Iran has historically resisted surrendering its enriched uranium stockpile, viewing it as a matter of sovereignty and leverage. The current geopolitical climate, including strained US-Iran relations and Iran's advanced enrichment capabilities, makes a voluntary surrender highly unlikely. Base rates for such complete concessions in nuclear negotiations are extremely low, and no credible reports suggest imminent agreement.
Given the current geopolitical tensions, Iran's historical reluctance to fully surrender its enriched uranium stockpile, and ongoing disputes over its nuclear program, it is unlikely Iran will publicly agree to surrender its enriched uranium stockpile by mid-2026. While diplomatic efforts continue, no recent credible reports suggest Iran is moving toward such a concession, making a 'Yes' outcome low probability but not impossible due to potential shifts in diplomacy or internal politics.
The Iranian leadership views its enriched uranium stockpile as a critical strategic deterrent and a primary bargaining chip in negotiations with the West. Given the current geopolitical climate, characterized by heightened tensions and the collapse of the JCPOA, there is no indication that Tehran is willing to relinquish this leverage, especially without a comprehensive sanctions-relief deal that currently appears politically impossible for both the U.S. and Iran.
Iran has historically been reluctant to surrender its enriched uranium stockpile, citing it as a matter of national sovereignty and nuclear rights. The current geopolitical climate, including tensions with the U.S. and Israel, suggests that Iran is unlikely to make such a concession without significant pressure or incentives. However, there is a small possibility of a diplomatic breakthrough or a shift in Iran's stance due to internal or external factors.
Iran has consistently expanded its uranium enrichment capabilities since the collapse of the JCPOA in 2018, and current diplomatic engagement remains limited. There are no active negotiations indicating a near-term agreement for Iran to surrender its stockpile. Geopolitical tensions with the U.S. and Israel, along with Iran's regional posture, reduce the likelihood of such a concession. Base rates of similar past agreements suggest low probability without a major policy shift.
While there have been past nuclear negotiations, ongoing geopolitical tensions and mistrust between Iran and major powers create uncertainty. Diplomatic efforts could lead to an agreement, but historical backtracking and current uncertainties limit the likelihood.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Iran has a history of airspace closures during heightened tensions, as seen in January 2026 and April 2024. However, such closures are rare and typically triggered by specific military or political events. As of early June 2026, no major closure has been reported, and the baseline probability of a new closure within the remaining weeks is low, estimated around 25% based on historical frequency and current geopolitical stability.
There is no current indication or credible reports suggesting Iran plans a major airspace closure by June 30, 2026. While Iran has previously closed its airspace for political or military reasons, such closures are typically reactive to specific events. Given the absence of escalating tensions or announcements, the likelihood of a broad closure remains low but not negligible due to regional instability.
While Iran has historically closed its airspace during periods of heightened military tension, such events are typically reactive to specific escalatory incidents. Given the current geopolitical climate and the lack of immediate indicators suggesting a major, non-weather-related, broad-scale closure of commercial aviation across multiple major airports, a low probability is assigned.
Iran has a history of closing its airspace during periods of political tension or military exercises, but such closures are not frequent. Recent events, such as the January 2026 closure, suggest that Iran is willing to take such measures under specific circumstances. However, there are no current indications or announcements that suggest an imminent closure by June 30, 2026.
As of now, there are no active indicators or credible reports suggesting that Iran plans to initiate a major closure of its airspace by June 30, 2026. Historical closures have typically occurred during periods of heightened military tension, such as in January and April 2026, but these were temporary and tied to specific geopolitical events. The absence of current military escalation, ongoing civil aviation operations, and no official notices from Iranian aviation authorities reduce the likelihood of a broad closure. Base rates of such rare events also support a low probability.
No current strong evidence of an impending broad airspace closure by June 30; recent closures have been partial or for specific reasons.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
MicroStrategy, under Michael Saylor, has consistently held its Bitcoin since 2020 without selling, even during market downturns, adopting a 'buy and hold forever' strategy. The company's corporate policy and recent debt issuances (e.g., convertible notes to buy more Bitcoin) reinforce a long-term accumulation stance. However, a small probability exists due to extreme scenarios like forced liquidation from a severe debt covenant breach or a regulatory mandate, though no current evidence points to such events by mid-2026.
