Given the extremely short remaining timeframe (two weeks) and the absence of any credible evidence or official announcement of a leadership change, the probability is very low. Prediction markets and models converge around 1–4%, and I adopt a conservative 2% estimate, consistent with the Polymarket price and Octagon model.
Current prediction markets and expert models consistently assign a very low probability (around 2%) to a leadership change in Iran by August 31, 2026. Despite Mojtaba Khamenei's public absence and speculation about his authority, institutional continuity and the entrenched power of the IRGC suggest stability in leadership through this period. No credible reports indicate imminent removal or incapacitation, and external intervention is considered unlikely to succeed soon.
As of mid-August 2026, prediction markets and expert analysis indicate a very low probability of a leadership change within the remaining two weeks of August. Despite Mojtaba Khamenei's lack of public appearances, the regime appears to be prioritizing institutional continuity and collective decision-making through the IRGC, making a formal change in leadership before the end of the month highly unlikely.
Prediction markets consistently assign a very low probability (around 2%) to an Iran leadership change by August 31, 2026. This reflects the institutional entrenchment of the regime and the lack of credible reports or significant internal upheaval suggesting an imminent leadership change. The base rate for such events is historically low, and current evidence does not suggest a deviation from this trend.
Prediction markets such as Polymarket and Manifold assign a 2% to 4% probability to a leadership change in Iran by August 31, 2026, reflecting low expectations of a near-term transition. Mojtaba Khamenei, appointed Supreme Leader in March 2026 after his father's death, has not appeared publicly since, fueling speculation, but institutional structures and the IRGC's entrenchment suggest continuity [octagonai.co](https://www.octagonai.co/markets/politics/politics/iran-leadership-change-by/). There is no credible evidence of his removal, resignation, or incapacitation confirmed by consensus reporting, and external removal attempts are deemed unlikely to succeed. The lack of public appearances is officially attributed to security concerns, not loss of power.
Low market probabilities from Polymarket, Manifold, and Octagon models, with consensus on institutional continuity through August 31.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Prediction markets on Polymarket as of August 17, 2026, show a 2.8-3% implied probability for a military encounter by August 31, 2026. Since the start of the Ukraine war, no direct NATO-Russia military engagement qualifying under the strict definition has occurred, and both sides have actively avoided escalation. The short remaining time (14 days) and high bar for resolution make a clash very unlikely, though accidental incidents cannot be ruled out completely. The market price is a strong aggregate signal, so I adopt a probability consistent with it.
Prediction markets on Polymarket assign about a 23% probability to a NATO-Russia military clash by August 31, 2026, reflecting moderate risk perceived by informed traders. Given ongoing geopolitical tensions but no current direct military engagements qualifying under the market's criteria, this probability balances the potential for escalation against the high costs of direct conflict. The market's large volume and real-money stakes lend credibility to this estimate.
While tensions between NATO and Russia remain high due to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, both sides have consistently demonstrated a strong desire to avoid direct military escalation that could trigger Article 5. The definition of a 'military encounter' in this market is quite narrow, excluding common incidents like airspace violations, non-weaponized collisions, or the interception of third-party munitions. Given the historical pattern of restraint and the catastrophic risks of direct conflict, the probability of a qualifying event occurring before August 31, 2026, remains low.
The prediction market on Polymarket currently assigns a 3% probability to a NATO-Russia military clash by August 31, 2026. This low probability reflects the collective judgment of traders who consider the current geopolitical tensions and historical patterns of conflict escalation. The base rate for such clashes is historically low, and while tensions are high, both sides have shown restraint in direct military engagement. The key factors include the ongoing war in Ukraine, NATO's support for Ukraine, and Russia's military posture, but the likelihood of a direct clash remains low in the near term.
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Prediction markets show low implied probability for a NATO x Russia military clash by August 31, 2026, with key factors including market odds and defined military encounter criteria.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Current IMF Portwatch data shows Strait of Hormuz traffic at roughly 13-22% of pre-conflict levels, with daily transit calls far below 60. Ongoing U.S.-Iran tensions, vessel attacks, and blockade enforcement make a rapid return to 60+ ships per day within the next 14 days extremely unlikely. Prediction market odds consistently price this outcome at 1-2%, reflecting informed trader consensus.
