagements between the U.S. and Iran, mediated by Qatar and Pakistan, indicate ongoing efforts to resolve disputes and establish communication channels. The establishment of a hotline and the agreement to continue discussions suggest a high likelihood of further in-person diplomatic meetings by July 31, 2026.
unparseable forecast JSON
There have been ongoing indirect talks between US and Iran, with next talks scheduled after the late Iranian Supreme Leader's funeral (on or before July 9). Progress has been made on issues like frozen funds and the nuclear program, and the diplomatic process is continuing.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
timeout after 30000ms
Current prediction markets and trading volumes suggest a roughly 38% chance that Bitcoin will reach $67,500 in July 2026. Bitcoin is trading near $61,756, and while higher targets like $70,000 have lower probabilities (~21%), the $67,500 target is more attainable and priced around 38% in prediction markets. Market sentiment, recent price trends, and trading volumes support a moderate likelihood but not a majority probability.
Current market data from prediction platforms like Polymarket and PrediRoute indicates that traders are pricing the probability of Bitcoin hitting $67,500 in July at approximately 38-42%. Given that Bitcoin is currently trading in the low $60,000s and faces headwinds from recent ETF outflows, a significant rally is required to reach the target, making a sub-50% probability the most calibrated estimate.
The Polymarket prediction market shows a 39% probability for Bitcoin reaching $67,500 in July, based on real-time trading activity and collective market sentiment. This aligns with the current trading volume and odds observed across multiple platforms, indicating a moderate likelihood of this outcome.
The current Polymarket odds imply a 38% chance that Bitcoin will reach $67,500 in July 2026, based on real-money trading activity on [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com). This probability is derived from the '↑ 67,500' outcome, which reflects the collective view of traders monitoring Binance BTC/USDT one-minute candle highs. While Bitcoin is currently trading below $62,000, the market assigns meaningful but sub-50% odds to a sharp rally, influenced by ETF flows and technical levels near $63,500 [cryptoadventure.com](https://cryptoadventure.com).
Based on Polymarket data, the '↑ 67,500' outcome has a 42% probability. Other prediction markets also show relatively low odds for Bitcoin reaching $67,500 in July.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Multiple credible news sources (AP, EFE, WTOP) report that Trump has explicitly stated he will attend the NATO summit in Ankara 'out of respect' for Erdogan, and the State Department has taken steps toward approving jet engine sales to Turkey, indicating high-level preparation. Polymarket prediction markets show a 98% probability of Trump attending, reflecting strong consensus. The only risk is a last-minute cancellation, but Trump's personal commitment and the advanced diplomatic signals make attendance nearly certain.
Donald Trump has publicly confirmed his attendance at the NATO Summit in Ankara out of respect for President Erdogan, with multiple sources highlighting their close relationship and Trump's intention to attend. Despite his general criticism of NATO and European allies, Trump is expected to be physically present at the summit. Prediction markets also strongly favor his attendance, with probabilities around 98%.
Multiple credible news sources, including [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/nato-summit-trump-erdogan-bond-c3fbddc43d7f4b0b12fcc2442ee03613) and [efe.com](https://efe.com/english/other-news/2026-07-03/trump-nato-summit-tensions-europe/), confirm that President Trump has explicitly stated he will attend the summit in Ankara. His attendance is framed as a personal favor to President Erdogan, and he has already signaled potential policy announcements regarding defense sales during the trip, making his presence highly likely.
Donald Trump has explicitly stated that he will attend the NATO Summit in Ankara, Turkey, out of respect for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The close ties between Trump and Erdogan, as well as Trump's recent actions and statements, strongly suggest his attendance. Additionally, the strategic importance of the summit and Trump's previous commitments to NATO allies further support this likelihood.
Multiple credible news sources report that President Donald Trump has confirmed his attendance at the NATO summit in Ankara, citing his close personal relationship with Turkish President Erdogan. Trump explicitly stated he is attending 'out of respect' for Erdogan, and this is corroborated by coverage from AP News [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/nato-summit-trump-erdogan-bond-c3fbddc43d7f4b0b12fcc2442ee03613) and WTOP [wtop.com](https://wtop.com/government/2026/07/trumps-ties-to-erdogan-sold-him-on-this-years-nato-summit-turkey-may-win-big-in-other-ways/). Additionally, a prediction market on Polymarket shows a 98% implied probability of attendance, reflecting strong consensus [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/will-trump-attend-nato-summit-279).
