The recently signed US-Iran MOU (June 18, 2026) defers enrichment suspension to a 60-day negotiation window, making a full end to enrichment by July 31 highly improbable. Iran has consistently avoided committing to a complete halt, and the market consensus of ~23-32% appears overly optimistic given the structural timeline. I estimate a 15% chance, as a last-minute breakthrough cannot be ruled out but is unlikely.
Recent data from prediction markets like Polymarket indicate a 32% chance that Iran will publicly agree to end all uranium enrichment by July 31, 2026. While there is a recent memorandum of understanding between the US and Iran aiming to end hostilities and reopen negotiations, the agreement only sets a 60-day window for a final deal and does not guarantee an immediate or unconditional end to uranium enrichment. Given Iran's historical reluctance to fully cease enrichment and the complexity of negotiations, the probability remains relatively low but non-negligible.
While a recent memorandum of understanding between the U.S. and Iran has been signed, the text focuses on ending military operations and negotiating a final deal within 60 days. The current framework prioritizes de-escalation and economic reconstruction over immediate nuclear disarmament. Given that the 60-day negotiation window extends beyond the July 31 deadline and there is no explicit mention of an immediate, total end to uranium enrichment in the published points of the MOU, it is unlikely that such a specific, high-stakes commitment will be formalized by the deadline.
The recent US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MOU) sets a 60-day window for negotiations, which would extend beyond the July 31 deadline. While the MOU includes commitments to address Iran's nuclear program, it does not specify an immediate end to uranium enrichment. The market probabilities on prediction platforms like Polymarket and Lines also reflect skepticism, with probabilities around 30-32% for a 'Yes' resolution.
While recent diplomatic progress between the U.S. and Iran has created a pathway for negotiations on the nuclear program, the current MOU does not include a commitment to end uranium enrichment. The 60-day negotiation window makes a formal agreement by July 31 unlikely, and Iran has not signaled a willingness to unilaterally end enrichment. Base rates of past Iranian nuclear policy and market-implied probabilities support a low but non-negligible chance of a last-minute breakthrough.
The Polymarket prediction market currently shows a 32% probability for Iran agreeing to end uranium enrichment by July 31, 2026, with no significant recent developments overriding this.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The recently signed US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MOU) explicitly commits Iran to 'down-blend' its enriched uranium under IAEA supervision and reaffirms that Iran shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons. While the MOU does not use the exact phrase 'end all enrichment,' the credible reporting (BBC, CNN) describes it as a binding agreement to neutralize Iran's stockpile of highly enriched uranium and to negotiate a final deal within 60 days. Given the MOU was signed on June 17, 2026, and the market resolves on June 30, this constitutes a public agreement by Iran to end enrichment for the purposes of this market, as it is a formal pledge to eliminate enrichment activities. The Polymarket crowd probability of 6% appears to underestimate the significance of the signed MOU, which meets the resolution criteria.
Despite a recent US-Iran memorandum of understanding aiming to end hostilities and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, the agreement explicitly defers detailed negotiations on Iran's nuclear program to a 60-day period after the initial deal. There is no public pledge or agreement by Iran to end all uranium enrichment by June 30, 2026. Prediction markets also reflect a low probability (6%) for this event, indicating skepticism about such a commitment being made by the deadline.
While the recently released 'Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding' [cnn.com](https://cnn.com/2026/06/17/middleeast/us-iran-war-mou-text-intl) establishes a framework for ending hostilities and future nuclear talks, it does not contain a commitment from Iran to end all uranium enrichment. The agreement focuses on de-escalation, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and future negotiations, rather than an immediate cessation of enrichment activities. Given the current diplomatic focus on a 60-day negotiation window for a final deal, an explicit agreement to end all enrichment by June 30 is highly unlikely.
The recent US-Iran memorandum of understanding [cnn.com](https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/17/middleeast/us-iran-war-mou-text-intl) [bbc.com](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c4gy700j0eko) outlines a 60-day window for further negotiations, but it does not explicitly state that Iran has agreed to end all uranium enrichment. The agreement mentions 'down-blending' enriched uranium and future technical talks, but not a complete cessation of enrichment. Given the current context and the lack of explicit commitment, the probability is relatively low but not zero due to the ongoing diplomatic process.
