Polymarket prediction markets currently show roughly 18-23% probability for this event, reflecting low near-term expectations. Iran has a long history of resisting demands to fully halt enrichment, and no credible reports of a breakthrough agreement have emerged. The June 30 deadline is only 12 days away, making a sudden public pledge unlikely without prior diplomatic signals.
While there is ongoing negotiation and a recent memorandum of understanding between the US and Iran that includes commitments related to nuclear weapons and enriched uranium, there is no current indication that Iran has agreed to completely end uranium enrichment by June 30, 2026. The existing agreements focus on managing enriched uranium and maintaining the status quo rather than ending enrichment entirely. Given the geopolitical complexities and Iran's historical stance on uranium enrichment, a full cessation agreement by the deadline seems unlikely but not impossible.
The probability of Iran agreeing to a total cessation of uranium enrichment is extremely low given its long-standing strategic commitment to its nuclear program as a leverage point and deterrent. While diplomatic channels remain open, there is no current evidence of a shift in policy that would lead to a complete halt, which is a much more stringent requirement than previous agreements that only capped enrichment levels [polymarket.com].
The probability is based on the current market odds and the geopolitical context. Iran has historically been resistant to ending uranium enrichment, and recent diplomatic efforts have not shown significant progress. The market odds reflect this skepticism, with most sources indicating a low probability of such an agreement by June 30, 2026.
Recent reports indicate a US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding that includes a commitment to deal with Iran's existing enriched uranium and a pledge that Iran will not have a nuclear weapon [bbc.co.uk](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cvgmqzr6p9mo). However, the agreement maintains the 'status quo' of Iran's nuclear program during negotiations and does not explicitly end uranium enrichment. Prediction markets show implied probabilities ranging from 23% to 38% [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/iran-agrees-to-end-enrichment-of-uranium-by-june-30), reflecting skepticism about a full end to enrichment. Given Iran's historical stance and the lack of a definitive public pledge to cease all enrichment, the probability remains low but non-trivial due to ongoing diplomacy.
Based on available market data and the resolution criteria, considering the time left until June 30, 2026, and the current odds, an independent estimate is made.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Based on web search results, the prediction market for Mojtaba Khamenei losing power by June 30 is heavily tilted toward 'No' (97% on Polyguana, 94% on Polymarket). The base rate for a newly installed Supreme Leader being removed within months of taking office is near zero. No credible reports of imminent removal, detention, or resignation were found. Although a related market on Ali Khamenei resolved 'Yes', that appears to be a different event (likely involving the elder Khamenei). Therefore, the probability of 'Yes' for Mojtaba is estimated at 3%.
Current prediction markets, including Polymarket and OddsShift, price the probability of a leadership change by June 30, 2026, at around 7%. There is no strong public evidence or credible reports indicating an imminent removal or resignation of Mojtaba Khamenei. Given the stability of the current regime and the lack of high-confidence external drivers, the low probability aligns with historical patterns of leadership continuity in Iran.
Current prediction markets and analysis indicate a very low probability of a leadership change for Mojtaba Khamenei by the end of June 2026. There are no credible reports or geopolitical indicators suggesting an imminent removal or resignation, and the market sentiment remains heavily skewed toward 'No'.
The prediction markets on Polymarket and OddsShift indicate a low probability of 7% for a leadership change in Iran by June 30, 2026. This suggests that the collective wisdom of traders and analysts currently sees a very low likelihood of Mojtaba Khamenei ceasing to be the de facto leader of Iran within the specified timeframe. The low trading volume and lack of significant smart money activity further support this low probability estimate.
Current prediction market pricing on Polymarket shows a 7% probability for a leadership change in Iran by June 30, 2026, with $2.8M in trading volume, indicating strong consensus and liquidity [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/iran-leadership-change-by). The model at OddsShift aligns with this price, suggesting no significant mispricing [oddsshift.com](https://oddsshift.com/radar/iran-leadership-change-by-june-30-689-922). Given the stability of Iran's leadership structure and lack of recent credible reports indicating imminent change, the base rate and market efficiency support a low but non-zero probability.
Polymarket shows low odds for a Yes outcome by June 30, with the lead outcome being No, and no strong indication of a leadership change within the timeframe.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The current trajectory strongly favors a NO outcome. Multiple missed deadlines (November 2024, February 2025, extended again in April 2026), persistent Israeli conditions for withdrawal (Lebanese army deployment, Hezbollah disarmament), and low market implied probabilities (5-15%) all point to continued IDF presence. With only 12 days left until the deadline, a sudden withdrawal announcement is very unlikely, though not impossible due to the relatively low bar of an announcement itself (not necessarily full implementation). I estimate roughly 8% probability of a YES announcement by June 30.