Current data and market prices indicate that Strait of Hormuz traffic remains significantly below normal levels, with daily transit calls at roughly 13-22% of pre-conflict levels and no signs of a near-term return to normal traffic volumes. Prediction markets and traders assign only about a 1-2% chance that traffic will return to normal by August 31, 2026, reflecting ongoing geopolitical tensions, blockade enforcement, and elevated risks that suppress shipping activity.
Current transit levels in the Strait of Hormuz remain severely depressed at 13-22% of pre-conflict levels, with daily throughput significantly below the threshold required to reach a 7-day moving average of 60 ships. Given that the resolution date is August 31, 2026, and there are no signs of immediate de-escalation or a return to historical traffic volumes, it is highly improbable that the required threshold will be met in the remaining days.
The current Polymarket odds indicate a 1% probability of the Strait of Hormuz traffic returning to normal by August 31, 2026. This low probability is supported by ongoing U.S.-Iran naval tensions, recent vessel attacks, and the current transit levels being at 13-22% of pre-conflict levels. The historical data and the need for a 7-day moving average of at least 60 transit calls further support this low probability.
Current data from IMF Portwatch, as reflected in prediction market prices, shows that the 7-day moving average of ship transits through the Strait of Hormuz remains far below the 60-ship threshold required for a 'Yes' resolution. Ongoing U.S.-Iran tensions, recent vessel attacks, and active blockade enforcement have kept transits at 13–22% of pre-conflict levels, with some days recording fewer than 10 vessels [polymarket.copilot.markets](https://polymarket.copilot.markets/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-august-31-20260702154212320). Prediction markets, which aggregate real-time trader intelligence, currently price the 'Yes' outcome between 1% and 2%, indicating very low confidence in normalization by August 31, 2026 [marketss.com](https://marketss.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-august-31-20260702154212320).
Current data shows Strait of Hormuz transits are at 13-22% of pre-conflict levels with daily throughput near 2 million DWT vs historical 10 million. Recent daily passages are 9 or fewer, far below the 60 needed for 'Yes'. Ongoing tensions and low throughput make it unlikely to reach the required 7-day moving average by August 31.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Current IMF Portwatch data likely shows transit calls far below the 60 threshold due to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. With about six weeks remaining and no major diplomatic breakthrough reported, a sustained recovery to the normal level is improbable. Polymarket's 12-17% probability aligns with this assessment, and given the short timeframe, I estimate a 15% chance.
Current market data from multiple prediction platforms indicates a low probability (around 12-16%) that the Strait of Hormuz traffic will return to normal levels (7-day average of 60 or more ship arrivals) by September 30, 2026. Given ongoing geopolitical tensions and historical disruptions in the region, the likelihood remains low. The market consensus and data from IMF Portwatch support this assessment.
Current market sentiment and available data suggest that shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz remains significantly below the threshold required for a 'Yes' resolution. Given the ongoing geopolitical tensions and the lack of significant indicators suggesting a rapid return to pre-disruption traffic levels by the end of September 2026, the probability of reaching a 7-day moving average of 60 transit calls remains low.
The current market odds across multiple platforms consistently show a low probability (around 12-17%) of the Strait of Hormuz traffic returning to normal by September 30, 2026. This suggests a consensus among traders and analysts that the likelihood is relatively low. The key factors include the historical data trends, ongoing geopolitical tensions, and the specific threshold of 60 transit calls which has not been met recently according to the available data.
Current market odds from multiple platforms such as Polymarket and Marketss indicate an implied probability of around 12–14% for the Strait of Hormuz traffic returning to normal (7-day moving average of 60+ transit calls) by September 30, 2026. This reflects persistent geopolitical tensions and ongoing disruptions in the region, which continue to suppress shipping traffic. The IMF Portwatch data is the definitive resolution source, and no recent data suggests a sustained rebound to the threshold level.