Recent reports confirm a US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed on June 18, 2026, which includes commitments to address Iranโs nuclear program, including down-blending enriched uranium under IAEA supervision [cnn.com](https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/17/middleeast/us-iran-war-mou-text-intl). However, the agreement does not constitute a full, public pledge by Iran to *end all uranium enrichment*โa key requirement for a 'Yes' resolution. Instead, it sets a 60-day window for further negotiations and includes only interim measures like limiting enrichment levels or down-blending stockpiles, which fall short of a complete cessation [bbc.co.uk](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c4gy700j0eko). The Polymarket odds reflect a 6% chance, consistent with low confidence in a definitive end to enrichment by the deadline. Given the lack of a final, binding commitment and Iran's continued hedging rhetoric, the probability remains low but slightly above zero due to ongoing talks.
The US and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding with a 60-day negotiation period, and Iran reaffirms not procuring nuclear weapons, which increases the likelihood of ending uranium enrichment by June 30.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Prediction markets on Polymarket currently price a 'Yes' outcome at 7% (7ยข) for Mojtaba Khamenei ceasing to be de facto leader by June 30, 2026, with $2.8M in volume and a prior market for Ali Khamenei already resolved 'Yes' at 99%โindicating the transition to Mojtaba has already occurred. The market for Mojtaba's removal shows strong 'No' sentiment (93ยข), with 60% of 'No' positions in profit and smart money entering 'No' at high prices (81โ96ยข), suggesting low probability of a further change by the deadline. Given only 21 days remain and no credible reports of imminent removal, the base rate from market consensus is robust.
Current prediction markets show a low probability (around 5%) that Mojtaba Khamenei will cease to be the de facto leader of Iran by June 30, 2026. Despite the advanced age and health concerns of the current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Mojtaba Khamenei's position as de facto leader remains stable with no official announcements or credible reports indicating imminent removal or resignation. The political structure and control by loyalists in the Assembly of Experts also reduce the likelihood of a leadership change in this timeframe.
Current prediction markets and geopolitical analysis indicate a very low probability of a leadership change in Iran by June 30, 2026. The regime has maintained stability, and there are no credible reports or immediate indicators suggesting that Mojtaba Khamenei will be removed from his position or cease to be the de facto leader within this short timeframe.
The prediction markets on Polymarket and OddsShift show a consensus probability of around 7% for Iran's leadership change by June 30, 2026. This low probability is supported by the fact that the current Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has not shown any signs of imminent removal or resignation. The stability of the Iranian regime and the lack of significant internal or external pressures suggesting an imminent leadership change further support this low probability.
Ali Khamenei, the previous Supreme Leader of Iran, passed away on March 4, 2026, and was succeeded by his son Mojtaba Khamenei, as confirmed by multiple prediction markets and news reports [manifold.markets](https://manifold.markets/Rubenabk6/will-ali-khamenei-be-out-as-supreme). Since Mojtaba Khamenei has already assumed the role and there are no credible reports indicating his removal, resignation, or incapacitation as of June 19, 2026, the likelihood of him ceasing to be the de facto leader by June 30, 2026, is extremely low. Markets such as Polymarket reflect minimal trading probability (5%) for a leadership change by that date [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/iran-leadership-change-by), further supporting stability in the near term.
The market 'Iran leadership change by June 30?' has a low 'Yes' probability, and there's no strong indication of Mojtaba Khamenei ceasing to be de facto leader by the date.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The Polymarket price of 35% reflects some perceived risk, but the procedural timeline for a leadership challenge (requiring 20% of Labour MPs to nominate, then a ballot) is very tight before June 30. While Healey's resignation and the by-election have increased pressure, no formal challenger has emerged, and Starmer retains cabinet support. Base rates for sudden PM departures in stable governments are low. I estimate a 20% chance, slightly below the market, as the window is too short for a full challenge to conclude, though an announcement of resignation could still occur.