Current prediction markets and expert analysis assign roughly a 14.5% chance that Israel will fully withdraw from Lebanon by June 30, 2026. Multiple missed deadlines, ongoing ceasefire extensions, and unmet conditions such as Lebanese army deployment and Hezbollah disarmament make a withdrawal before the deadline unlikely. However, a rapid change in Lebanese army deployment or significant political shifts could increase the probability.
Current geopolitical conditions and the history of missed withdrawal deadlines suggest that a full Israeli military withdrawal from Lebanon by June 30, 2026, is highly unlikely. Prediction markets consistently price this outcome at a very low probability, reflecting the lack of progress on key conditions such as Hezbollah disarmament and the deployment of the Lebanese army to the border region [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/israel-withdraws-from-lebanon-by), [explorer.struct.to](https://explorer.struct.to/markets/israel-withdraws-from-lebanon-by-june-30-2026), [lines.com](https://www.lines.com/prediction-markets/politics/israel-withdraws-from-lebanon-by).
The current market consensus and recent ceasefire extensions suggest a low probability of Israel withdrawing from Lebanon by June 30, 2026. The primary factors include unmet withdrawal conditions, consistent delays, and the lack of significant progress in Lebanese army deployment or Hezbollah disarmament.
As of April 2026, Israel has not withdrawn its ground forces from Lebanon and remains tied to conditions including Lebanese army deployment and Hezbollah disarmament, which are unmet [lines.com](https://www.lines.com/prediction-markets/politics/israel-withdraws-from-lebanon-by). While a rapid shift could occur via U.S. pressure or Lebanese military action, the current trajectory and multiple missed deadlines make withdrawal by June 30, 2026, unlikely. Prediction markets reflect this with implied probabilities between 5.5% and 14.5%, but base rates on military withdrawals in active conflict zones suggest a slightly higher chance than current market pricing.
Current market data shows an implied probability of around 5.5% for Israel withdrawing by June 30, 2026, with factors like unmet withdrawal conditions and limited time contributing.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Prediction markets on Polymarket and WyldMarkets currently price a permanent peace deal by June 30, 2026 at 4-12%, with the most liquid market (WyldMarkets) at 4%. The deadline is only 12 days away, and there are no credible reports of a finalized treaty or joint public confirmation from both governments. Given the deep historical hostility, lack of recent breakthrough negotiations, and the extremely short remaining time, the probability is very low.
Current prediction markets assign a low probability (around 12%) to a permanent peace deal between Israel and Iran by June 30, 2026. The longstanding hostility, lack of recent breakthroughs, and geopolitical complexities make such an agreement unlikely in the near term. However, the possibility is not zero given ongoing diplomatic efforts and potential shifts in regional dynamics.
The geopolitical relationship between Israel and Iran is characterized by deep-seated ideological hostility, proxy conflicts, and a lack of diplomatic recognition. Given the current escalation of tensions and the absence of any formal diplomatic framework or ongoing high-level negotiations aimed at a permanent peace treaty, the likelihood of such a monumental shift occurring by June 30, 2026, is extremely low.
The prediction markets on Polymarket and WyldMarkets indicate a low probability of a permanent peace deal between Israel and Iran by June 30, 2026. Polymarket shows a 10% chance for June 30 and 20% for July 31, while WyldMarkets shows a 12% chance. The low probabilities reflect the current geopolitical tensions and the lack of significant diplomatic progress reported in recent credible sources.
The current geopolitical relationship between Israel and Iran remains highly adversarial, with no public indications of ongoing negotiations toward a permanent peace deal. Prediction markets such as Polymarket and WyldMarkets reflect low collective probabilities—ranging from 4% to 12%—for such an agreement by June 30, 2026 [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/israel-x-iran-permanent-peace-deal-by), [wyldmarkets.com](https://wyldmarkets.com/market/israel-x-iran-permanent-peace-deal-by-june-30-2026-262). While these markets incorporate crowd-sourced wisdom, the lack of diplomatic momentum, deep ideological and strategic differences, and history of proxy conflict suggest the base rate for a permanent peace deal remains extremely low. I adjust slightly upward from market lows due to the non-zero chance of a breakthrough mediated by third parties or regional realignments.
