The prediction market on Polymarket for this exact event (Mojtaba Khamenei ceasing to be de facto leader by June 30, 2026) currently prices a Yes outcome at 7%, with $2.8M in volume indicating informed trading. There is no credible reporting of any imminent removal, detention, or resignation of Mojtaba Khamenei. The earlier market about Ali Khamenei resolving Yes does not apply directly, as the question is about Mojtaba. Base rates for sudden leadership changes in Iran are very low, and with only ~18 days remaining, the probability remains small.
Current prediction markets, including Polymarket and OddsShift, price the probability of a leadership change by June 30, 2026, at around 7%. There is no significant recent news indicating an imminent removal or resignation of Mojtaba Khamenei, and the market consensus reflects a low but non-negligible chance of change within this timeframe.
Current prediction markets and available data indicate a very low probability of a leadership change in Iran by the end of June 2026. There are no credible reports or high-confidence indicators suggesting an imminent removal or resignation of Mojtaba Khamenei, and the market sentiment remains heavily skewed toward 'No'.
Prediction markets like Polymarket and OddsShift provide real-time odds based on collective trader sentiment. The current odds for an Iran leadership change by June 30, 2026, are consistently around 7% across these platforms. This suggests a low probability of a leadership change occurring by the specified date, reflecting the market's collective assessment of the political stability in Iran and the likelihood of significant changes in the near term.
The 7% probability aligns with current market pricing and reflects low expectations of a leadership change before June 30, 2026. While succession after Ali Khamenei remains a long-term uncertainty, Mojtaba Khamenei's consolidation of power within the IRGC and clerical structures reduces near-term risk of removal. Absent a coup, health crisis, or public split in the regime, the status quo is likely to persist through the resolution date.
Polymarket's Polyguana market has a 97% 'No' lead, while OddsShift reports 7% probability for 'Yes' as of June 2026.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
As of June 12, 2026, with only three days left until the deadline, there have been no official announcements from Israeli aviation authorities indicating a broad, nationwide airspace closure. Recent reports show that after a morning of sirens tied to missiles from Iran, daily life in Israel largely resumed, and Polymarket odds have fallen sharply to around 7-8% [global-political-spotlight.com](https://www.global-political-spotlight.com/articles/polymarket/briefs/israel-airspace-closure-odds-fall-traders-discount-broad-shutdown-despite-regional-flare-ups-20260609-0003). The base rate for such a drastic government-ordered closure is very low, and the absence of any credible reporting or official signals makes a sudden reversal in the next 72 hours unlikely.
Recent market data and news reports indicate a sharp decline in the probability of Israel initiating a major airspace closure by June 15. Despite regional tensions, daily life and commercial activities in Israel have largely normalized, and no official government announcements have signaled a broad airspace shutdown. The market's repricing reflects differentiation between regional risks and Israel-specific aviation policies, suggesting a low likelihood of a major closure within the timeframe.
As of June 12, 2026, there have been no official announcements from Israeli aviation authorities indicating a planned nationwide closure of civilian airspace. Market sentiment and reporting suggest that daily life and aviation operations have largely normalized, and traders have significantly discounted the likelihood of such a major government-ordered suspension before the June 15 deadline.
Recent reports indicate that daily life in Israel has resumed after missile alerts, with no official announcement of a broad airspace closure. The odds on prediction markets have fallen sharply, reflecting a lower likelihood of such an event occurring by June 15.
Despite regional tensions, there is no evidence of an official Israeli government or aviation authority directive to close airspace. Reports indicate normal operations resumed, and markets reflect a sharp decline in perceived risk. A major closure would require a broad, state-ordered halt, which is highly unlikely given current conditions.
There is no current evidence of an imminent major airspace closure as defined, and the market indicates low expectation.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Recent reports indicate that US President Trump declared a peace deal with Iran 'nearly complete' and that the US has 'ended the war with Iran,' but Iran's foreign ministry explicitly denied that a final agreement has been reached, stating 'nothing finalised.' The market requires a formal, signed agreement or clear public confirmation from both Israel and Iran, not just US declarations. Given Iran's denial and the lack of any reported Israeli involvement or formal signing, the probability of a qualifying permanent peace deal by June 30, 2026, is very low. Polymarket prices also reflect a ~3% chance, supporting this assessment.