Current prediction markets and multiple AI models indicate a roughly 30% chance that Keir Starmer will cease to be UK Prime Minister by June 30, 2026. While there is some internal party pressure and a recent senior cabinet resignation, no formal leadership challenge has yet materialized, and Starmer retains significant support within his party. The upcoming Makerfield by-election and internal party dynamics will be critical to watch, but the base case remains that he will stay in office through the period.
While Keir Starmer is facing increased political pressure following the resignation of Defense Secretary John Healey and upcoming by-election challenges, the procedural hurdles for a leadership change remain significant. A formal challenge requires 20% of the Parliamentary Labour Party to trigger, and despite speculation, no challenger has officially declared. Given the short timeframe remaining until June 30, 2026, the base rate for a sitting Prime Minister to survive such a period remains high, though the recent uptick in market probability reflects genuine instability.
The current market consensus on Polymarket suggests a 32% probability of Starmer being out by June 30, 2026. This is supported by recent political developments, including the resignation of Defense Secretary John Healey and the upcoming Makerfield by-election, which could further pressure Starmer's leadership. However, no formal challenge has materialized, and Starmer retains support among key Cabinet members, making survival through June 30 the base case.
Recent political developments, including Defense Secretary John Healey's resignation and mounting pressure from within Labour, have increased speculation about Keir Starmer's leadership. However, Starmer remains in office and has publicly dismissed calls for a leadership challenge. Market pricing on Polymarket reflects a 32% probability of him leaving by June 30, 2026, consistent with [OddsShift.com](https://oddsshift.com/radar/starmer-out-by-june-30-2026-862-594-548-219-739) and [Polymarket](https://polymarket.com/event/starmer-out-in-2025). While the Makerfield by-election and internal party dynamics could accelerate a challenge, no formal process has begun, and Cabinet support remains largely intact.
Current market data from Polymarket and OddsShift shows a 'Yes' probability around 32%. Key factors include leadership challenge dynamics, local election impacts, and model consensus.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The current Polymarket odds fluctuate between 23% and 51%, with a recent snapshot at 38% and another at 51.5%, suggesting the market is roughly split but leaning slightly against recovery by July 15. Normal Strait of Hormuz traffic (above 60 transit calls) was disrupted, and while diplomatic efforts could restore it, the short remaining window (26 days) and ongoing geopolitical risks make a full return to the 60-threshold uncertain. Base rates for such geopolitical disruptions suggest recovery often takes weeks to months, so I estimate a 35% chance, slightly below the midpoint of the observed odds, given the tight deadline.
Current market data from Polymarket indicates a 38% chance that traffic through the Strait of Hormuz will return to normal levels (7-day average of 60 or more ship arrivals) by July 15, 2026. This relatively low probability reflects ongoing regional tensions, potential disruptions, and recent reports of GPS jamming and AIS spoofing affecting vessel tracking, which suggest that normal traffic flow is uncertain in the near term.
Current market sentiment and betting data from [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-15) indicate a 38% probability of the 7-day moving average of transit calls reaching the required threshold by July 15, 2026. The ongoing geopolitical tensions in the region, including reports of GPS jamming and AIS spoofing, suggest that a rapid return to normal shipping volumes is unlikely within the short timeframe remaining before the resolution date.
The current market odds on Polymarket are at 51.5% [predictmarketcap.com](https://predictmarketcap.com/markets/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-15), indicating a near-even split in expectations. Given the lack of specific recent data on transit calls and the geopolitical stability in the region, this probability reflects the market consensus.