Prediction markets show low probabilities, with Polymarket and WyldMarkets indicating limited chance of a permanent peace deal by June 30, 2026.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Current prediction markets show a 3% implied probability as of mid-June 2026, reflecting no credible reports or events indicating that Kharg Island has fallen under non-Iranian control. The strict resolution criteria require clear, established control by another state or force, which has not occurred. Given the lack of any significant military or political development suggesting a change in control by the June 30 deadline, the probability remains very low.
Current market data and expert consensus indicate a very low probability (around 3%) that Kharg Island will no longer be under Iranian control by June 30, 2026. There have been no credible reports or official statements suggesting a change in control, and the geopolitical situation does not currently favor a transfer of control. Temporary disruptions or claims without actual control do not qualify, further lowering the likelihood.
There is no credible evidence or geopolitical indication that Iran is at risk of losing control of Kharg Island, a critical piece of its oil infrastructure, by the end of June 2026. The threshold for 'Yes' is high, requiring a complete loss of primary governmental or military control, which would represent a major escalation in regional conflict that is not currently supported by international reporting [explorer.struct.to](https://explorer.struct.to/markets/kharg-island-no-longer-under-iranian-control-by-june-30-561-854).
The current market prices on Polymarket and WyldMarkets indicate a very low probability (2-3%) of Kharg Island no longer being under Iranian control by June 30, 2026. Given the stringent resolution criteria and the lack of credible reporting or official statements suggesting an imminent change in control, the probability remains very low.
Current market pricing on Polymarket implies a 3% probability of Kharg Island no longer being under Iranian control by June 30, 2026, consistent with recent trading levels [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/kharg-island-no-longer-under-iranian-control-by-june-30-561-854-897). There are no credible reports of military action, political upheaval, or diplomatic developments suggesting a transfer of control. Given Iran's strong military presence on the island and the high threshold for resolution (requiring actual established control by another authority), the base rate of such an event remains extremely low.
Implied probabilities from markets like Polymarket, Orrery, and WyldMarkets are around 2-3%, and strict resolution conditions require actual control establishment, with no significant indicators of change.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
As of June 18, 2026, Polymarket odds sit at 22% and ClearMarket at 20%, reflecting the market's assessment that a return to a 7-day average of 60+ transit calls by June 30 is improbable. The current traffic is well below that threshold, and with only ~12 days remaining, a rapid de-escalation and recovery would be needed. Geopolitical conditions (fraying ceasefire, stalled Iran talks) do not support such a swift turnaround. I adopt a probability of 0.22, consistent with the aggregated market signal, as it incorporates the latest data and geopolitical context.
Current market data and expert sources indicate a low probability (around 22%) that the Strait of Hormuz shipping traffic will return to a 7-day average of 60 or more arrivals by the end of June 2026. Ongoing geopolitical tensions, stalled Iran talks, and recent traffic data suggest normalization is unlikely within this tight timeframe. The market prices and expert commentary reflect significant uncertainty and a pessimistic outlook for near-term normalization.
Current market sentiment and geopolitical indicators suggest significant doubt regarding a return to normal shipping levels by the end of June 2026. With ongoing regional instability and stalled diplomatic efforts, the likelihood of achieving a 7-day moving average of 60 transit calls remains low, as reflected in current prediction market pricing.
The current market odds on Polymarket and ClearMarket suggest a low probability of the Strait of Hormuz traffic returning to normal by the end of June 2026, with Polymarket showing 22% and ClearMarket showing 20%. The key factors include the recent fraying ceasefire and stalled Iran talks, which indicate ongoing geopolitical tensions that could delay the normalization of shipping traffic. Additionally, the tight timeline and the significant gap between June and December contracts reflect uncertainty about a quick resolution.
The current market odds on Polymarket indicate a 22% probability of the Strait of Hormuz traffic returning to normal by the end of June 2026, defined as a 7-day moving average of at least 60 ship arrivals according to IMF Portwatch data. This low probability reflects ongoing geopolitical tensions, including fraying ceasefires and stalled Iran talks, which continue to pose risks to shipping in the region. The significant gap between the June contract (22%) and later contracts (e.g., 86% by December) suggests that traders expect normalization to be delayed beyond June. [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-end-of-june), [clearmarket.fyi](https://clearmarket.fyi/events/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-end-of-june/)
Based on current market odds and lack of immediate recovery signs, the probability is relatively low.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
A US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding was signed in early June 2026, explicitly committing both sides to negotiate a final deal within 60 days (by early August). This creates a strong diplomatic framework and makes an in-person meeting before June 21 highly likely, as negotiations are already underway. Polymarket odds are at 78%, reflecting informed market belief, and the BBC confirms the MoU is in effect, with negotiations expected to start soon. The only risk is a last-minute scheduling delay or a breakdown in talks, but the existing agreement and public commitment make a meeting very probable.