Market prices from Polymarket, Marketss, etc., indicate an implied probability of around 12-14% for the 'Yes' outcome.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
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Recent official statements from the U.S. government indicate a strong commitment to maintaining the naval blockade on Iran indefinitely, with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth explicitly stating the capability and intention to continue the blockade. Prediction markets, which aggregate real-money bets and have a strong track record of accuracy, currently assign only about a 6% chance that the U.S. will announce an end to the blockade by August 22, 2026. No credible official announcements or credible indications suggest an imminent termination or suspension of the blockade by that date.
As of August 13, 2026, the U.S. government explicitly stated that it could maintain the naval blockade of Iran 'indefinitely' [reuters.com]. While there are ongoing diplomatic efforts and tentative discussions regarding a potential deal, no official announcement has been made to terminate or suspend the blockade, and the administration's current public stance remains committed to the policy [reuters.com][apnews.com]. Given the very short timeframe remaining until August 22, 2026, the likelihood of a formal, official announcement ending the blockade is extremely low.
The current Polymarket odds for the US announcing the end of the Iranian blockade by August 22, 2026, are at 5% [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/us-announces-end-of-iranian-blockade-byptptpt-20260713152715080/us-announces-end-of-iranian-blockade-by-august-22-2026). Recent statements from US officials indicate a commitment to maintaining the blockade indefinitely [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-eyes-indefinite-iran-naval-blockade-oil-supply-shortfall-deepens-2026-08-13/), which suggests a low likelihood of an announcement to end it by the specified date. Additionally, ongoing tensions and the lack of a definitive deal to end the blockade further support this low probability.
The current Polymarket odds reflect a 5-6% chance of resolution, based on real-money trading aggregating informed trader beliefs. Recent official statements indicate the US intends to maintain the blockade indefinitely, and while ceasefire talks are ongoing, no binding deal has been announced. The lack of progress and strong official signaling reduce the likelihood of a sudden announcement before August 22.
Polymarket odds for August 22 are very low, around 5-6%, and recent US statements indicate intent to maintain the blockade indefinitely, with no confirmed deal to end it.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
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Recent prediction market data from Polymarket shows a significant decline in the probability of a U.S. announcement ending the Iranian blockade by August 31, 2026, currently around 32%. This drop is driven by Iran's firm stance on not reopening the Strait of Hormuz without U.S. concessions and the absence of any official U.S. signals indicating an imminent end to the blockade. Additionally, U.S. officials have stated the blockade can be maintained indefinitely, and recent communications have not suggested a policy change, reinforcing the low near-term likelihood of an official announcement ending the blockade.
The U.S. government has recently reaffirmed its commitment to maintaining the naval blockade indefinitely, with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth explicitly stating the military's capability to sustain the operation [reuters.com]. Furthermore, Iran's recent refusal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz without significant U.S. concessions has created a diplomatic impasse, and there have been no official U.S. communications signaling a shift in policy [global-political-spotlight.com]. Given the current date is August 17 and the resolution deadline is August 31, the lack of any de-escalatory signals makes a reversal highly unlikely.
The current probability on Polymarket for the US announcing the end of the Iranian blockade by August 31, 2026, is 32.0%, down from 57% a few weeks ago. This decline is driven by Iran's stance on not reopening the Strait of Hormuz without US concessions and the absence of any qualifying US government announcement ending the blockade. The US has also indicated it can maintain the blockade indefinitely, further reducing the likelihood of a near-term resolution.
Recent developments indicate a hardening of positions, with Iran demanding concessions and the U.S. affirming its ability to sustain the blockade indefinitely. The sharp decline in market-implied probability and absence of diplomatic breakthroughs suggest low odds of an official U.S. announcement before the August 31 deadline.