Current prediction markets assign a very low probability (around 3%) to a permanent peace deal between Israel and Iran by June 30, 2026. Given the longstanding hostility, lack of recent progress toward a definitive peace agreement, and the complexity of regional dynamics, a permanent peace deal by this date is highly unlikely. Temporary ceasefires or indirect negotiations do not meet the criteria for a permanent peace deal.
While there have been reports of US-led diplomatic efforts regarding Iran, there is no credible evidence of a direct, permanent peace treaty or formal agreement between Israel and Iran. The geopolitical tensions remain high, and Iranian officials have explicitly denied that a final agreement has been reached, making a formal, permanent peace deal by June 30, 2026, highly unlikely.
The prediction market on Polymarket indicates a 3% chance of a permanent peace deal between Israel and Iran by June 30, 2026. This low probability reflects the high uncertainty and the lack of strong indicators or recent progress towards such an agreement. The historical context of ongoing tensions and the absence of significant diplomatic breakthroughs further support this low probability.
The current evidence shows no progress toward a direct or multilateral peace deal between Israel and Iran. The Polymarket price of 3ยข implies a crowd-sourced probability of about 3%, which aligns with the lack of official statements or credible reports. While U.S.-mediated talks with Iran are ongoing, they do not include Israel or address bilateral hostilities. Base rates of conflict resolution in the region and absence of diplomatic channels between the two nations further suppress the likelihood.
The Polymarket market shows a 'Yes' price of 3.1ยข, implying low probability. Trump declared a nearly complete deal but Iran denied a final agreement, with no definitive written agreement or clear public confirmation of a qualifying peace deal.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Base rates from prediction markets show ~15.5% for June 30, but the May 31 market resolved at 0%, and no major escalation has occurred since. Given the extreme difficulty of seizing and holding Kharg Island, the short remaining time, and the lack of any credible reports of an imminent takeover, the true probability is far lower than market prices suggest. I estimate a 3% chance, reflecting a very low but non-zero possibility of a sudden, decisive event.
Kharg Island is a strategically important oil terminal under firm Iranian control, and there is no current indication of imminent loss of control. Prediction markets assign a low probability (~15.5%) to Iran losing control by June 30, 2026, reflecting the high geopolitical and military barriers to such a change. Temporary disruptions or claims without established control do not count, further lowering the likelihood of a 'Yes' outcome.
The probability of Iran losing control of Kharg Island, a critical oil terminal, remains low due to the significant military escalation required to establish and maintain physical occupation. Current prediction markets [predictmarketcap.com](https://predictmarketcap.com/markets/kharg-island-no-longer-under-iranian-control-by-june-30-561) reflect a similar skepticism, as such an event would represent a major shift in regional conflict dynamics that is not currently supported by geopolitical trends or military movements.
Prediction markets currently estimate a 15.5% chance that Kharg Island will no longer be under Iranian control by June 30, 2026. This low probability reflects the significant geopolitical leverage Iran holds over the strategic Persian Gulf oil terminal and the lack of immediate indications of a change in control.
Iran continues to exercise full military and administrative control over Kharg Island, a critical oil export hub. No credible reports suggest an imminent takeover, invasion, or negotiated transfer of control. While regional tensions persist, the threshold for resolutionโsustained, undisputed control by another entityโis not likely to be met by June 30, 2026.
Polymarket currently prices the chance of Kharg Island no longer being under Iranian control by June 30, 2026, at 15.5%.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
With only three days remaining until the resolution date (June 15, 2026), the 7-day moving average of transit calls can increase only modestly unless there is a huge surge in daily traffic. Current traffic levels are likely well below the threshold of 60, and no major news suggests an immediate recovery. Market odds on Polymarket are around 3.4%, indicating very low probability. Thus, the chance of reaching or exceeding 60 by the deadline is estimated at 5%.
Current market data and analysis indicate a very low probability (around 3.4%) that the Strait of Hormuz traffic will return to normal levels (7-day average of 60 or more transit calls) by June 15, 2026. Given ongoing geopolitical tensions, regional instability, and the current low traffic levels reported by IMF Portwatch, a return to normal traffic volume by the deadline appears unlikely.
