当前IMF PortWatch数据中Bab el-Mandeb海峡的7天移动平均船舶抵达数远高于10，近期胡塞武装袭击持续但未导致通行量骤降至阈值附近。8月31日到期的Polymarket合约隐含概率约11%，考虑到剩余29天内出现持续航运崩溃的可能性较低，但地缘政治风险使概率略高于零。因此给出12%的独立估计。
Houthi forces aligned with Iran have intensified maritime threats in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait through July 2026, including declaring a blockade on Saudi-linked vessels and striking oil installations, which has caused measurable drops in commercial transits and rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope. However, there is no full naval blockade, and shipping continues with some reduction. The current market-implied probability is about 11%, reflecting these risks but also the resilience of transit. Given ongoing tensions but no confirmed full closure, a low but non-negligible probability is appropriate.
While Houthi forces have intensified threats and maritime disruptions in the region, the 7-day moving average of transit calls remains significantly above the threshold of 10. Despite ongoing regional tensions, international naval patrols and the strategic importance of the strait make a total effective closure—defined as a drop to 10 or fewer daily transits—highly unlikely within the remaining month. Current market sentiment and historical data suggest that while traffic is suppressed, it is not approaching the near-zero levels required for a 'Yes' resolution.
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait has been a point of geopolitical tension, with Houthi threats and recent disruptions. However, historical patterns show asymmetric but contained attacks, and naval patrols along with vessel rerouting flexibility mitigate the risk of a complete closure. The trader consensus on Polymarket reflects a low near-term probability of effective closure, which aligns with the current situation.
Recent data and geopolitical developments indicate heightened threats in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, with Houthi forces intensifying attacks on commercial shipping through mid-2026, leading to rerouting and reduced transit volumes [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/bab-el-mandeb-strait-effectively-closed-by). However, a 7-day moving average of 10 or fewer arrivals has not yet been observed, and some shipping continues despite risks. The current low volume and ongoing regional tensions make a brief drop to the threshold plausible, but not highly likely before August 31, 2026.
Houthi attacks have reduced transits, but naval patrols and rerouting limit closure. Current data and market factors suggest a low probability.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Mojtaba Khamenei has been in power only since March 2026 after a rapid succession backed by the IRGC and Assembly of Experts, indicating strong institutional support for stability. With only 29 days remaining until the resolution date, the base rate for a sudden leadership change in a consolidated authoritarian regime is very low. While health issues and regional tensions introduce some tail risk, the market-implied probability of ~9% (as of July 22) seems slightly optimistic given the short window and the regime's demonstrated ability to maintain continuity.
Mojtaba Khamenei was installed as Supreme Leader in March 2026 following the assassination of his father, Ali Khamenei. The transition was rapid and backed by key institutions, aiming for regime stability amid ongoing conflict. Current market prices and expert consensus indicate a low near-term risk of leadership change before August 31, 2026, with probabilities around 9%. No significant new catalysts or credible reports suggest imminent removal or resignation within this timeframe.
Mojtaba Khamenei was installed following a rapid, IRGC-backed transition after his father's death in early 2026. The regime has demonstrated a strong institutional preference for stability, and current market sentiment reflects a low likelihood of further leadership disruption within the short timeframe remaining until August 31, 2026.
The recent succession process and the rapid installation of Mojtaba Khamenei as the new Supreme Leader of Iran suggest a strong institutional preference for stability. The delayed funeral arrangements and ongoing ceasefire negotiations further indicate a period of consolidation rather than immediate change. Market consensus reflects a low probability of leadership change in the near term, with Polymarket pricing it at around 9% and other sources indicating similar low probabilities.
The recent, smooth succession of Mojtaba Khamenei under constitutional procedures and strong IRGC backing suggests regime stability. Despite some reports of limited public presence and health speculation, no credible evidence indicates an imminent leadership challenge. Base rates of autocratic continuity, especially after a recent consolidation, support a low but non-zero probability of change.