The question asks whether Strait of Hormuz traffic will return to normal by July 15, 2026, defined as a 7-day moving average of at least 60 ship transit calls reported by IMF Portwatch. As of June 19, 2026, no data indicates that this threshold has been met recently, and ongoing regional tensions involving Iran, Oman, and the UAE continue to disrupt shipping [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.copilot.markets/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-15). Multiple prediction markets show significant uncertainty, with implied probabilities ranging from 27% to 51.5% [predictmarketcap.com](https://predictmarketcap.com/markets/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-15), but these reflect trader sentiment rather than observed traffic levels. Given the lack of verifiable evidence that traffic has returned to normal and the persistence of geopolitical risks, the likelihood remains low.
unparseable forecast JSON
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
The Polymarket prediction aggregator shows the market at 62% Yes as of June 19, 2026. This reflects investor consensus based on current IMF Portwatch data and the geopolitical trajectory regarding Iran tensions. Given the market's high volume and liquidity, the 62% figure is a strong baseline without contrary evidence suggesting a drastic departure.
Current market data from Polymarket and related sources indicate a roughly 62% probability that the Strait of Hormuz traffic will return to normal levels (7-day moving average of 60 or more transit calls) by July 31, 2026. This reflects moderate confidence based on recent trends, geopolitical stability, and shipping activity data. The market volume and trader activity support this estimate as a reasonable reflection of informed expectations.
Current market sentiment on prediction platforms like [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-31) reflects a moderate expectation that shipping traffic will recover to the required threshold by the end of July 2026. While geopolitical tensions in the region remain a significant risk factor, the market suggests that a return to 'normal' levels of transit calls is more likely than not within the specified timeframe.
The Polymarket odds for this event vary between 37% and 71%, indicating significant uncertainty. The most recent data shows a 62% chance, suggesting a slight lean towards 'Yes'. However, the wide range of predictions suggests that the outcome is not certain. The key factors include the current geopolitical situation in the Strait of Hormuz, historical traffic patterns, and any recent disruptions or improvements in shipping traffic.
Despite volatility in prediction market prices, the event only requires a single 7-day average of 60+ ship arrivals by July 31, 2026. Historical traffic levels before disruptions were often above this threshold, and even temporary de-escalations could allow traffic to briefly normalize. Given the binary nature of the trigger and the long timeframe remaining, a moderate probability around 0.6 is justified.
Based on Polymarket odds, the current probability of Strait of Hormuz traffic returning to normal by July 31 is around 62%.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The market currently prices this at ~9%, and the related bucket market for the June 30 average shows the 60+ outcome at ~18% but the 0-10 outcome at 40%, indicating most weight is on very low traffic. While a US-Iran deal and EU backing provide a political framework for reopening, the remaining time (~11 days) is extremely short for the 7-day moving average to climb from near-zero to 60, as it would require a sudden and sustained surge in actual ship transits that has not yet materialized. The brief spike to 22% after the deal news has already faded, suggesting traders see implementation as too slow to meet the threshold.
Current market data from Polymarket shows a low probability (around 9%) that the 7-day moving average of ship arrivals in the Strait of Hormuz will reach or exceed 60 by the end of June 2026. This low probability reflects ongoing regional security concerns, potential rerouting of shipping traffic, and recent trends in transit calls that have not approached the threshold. The market's live pricing and volume indicate strong consensus toward a negative outcome, and no recent data suggests a significant rebound in traffic to normal levels by the deadline.
The market for this event has consistently trended toward 'No' over the past month, with current betting odds on platforms like [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com) and [predictionninja.com](https://predictionninja.com) reflecting a low probability of approximately 9%. Given that we are already at the end of June 2026, the lack of a reported 7-day moving average reaching the 60-ship threshold makes a sudden, significant recovery in transit data highly unlikely within the remaining days.
The current market probability on Polymarket is 9%, indicating low confidence in the event. The related market for the average number of ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz by the end of June shows only 17.9% probability for the 60+ range, suggesting a similar low expectation. The base rate for such disruptions to resolve quickly is also low, and there is no recent evidence of significant improvements in the situation.
Despite the possibility of a short-term spike in traffic, current data and market sentiment indicate that the 7-day moving average is unlikely to reach 60 by June 30, 2026. The persistent low volume and lack of resolution in underlying geopolitical factors make a rebound improbable, though not impossible.
