The question asks whether Mojtaba Khamenei will cease to be de facto leader of Iran by June 30, 2026. As of June 13, 2026, there are no credible reports of his imminent removal, detention, or resignation. Prediction markets reflect a ~7% probability, which aligns with the extremely low historical base rate of sudden leadership change in Iran and the very short remaining time window. While not impossible, the chance is small.
Current prediction markets, including Polymarket and OddsShift, price the probability of a leadership change of Mojtaba Khamenei by June 30, 2026, at about 7%. There is no significant credible reporting or political developments indicating an imminent change, and the market liquidity and smart money signals support this low probability. Given the stability of Iran's leadership and the lack of strong external or internal pressures for change, the low probability is reasonable.
Current prediction markets and expert sentiment strongly favor the status quo, with the probability of a leadership change by June 30, 2026, estimated at approximately 7%. There are no credible reports or indicators of imminent instability or transition regarding Mojtaba Khamenei's position as the de facto leader of Iran within this short timeframe.
The prediction markets, particularly Polymarket, are pricing the probability of an Iran leadership change by June 30 at 7%. This is supported by a consensus of credible reporting and the current political stability in Iran, with no significant indicators suggesting an imminent leadership change. The base rate for such events is low, and the specific evidence does not suggest a higher probability.
The current prediction market price on Polymarket reflects a 7% probability of a leadership change in Iran by June 30, 2026, with $2.8M in trading volume, indicating strong market consensus [odddshift.com](https://oddsshift.com/radar/iran-leadership-change-by-june-30-689-922). The leadership of Iran, particularly the Supreme Leader, is highly stable due to entrenched power structures, and there is no public evidence of imminent political upheaval or health crises suggesting a near-term transition. While some smart money bets favor 'Yes', the majority of large positions are on 'No', and profitable 'No' holders are unlikely to sell early, creating structural price support [polyspotter.com](https://polyspotter.com/market/iran-leadership-change-by-june-30-0xb196a).
Prediction markets like Polymarket and OddsShift currently price the probability of Iran leadership change by June 30 at around 7%.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Given only 2 days remain until the June 15 deadline and there are no credible reports of an imminent major airspace closure by Israeli authorities, the probability is very low. The definition requires broad closure of civilian airspace, which is an extreme measure. Current geopolitical tensions do not appear to justify such a step based on available information. The Polymarket odds (~15%) may slightly overestimate due to speculative trading.
Recent market data and official statements indicate a very low likelihood of Israel initiating a major airspace closure by June 15. There have been no official signals or government statements suggesting a nationwide airspace shutdown, and the market probability has dropped sharply to around 15%. Regional tensions have not translated into Israeli aviation restrictions, and limited disruptions do not meet the criteria for a major closure.
Current market data and recent reporting indicate that there are no official signals or government statements suggesting an imminent, nationwide closure of Israeli civilian airspace. Previous similar markets have seen probabilities drop to near-zero as deadlines approached without such actions, and the current geopolitical focus remains on diplomatic and sanction-related issues rather than aviation restrictions.
Given the current geopolitical situation and the lack of recent official announcements or credible reports indicating an imminent major closure of Israeli airspace, the probability is relatively low. The base rate for such closures is low, and there is no specific evidence to suggest a significant escalation leading to a major airspace closure by June 15.
As of early June 2026, the probability of Israel initiating a major airspace closure by June 15 is very low. Recent market pricing on Polymarket dropped to around 2% for a similar June 9 deadline amid no official statements from Israeli aviation authorities indicating a broad closure [global-political-spotlight.com](https://www.global-political-spotlight.com/articles/polymarket/briefs/israel-airspace-closure-odds-drop-sharply-into-deadline-amid-no-official-closure-signals-in-cited-gov-t-statements-20260). Current geopolitical focus appears to be on West Bank sanctions and diplomatic actions rather than civil aviation disruptions, and no credible reports suggest an impending nationwide closure. Given the strict definition requiring an Israel-initiated, broad suspension of commercial flights, and the absence of any qualifying signals, the likelihood remains minimal.