MicroStrategy has historically been a strong proponent of holding Bitcoin as a long-term asset, with CEO Michael Saylor emphasizing accumulation rather than selling. While the company has occasionally used Bitcoin as collateral for loans, there is no strong indication they plan to sell their holdings outright by mid-2026. However, market conditions or strategic shifts could lead to some sales, so a moderate probability is assigned.
MicroStrategy has consistently maintained a 'buy and hold' strategy for Bitcoin, with Michael Saylor frequently reiterating that the company views Bitcoin as a long-term treasury reserve asset rather than a trading vehicle. While they may sell small amounts for tax purposes or to cover operational costs if necessary, the core corporate strategy is heavily incentivized to continue accumulating rather than divesting.
MicroStrategy has been a long-term holder of Bitcoin, consistently acquiring more despite market fluctuations. The company's CEO, Michael Saylor, has repeatedly expressed strong confidence in Bitcoin as a long-term investment. However, market conditions, financial needs, or regulatory changes could potentially lead to a sale.
MicroStrategy has consistently added Bitcoin to its holdings and adopted a 'no sell' strategy under CEO Michael Saylor, who has positioned Bitcoin as a core treasury reserve asset. Historical on-chain data and company statements show no sales since accumulating began, and there is strong ideological commitment to holding. However, regulatory changes, financial distress, or strategic shifts could force a sale, making a small probability appropriate.
MicroStrategy has held significant Bitcoin, but financial needs or market changes could prompt a sale, though no current strong signal.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
MicroStrategy has consistently stated its intention to hold Bitcoin long-term as a treasury asset, with CEO Michael Saylor emphasizing a buy-and-hold strategy despite volatility. The company has never sold any Bitcoin since beginning purchases in 2020, and there is no credible signal or financial pressure (e.g., debt covenants) that would force a sale by May 2026. Tax and market considerations further disincentivize selling. However, a small probability remains for unforeseen events, such as regulatory changes forcing liquidation, existential corporate crisis, or a fundamental shift in strategy, hence 5%.
MicroStrategy has historically been a strong proponent of holding Bitcoin as a long-term asset, with CEO Michael Saylor emphasizing accumulation rather than selling. However, given market volatility and potential strategic shifts over the next few years, there is a moderate chance they might sell some Bitcoin by May 31, 2026. The company's past behavior and public statements suggest a low likelihood but not negligible, hence a probability around 35%.
MicroStrategy has consistently positioned itself as a long-term Bitcoin holder, with Michael Saylor frequently stating that the company has no intention of selling its holdings. While the company has utilized debt and equity offerings to acquire more Bitcoin, there is no current strategic incentive to divest, making a sale unlikely unless the company faces extreme liquidity distress or a fundamental shift in corporate strategy.
MicroStrategy has been a long-term holder of Bitcoin, acquiring more despite market fluctuations. The company's CEO, Michael Saylor, has consistently expressed bullish sentiment about Bitcoin. However, financial pressures or strategic shifts could lead to a sale.
MicroStrategy has consistently positioned Bitcoin as a core treasury asset, with CEO Michael Saylor demonstrating strong commitment to holding. The company has repeatedly bought more Bitcoin and pledged to hold long-term, making a sale before 2026 unlikely. However, regulatory pressure, extreme financial distress, or a major shift in leadership could force a sale, so a small probability remains.
MicroStrategy has shown commitment to Bitcoin, but financial pressures or strategic shifts could lead to sales. On-chain data and public statements are key indicators.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Current IMF Portwatch data (May 2026) shows the 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transit calls around 45-50, below the 60 threshold. While tensions have eased somewhat since early 2026, shipping traffic has not fully recovered to pre-2024 levels, and the likelihood of a sustained spike above 60 within the next month is moderate. Base rates for such a rapid recovery are low given historical patterns of post-disruption normalization.
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical chokepoint for global oil and shipping traffic, and historically, transit volumes tend to normalize after periods of disruption due to geopolitical tensions or conflicts. Given the current global emphasis on maintaining open trade routes and the absence of major ongoing conflicts specifically blocking the Strait, it is likely that traffic will return to or exceed the threshold of 60 transit calls by June 15, 2026. However, regional instability and potential sanctions or conflicts could still pose risks, so a probability below certainty is appropriate.
Historical data from IMF Portwatch indicates that the 7-day moving average for transit calls in the Strait of Hormuz frequently fluctuates above 60 during normal global trade conditions. Despite regional geopolitical tensions, the essential nature of the Strait for global energy and commodity transport makes a return to these baseline traffic levels highly probable over the extended timeframe provided.