Current market sentiment and geopolitical conditions suggest that shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz remains significantly disrupted. Given the persistent nature of these regional tensions and the low probability assigned by prediction markets [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-june-15), it is highly unlikely that the 7-day moving average of transit calls will reach the threshold of 60 by the June 15, 2026 deadline.
The current market odds on Polymarket indicate a 3.4% chance of the event resolving to 'Yes' [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-june-15). This low probability suggests that the market participants believe it is unlikely that the 7-day moving average of transit calls will reach 60 or above by June 15, 2026. The key factors include the historical data trends and the current geopolitical situation in the Strait of Hormuz, which may be affecting shipping traffic.
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Current market odds show a very low probability, and there's no indication of a significant change in traffic levels to push the 7-day moving average above 60 by June 15.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Based on the web search results, the current 7-day moving average of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz is significantly below the 60 threshold, likely in the 40โ50 range due to ongoing geopolitical disruptions. With only about 18 days left until the June 30 deadline, achieving a sustained increase to push the average above 60 would require a rapid and unlikely normalization of shipping traffic. The Polymarket odds (~16.5%) and the persistent regional tensions further support a low probability of resolution to Yes.
Current market data and analysis indicate a low probability (around 17%) that the Strait of Hormuz traffic will return to a 7-day moving average of 60 or more ship arrivals by the end of June 2026. The region remains geopolitically sensitive, and disruptions or rerouting of shipping traffic have kept transit calls below the threshold. Without significant changes in regional stability or shipping patterns, traffic normalization to the specified level appears unlikely within the timeframe.
The current market sentiment and geopolitical context suggest significant skepticism regarding a return to normal shipping volumes in the Strait of Hormuz by the end of June 2026. Given the ongoing regional tensions and the specific requirement for a 7-day moving average of 60 transit calls, the probability of reaching this threshold within the remaining timeframe is low, as reflected in current prediction market pricing [clearmarket.fyi](https://clearmarket.fyi/events/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-end-of-june/) [predictionninja.com](https://predictionninja.com/market/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-end-of-june).
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical shipping lane, and recent disruptions or geopolitical tensions could impact traffic. The threshold of a 7-day moving average of 60 transit calls is relatively high, and historical data or current trends are not provided. Given the uncertainty and potential for disruptions, a moderate probability is assigned.
The current market odds across platforms like Polymarket and ClearMarket suggest a consensus probability of around 17-20% for a 7-day moving average of ship arrivals reaching 60 or more by June 30, 2026, based on IMF Portwatch data. Geopolitical tensions in the region, including fraying ceasefires and stalled Iran talks, create uncertainty and increase the risk of continued rerouting of vessels away from the Strait of Hormuz. The 44-point gap between June and December 2026 contracts indicates that traders view normalization by end-2026 as more likely, but the near-term window is seen as tight and challenging [predictionninja.com](https://predictionninja.com/market/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-end-of-june), [clearmarket.fyi](https://clearmarket.fyi/events/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-end-of-june/).
Based on Polymarket data, the current odds for 'Yes' are low. The market resolves on June 30, 2026, with a specific condition on IMF Portwatch's 7-day moving average of transit calls.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
On June 2, 2026, President Trump stated he expects a deal to extend the ceasefire and reopen the Strait of Hormuz 'over the next week' [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/us-israel-iran-war/trump-expects-us-iran-deal-to-extend-ceasefire-reopen-strait-of-hormuz-over-the-next-week-report/3953666). However, as of June 12, no such announcement has been made, and reports indicate Iran is still reviewing the latest US proposal and talks have paused [aljazeera.com](https://1-e8259.azureedge.net/news/2026/6/2/irans-supreme-leader-appears-more-active-as-talks-continue-uss-rubio). The deadline is June 30, giving 18 more days, but the lack of progress and the high bar for a qualifying announcement (explicit extension or new framework) suggest a moderate but not high probability.
Recent statements from President Trump indicate a strong expectation of an agreement to extend the ceasefire and reopen the Strait of Hormuz within the next week, suggesting imminent progress. While Iran remains cautious and negotiations are complex, the U.S. government has shown commitment to extending the ceasefire, and official announcements have been made in the past to extend it temporarily. Given the proximity to the deadline and the high-level engagement, it is likely the U.S. will officially announce an extension by June 30.