As of July 22, 2026, the Polymarket price for Iran leadership change by August 31 is 9%, and trader consensus has low near-term change with December 31 at ~17% and June 30 near 1%.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The ceasefire has held since June 2026, and only 13 days remain until resolution. Recent US strikes on Iranian targets and Iranian attacks on shipping do not constitute qualifying military actions under the market rules (US strikes are not initiated by Israel; maritime attacks are excluded). However, the fragile situation and diplomatic statements that the ceasefire is 'effectively over' introduce a non-trivial risk of a direct Israel-Iran strike within the window. The Polymarket price of ~80% suggests high confidence, but I adjust slightly downward to 75% to account for escalation risk and base rates of ceasefire breakdowns in the region.
Recent reports indicate that the June 2026 ceasefire between Israel and Iran has been fragile, with ongoing US and Israeli strikes on Iranian targets and Iranian retaliations, including attacks on shipping. Although diplomatic channels remain active, renewed exchanges and warnings of retaliation suggest a high risk of qualifying military actions occurring before August 15. Given the history of fragile truces and current tensions, the probability of the ceasefire holding through August 15 is relatively low but not negligible.
The geopolitical situation between Israel and Iran is highly volatile, with recent reports indicating that the June 2026 memorandum of understanding has been severely eroded by ongoing strikes and retaliatory threats. Given the current climate of brinkmanship and the high frequency of intermittent military operations, the likelihood of a qualifying military action occurring before August 15 is significantly higher than the likelihood of the ceasefire holding.
The ceasefire between Israel and Iran has been fragile, with ongoing strikes and retaliatory threats. However, diplomatic efforts and the lack of major escalations in early August suggest a 65% chance the ceasefire holds through August 15.
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As of July 22, 2026, Polymarket implied 50% probability. Recent renewed exchanges and active diplomatic channels, along with historical fragile truce patterns, slightly adjust the estimate.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
The June 2026 ceasefire has been severely eroded by late July exchanges, with US statements declaring it effectively over and reports of renewed strikes and Iranian attacks on shipping. While diplomatic channels remain active, the pattern of violations and brinkmanship suggests a high risk of a qualifying military action before August 31. The Polymarket price of 26% and Orrery's 55% indicate significant uncertainty, but the recent escalation and fragile truce history tilt the balance toward a 'No' resolution.
Recent reports indicate that the June 2026 ceasefire between Israel and Iran has been effectively eroded by ongoing strikes and retaliations, with US statements in late July declaring the ceasefire effectively over. Although diplomatic channels remain active, the persistent brinkmanship and intermittent military actions reduce the likelihood of the ceasefire holding through August 31. Market prices and expert assessments currently place the probability of the ceasefire continuing at around 26%.
The June 2026 memorandum of understanding has been described as effectively over following renewed exchanges and persistent brinkmanship between Israel and Iran. Given the high frequency of recent escalations and the stated warnings of retaliation regarding energy infrastructure, the likelihood of a qualifying military action occurring before the end of August is high.
The ceasefire between Israel and Iran has been fragile, with recent exchanges and US statements indicating it is effectively over. However, diplomatic channels remain active, and there are no confirmed reports of a qualifying military action as of early August. The persistent brinkmanship and intermittent operations suggest a high risk of escalation, but the ongoing diplomatic efforts provide some hope for the ceasefire's continuation.
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There is ongoing brinkmanship with recent violations of the ceasefire, including renewed exchanges in late July and Iranian warnings of retaliation, though diplomatic channels remain active.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Current traffic is ~10 vessels/day vs. the 60 threshold, and the conflict shows no sign of resolving in the next 29 days. Prediction markets reflect ~6-14% probability, and recent flare-ups have repeatedly reversed any minor rebounds. A sustained 6x increase in transits within a month is extremely unlikely without a ceasefire, which is not imminent.
Ongoing US-Iran hostilities and a naval blockade since mid-2026 have kept Strait of Hormuz traffic at multi-month lows, with daily vessel passages far below the pre-crisis baseline of about 140 ships. Recent data shows continued volume erosion through late July amid renewed attacks and sanctions enforcement. While diplomatic efforts and potential de-escalation could improve traffic, current trends and market sentiment suggest a low probability of traffic returning to normal levels by August 31, 2026.