Based on Polymarket odds, the current probability of the Strait of Hormuz traffic returning to normal by end of June is 9%.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The planned US-Iran talks in Switzerland on June 19 were postponed after Iran insisted Israeli strikes on Hezbollah in Lebanon must stop first [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c8r2eme2n5do?bcmt=1). A ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah was agreed later that day, but the US-Iran talks have not been rescheduled and only two days remain until the June 21 deadline [AP](https://apnews.com/article/vance-trump-iran-switzerland-aee3839175b47b0b469879cfb835dce7). While the underlying deal is signed and both sides express willingness, the logistical and political hurdles make a meeting within the next 48 hours unlikely, though not impossible if a quick rescheduling occurs.
Recent attempts to initiate US-Iran diplomatic talks have faced significant obstacles, including postponements due to regional conflicts such as Israeli strikes in Lebanon and tensions involving Hezbollah. Although a ceasefire has been agreed upon, the political environment remains unstable, and previous scheduled talks were delayed. Given the short timeframe until June 21, 2026, and the current geopolitical tensions, the likelihood of a formal, in-person diplomatic meeting occurring by that date is relatively low but not negligible, as both sides have expressed some willingness to engage through intermediaries.
While a high-level meeting was planned for June 19, it was abruptly cancelled due to ongoing regional tensions and disagreements over the implementation of the recent memorandum of understanding. With only two days remaining until the June 21 deadline and no reports of a rescheduled meeting, the likelihood of a formal diplomatic encounter occurring in such a short window is low.
The recent postponement of the US-Iran diplomatic meeting due to escalating tensions in Lebanon and the Israeli strikes on Hezbollah indicates significant obstacles to scheduling the meeting by June 21, 2026. However, the agreement to renew the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah could potentially create a window for rescheduling the talks. The fluid nature of the situation and the historical context of US-Iran relations suggest a moderate probability of the meeting occurring within the specified timeframe.
As of 2026-06-19, the planned in-person diplomatic meeting between U.S. and Iranian representatives in Switzerland has been postponed due to escalating Israeli strikes in Lebanon and Hezbollah's response, with both sides linking the talks to regional stability [bbc.com](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c8r2eme2n5do). Although a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah was agreed upon, the U.S. and Iran have not confirmed rescheduled talks, and Vice-President JD Vance's trip was abruptly canceled, signaling logistical and political fragility [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/vance-trump-iran-switzerland-aee3839175b47b0b469879cfb835dce7). With less than 48 hours remaining before the deadline and no indication of imminent talks, the likelihood of a qualifying in-person diplomatic meeting occurring by 11:59 PM ET on June 21, 2026, is effectively zero.
Recent postponement of US-Iran talks due to Israeli strikes in Lebanon introduces uncertainty, though market probabilities suggest some chance. Key factors include the recent delay and current market indicators.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The Polymarket probability for this event is around 10% as of June 16, 2026, reflecting low market expectation. Iran has not recently announced any major closure, and the geopolitical situation appears relatively stable with ongoing ceasefire talks. The short remaining time (11 days) and lack of a clear trigger make a major closure unlikely, though not impossible given past precedents.
Recent market data and expert analysis indicate a low probability of Iran initiating a major airspace closure by June 30, 2026. While Iran has closed its airspace in the past for political or military reasons, current signals and trading volumes suggest limited likelihood of such an event in the near term. The market consensus and news sources show a probability around 10%, reflecting geopolitical stability and absence of immediate triggers for a broad closure.
Current market data from [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/will-iran-close-its-airspace-by-june-30-20260609184136054) indicates a low probability (approximately 10%) for a major airspace closure by June 30, 2026. While Iran has historically closed its airspace during periods of heightened regional tension, there are no current reports or indicators of an imminent, broad-scale suspension of commercial aviation that would meet the specific criteria of the market.
The probability is low due to the lack of recent geopolitical tensions or official announcements from Iran indicating an imminent airspace closure. Historical data shows that such closures are typically tied to specific events or conflicts, which are not currently reported. The base rate for such closures is also low, with only a few instances in recent years.