The market odds for a US announcement ending the Iranian blockade by August 31, 2026 have fallen to 32% as of recent data, with no qualifying announcement made and the US indicating an indefinite blockade.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
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Recent reports indicate that the US-Iran 60-day negotiation period under the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding is expiring without extension, with both sides showing reluctance to continue formal negotiations. Iranian officials have publicly stated the deadline is irrelevant and have not agreed to extend, while US-Iran technical talks remain stalled amid disagreements. Although Pakistani sources claim an agreement to extend the ceasefire, neither the US nor Iran has publicly confirmed an official mutual extension, which is required for the market to resolve YES. Given the lack of official mutual announcements and ongoing deadlock, the probability of a formal extension is low but not zero due to ongoing mediation efforts.
While there have been reports from Pakistani sources suggesting an agreement to extend the negotiation period, both the US and Iranian governments have publicly signaled that the agreement has effectively collapsed. Iranian officials have explicitly stated that the ceasefire is over and that they have not decided to restart negotiations, while US leadership has characterized the agreement as 'over' following continued military exchanges. Given the requirement for a clear, official, and mutual public announcement by August 20, the current hostile rhetoric and lack of official confirmation make a 'Yes' resolution highly unlikely.
The probability is adjusted based on recent reports indicating that both the US and Iran have agreed to extend the 60-day ceasefire, though the exact duration is still being negotiated. The involvement of mediators and the mutual consent for extension suggest a high likelihood of an official announcement. However, past disputes and violations of the agreement temper the confidence slightly.
As of August 17, 2026, the 60-day negotiation period initiated by the US-Iran MOU on June 14 has expired, and both sides have accused each other of violations. Iranian officials, including Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, have stated the agreement was violated by the US and that Iran has suspended its commitments [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/16/us-iran-mou-is-set-to-expire-what-to-know). The US has continued military actions and maintained sanctions, while Iran claims the deal is defunct. No joint public announcement of extension has been made by both parties, and recent leadership changes in Iran suggest a harder line. Given the lack of diplomatic progress and mutual accusations, the likelihood of a retrospective or last-minute mutual announcement of extension is very low.
Ongoing deadlock and lack of confirmed mutual announcements, with both sides accusing the other of violations, leading to low likelihood of extension before the deadline.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Polymarket odds for this specific event are 14.5% as of Aug 17, 2026, with substantial trading volume indicating crowd-sourced consensus. The broader market shows a 90.5% chance of dipping to $62,500 and only 1.8% for $45,000, placing $55,000 as an intermediate threshold. Given Bitcoin's current price around $65,000 and typical monthly volatility, a ~15% drawdown in the remaining two weeks of August is plausible but not highly likely, consistent with the market-implied probability.
Prediction markets on Polymarket currently assign about a 14.5% chance that Bitcoin will dip to $55,000 in August 2026 based on Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute candle lows. These markets aggregate real-money trader sentiment and have a strong track record of accuracy, making this a reliable estimate. Given Bitcoin's historical volatility and current market conditions, a dip to $55,000 is possible but not highly likely within the month.
The current market probability on [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/what-price-will-bitcoin-hit-in-august-2026) for Bitcoin dipping to $55,000 is approximately 14.5%. Given that Bitcoin's price volatility is a key factor and the market has already incorporated significant trading volume, this estimate reflects the collective assessment of traders regarding the likelihood of such a price movement within the remaining days of August 2026.
The current market consensus on Polymarket suggests a 12% probability that Bitcoin will dip to $55,000 in August, as indicated by the 'What price will Bitcoin hit in August?' market. This is supported by the fact that the next closest outcome below $55,000 is $52,500 with a 3% probability, and the market for a dip to $62,500 has a 90.5% probability, indicating a strong expectation that Bitcoin will stay above $55,000. The low probability for a dip to $45,000 (1.8%) further supports this view.
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The Polymarket market for Bitcoin dipping to $55,000 in August currently has 14.5% odds, based on Binance 1-minute candle low prices.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
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United Russia (ER) is the ruling party with extensive institutional control, including candidate selection, media access, and regional administration advantages, which strongly favor its ability to gain seats. Prediction markets currently assign a high probability (71%-98%) to United Russia winning the most seats, reflecting both structural advantages and historical precedent. While economic strains and the Ukraine conflict have softened approval ratings, realistic challenges to United Russia's dominance remain narrow and would require major unforeseen disruptions.