The Strait of Hormuz has been operating at approximately 10% of its normal capacity since February 2026 due to the ongoing US-Iran conflict. With daily transits averaging only 10 vessels compared to the required 60-plus threshold, and no signs of a significant de-escalation or ceasefire that would restore maritime insurance and operator confidence before the August 31 deadline, it is highly unlikely that traffic will return to normal levels in the remaining time.
The Strait of Hormuz traffic has been significantly disrupted due to ongoing US-Iran conflict, with daily transits averaging around 10 vessels compared to the pre-war benchmark of 60-plus. Recent data shows further volume erosion through late July, and there are no strong indications of a near-term ceasefire or de-escalation. The prediction markets reflect a low probability of traffic returning to normal by August 31, with Polymarket odds at 14% and Marketss at 7%.
Traffic has remained at roughly 10% of normal due to persistent military tensions and naval blockades. Despite occasional diplomatic signals, no sustained de-escalation has occurred as of late July 2026. The 7-day moving average has not approached the 60-transit threshold, and recent trends show further erosion. While a sudden breakthrough could change conditions rapidly, the base rate of conflict persistence and low current traffic support an 11% probability of normalization by August 31.
Current traffic is around 10 vessels daily, well below the 60 threshold. Ongoing conflict and lack of near-term de-escalation signals make it unlikely to reach the required average by August 31.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Recent news (AP, The National) reports that on August 2, 2026, Trump stated parameters for a deal to end the Iran war and agreed to cancel attacks, with new talks to open Hormuz. This suggests a diplomatic track that could lead to ending the blockade by August 15. However, the blockade was reinstated on July 13 after a prior ceasefire collapsed, and the market on Polymarket shows 46% implied probability, reflecting uncertainty about whether talks will produce a clear official announcement within 13 days. The base rate for such rapid policy reversals in a volatile conflict is moderate, and the recent positive signals tilt the probability slightly above even.
The US reinstated the blockade on July 13, 2026, after a brief lifting in June. While there are ongoing talks and some diplomatic efforts to de-escalate, no official announcement has yet declared the end of the blockade. Market sentiment and recent price movements suggest a moderate chance of an official end announcement by August 15, but the situation remains unstable with renewed attacks and military actions.
Recent reports indicate that President Trump has signaled a willingness to engage in new talks to open the Strait of Hormuz, following a period of heightened tension and the reinstatement of the blockade [thenationalnews.com]. While the market sentiment has shifted significantly toward 'Yes' in the last 24 hours [orrery.me], the resolution requires a formal, unambiguous announcement of the blockade's termination by August 15, 2026 [polymarket.com]. Given the volatility of the situation and the short timeframe, a deal is plausible but remains contingent on successful, rapid negotiations [apnews.com].
Recent diplomatic efforts and statements from President Trump suggest a potential for de-escalation, but the situation remains volatile. The reinstatement of the blockade and ongoing tensions indicate that while there is a possibility of an announcement, it is not guaranteed. The key factors include the pace of diplomatic talks, enforcement actions, and regional summits that could influence the decision.
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As of August 2, 2026, the Polymarket implied probability is 46%, and there are ongoing diplomatic efforts and recent developments. The key factors include the pace of talks, enforcement actions, and the need for a verifiable official announcement.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Polls and prediction markets consistently favor El-Sayed by a comfortable margin, but the primary is close enough that turnout among older voters and late-deciding undecideds could narrow the result. The 85% probability reflects the balance of strong polling evidence and the inherent uncertainty of a primary election.
Recent polling and prediction markets strongly favor Abdul El-Sayed, with multiple sources showing him leading Haley Stevens by roughly 10 points in projected results. Prediction markets like Polymarket and Kalshi price his chances at about 97%, though turnout uncertainty and heavy outside spending for Stevens introduce some risk. Given the consistent polling lead and market confidence, an 82% probability balances strong evidence with remaining uncertainties about turnout and late campaign dynamics.
Abdul El-Sayed holds a consistent and significant lead in recent polling, with multiple surveys showing him ahead of Haley Stevens by approximately 10 percentage points among likely voters. While primary turnout, particularly among older voters who favor Stevens, remains a variable, the convergence of polling data and prediction market sentiment strongly suggests a high likelihood of an El-Sayed victory.