The current market probability and recent activity suggest a low likelihood of Iran closing its airspace by June 30. There is no recent news or official indication of an impending major closure, and past closures have been tied to specific military or geopolitical events not currently reported. The absence of credible warnings or official actions from Iranian aviation authorities further supports a low probability.
Based on the current market data from Polymarket, the probability of Iran closing its airspace by June 30 is 10%. However, considering the potential for unforeseen events and the nature of the market, a slightly higher estimate of 15% is provided.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Cepeda lost the first round by 3 points and now faces a unified right-wing opposition after Valencia's endorsement. Incumbent President Petro's unsubstantiated fraud allegations have been dismissed by observers and Cepeda accepted the results, so no major recount or disruption is likely. The base rate for a first-round runner-up to come back and win a Colombian runoff is low, and current polling and prediction markets (13% implied probability) confirm Cepeda is a clear underdog. [bbc.com](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1w2xvwq8g9o) [nbcnews.com](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/latin-america/colombia-presidential-election-petro-doubt-rcna347785) [congress.gov](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IN12689) [lines.com](https://www.lines.com/prediction-markets/elections/colombia-presidential-election)
Ivan Cepeda Castro, the left-wing candidate, is trailing in the runoff against Abelardo de la Espriella, who leads with about 44% of the vote to Cepeda's 41% from the first round. Despite Cepeda's alliance with the incumbent president Gustavo Petro and his peace-focused platform, the right-wing candidate has strong momentum, endorsements, and public support, including from moderate conservatives. The election has been peaceful and transparent according to observers, and Cepeda has accepted the results, reducing the likelihood of overturning the outcome. Market data also strongly favors de la Espriella's victory.
Abelardo de la Espriella finished the first round with a lead of approximately 3 percentage points over Ivรกn Cepeda. With the endorsement of the third-place candidate, Paloma Valencia, and the significant momentum shift toward the right-wing opposition, Cepeda faces a difficult path to overcome the deficit in the runoff. Market sentiment and political analysis strongly favor De la Espriella to win the presidency.
The first round results show Cepeda trailing De La Espriella by a narrow margin, with both candidates heading to a runoff. Cepeda's campaign has faced challenges, including allegations of irregularities and a fragmented opposition. However, Cepeda's base support and the endorsement from the outgoing president Petro could still make him a strong contender in the runoff.
Based on the official results certified by Colombian authorities, Abelardo de la Espriella won the first round with 44% of the vote compared to Ivรกn Cepeda's 41% [congress.gov](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IN12689). With de la Espriella leading and receiving endorsements from key figures like Paloma Valencia, and given the lack of evidence to overturn the results, Cepeda is unlikely to win the June 21 runoff. International observers confirmed the election's transparency, undermining claims of fraud [nbcnews.com](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/latin-america/colombia-presidential-election-petro-doubt-rcna347785).
De la Espriella led in the first round with 43.7% vs. Cepeda's 41%, and the market currently prices Cepeda at 46% probability. Runoff dynamics and Petro's disputed results are factors.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The recently signed US-Iran MoU explicitly defers the nuclear enrichment question to future negotiations and requires down-blending of existing stockpiles, indicating no definitive US agreement to continued enrichment as defined. Polymarket pricing (~13%) aligns with this low probability. With only ~11 days remaining before the deadline and no further deals expected, the chance of an additional announcement agreeing to enrichment is very small, estimated at 12%.
Current market data and political analysis indicate a low probability that Trump or the US government will definitively agree to Iranian uranium enrichment by June 30, 2026. Despite recent diplomatic talks and a memorandum of understanding aimed at ending hostilities, skepticism remains high among US hawks and Israeli officials, and no definitive agreement has been announced. The political environment and historical US policy toward Iran's nuclear program suggest limited likelihood of acceptance within this timeframe.
While the United States and Iran have recently signed a memorandum of understanding to halt hostilities and initiate a 60-day process to address nuclear and sanctions issues [time.com], there is no evidence that the U.S. has already agreed to allow Iranian uranium enrichment. Given the short timeframe remaining until June 30 and the significant political opposition to such a concession, it is highly unlikely that a definitive agreement on this specific, contentious issue will be reached and announced by the deadline [polymarket.com].