United Russia maintains near-total control over the Russian political landscape, including the electoral process, media, and candidate vetting. While prediction markets show some variance in the exact probability, the structural advantages of the ruling party make it overwhelmingly likely that they will secure the most seats in the 2026 State Duma election, as they have in every cycle since their inception.
United Russia (ER) is the clear favorite in the upcoming Russian parliamentary election, with prediction markets assigning it a high probability of winning the most seats. The party benefits from extensive institutional control, media access, and a favorable electoral system. While opposition parties face significant barriers, United Russia's dominance is reinforced by recent preparations and historical precedent. However, economic strains and the Ukraine conflict could impact voter sentiment, and unforeseen disruptions could alter the outcome.
Prediction markets, which aggregate real-money bets from informed traders, currently assign a 71% probability to United Russia (ER) gaining the most seats in the September 2026 Russian parliamentary election [worldeventtrading.com](https://www.worldeventtrading.com/predictions/which-party-will-gain-most-seats-in-russian-parliamentary-election-odds-2026-09-20). This is supported by United Russia's entrenched institutional advantages, including control over candidate nomination, media access, and regional administrations, which have historically enabled it to secure supermajorities despite lower public approval ratings. While some sources like Polymarket show higher odds (e.g., 98.2%), the 71% figure from a broader market consensus reflects a more calibrated view that accounts for uncertainty in turnout, economic conditions, and potential disruptions from the ongoing war in Ukraine.
United Russia has significant institutional control, including candidate selection, media access, and regional advantages. Opposition parties face hurdles. Markets show high probabilities, though some challenges exist.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Based on recent market conditions and the July resolution, WTI is trading well below $95 with a downward trend. A spike to $95 would require a major supply disruption or geopolitical shock, which is unlikely in the remaining two weeks. Polymarket odds of ~17-18% provide a reasonable anchor, and I adjust slightly upward to 0.18 to account for the possibility of intraday volatility and tail risks.
Current prediction markets, which aggregate real-money trader beliefs and have a strong track record of accuracy, assign about a 17.5% probability that WTI Crude Oil will hit $95 or higher in August 2026. Recent trends show WTI prices in the low-to-mid $80s with some supply increases and easing geopolitical tensions, making a $95 spike less likely but still possible due to market volatility.
Current market sentiment and recent geopolitical developments suggest that oil prices are unlikely to reach $95 in August 2026. The de-escalation of tensions in the Middle East and increased OPEC+ production have stabilized prices in the low-to-mid $80s, making a significant spike to $95 improbable without a major new supply shock.
The current market odds on Polymarket suggest a 17.5% probability that WTI Crude Oil will hit $95 in August 2026. This is a crowd-sourced estimate from real traders, which tends to be well-calibrated. The base rate for such high price movements in WTI is relatively low, and the specific evidence from prediction markets aligns with this historical trend.
Current prediction markets such as Polymarket and Worldstreet show a consensus probability of around 17.5% for WTI Crude Oil reaching $95 in August 2026 [predictmarketcap.com](https://predictmarketcap.com/markets/will-wti-reach-95-in-august-2026), [worldstreetgold.com](https://prediction.worldstreetgold.com/local/what-will-wti-crude-oil-wti-hit-in-august-2026). This reflects aggregated trader expectations based on available fundamentals, geopolitical risks, and supply-demand outlook. Given the absence of major disruptive events and the current forward curve, this probability aligns with a calibrated assessment.
The market currently assigns a 17.5% probability to WTI Crude Oil hitting $95 in August 2026 based on Polymarket odds, considering the resolution criteria and market conditions.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Based on the prevailing economic environment of easing inflation and slowing growth, the Fed is highly unlikely to reverse course and hike rates. Prediction market consensus (~6% Yes) reflects this low probability, and I see no compelling evidence to deviate significantly from that estimate.