No current evidence of a major airspace closure by the deadline, and market indicators suggest low likelihood.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
With only 17 days remaining until the deadline and no credible reports of imminent permanent peace negotiations, the current temporary ceasefire (April 16, 2026) explicitly does not qualify. Historically, permanent peace between Israel and Hezbollah has never been achieved, and the deep ideological and geopolitical barriers make a sudden agreement extremely unlikely in this short timeframe. Polymarket prediction markets also show overwhelming consensus (~80% No) for earlier deadlines, further supporting a low probability.
Given the long-standing hostility and complex geopolitical dynamics between Israel and Hezbollah, a permanent peace deal by mid-2026 remains unlikely. While ceasefires and temporary agreements have occurred, a definitive, lasting peace agreement requires significant shifts in political will and security guarantees, which have not shown strong signs recently. The current environment and historical patterns suggest a low but non-negligible chance of a permanent peace deal within this timeframe.
Given the deep-seated ideological conflict and the history of temporary ceasefires rather than permanent settlements, the likelihood of a formal, permanent peace treaty being signed by June 30, 2026, is low. Current diplomatic efforts remain focused on managing hostilities rather than achieving a comprehensive, lasting peace agreement as defined by the market criteria [explorer.struct.to](https://explorer.struct.to/markets/israel-x-hezbollah-permanent-peace-deal-by-june-30-2026).
The current market sentiment on Polymarket suggests a high likelihood of 'No' with 72-80% probability, indicating a low chance of a permanent peace deal by June 30, 2026. Historical context shows that peace deals between Israel and Hezbollah have been rare and difficult to achieve, with recent conflicts and ceasefires not leading to permanent agreements. The ongoing tensions and lack of clear, definitive steps towards a permanent peace deal further support this low probability.
As of June 2026, there is no indication of a permanent peace deal between Israel and Hezbollah. The situation remains tense, with recent developments including a temporary ceasefire agreement on April 16, 2026, which explicitly does not qualify as a permanent resolution [struct.to](https://explorer.struct.to/markets/israel-x-hezbollah-permanent-peace-deal-by-june-30-2026). Market sentiment and available reporting suggest a very low likelihood of a definitive, lasting agreement being reached by June 30, 2026, with betting odds implying a 72–80% chance of "No" [polymarket.com](https://polymapket.com/event/israel-x-hezbollah-permanent-peace-deal-by). Given the deep structural hostilities and lack of public progress toward a formal treaty, the true probability of a permanent deal remains near zero.
Historical pattern of temporary ceasefires, complexity of reaching a permanent agreement, and absence of recent definitive progress make a permanent peace deal by June 30, 2026 unlikely.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The question asks about a permanent peace deal between Israel and Iran by June 30, 2026, which is only about two weeks away. There are no credible reports of active negotiations toward such a deal, and the deep-seated hostility between the two countries makes a sudden breakthrough implausible. Prediction markets consistently price this outcome at 4% or lower, and given the extremely short timeframe and lack of any diplomatic momentum, a probability of 2% is appropriate.
Given the longstanding hostility and deep geopolitical tensions between Israel and Iran, a permanent peace deal by mid-2026 is highly unlikely. Current market assessments and expert consensus place the probability around 4%, reflecting the entrenched conflict, lack of recent progress toward peace, and absence of diplomatic breakthroughs. While peace deals involving multiple parties could include both nations, no credible signs indicate such an agreement is imminent.
The geopolitical relationship between Israel and Iran is characterized by deep-seated ideological hostility and a long history of proxy conflict, making a formal, permanent peace treaty highly improbable within the next year. Current market sentiment [wyldmarkets.com](https://wyldmarkets.com/market/israel-x-iran-permanent-peace-deal-by-june-30-2026-262) reflects this, pricing the likelihood at approximately 4%, which aligns with the lack of diplomatic channels or de-escalation trends necessary for such a historic agreement.
The current geopolitical climate between Israel and Iran is highly adversarial, with ongoing tensions and proxy conflicts. Historical precedents show that permanent peace deals between such entrenched adversaries are rare and typically require significant diplomatic breakthroughs. The low market probability of 4% on WyldMarkets reflects this assessment, indicating a consensus view of a highly improbable outcome within the given timeframe.