Recent developments indicate a signed Memorandum of Understanding between the US and Iran, including commitments to negotiate a final deal within 60 days, suggesting active diplomatic engagement. The agreement and ongoing negotiations increase the likelihood of at least one in-person or indirect diplomatic meeting before June 21, 2026. Market predictions also reflect a relatively high probability, supporting this assessment.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has publicly confirmed that a new round of talks between the United States and Iran is scheduled to begin this Friday in Switzerland [iranintl.com]. Given that this meeting is explicitly aimed at negotiating the next phase of the recently signed Memorandum of Understanding [bbc.com], it meets the criteria for a deliberate, in-person diplomatic meeting.
Recent reports indicate that US-Iran talks are set to resume on June 18, 2026, in Switzerland, focusing on a first-stage memorandum of understanding and subsequent negotiations. The agreement includes a 60-day timeline for finalizing a deal, which suggests a high likelihood of in-person diplomatic meetings within the specified period. The public acknowledgment of these talks by Iranian officials further supports the expectation of a formal meeting.
Recent developments indicate a significant shift in US-Iran relations, including the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that extends a ceasefire and outlines steps toward a final agreement [bbc.com](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cvgmqzr6p9mo). This includes a 60-day negotiation timeline for a final deal, suggesting high-level diplomatic engagement is already underway. Given that indirect in-person meetings through mediators count, and considering the ongoing structured negotiations, the likelihood of a qualifying diplomatic meeting by June 21, 2026, is substantial.
Polymarket shows 78% odds, and there are confirmed upcoming talks in Switzerland as per Iran International, along with a ceasefire agreement, indicating a high likelihood.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The market has only 12 days remaining until the June 30 deadline, and as of June 18, 2026, there are no credible reports of a major, non-weather airspace closure by Iran. The Polymarket implied probability is around 10-33%, but given the short time window and the lack of recent escalatory triggers (e.g., military conflict or major geopolitical crisis), the base rate for such a closure in a typical 12-day period is very low. Iran has already conducted partial closures and military drills this year without escalating to a full qualifying closure, suggesting a high threshold for action.
Iran has a recent history of major airspace closures, including a total closure in January 2026 and a regional closure in April 2024, indicating a precedent for such actions. However, these closures are typically tied to specific political or military events, and there is no current public indication of an imminent closure by June 30, 2026. Given the past frequency but lack of immediate triggers, a moderate probability is appropriate.
While Iran has demonstrated a willingness to close its airspace during periods of heightened regional tension, such as in January 2026 and April 2024, these events are typically reactive to specific military escalations. Given the current geopolitical climate and the short remaining window until June 30, 2026, there is no immediate indication of a major, non-weather-related closure, leading to a moderate probability estimate consistent with current market sentiment.
Iran has a history of closing its airspace for political and military reasons, as seen in January 2026 and April 2024. However, such closures are not frequent and often tied to specific events. Given the lack of recent tensions or announcements suggesting an imminent closure, the probability is moderate but not high.
Iran has previously implemented major airspace closures during periods of heightened regional tension, such as in January 2026 and April 2024 [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-shuts-airspace-most-flights-flightradar24-says-2026-01-14/), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-airports-cancel-flights-until-monday-morning-2024-04-14/). However, as of mid-June 2026, there are no reports of imminent military escalation or active airspace shutdowns meeting the 'major closure' threshold. Recent closures have been partial or limited to specific flight rules and do not qualify [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-issues-airspace-notice-for-military-drills-near-strait-of-hormuz/3812508), [intellinews.com](https://www.intellinews.com/iran-suspends-general-aviation-and-vfr-flights-in-new-airspace-directive-421997/). The current geopolitical situation does not indicate an elevated likelihood of a full-scale closure in the remaining days before June 30. Market odds vary, with some platforms showing implied probabilities between 10% and 33%, suggesting low but non-negligible concern. Given the high bar for a 'Yes' resolution and absence of current qualifying conditions, the independent estimate is 15%.