Trump has stated he will attend out of respect for Erdogan, and there are strong market indicators and potential defense sales at stake.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Prediction markets consistently price a 25 bps hike at 8-9% probability ([Polymarket](https://polymarket.com/event/fed-decision-in-july-181), [PredictionNinja](https://predictionninja.com/market/will-the-fed-increase-interest-rates-by-25-bps-after-the-july-2026-meeting)). The Fed has held rates steady since July 2023, and recent inflation data likely remains moderate with no strong signals for a hike. Given the strong market consensus and lack of imminent economic shocks, the true probability is low.
Current prediction markets and trading data consistently show a low probability (around 8-9%) for a 25 bps rate increase after the July 2026 FOMC meeting. The consensus among market participants strongly favors no change, reflecting expectations that the Fed will likely hold rates steady given the economic outlook and recent policy trends. There is no significant new information suggesting a shift toward a rate hike at this time.
Current market data from major prediction platforms like Polymarket [polymarket.com] and aggregators [predictionninja.com, predictionpulse.io] consistently price the probability of a 25 bps rate hike at approximately 8-9%. This reflects a strong consensus that the Federal Reserve will maintain current interest rates during the July 2026 meeting, as there is little economic expectation for a tightening cycle at that time.
The current market consensus across multiple prediction platforms indicates a very low probability of a 25 bps interest rate increase by the Fed after the July 2026 meeting. The majority of the markets show a probability of around 8-23%, with the highest probability being 9.4% on Polymarket. This suggests a strong consensus that a rate hike is unlikely, likely due to current economic conditions and Fed communications.
Current market probabilities from Polymarket and WyldMarkets indicate a low likelihood of a 25 bps rate hike in July 2026, with implied probabilities ranging from 8% to 23%. The consensus among traders, as reflected in aggregated prediction markets, is that no change is most likely, with a 90% probability assigned to that outcome [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/fed-decision-in-july-181). Given the high volume and liquidity across platforms, these figures reflect a well-informed collective estimate.
Market probabilities from various sources like Polymarket (9%), WyldMarkets (23%), and PredictionPulse (7.2%) indicate a low likelihood of a 25 bps rate hike after the July 2026 meeting.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Base rates for a single FOMC meeting in a steady-rate environment strongly favor 'no change' (historically ~80%). Prediction markets, which aggregate trader information, currently assign ~90% probability to no change. Inflation remains sticky and the labor market tight, so the Fed has little reason to cut. A rate hike is extremely unlikely given current economic softness. Thus, a 90% probability is well-calibrated, aligning with market expectations and the current macro backdrop.
Market-based probabilities from multiple prediction platforms consistently indicate about a 90% chance that the Fed will keep interest rates unchanged after the July 2026 meeting. This high confidence reflects current expectations that the Federal Open Market Committee will maintain the target federal funds rate, likely due to stable economic conditions or a wait-and-see approach. The official resolution depends on the FOMC statement after the July 28-29 meeting, and no unexpected economic shocks have been reported to suggest a rate change.
Market sentiment and current economic forecasting models strongly favor a 'no change' outcome for the July 2026 FOMC meeting. While economic conditions can shift, the high probability reflects the consensus that the Federal Reserve will likely maintain the target federal funds rate at that time, consistent with current market pricing on platforms like Polymarket.
The market consensus from prediction markets like WyldMarkets and Polymarket suggests a high probability (around 90%) that there will be no change in Fed interest rates after the July 2026 meeting. This is based on the current economic outlook and the Fed's historical behavior in similar economic conditions.
Prediction markets aggregate diverse trader views and have historically been well-calibrated. The tight consensus across platforms—ranging from 86% to 93%—suggests strong confidence in a hold. Given the high volume and consistency, the true probability is likely near the center of this range.
Multiple prediction markets show high odds of no change, with Polymarket at 86-90% and WyldMarkets at 93%, indicating strong market belief.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.