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical shipping lane, and traffic disruptions are typically temporary. Historical data shows that transit calls often rebound quickly after disruptions. However, geopolitical tensions and potential incidents could delay a return to normal traffic levels.
As of early 2024, the Strait of Hormuz has experienced periodic disruptions due to geopolitical tensions, but average daily transits typically range between 60 and 70 vessels. Recent IMF Portwatch data shows 7-day moving averages frequently near or above 60, indicating normal traffic levels have been intermittently sustained. Given the strategic importance of the strait and historical resilience of shipping lanes, traffic is likely to return to or exceed normal levels by June 2026 unless a major conflict erupts. Base rate of unimpeded transit over the past two years supports a more than even chance of reaching the threshold.
Historically, the Strait of Hormuz has high transit call volumes, and assuming no major disruptions by June 15, the 7-day moving average is likely to reach 60.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Strait of Hormuz traffic has been volatile recently due to geopolitical tensions and potential maritime disruptions (e.g., Houthi attacks, Iran-Israel conflict). While baseline historical normal daily transits are above 60, the 7-day moving average has recently dipped below 60, as of early 2025. Given ongoing risks of escalation and no clear diplomatic resolution by June 2026, the chance of sustained recovery to a 60+ average by end of June 2026 is moderate but not high.
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical chokepoint for global oil and shipping traffic, and historically, transit volumes tend to recover to normal levels barring major geopolitical disruptions. Current trends show relative stability in the region with no significant blockades or conflicts reported recently, and shipping traffic has been gradually increasing. Given the importance of the route and ongoing efforts to maintain open navigation, it is likely that the 7-day moving average of transit calls will reach or exceed 60 by June 30, 2026.
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical global maritime chokepoint for oil and trade. Historical data from IMF Portwatch indicates that transit volumes typically fluctuate but remain high due to the essential nature of the route, and a 7-day moving average of 60 calls is well within the standard operational range for this region, making it highly probable that this threshold will be met at some point before mid-2026.
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical shipping lane, and traffic disruptions are typically temporary. Historical data shows that transit calls often return to normal levels within a few months after disruptions. The base rate for such recovery is high, and there are no current major conflicts or disruptions reported that would significantly delay the return to normal traffic levels by the end of June 2026.
The Strait of Hormuz typically sees daily transits well above 60 ships, with historical averages around 70-80 before recent geopolitical tensions. While periodic disruptions have occurred due to regional conflicts, transit has generally rebounded quickly. Recent data from IMF Portwatch shows recovery toward normal levels, and no sustained blockade or permanent disruption is expected through mid-2026. Base rate of recovery after past incidents supports high likelihood of a 7-day average reaching 60+.
Normal traffic levels in the Strait of Hormuz typically result in transit calls well above 60, and there's no current evidence of a disruption preventing this by end-June.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The current US-Iran ceasefire, brokered in early 2026, is fragile and has faced repeated violations. While both sides have expressed interest in negotiations, no formal extension or new agreement has been announced as of mid-June 2026. The Trump administration's unpredictable foreign policy and Iran's domestic political pressures make a new announcement by June 30 unlikely, though not impossible. Base rates for such diplomatic breakthroughs in short timeframes are low.
Currently, there is no public indication that the U.S. has announced a new extension or successor agreement to the existing ceasefire with Iran. While ongoing negotiations and diplomatic efforts continue, official statements have not confirmed a formal extension or new framework by the U.S. government. Given the complex geopolitical dynamics and past patterns of intermittent agreements, a moderate probability reflects the possibility of a last-minute announcement but no strong evidence for it yet.
There is currently no formal, active ceasefire agreement between the United States and Iran that requires a periodic extension, nor are there active high-level diplomatic negotiations aimed at establishing such a framework. Given the current geopolitical climate and the lack of a structured 'ceasefire' mechanism to extend, the likelihood of an official announcement meeting the specific criteria by June 30, 2026, is extremely low.
The current geopolitical climate between the U.S. and Iran is tense, with ongoing negotiations and periodic escalations. While there have been ceasefires and agreements in the past, the likelihood of a new agreement or extension by June 30 is uncertain. The key factors include the current state of negotiations, recent diplomatic efforts, and historical patterns of U.S.-Iran relations.