Current prediction markets, such as Polymarket, price the probability of a 25 bps rate increase after the September 2026 Fed meeting at about 28%. This reflects market consensus and expert expectations that the Fed is more likely to hold rates steady or possibly cut, given recent economic data and Fed officials' cautious stance. The low volume and recent downward trend in the probability also suggest limited confidence in a rate hike at that meeting.
Current prediction market data from [kresmion.com](https://kresmion.com/odds/will-the-fed-increase-interest-rates-by-25-bps-after-the-september-2026-meeting-649) indicates that the market assigns approximately a 28-30% probability to a 25 bps rate increase. While economic uncertainty persists, the prevailing expectation remains that the Federal Reserve will either hold rates steady or potentially cut them, rather than hike, given the broader economic context and recent market sentiment.
The current Polymarket odds for a 25 bps increase in interest rates by the Fed after the September 2026 meeting are around 28% [kresmion.com](https://kresmion.com/odds/will-the-fed-increase-interest-rates-by-25-bps-after-the-september-2026-meeting-649). This aligns with the broader market sentiment that a rate increase is unlikely, as indicated by other Polymarket markets showing a 94% and 85% probability of no increase [explorer.struct.to](https://explorer.struct.to/markets/will-the-fed-increase-interest-rates-by-25-bps-after-the-september-2026-meeting) [explorer.struct.to](https://explorer.struct.to/markets/will-the-fed-increase-interest-rates-by-25-bps-after-the-september-2026-meeting-649). Additionally, recent economic data and Fed statements suggest a focus on potential rate cuts rather than increases [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/fed-decision-in-september).
As of August 17, 2026, prediction markets on Polymarket and Kresmion indicate a 28% chance of a 25 bps rate increase after the September 2026 FOMC meeting, with the 'No' outcome at 72% [kresmion.com](https://kresmion.com/odds/will-the-fed-increase-interest-rates-by-25-bps-after-the-september-2026-meeting-649). Market sentiment has shifted downward in recent weeks, from 37% a month ago, suggesting waning expectations for a rate hike. Current economic indicators and Fed communications point more toward rate stability or cuts rather than hikes, given inflation trends and labor market data.
Polymarket prices show a 28% probability of a 25 bps rate increase, with other indicators like Fed uncertainty and upcoming economic data supporting a low likelihood.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
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Current prediction markets, particularly Polymarket, price the probability of no change in Fed interest rates after the September 2026 meeting at approximately 75%. This reflects a strong market consensus based on recent trading volumes and sentiment, indicating that traders expect the Fed to hold rates steady. Historical accuracy of these markets and the lack of strong signals for a rate change support this estimate.
Current prediction market data from [kresmion.com](https://kresmion.com/odds/will-there-be-no-change-in-fed-interest-rates-after-the-september-2026-meeting-615) indicates a strong consensus around 74-75% for no change in interest rates following the September 2026 FOMC meeting. While economic conditions remain fluid, the market's aggregation of trader sentiment suggests that the Federal Reserve is likely to maintain the current target federal funds range, reflecting a cautious approach to monetary policy in the face of ongoing economic uncertainty.
Prediction markets show mixed signals, with Polymarket indicating a 75% chance of no change [kresmion.com](https://kresmion.com/odds/will-there-be-no-change-in-fed-interest-rates-after-the-september-2026-meeting-615) but PredEdge showing only 39.5% [prededge.com](https://prededge.com/markets/finance/61785150-will-there-be-no-change-in-fed-interest-rates-after-the-september-2026-meeting). The base rate for no change in recent FOMC meetings is around 50%, and current economic indicators suggest a slight lean towards a rate cut, but not a certainty. The most recent Polymarket data shows a 100% chance of a 25 bps decrease [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/fed-decision-in-september), which contradicts the no change outcome.
unparseable forecast JSON
Polymarket prices the 'no change' outcome at 75% as of August 16, 2026, considering the upcoming September 2026 FOMC meeting and market dynamics.
Mean of 4/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 4/6 valid model forecasts.