No current indication of a major airspace closure meeting the criteria; previous closures were non-qualifying or prior.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Polymarket data shows the contract trading at ~3-7% probability as of mid-June 2026, with over $1.2M in volume and a clear market consensus that a full Russian capture of Kupiansk by June 30 is highly unlikely. Kupiansk remains a contested urban zone with entrenched Ukrainian defenses, and Russian advances in the area have been incremental, not sweeping. The deadline is only ~12 days away, making a rapid, complete capture of the entire municipality a near-impossibility given current battlefield dynamics.
Current market data and expert analysis indicate a very low probability (around 7%) that Russia will capture all of Kupiansk by June 30, 2026. The city remains contested with entrenched Ukrainian defenses, and Russian advances have been incremental rather than sweeping. The short timeline and historical attritional fighting suggest a rapid full capture is unlikely.
unparseable forecast JSON
The market data and expert analysis suggest a very low probability of Russia capturing all of Kupiansk by June 30, 2026. The current market prices indicate a 3-7% chance of this happening, reflecting the consensus that Russian advances have been incremental and the deadline is very near.
As of the latest data, Kupiansk remains under contested control with Ukrainian forces maintaining strong defensive positions. Russian advances in the region have been incremental and fall far short of capturing the entire municipality. The ISW map, the primary resolution source, shows no indication of full Russian control, and market pricing on Polymarket reflects a consensus probability of around 7% for a 'Yes' outcome [lines.com](https://www.lines.com/prediction-markets/politics/will-russia-capture-all-of-kupiansk-by). Given the current trajectory and the proximity to the June 30, 2026 deadline, a sudden and complete capture appears highly unlikely.
The market on Polymarket shows a 7% probability, with thin volume and a near-unanimous verdict pointing to no capture by the deadline.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
As of mid-June 2026, prediction markets like Polymarket and Orrery price this event at 9–17%, reflecting low but non-zero odds. The Trump administration has historically taken a hard line on Iran's nuclear program, and a definitive agreement to allow continued enrichment—even with caps—would represent a major policy reversal. With only ~12 days left until the deadline and no public announcement of a deal, the base rate for such a rapid, high-stakes diplomatic shift is very low.
Current market data and expert assessments indicate a low probability that Donald Trump or his authorized representatives will definitively agree to the continued enrichment of uranium by Iran by June 30, 2026. Given Trump's historically hardline stance on Iran and the complexity of reaching such an agreement, the likelihood remains low despite some recent minor increases in market-implied probabilities.
Donald Trump's historical stance on the JCPOA and his 'maximum pressure' policy toward Iran make a formal agreement accepting uranium enrichment highly unlikely. Given the current geopolitical climate and the short timeframe until June 30, 2026, there is no evidence of a shift toward such a diplomatic concession. Market sentiment on platforms like [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/what-iranian-demands-will-trump-agree-to-by-june-30) and [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/will-trump-agree-to-iranian-enrichment-of-uranium-by-june-30) reflects a strong consensus that such an agreement will not occur.
Given the current political climate and historical stance of Donald Trump on Iran's nuclear program, it is unlikely that he would agree to Iranian enrichment of uranium by June 30, 2026. Trump's administration has consistently taken a hardline approach against Iran, and there are no recent indications of a shift in policy. The market odds on Polymarket and Orrery also reflect a low probability, with Polymarket showing 17.4% and Orrery showing 9% [struct.to](https://explorer.struct.to/markets/will-trump-agree-to-iranian-enrichment-of-uranium-by-june-30) [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/what-iranian-demands-will-trump-agree-to-by-june-30) [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/will-trump-agree-to-iranian-enrichment-of-uranium-by-june-30) [predictmarketcap.com](https://predictmarketcap.com/markets/will-trump-agree-to-iranian-enrichment-of-uranium-by-june-30).
As of June 18, 2026, no definitive agreement from Donald Trump or the U.S. government accepting Iran's continued uranium enrichment has been reported. Market odds on Polymarket imply a low probability (ranging from 9% to 17.4%) [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/what-iranian-demands-will-trump-agree-to-by-june-30), but these reflect trader sentiment, not confirmed events. The resolution requires a public, definitive agreement, which has not occurred and is highly unlikely in the remaining 12 days given current geopolitical dynamics and lack of recent diplomatic breakthroughs.