The historical enmity between Israel and Iran, lack of active peace talks, and unfavorable geopolitical dynamics make a permanent peace deal highly unlikely by mid-2026. Prediction markets reflect this with a consensus near 4%, indicating low but non-zero probability. Given the absence of catalysts for rapprochement, the true probability remains very low but slightly above zero to account for unforeseen diplomatic breakthroughs.
Web search shows WyldMarkets currently prices a 4% chance, with no clear signs of a definitive agreement, leading to a low probability.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
With only two days until the deadline, the 7-day moving average of transit calls in the Strait of Hormuz would need to reach 60, which is highly unlikely given the current depressed levels. Prediction markets imply a ~3% chance, and the inertia of a 7-day moving average makes a rapid surge improbable. Even if traffic spikes, the moving average will only partially reflect it in such a short window.
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical chokepoint for global oil and shipping traffic, and while traffic has been disrupted in recent years due to geopolitical tensions, there is ongoing pressure and incentives for traffic to return to normal levels. However, given the persistent regional instability and the strict criteria of a 7-day moving average of 60 or more transit calls, the probability is moderate but not high. Current market data and expert predictions suggest a low likelihood of full normalization by June 15, 2026, but it remains possible if tensions ease and shipping resumes at typical volumes.
Current market sentiment and geopolitical conditions in the Strait of Hormuz suggest that shipping traffic remains significantly suppressed due to ongoing regional tensions. Given that the threshold of 60 daily transit calls is a specific statistical target that has not been met, and with the resolution date of June 15, 2026, approaching, the likelihood of a sudden, sustained return to 'normal' traffic levels as defined by IMF Portwatch data is very low.
The current market odds on Polymarket show a 3.4% chance of the event resolving to 'Yes' [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-june-15). Given the low probability and the specific, rule-based nature of the resolution criteria, this estimate aligns with the market sentiment and the lack of recent data suggesting a significant increase in transit calls.
The current market odds across platforms like Polymarket and PredictMarketCap indicate a less than 1% chance of the 7-day moving average of ship arrivals in the Strait of Hormuz reaching 60 or above by June 15, 2026 [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-june-15). This reflects persistent geopolitical tensions and shipping disruptions in the region, which have kept traffic well below normal levels. Given the lack of significant de-escalation and the high bar for resolution (60+ transits on a 7-day average), the true probability remains extremely low.
Based on current market odds and the need for the 7-day moving average of transit calls to reach 60 by June 15, 2026, with no immediate signs of this threshold being met.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The IMF Portwatch data has shown Strait of Hormuz transit calls well below 60 in recent months due to ongoing regional instability. With only about two weeks left in the resolution period, a sudden and sustained surge to 60 is improbable. Polymarket's ~16.5% Yes price reflects this low likelihood, and after adjusting for potential volatility from unexpected diplomatic breakthroughs, I place the probability at 18%.
Current market data from Polymarket and related prediction platforms indicate a 60% probability that Strait of Hormuz traffic will return to normal levels by the end of June 2026. This reflects moderate confidence based on recent trends and the importance of the Strait for global shipping, balanced against ongoing geopolitical risks and potential disruptions. The availability of detailed transit call data from IMF Portwatch provides a reliable measurement framework for this forecast.
Current market sentiment and available data suggest that shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz remains significantly below the threshold required for a 'Yes' resolution. Given the ongoing geopolitical tensions and the lack of clear indicators suggesting a rapid, sustained recovery in transit volumes to the 60-call threshold by the end of June 2026, the probability of this event occurring is low.
The current data from IMF Portwatch and the market odds suggest a low probability of the Strait of Hormuz traffic returning to normal by the end of June 2026. The market odds are heavily skewed towards 'No' at 83.5%, indicating that most traders expect the 7-day moving average of transit calls to remain below 60. However, there is still a possibility of improvement in traffic conditions.