President Trump has publicly expressed optimism about reaching a deal with Iran to extend the ceasefire and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, suggesting it could happen within a short timeframe. While negotiations are complex and Iran remains cautious, the administration's active pursuit of a deal and the high stakes involved in the Strait of Hormuz increase the likelihood of a formal announcement before the end of June.
Recent reports indicate ongoing negotiations and positive statements from both the U.S. and Iran, suggesting a high likelihood of a ceasefire extension or new agreement. President Trump's comments about an imminent deal and the active role of Iran's Supreme Leader in negotiations are key indicators. However, the lack of a formal announcement and Iran's cautious approach temper the probability.
President Trump stated on June 2 that a deal to extend the ceasefire and reopen the Strait of Hormuz could be reached 'over the next week,' indicating active negotiations and high-level expectations [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/us-israel-iran-war/trump-expects-us-iran-deal-to-extend-ceasefire-reopen-strait-of-hormuz-over-the-next-week-report/3953666). However, as of June 12, no official U.S. announcement meeting the qualifying criteria has been made, and Iran is reportedly taking a 'stern' approach due to mistrust and perceived U.S. non-compliance [aljazeera.com](https://1-e8259.azureedge.net/news/2026/6/2/irans-supreme-leader-appears-more-active-as-talks-continue-uss-rubio). While the U.S. continues to signal progress, the absence of a formal announcement so far and the complexity of the issues at stake reduce the likelihood of a qualifying announcement by June 30.
Trump expects a US-Iran deal to extend the ceasefire over the next week, but Iran is reviewing the US proposal and there were recent issues with Israel's attacks. There's still time before June 30, but negotiations are ongoing with outstanding points.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Search results show Polymarket implied probability at ~11-13.5% as of June 12, 2026, with an unsigned MOU awaiting Trump's signature cited as the main bottleneck. The deadline is only three days away, and no formal, permanent agreement has been publicly confirmed by both governments. While negotiations exist, a last-minute signing remains possible but unlikely given the lack of concrete progress, so the base rate from prediction markets (~13%) is a reasonable estimate.
Current prediction markets and expert aggregators place the probability of a permanent peace deal between the US and Iran by June 15, 2026, at around 11-13.5%. There is no public indication of a signed or imminent permanent peace agreement, only temporary ceasefire extensions and ongoing negotiations. Given the historical difficulty of US-Iran relations and the lack of definitive announcements, the chance remains low but not negligible.
With the deadline of June 15, 2026, only days away, there is no evidence of a formal, permanent peace treaty or a definitive public confirmation from both governments that military hostilities have permanently ceased. Current market sentiment and reporting indicate that negotiations remain in a state of deadlock or are limited to temporary arrangements, making a breakthrough to a permanent, binding agreement within this extremely short timeframe highly unlikely.
The current geopolitical climate and historical context suggest that a permanent peace deal between the US and Iran by June 15, 2026, is unlikely. While there have been temporary ceasefires and diplomatic efforts, a permanent agreement requires significant political will and mutual trust, which is currently lacking. The prediction markets also reflect a low probability, with the majority of bets placed on 'No'.
While there is active diplomacy and a pending MOU, a permanent peace deal requires formal adoption or public confirmation from both governments by the deadline. Given the high political hurdles and lack of public commitment as of June 12, 2026, the likelihood remains low. The 13.5% market price [orakll.com](https://orakll.com/article/june-15-iran-deal-holds-13-5-as-mou-awaits-trump-signature) aligns with a realistic assessment of the slim but non-zero chance of a breakthrough in the final days.
As of June 12, 2026, the Polymarket implied probability is 11%, and there's no strong indication of a definitive agreement meeting the explicit end of hostilities criteria.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Prediction markets currently price this at 20-34%, reflecting skepticism that a formal deal can be reached by the June 30 deadline given the history of failed negotiations and deep mistrust. While diplomatic channels remain open and both sides have incentives to avoid escalation, the short remaining time and lack of recent breakthrough announcements make a comprehensive agreement unlikely. I estimate a 25% chance, slightly below the market midpoint, as the window is very tight and no credible reports of imminent agreement exist.