As of now, there is no public indication that the U.S. and Iran are close to announcing a new agreement or extending a ceasefire by June 30, 2026. The current geopolitical environment shows continued tensions, with no formal ceasefire currently in place that would require extension. Historical patterns of U.S.-Iran diplomacy suggest that major breakthroughs are rare and typically preceded by visible diplomatic engagement, which is absent. Without active negotiations or high-level talks, the likelihood of a qualifying announcement remains low.
There have been recent diplomatic efforts between the US and Iran, but geopolitical tensions and differing interests remain significant factors.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Base rate of bilateral meetings between US and Cuba in recent years is extremely low. No credible reports or official announcements suggest a planned meeting before the deadline. The political climates remain adversarial, and no major push for engagement is evident.
While the US and Cuba have had a historically tense relationship, recent years have seen some cautious diplomatic engagement. However, as of mid-2024, there are no strong indications or announcements of an imminent in-person diplomatic meeting by May 31, 2024. The political climate and ongoing US policy towards Cuba suggest limited likelihood of such a meeting in the very near term.
Diplomatic relations between the US and Cuba remain strained, with no high-level bilateral summits or formal diplomatic negotiations currently scheduled before the end of May 2024. While low-level technical discussions on migration or law enforcement occasionally occur, the political climate in an election year makes significant diplomatic engagement unlikely.
Recent diplomatic relations between the US and Cuba have been strained, with no major meetings scheduled or announced. However, there is a historical precedent for occasional diplomatic engagements, and both countries have shown interest in improving relations in the past. The probability is adjusted based on the current political climate and the lack of concrete plans for a meeting by the end of May.
Recent trends show increased diplomatic engagement between the US and Cuba, including discussions on migration and reopening of consular services. High-level meetings have occurred in 2023 and early 2024, and both governments have expressed interest in further dialogue. Given the current trajectory and precedent of in-person talks, a formal meeting by May 31, 2026, is likely but not certain due to political and bureaucratic constraints.
There has been no recent public indication of an upcoming US-Cuba diplomatic meeting, and the relationship has been relatively quiet. No credible media reports or official announcements suggest a meeting by May 31.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
A permanent peace deal between the US and Iran is extremely unlikely by June 2026 due to deep-seated geopolitical tensions, lack of recent diplomatic progress, and the short timeframe. The two-week ceasefire in April 2026 is explicitly temporary and does not signal a lasting agreement. Historical base rates for such comprehensive deals between adversarial nations are very low, and no credible reports indicate serious negotiations toward a permanent end to hostilities.
Despite ongoing diplomatic efforts and some recent de-escalation measures, US-Iran relations remain strained with deep-rooted conflicts over nuclear programs, regional influence, and sanctions. A permanent peace deal requires significant breakthroughs and mutual concessions, which have historically been elusive. Given the complexity and current geopolitical tensions, a definitive permanent peace agreement by mid-2026 is unlikely but not impossible.
The geopolitical relationship between the United States and Iran is characterized by deep-seated ideological hostility, lack of formal diplomatic relations, and conflicting regional interests. Given the current trajectory of sanctions, proxy conflicts, and nuclear tensions, the likelihood of a formal, permanent peace treaty being negotiated and signed within the next two years is extremely low.
The historical context of US-Iran relations, marked by deep-seated animosity and periodic escalations, suggests a low probability of a permanent peace deal. While diplomatic efforts have occurred, significant trust and political will are lacking. Recent geopolitical tensions and the complex nature of the conflict further reduce the likelihood of a lasting agreement by June 7, 2026.
The US and Iran have no formal diplomatic relations and a history of deep mutual distrust. The April 2026 ceasefire appears temporary, and no public steps toward a permanent agreement are evident. Given the lack of ongoing high-level diplomacy and political constraints in both countries, the likelihood of a permanent peace deal by June 7, 2026, is very low.
As of now, there is no significant ongoing peace process between the US and Iran, and historical tensions and complex issues make a permanent deal by June 2026 unlikely.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
As of early 2026, US-Iran nuclear negotiations remain stalled. The US maintains maximum pressure sanctions, and Iran has advanced its enrichment beyond JCPOA limits. No formal talks are public, and both sides show little flexibility. Given the substantial political and technical obstacles, a formal deal by June 30, 2026 is unlikely.
Negotiations over the US-Iran nuclear deal have been ongoing but face significant challenges including political opposition in both countries, regional tensions, and disagreements over compliance and sanctions. While there is international pressure to revive some form of agreement, the complexity and mistrust make a timely deal by June 30, 2026, unlikely but not impossible.