The current trading odds on Polymarket indicate a 16.5% probability of the Strait of Hormuz traffic reaching a 7-day moving average of 60 or more transit calls by June 30, 2026 [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-end-of-june). This reflects aggregated market sentiment based on available information about geopolitical risks, shipping patterns, and IMF Portwatch data. Given the lack of recent reports indicating a significant increase in traffic and the high sensitivity of the region to disruptions, the probability remains low. The market is actively traded with substantial volume, suggesting the price is informationally efficient.
Current market odds show low probability, and without data indicating a significant shift to meet the 60+ transit calls threshold, the likelihood is low.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Recent reports indicate that a final peace deal text has been reached, with Pakistan mediating and Trump stating a signing could occur 'over the weekend' (by June 14). The draft includes a 60-day negotiation period, which would qualify as a ceasefire extension or successor agreement. While Trump has previously raised expectations without finalizing, the level of detail and involvement of a third-party mediator (Pakistan) suggest a higher likelihood of an official U.S. announcement by June 30. The main risk is that talks could still stall, but the current momentum makes a qualifying announcement more likely than not.
Recent reports indicate that a ceasefire took effect in April 2026, with ongoing negotiations and some sporadic violence. President Trump has repeatedly stated that a peace deal is close, and there have been announcements of agreements at high leadership levels, though no official new extension announcement has been made yet. Given the momentum and the political incentives to publicly confirm an extension or new framework before June 30, it is likely but not certain that the U.S. will announce a qualifying ceasefire extension or new agreement by the deadline.
President Trump has publicly stated that a final peace deal has been reached and approved by the highest levels of Iranian leadership, with a signing expected in the coming days [cnbc.com]. While previous claims of a deal have not materialized, the current level of diplomatic signaling, including involvement from third-party mediators like Pakistan [euronews.com], suggests a high likelihood that an official announcement regarding a ceasefire extension or a formal agreement will occur before the June 30 deadline.
Recent statements from both the U.S. and Iran indicate significant progress towards a peace deal, with President Trump and Iran's foreign minister both suggesting that a final agreement is close. The U.S. has downed Iranian drones, but this does not necessarily derail the peace process. The key factors are the high-level approval of the deal by Iranian leadership and the U.S. cancellation of planned strikes, which suggests a strong likelihood of an official announcement by June 30.
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Recent reports indicate a final peace deal text has been reached, with Trump stating a signing is imminent, increasing the likelihood of a qualifying announcement by June 30.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
As of June 13, 2026, only two days remain before the deadline. While a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) reportedly awaits Trump's signature, no permanent peace deal has been formally signed or publicly confirmed by both governments. The permanent peace deal requires explicit language ending military hostilities permanently, whereas existing agreements are temporary ceasefires. Prediction markets price the probability around 13.5%, but I judge the true probability lower given the extreme time pressure, the high bar for a 'permanent' agreement, and the absence of any definitive announcement as of the search date. Base rates for such transformative diplomatic breakthroughs in a two-day window are extremely low.
Despite ongoing diplomatic efforts and some temporary ceasefire agreements, there is no current indication of a definitive, permanent peace deal between the US and Iran. The history of strained relations, regional conflicts, and the requirement for explicit language ending hostilities permanently make such an agreement unlikely by mid-2026. Market sentiment and expert analysis also suggest a low probability of a permanent peace deal within this timeframe.
Given the deep-seated geopolitical tensions and the current reliance on temporary, short-term ceasefires, the likelihood of a formal, permanent peace treaty being signed and ratified by both nations within such a short timeframe is extremely low. Market sentiment and the lack of diplomatic momentum toward a comprehensive, lasting settlement further support a 'No' outcome.
The current market odds and recent trading activity suggest a low probability of a permanent peace deal between the US and Iran by June 15, 2026. The Polymarket market shows 85% No, and Orakll reports a 13.5% chance, indicating a consensus of low likelihood. The key factors include the lack of definitive public confirmation from either government and the historical context of US-Iran relations, which have been marked by prolonged tensions and limited progress in recent negotiations.