Current prediction markets and trader consensus assign about a 32% probability to a US-Iran nuclear deal by June 30, 2026. Given the complex geopolitical dynamics, historical difficulties in reaching such agreements, and ongoing negotiations, this moderate probability reflects cautious optimism but significant uncertainty.
The geopolitical climate between the United States and Iran remains highly strained, with significant mutual distrust and conflicting strategic objectives regarding nuclear enrichment. Given the current lack of formal, high-level diplomatic breakthroughs and the complexity of negotiating a binding agreement that satisfies both domestic political constraints in the U.S. and Iran's security requirements, the likelihood of a formal, publicly announced deal by June 30, 2026, is low.
The prediction markets show a range of probabilities, with Polymarket indicating 20% [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/us-iran-nuclear-deal-by-june-30) and another source showing 34% [polymarket.copilot.markets](https://polymarket.copilot.markets/event/us-iran-nuclear-deal-by-june-30). Recent news reports suggest that while US President Trump has announced a deal is nearly complete, Iran has not confirmed a final agreement [rediff.com](https://www.rediff.com/news/report/war-with-iran-ended-declares-trump-tehran-says-nothing-finalised/20260612.htm). The uncertainty and lack of official confirmation from Iran lead to a moderate probability.
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Prediction markets show around 20% chance, considering current odds and resolution criteria.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
The blockade was imposed on April 12, 2026, and lifting it would represent a major policy reversal. As of June 12, 2026, there is no public evidence of negotiations or statements indicating an imminent end. Prediction markets on Polymarket and FRC price the June 30 resolution at roughly 30% Yes, reflecting a low but non-zero chance that Trump or the US government makes a clear, official announcement within the remaining 18 days. The short timeframe and lack of diplomatic signals make a sudden announcement unlikely, but Trump's unpredictable communication style (e.g., Truth Social posts) keeps the probability above zero.
Given the recent announcement of the blockade on April 12, 2026, and the geopolitical tensions involved, it is relatively unlikely that the blockade will be lifted and officially announced by June 30, 2026. The short timeframe and the nature of such military and diplomatic decisions suggest a low probability of reversal. However, political dynamics and negotiations could lead to an announcement, so a non-negligible chance remains.
The blockade was announced very recently (April 2026), and geopolitical blockades of this nature typically persist for more than two months unless a major diplomatic breakthrough occurs. Given the current tensions and the lack of reported progress in negotiations, it is more likely that the administration will maintain the blockade through the end of June 2026 rather than announce its termination.
The blockade was announced on April 12, 2026, and there is no indication of a planned lift by June 30, 2026. The prediction markets show a split, with one market at 73% Yes and another at 30% Yes, suggesting uncertainty. The lack of recent diplomatic progress or announcements suggests a low probability of the blockade being lifted by the specified date.
The blockade was recently imposed in April 2026, and there is no public indication of de-escalation. The burden of a clear, official announcement remains high. Prediction markets suggest a low but non-negligible chance (~30%) of a 'Yes' resolution, which aligns with the possibility of a sudden diplomatic shift or announcement. Base rates for such escalations being quickly reversed are low, but not zero, especially given Trumpโs unpredictable communication style via social media.
As of April 12, 2026, there is no indication of a clear, official announcement from Trump, the US government, or the US military regarding the lifting of the Strait of Hormuz blockade by the June 30, 2026 deadline. The market requires definitive language, and no such statement has been made.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The most recent Survation poll (May 26โJune 1, 2026) shows Labour's Andy Burnham at 49% and Reform UK's Robert Kenyon at 39%, a 10-point gap. Polymarket odds give Kenyon a 25% chance. While Reform UK performed well in local elections and the seat is a Labour-Reform marginal, Burnham's strong personal brand and mayoral majorities (60%+) make him a clear favorite. Kenyon's controversial past comments may also hurt his appeal. The polling and market data consistently point to a Burnham win, so Kenyon's probability is low but not negligible given the tight margin in some polls.