The recent agreement between the US and Iran focuses on ending the war and includes provisions for the Strait of Hormuz and sanctions, but it explicitly states that the issue of Iran's nuclear program will be negotiated over an extendable 60-day period. The agreement mentions that Iran's enriched uranium will be 'down-blended' under IAEA supervision, indicating that the US has not yet agreed to continued enrichment of uranium by Iran. Given the current market odds and the lack of definitive statements from the US government on accepting continued enrichment, the probability remains low.
The BBC reports that the US-Iran agreement includes down-blending of Iran's enriched uranium under IAEA supervision, not continued enrichment [bbc.com](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crr8z4z2er9o). This directly contradicts the condition for a 'Yes' resolution, which requires US agreement to continued enrichment. The deal reaffirms Iran's commitment not to develop nuclear weapons, and no credible source indicates acceptance of ongoing enrichment by the US.
Based on the current market data from Polymarket, the probability of Trump agreeing to Iranian enrichment of uranium by June 30 is 17.4%. There are no significant positive developments or strong indicators to suggest a higher likelihood of agreement.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The recently signed US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MOU) explicitly commits both sides to a final deal within 60 days, which extends past the June 30 deadline. However, the MOU includes provisions for reopening the Strait of Hormuz and lifting sanctions, but does not specifically mention a withdrawal of US troops from the region. The market on Polymarket for a similar question (Trump announcing end of military operations by June 30) is trading at 68.5%, suggesting some uncertainty. Given the MOU's focus on ending military operations and the 60-day timeline for a final deal, a formal troop withdrawal agreement by June 30 is plausible but not guaranteed, as the MOU primarily addresses cessation of hostilities and sanctions relief rather than explicit troop withdrawal. I estimate 85% probability based on the MOU's commitment to end military operations and the high likelihood of a broader agreement being reached within the 60-day window.
The US and Iran have signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that includes commitments to end military operations and remove US forces from proximity to Iran within 30 days after a final deal. The MOU was signed recently and triggers a 60-day negotiation window for a final agreement, which aligns with the June 30 deadline. Despite some ongoing tensions and distrust, the official agreement and public statements by Trump support a high likelihood of troop withdrawal agreement by the deadline.
The recently signed memorandum of understanding between the US and Iran explicitly includes a commitment for the United States to remove its forces from the proximity of the Islamic Republic of Iran within 30 days after the final deal [bbc.co.uk]. Given that the MOU was signed on June 17, 2026, and the parties have committed to negotiating the final deal within 60 days, the formal agreement to withdraw is already established in the text of the MOU, which satisfies the criteria for a definitive agreement to withdraw troops from the region [cnn.com].
The recent US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MOU) includes a commitment from the US to remove its forces from the proximity of Iran within 30 days after the final deal [bbc.co.uk](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c4gy700j0eko). Given the agreement is already signed and the 60-day timeline for the final deal has begun, it is highly likely that the US will agree to withdraw troops by June 30, 2026. The market signals also reflect a strong belief in a ceasefire and troop withdrawal, with a 68.5% probability [lines.com](https://www.lines.com/prediction-markets/politics/trump-announces-end-of-military-operations-against-iran-by).
The United States and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding on June 18, 2026, which includes a commitment for the U.S. to remove its forces from the proximity of Iran within 30 days after the final deal is reached [bbc.co.uk](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c4gy700j0eko). Since the MOU was signed and the final deal is expected within 60 days (extendable by mutual consent), the troop withdrawal commitment is part of a formal agreement. Given that the U.S. has already agreed to this condition as part of the deal, and the timeline allows for fulfillment by June 30, the probability of a definitive agreement to withdraw is high, though not certain due to potential delays or non-ratification.
The US-Iran MOU includes a commitment to remove forces from Iran's proximity within 30 days after the final deal, which is to be negotiated within 60 days of the MOU's signing. The MOU is formally signed before June 30, increasing the likelihood of troop withdrawal within the window.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.