Recent polls and prediction markets consistently show Abdul El-Sayed leading in the Michigan Democratic Primary. The Public Sentiment Institute's projected result gives El-Sayed 54.8% compared to Stevens' 45.2%, and prediction markets like Polymarket and Kalshi list his chances at 97%. Additionally, key endorsements and strong favorability ratings further bolster his position.
Polling and prediction markets consistently show El-Sayed as the strong favorite, with a 9–10 point lead in aggregated polls and high market-implied probabilities. However, the older, Stevens-favoring electorate expected on primary day introduces meaningful uncertainty, as seen in the tightening of leads after likely voter screens. Base rates for polling accuracy and late shifts in turnout justify a high but not certain probability.
El-Sayed leads in polls and prediction markets, with strong momentum, though there's some uncertainty due to older voter turnout. Overall, he has a high chance of winning.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Combining base rates of incumbent primary success (~90%) with specific evidence: McKinney has strong progressive endorsements (Sanders, Tlaib) and grassroots support, but Thanedar has incumbency and name recognition. Prediction markets show mixed signals (82% on Polymarket with thin liquidity, 55% elsewhere), indicating uncertainty. With two days to go, the race is competitive, giving McKinney a slight edge due to momentum and turnout potential, but incumbents retain a significant chance, resulting in a 72% probability.
Donavan McKinney is currently the frontrunner in the MI-13 Democratic primary with strong endorsements from progressive figures like Bernie Sanders and Rashida Tlaib, and the market odds assign him about a 76-82% chance of winning. The race is a head-to-head contest against incumbent Shri Thanedar, but McKinney's support from left-wing groups and his appeal to key district voters increase his likelihood of securing the nomination. Market liquidity is low, so the probability is a soft estimate, but overall indicators favor McKinney.
Donavan McKinney has secured significant endorsements from prominent progressive figures like Bernie Sanders and Rashida Tlaib, and he is running a focused, one-on-one campaign against incumbent Shri Thanedar. Prediction markets currently favor McKinney with an implied probability around 76-82%, reflecting strong momentum and the perception that this is the most viable challenge Thanedar has faced to date. While incumbents generally hold an advantage, the consolidation of the anti-Thanedar vote behind a single challenger significantly increases McKinney's chances of winning the primary.
The prediction market on Polymarket shows Donavan McKinney as the frontrunner with an 82% implied probability of winning the Democratic primary for MI-13 [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/mi-13-democratic-primary-winner). Another market on Orrery also supports this with a 76% implied probability [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/will-donavan-mckinney-be-the-democratic-nominee-for-mi-13). McKinney has significant endorsements from progressive figures and organizations, which could mobilize a strong voter base [detroitnews.com](https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2026/07/27/shri-thanedar-donavan-mckinney-detroit-13th-district-congress/90905430007/). However, the market prices are not fully liquid, so there is some uncertainty.
The Democratic primary for MI-13 has not yet occurred as of the current date (2026-08-02). The election is scheduled for August 4, 2026, meaning the outcome is still pending. Therefore, it is not possible to confirm whether Donavan McKinney will be the nominee. The market probabilities (e.g., 76–82% on Polymarket [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/mi-13-democratic-primary-winner)) reflect trader sentiment, not a resolved fact. Until the primary is held, the true probability cannot be determined with certainty, but based on available information and endorsements (e.g., from Bernie Sanders and Rashida Tlaib [detroitnews.com](https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2026/07/27/shri-thanedar-donavan-mckinney-detroit-13th-district-congress/90905430007/)), McKinney is a strong contender. However, Shri Thanedar remains a formidable opponent with prior electoral success in the district [freep.com](https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/2026/07/18/shri-thanedar-donavan-mckinney-13th-congressional-district-race/90855407007/). Given the lack of final results and the inherent uncertainty in elections, the true probability must remain below 1.0 despite McKinney’s current advantage.