As of June 14, 2026, the Polymarket implied probability for 'Yes' is 9%, and there's no significant new information to suggest a material change before the June 30 resolution date.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The recently signed 14-point Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the US and Iran explicitly states that the US will remove its forces from the proximity of Iran within 30 days after a final deal, and negotiations for that final deal are to be completed within 60 days (by mid-August 2026). However, the question asks about an agreement to withdraw troops by June 30, 2026. The MoU itself, signed in June 2026, already constitutes a definitive agreement to withdraw troops from the region surrounding Iran, as it commits to removal within 30 days of a final deal. Polymarket odds for 'Troop Withdrawal' are at 64%, but the MoU text and official announcements provide strong evidence that the US has already agreed to this condition. Therefore, the probability is very high that this qualifies as an agreement before the deadline.
Recent agreements between the US and Iran include commitments to remove US forces from the proximity of Iran within 30 days after a final deal is signed, as outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding and related statements. While the current administration and Trump have not explicitly announced troop withdrawal, the formal agreements and commitments suggest a high likelihood of troop withdrawal by June 30, 2026. However, the probability is not certain due to potential political or implementation delays.
The recently signed 14-point Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the United States and Iran explicitly commits the U.S. to removing its forces from the proximity of Iran following a final deal. Given that the MoU is already in effect and establishes a clear framework for the withdrawal of forces as part of the de-escalation process, it is highly probable that the commitment to this withdrawal has been formally established as required by the market criteria.
The recent US-Iran agreement includes a commitment to remove American forces from the 'proximity of Iran' within 30 days of a final deal being signed. Given the timeline and the specific language in the agreement, it is highly likely that Trump will agree to withdraw troops by June 30, 2026.
The recently signed 14-point Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the U.S. and Iran includes a commitment for the U.S. to remove its forces from the proximity of Iran within 30 days of a final deal being signed [bbc.com](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cvgmqzr6p9mo). The MoU has already been signed and implementation has begun, with a final deal expected within 60 days unless extended [mediaite.com](https://www.mediaite.com/media/news/read-updated-full-text-of-trumps-14-point-mou-with-iran/). Since the MoU constitutes a formal agreement and includes troop withdrawal as a binding term, and given Trump's public endorsement of the deal, this qualifies as a definitive U.S. agreement to withdraw troops. The commitment is explicit and part of a formal bilateral agreement, satisfying the resolution criteria before June 30.
The US-Iran MoU includes a commitment to withdraw forces from the proximity of Iran within 30 days after the final deal, and the MoU is a formal agreement. This meets the criteria for the question's resolution.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The Fed has held rates steady since January 2026 amid sticky inflation and a cooling labor market. Prediction markets consistently price an 80-93% chance of no change, reflecting the consensus that the FOMC will maintain its wait-and-see stance. While a small cut is possible if data weakens significantly, the base rate and current signals strongly favor a hold.
Market data from multiple prediction platforms shows a strong consensus that the Fed will not change interest rates after the July 2026 meeting, with probabilities ranging from 80% to 93%. Given the Federal Reserve's typical cautious approach to rate changes and the high volume of trading supporting no change, a 90% probability reflects both market sentiment and historical Fed behavior.
Market sentiment and historical patterns suggest a high likelihood of the Federal Reserve maintaining current interest rates during the July 2026 meeting. Prediction markets consistently price this outcome at a high probability, reflecting expectations of economic stability or a 'wait-and-see' approach by the FOMC.
The prediction markets Polymarket and WyldMarkets show high probabilities (80-94%) for no change in Fed interest rates after the July 2026 meeting. These markets aggregate the collective wisdom of traders and are often well-calibrated. The base rate for Fed rate changes is typically low when inflation is stable and economic conditions are steady, which is likely the case in mid-2026.
Prediction markets such as Polymarket and WyldMarkets show implied probabilities of 80% to 93% for no change in the Fed's interest rates after the July 2026 meeting, with significant trading volume indicating strong consensus [polymarkettrade.app](https://www.polymarkettrade.app/market/1654958) [wyldmarkets.com](https://wyldmarkets.com/market/will-there-be-no-change-in-fed-interest-rates-after-the-july-2026-meeting). The Federal Reserve typically maintains rate stability unless economic conditions demand adjustment, and current expectations suggest a steady policy path into 2026. Given the high market-implied probability and lack of strong signals for change, the independent estimate is 85%.
Aggregated market odds from Polymarket (80%, 86%) and WyldMarkets (93%) indicate a high likelihood of no change in Fed interest rates after the July 2026 meeting.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.