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Historical lack of permanent US-Iran peace deals, high bar for explicit ending of hostilities, and temporary ceasefires as recent example make a permanent deal by the deadline unlikely.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
With only 17 days left until the June 30 deadline and no public announcement of a breakthrough, the historical difficulty of US-Iran nuclear negotiations suggests a deal is unlikely in this short window. Prediction market odds have dropped to around 18-34% Yes across various sources (e.g., predictstamp.com shows 18% Yes, struct.to shows 34% Yes), indicating low confidence from informed traders. Given the lack of evidence of imminent agreement, the probability is low.
Current prediction markets and aggregated forecasts show a range of probabilities for a US-Iran nuclear deal by June 30, 2026, with some markets pricing around 18-50% chance. Given the complex geopolitical tensions, historical difficulties in reaching and maintaining agreements like the JCPOA, and ongoing regional conflicts, the likelihood of a new official agreement by the deadline is moderate but not high. The probability is adjusted downward from a neutral 50% to about 35% to reflect persistent diplomatic challenges and recent market signals favoring no deal.
The geopolitical climate between the United States and Iran remains highly strained, with significant mutual distrust and conflicting regional interests. While prediction markets show some volatility, the lack of concrete diplomatic progress or public signals of a breakthrough suggests that a formal, publicly announced nuclear agreement by June 30, 2026, is unlikely. The high bar for an 'official agreement' makes a 'No' outcome more probable than a 'Yes'.
The prediction market data shows a range of probabilities from 34% to 50% for a US-Iran nuclear deal by June 30, 2026. Given the complexity of the negotiations and the historical context of US-Iran relations, a mid-range probability of 45% seems reasonable. Key factors include the current state of negotiations, political will on both sides, and the broader geopolitical context.
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Current prediction market data shows a 18% probability for a US-Iran nuclear deal by June 30, 2026.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
On June 11, 2026, President Trump stated that the Strait of Hormuz will be reopened as soon as a deal with Iran is signed, which he described as 'subject to finalization' with signing expected 'in days' [cnbc.com](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/11/trump-iran-strikes-deal.html). This makes a qualifying announcement before the June 30 deadline likely, but the deal could still face last-minute delays or fail to materialize, and the announcement must explicitly state the blockade is lifted. Prediction markets show mixed signals (73% Yes on Polymarket vs. ~30% on FRC), reflecting uncertainty. I estimate a 75% chance based on the strong recent signal from Trump himself.
Given that the blockade was only recently announced in April 2026 and is tied to ongoing negotiations with Iran and regional stakeholders, it is uncertain but somewhat unlikely that Trump or the US government will officially announce lifting the blockade by June 30, 2026. The blockade is stated to remain in effect until a final deal is signed, and while talks are progressing, no definitive announcement of lifting the blockade has been made yet. Therefore, the probability is moderate but leans towards no announcement within the timeframe.
Recent reports indicate that a deal with Iran is in the final stages of being finalized, with President Trump explicitly stating that the naval blockade will remain in effect only until this transaction is completed. Given the high-level diplomatic progress and the stated intent to reopen the Strait upon signing, it is highly probable that an official announcement regarding the lifting of the blockade will occur before the June 30, 2026, deadline.
Recent statements by President Trump indicate that a deal with Iran is close to finalization, which would likely include the lifting of the blockade. However, the exact timing and specifics of the announcement remain uncertain, and past actions suggest that such announcements are often made at the last minute or subject to sudden changes.
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As of the search, there is no current indication of a qualifying announcement from Trump, the US government, or the US military regarding the lifting of the Strait of Hormuz blockade by June 30, 2026.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Survation's poll shows Andy Burnham leading Robert Kenyon 43% to 40%, a narrow margin within the error. Burnham's personal popularity as Greater Manchester mayor gives Labour an edge, but Reform UK's strong local base and national momentum make the race competitive. Prediction markets assign Kenyon roughly 25-39% chance of winning. I set the probability at 0.30, slightly below the market consensus of ~0.30-0.35, considering Burnham's advantage in turnout and name recognition.
Current polling and prediction markets show Andy Burnham leading Robert Kenyon by a significant margin, with Burnham's personal vote and local popularity providing a strong advantage. However, Reform UK and Kenyon have a solid base and could capitalize on vote splitting or any campaign missteps by Labour. The race is competitive but Burnham is favored to win, making Kenyon's chances lower but not negligible.