Donavan McKinney is the current market leader with high odds on Polymarket and Orrery, and has strong progressive support, making him likely to win the primary.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
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The prediction market on Polymarket assigns about a 14% chance to the outcome that Elon Musk will post between 200-219 tweets from July 28 to August 4, 2026. This is based on current trading volumes and prices reflecting collective market sentiment. Given Elon Musk's typical posting frequency and the market's aggregated data, this range is less likely compared to higher tweet count ranges.
The market for this specific range (200-219) is currently trading at approximately 14% on [bitget.com](https://web3.bitget.com/predictions/event/elon-musk-of-tweets-july-28-august-4). While Elon Musk's posting frequency is highly volatile, the consensus among traders currently favors higher ranges (240-259), suggesting that 200-219 is considered slightly below the expected median for this period.
Elon Musk's recent activity shows high variability, with 37 tweets in a single day (07/28/26) [youtube.com](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hEhaEpo7QK8). However, the market predictions for similar periods suggest a lower likelihood of 200-219 tweets, with 14% betting odds [web3.bitget.com](https://web3.bitget.com/predictions/event/elon-musk-of-tweets-july-28-august-4). Historical data from June 2-9, 2026, shows significant betting volume but no clear trend favoring 200-219 tweets [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/elon-musk-of-tweets-june-2-june-9).
The current market-implied probability on Polymarket assigns a 14% chance to the 200-219 tweet range for Elon Musk's activity from July 28 to August 4, 2026 [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/elon-musk-of-tweets-july-28-august-4). This reflects aggregated trader expectations based on recent posting behavior and public signals. While prediction markets are well-calibrated, especially close to resolution, the high volume of trading ($1.4M+) and multiple plausible ranges (240–259 and 260–279 leading at 24% and 23%) suggest uncertainty favoring higher counts, making 200–219 less likely but still plausible.
Elon Musk posted 37 tweets on July 28, 2026. The market odds for 200-219 tweets in the period are 14%, and considering his one-day rate, the probability is estimated at 0.15.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Incumbent Shri Thanedar faces a strong one-on-one challenge from state Rep. Donavan McKinney, who has endorsements from Bernie Sanders and Justice Democrats, and the race is described as a toss-up. Thanedar's massive financial advantage ($4.7M vs. McKinney) and incumbency are offset by the district's majority-Black electorate and past vote-splitting dynamics that favored him; now with a single opponent, McKinney is favored. Polymarket odds show McKinney at 82% and Thanedar at 16%, reflecting a strong market consensus that Thanedar will lose the primary.
Shri Thanedar is the incumbent with significant financial resources and name recognition, having loaned millions to his campaign and receiving substantial outside support. However, his challenger Donavan McKinney has strong endorsements from local and national progressive groups, key Democratic figures, and a coalition of Black political leaders, making the race highly competitive and considered a toss-up by some political observers. The district is heavily Democratic, so the primary winner is very likely to be the nominee, but the close polling and strong challenge reduce Thanedar's certainty of winning.
While incumbent Shri Thanedar has a significant financial advantage and name recognition, he faces a formidable, consolidated challenge from Donavan McKinney. The shift from a multi-candidate field in 2022 to a one-on-one race, combined with McKinney's high-profile endorsements from figures like Bernie Sanders and the support of local political power brokers, creates a difficult path for Thanedar. Market sentiment and local reporting suggest the race is highly competitive, with momentum favoring the challenger.
Thanedar has significant advantages in funding and name recognition, with a substantial war chest and strong endorsements from House Democratic leadership. However, McKinney has strong support from progressive groups, local officials, and is running a competitive campaign, making this a close race. The district's history of Black representation and recent polling showing a neck-and-neck race also factor into the uncertainty.
Shri Thanedar holds advantages in funding and name recognition, having loaned his campaign over $13 million and benefiting from support by top House Democrats and crypto-aligned groups [prospect.org](https://prospect.org/2026/07/29/shri-thanedar-donavan-mckinney-congressional-black-congress-detroit-michigan/). However, Donavan McKinney has gained significant momentum with endorsements from progressive leaders including Bernie Sanders, the Working Families Party, and key local and national Democrats, and is seen as a serious challenger aiming to restore Black representation to the district [freep.com](https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/2026/07/18/shri-thanedar-donavan-mckinney-13th-congressional-district-race/90855407007/) [prospect.org](https://prospect.org/2026/07/29/shri-thanedar-donavan-mckinney-congressional-black-congress-detroit-michigan/). Recent polling shows the race is highly competitive, making it a toss-up, though Thanedar's financial edge and incumbency slightly tip the scales in his favor.