Robert Kenyon, representing Reform UK, is currently polling strongly and has closed the gap significantly against Labour's Andy Burnham, with recent polls showing a near tie (Burnham 49%, Kenyon 39%). However, Burnham's personal popularity and strong mayoral majorities in Greater Manchester provide him a notable advantage. The presence of smaller parties like Restore could split the right-leaning vote, potentially benefiting Burnham. Given these factors, Kenyon has a substantial chance but remains the underdog.
While recent polling from [pollcheck.co.uk](https://pollcheck.co.uk/by-elections/makerfield) shows Andy Burnham leading with 49% against Robert Kenyon's 39%, the race is competitive. Kenyon's support is significant, and Reform UK has shown momentum in similar constituencies. However, Burnham's strong personal brand as Mayor of Greater Manchester and the historical Labour lean of the seat make him the clear favorite, limiting the probability of a Kenyon victory.
The most recent polling data from Survation shows Andy Burnham (Labour) leading with 49% support, while Robert Kenyon (Reform UK) trails with 39% support. Additionally, betting odds have shifted significantly in favor of Burnham following Kenyon's poor performance on BBC Question Time, with bookmakers now giving Burnham a much higher chance of winning. The key factors include recent polling data, betting odds, and Kenyon's public performance.
Recent polling and betting markets indicate Robert Kenyon (Reform UK) is unlikely to win the 2026 Makerfield by-election. A Survation poll from late May 2026 shows Labour's Andy Burnham leading with 49% to Kenyon's 39% [pollcheck.co.uk](https://www.pollcheck.co.uk/by-elections/makerfield). Kenyon's performance on BBC Question Time appears to have damaged his prospects, with bookmakers shifting odds from a 28% to a 20% chance of a Reform win [thelondoneconomic.com](https://www.thelondoneconomic.com/politics/makerfield-by-election-odds-reform-labour-406861/). Burnham's high personal popularity and mayoral support in Greater Manchester further tilt the race in Labour's favor.
Polymarket shows Robert Kenyon at 25%, Survation poll has him at 39%, and other markets around 39%. He trails Andy Burnham but has significant support.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The Polymarket contract surged to 95% after the US War Department signaled major operations against Iran and allied statements condemned IRGC activities, creating strong pressure to restart the escort mission. Project Freedom was paused just weeks ago, making a restart a natural escalation step. Given the high market confidence and the short remaining time, the probability is very high, but I slightly discount from 95% to account for the possibility that the announcement could be delayed or take a different form that doesn't meet the strict criteria.
While there have been reports of the US Navy assisting vessel crossings through the Strait of Hormuz as part of Project Freedom, official US military sources have denied that the project has been restarted. No definitive announcement from Donald Trump, the US government, or military has been made to explicitly restart Project Freedom. Given the lack of official confirmation and the denials, the probability of a formal restart announcement by June 30 is relatively low but not negligible due to ongoing tensions in the region and prior reports of assistance.
While there has been no explicit, official announcement confirming the restart of 'Project Freedom' as of mid-June 2026, the market sentiment and recent geopolitical escalations suggest a high likelihood of such a move. The U.S. government has signaled significant upcoming operations regarding Iran, and the intense market repricing reflects an expectation that a formal escort program is imminent as part of these broader strategic actions.
Recent signals from the U.S. government, including statements from the Department of War and coordinated allied messaging, suggest heightened activity and planning related to the Strait of Hormuz. The surge in Polymarket odds to 95% indicates a strong market expectation of an announcement, though no definitive statement has been made yet. The historical context of Project Freedom and ongoing maritime operations further support the likelihood of a restart announcement.
As of the latest reports, the U.S. military has explicitly denied restarting Project Freedom or conducting vessel escorts through the Strait of Hormuz [seatrade-maritime.com](https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/security/us-denies-restarting-strait-of-hormuz-escorts). Despite a conflicting report from the Wall Street Journal citing unnamed officials, official U.S. Central Command statements on X have refuted the claim, indicating no current operations under this program. Given that only definitive announcements count and none have been made by Trump or the U.S. government, the probability remains low. Base rates of military program restarts and geopolitical tensions support a non-zero chance, but no concrete evidence currently supports a restart by June 30, 2026.
Polymarket currently shows an 86% probability for the 'Yes' outcome, considering the market's assessment of potential announcements by the June 30 deadline.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.