While recent polling from [pollcheck.co.uk](https://www.pollcheck.co.uk/by-elections/makerfield) shows Andy Burnham leading Robert Kenyon (49% to 39%), the race remains competitive. Burnham's personal popularity as Mayor of Greater Manchester is a significant factor, but Reform UK has shown strong momentum in the constituency, and the margin of error in polling leaves room for an upset if turnout patterns deviate from expectations.
The current polling data and prediction markets suggest that Robert Kenyon has a significant chance of winning the 2026 Makerfield by-election, but not a majority. The Survation poll shows Kenyon trailing Andy Burnham by a narrow margin, and prediction markets like Polymarket and Lines.com indicate a probability of around 25-39% for Kenyon's victory. Key factors include Burnham's personal popularity, the competitive environment, and the potential for vote splitting among other parties.
The prediction market on Polymarket and analysis from lines.com suggest an implied probability of around 39% for Robert Kenyon winning, based on current trading. A Survation poll shows Kenyon trailing Andy Burnham 40% to 43% in a named-candidate ballot, but leading by 11 points on a generic Westminster vote, indicating Burnham's personal popularity is a major factor. The outcome hinges on whether Reform UK can consolidate the anti-Labour vote and if Burnham receives timely approval from Labour's NEC to run.
Survation poll shows Andy Burnham leading Robert Kenyon by 3 points, and Polymarket has Robert Kenyon at 25% probability.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Trump's initial Project Freedom was quickly abandoned after provoking Iranian attacks and regional opposition. The US military has since shifted to a quiet, unlabeled coordination effort, explicitly denying a restart of the named program. While a formal announcement remains possible, the administration's current strategy of avoiding the 'Project Freedom' label and the short remaining time make a definitive restart announcement by June 30 unlikely. The Polymarket odds of 86% appear overconfident given the official denials and tactical shift.
There is currently no definitive announcement from Donald Trump, the U.S. government, or military that Project Freedom will be restarted by June 30, 2026. While the U.S. military is engaging in less public efforts to protect commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, these are not explicitly labeled as Project Freedom or a substantially equivalent program. Official denials and lack of clear, definitive statements reduce the likelihood of a qualifying announcement by the deadline.
While the administration is engaging in 'quiet' coordination with commercial shippers to facilitate transit through the Strait of Hormuz, official sources have explicitly denied the restart of 'Project Freedom' or any formal escort program [straitstimes.com](https://straitstimes.com/world/middle-east/us-looks-to-unblock-strait-of-hormuz-with-quiet-version-of-project-freedom), [iranintl.com](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202605260538). Given that the administration previously abandoned the initiative due to regional pressure and the risk of escalation, a formal, definitive announcement of a restart by June 30 is unlikely, as they appear to prefer low-profile, non-escort coordination methods.
Recent reports indicate that the U.S. Navy has resumed assisting vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, which suggests a revival of Project Freedom. However, there has been no formal announcement, which is required for the market to resolve to 'Yes'. The lack of a definitive statement from Trump or the U.S. government leaves some uncertainty.
Recent reports indicate conflicting information about US naval activity in the Strait of Hormuz. While the Wall Street Journal reported that the US Navy had restarted assisting vessel crossings under Project Freedom, both CENTCOM and other US officials have explicitly denied restarting the program, stating that no formal escorts are underway [iranintl.com](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202605260538). Instead, the US is engaging in quiet coordination with commercial ships without public announcements or formal designations [straitstimes.com](https://www.straitstimes.com/world/middle-east/us-looks-to-unblock-strait-of-hormuz-with-quiet-version-of-project-freedom). These actions fall short of the definitive, official announcement required for resolution. Given the lack of an explicit, official statement from Trump, the US government, or the military, and the current administration's preference for low-profile operations, the likelihood of a qualifying announcement before June 30, 2026, is low.
As of now, there is no definitive announcement of Trump restarting Project Freedom. However, there are ongoing quiet efforts, so a moderate probability is assigned.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.