The current geopolitical climate, characterized by heightened tensions, Iran's continued expansion of its nuclear program, and the lack of formal diplomatic channels, makes a comprehensive nuclear agreement highly unlikely before mid-2026. While back-channel communications may persist, the political constraints in both Washington and Tehran significantly limit the possibility of a formal, publicly announced deal.
While there have been discussions and indirect talks between the U.S. and Iran regarding a potential nuclear deal, significant obstacles remain, including political tensions, differing priorities, and the complexity of the negotiations. The base rate for successful nuclear negotiations is low, and specific evidence suggests that while there is interest, substantial progress is unlikely by June 30, 2026.
As of 2024, there is no active negotiation between the U.S. and Iran on a nuclear deal, and both sides show limited political incentive to re-engage before 2026. Iran's advancing nuclear program and U.S. domestic politics reduce the likelihood of a breakthrough. Historical precedent and current trajectory suggest a low but non-zero chance of a surprise agreement by June 2026.
Recent diplomatic engagement shows some momentum, but historical distrust and potential obstacles limit the likelihood.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Abelardo de la Espriella is a relatively minor candidate who ran in 2022 and received about 0.22% of the vote. In 2026, the presidential race is highly competitive with several strong contenders from major parties (e.g., Gustavo Petro, Sergio Fajardo, Federico Gutiérrez). There is no indication that de la Espriella has surged in polls or built a broad coalition. The base rate for a minor-party candidate winning is extremely low, and current polling shows him well below 5%.
Abelardo de la Espriella is primarily known as a lawyer and political figure but has not demonstrated significant national political support or presence as a presidential candidate. Colombian presidential elections are highly competitive with established political parties and figures dominating the race. Given the lack of current evidence of his candidacy or widespread political backing, his chances of winning are very low.
Abelardo de la Espriella is a prominent lawyer and political commentator, but he lacks a significant political base or party structure necessary to win a presidential election in Colombia. While he has expressed interest in political involvement, he is not currently considered a front-runner, and the political landscape is dominated by established parties and figures.
Abelardo de la Espriella is a relatively unknown figure in Colombian politics with no significant recent political experience or high-profile endorsements. The Colombian political landscape is dominated by established parties and figures, and there is no substantial evidence to suggest he has a strong base of support or campaign infrastructure.
Abelardo de la Espriella is not a prominent or widely recognized candidate in current Colombian political discourse, and there is no significant polling or media coverage suggesting he is a frontrunner for the 2026 presidential election. The field is expected to be competitive, with major parties and emerging figures from both left and right likely to dominate. Without strong institutional backing, name recognition, or early momentum, his chances remain very low.
Abelardo de la Espriella is a relatively unknown figure in Colombian politics with limited public profile and support, making it unlikely he will win the 2026 presidential election.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Spencer Pratt is a reality TV personality with no political experience or declared candidacy, while major LA mayoral races attract experienced politicians and serious fundraising. A celebrity outsider has never won a major mayoral election in a city of this size, so the base rate is extremely low. Current news and polling show no evidence of his candidacy or serious support. A probability of 0.01 reflects a very small chance of an unexpected development, such as a protest vote or viral campaign, but it is not 0.0 because such events are not impossible in principle.
Spencer Pratt is primarily known as a reality TV personality with no significant political background or public indication of running for mayor of Los Angeles. The mayoral race typically involves experienced politicians or public figures with strong political support. Given the lack of evidence of his candidacy or political engagement, the probability of him winning is very low.
Spencer Pratt is a reality television personality with no significant political experience, base of support, or campaign infrastructure required to win a major municipal election in Los Angeles. Given the high barrier to entry for mayoral candidates in a city of this size and the lack of any credible indication of a campaign, his chances are effectively zero.
Spencer Pratt is not a well-known political figure and has no prior political experience. The base rate for political outsiders winning major elections is low, and there is no evidence of significant support or campaigning for his candidacy.
Spencer Pratt is a reality television personality with no prior political experience, and there is no public indication he is running for office or has political ambitions. Los Angeles mayoral elections typically feature candidates with established political or civic leadership backgrounds. The field for 2026 is still forming, but Pratt's lack of political engagement, low public credibility in governance matters, and absence of campaign activity make a win extremely unlikely.
Spencer Pratt has no significant political track record or public indication of running for Los Angeles mayor in 2026, making a win highly unlikely.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.