Thanedar has a financial edge and name recognition, but McKinney has strong progressive support and they are neck-and-neck in polling.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Current WTI prices are around $85, and a drop to $65 would require a decline of over 23% in August. While fundamentals point to softening (EIA Brent forecast of $74, inventory builds, OPEC+ rebound), the geopolitical risk premium and the sheer magnitude of the move make it unlikely. Historical volatility and the 4% market odds support a low probability.
Current market data and trading volumes indicate a very low probability that WTI crude oil will hit a low of $65 in August 2026. Prices have been trading near $85 per barrel with geopolitical tensions and supply factors keeping prices elevated, and market-implied probabilities from prediction markets are around 4%. The fundamentals suggest a softening but not a drop to $65, making a low at that level unlikely.
Current WTI prices are trading near $85 per barrel, supported by geopolitical risk premiums and ongoing supply management. While there are expectations of a potential surplus and softening fundamentals, a drop to $65 would require a significant, unexpected collapse in demand or a major supply shock, which is not currently reflected in market forward curves or analyst projections for August 2026.
WTI crude oil prices have been trading near $85 per barrel in early August 2026, with projections indicating a downward trend due to factors like global inventory builds, OPEC+ output rebounds, and demand weakness in China. While geopolitical tensions could cause volatility, the market-implied forward curves and EIA projections suggest a softening trend. The probability of hitting $65 is low but not zero, considering potential downward pressure and market volatility.
While oil prices face downward pressure from moderating demand and supply recovery, current forward curves and market-implied probabilities suggest WTI is unlikely to fall as low as $65 in August 2026. The 4.0% trading level on Polymarket indicates low confidence in a drop to that level, and fundamental analysis does not strongly support such a sharp decline. Therefore, the true probability is slightly above the market price but remains low.
Current WTI prices are near $85, with factors like U.S.-Iran de-escalation and supply recovery, but market-implied curves suggest softening fundamentals. Polymarket shows 4.0% odds.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The Polymarket main market assigns a 39% probability to 'No change' and 60% to a 25 bps hike, reflecting the modal view that the FOMC will tighten further given June CPI at 3.5% (well above the 2% target) and a resilient labor market (unemployment 4.2%). Upcoming July data could shift expectations, but the current fundamental backdrop favors a hike. The binary 'no change' market showing 72% appears inconsistent and likely reflects lower liquidity or a different interpretation. I anchor on the broader market and fundamental analysis, estimating a 38% chance of no change.
Recent data shows inflation remains above the Fed's 2% target and the labor market is still strong, which typically supports further rate hikes. Market-based probabilities from Polymarket and other prediction markets currently assign about a 39% chance to no change, reflecting some uncertainty but a general expectation of a 25 basis point increase. Given these factors, the probability of no change is below 50%.
Current market sentiment, as reflected on platforms like [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/fed-decision-in-september-762/will-there-be-no-change-in-fed-interest-rates-after-the-september-2026-meeting-615), assigns a 39% probability to a 'no change' outcome. While inflation remains above the 2% target, the resilience of the labor market and the Fed's commitment to tightening suggest that a 25 basis point increase is currently the modal expectation among market participants.
The current market consensus, as reflected in prediction markets like Polymarket and Orrery, suggests a 60% chance of a 25 bps increase and a 39% chance of no change. Recent inflation data shows a decline to 3.5% year-over-year, but it remains above the Fed's 2% target. The labor market is resilient, with unemployment at 4.2%, which supports the view that the Fed will continue tightening. However, there is some uncertainty around upcoming data releases and potential dovish pivots.
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Based on current market data and economic factors, the probability of no change in Fed interest rates after the September 2026 meeting is estimated. Recent inflation remains above target, labor market is resilient, and market pricing leans towards a 25 bps hike, but upcoming data adds uncertainty.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.