As of mid-June 2026, Polymarket shows a consensus probability of 18-23% for this outcome, reflecting a low base rate for Iran completely ceasing all uranium enrichment. Public negotiations have focused on caps and limits rather than a full halt, and there is no credible reporting of an imminent breakthrough to end enrichment entirely by June 30. The 18% figure incorporates a small chance of a last-minute diplomatic surprise, but the historical reluctance and lack of recent progress keep the probability low.
Given the current geopolitical tensions and Iran's historical reluctance to fully cease uranium enrichment, the probability of Iran publicly agreeing to end all enrichment by June 30, 2026, is low. While there is some possibility of an agreement as part of a broader peace process, no credible reports or negotiations indicate a high likelihood of such a pledge. Market probabilities also reflect a low chance, reinforcing this assessment.
Iran views its uranium enrichment program as a core component of its national sovereignty and a key leverage point in international negotiations. Given the current geopolitical climate, there is no indication that the Iranian leadership is prepared to abandon this program entirely, as doing so would represent a massive strategic concession without a clear, guaranteed path to sanctions relief or security assurances. The probability remains low because such a total cessation is fundamentally inconsistent with Iran's long-standing nuclear policy.
The market odds from Polymarket suggest a low probability of Iran agreeing to end uranium enrichment by June 30, 2026, with prices ranging from 18% to 23%. Historical context indicates Iran's consistent stance on nuclear enrichment, and recent geopolitical tensions reduce the likelihood of a sudden agreement. The base rate for such agreements is low, and specific evidence does not suggest a significant shift in Iran's position.
Current market pricing on Polymarket reflects an 18% chance of Iran agreeing to end all uranium enrichment by June 30, 2026 [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/iran-agrees-to-end-enrichment-of-uranium-by-june-30). This aligns with the lack of recent diplomatic breakthroughs and Iran's historical stance on maintaining enrichment capabilities. Absent a major shift in geopolitical dynamics or negotiations with the U.S. or Israel, a complete public agreement to end enrichment remains unlikely.
Based on the available market data and the time until the June 30, 2026 resolution date, considering the varying odds and the nature of the agreement criteria, a 35% probability is estimated.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The prediction market consensus of ~7% is well-calibrated given the short time horizon (16 days) and the lack of any credible reports of imminent removal, detention, or resignation of Mojtaba Khamenei. Base rates for sudden leadership changes in Iran are extremely low, and no high-confidence external drivers have emerged. While the resolution criteria are broad, the probability of a sudden event in this brief window remains small, aligning with the market price.
Current prediction markets, including Polymarket and OddsShift, price the probability of a leadership change by June 30, 2026, at about 7%. There is no significant credible reporting or high-confidence external driver indicating an imminent change in Mojtaba Khamenei's status. Given the stability of the current leadership and the market consensus, the probability remains low.
There is no credible evidence or geopolitical indication suggesting that Mojtaba Khamenei will lose his position as the de facto leader of Iran before June 30, 2026. Prediction markets and analytical models consistently price this event at a very low probability, reflecting the stability of the current leadership structure and the lack of imminent threats to his authority.
The prediction markets, particularly Polymarket, are pricing the probability of an Iran leadership change by June 30 at 7%. This is supported by a consensus of credible reporting and the current political stability in Iran, with no significant indicators suggesting an imminent leadership change. The base rate for such events is low, and the specific evidence does not suggest a higher probability.
timeout after 30000ms
Prediction markets like Polymarket, Polyguana, and OddsShift indicate a low probability of Iran leadership change by June 30.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Given the extremely short remaining time (until June 30, 2026), the lack of any credible reports of imminent permanent agreement, and the historical difficulty of resolving such conflicts, the chance of a permanent peace deal being signed and confirmed by both parties in the next ~16 days is very low. The temporary ceasefire extension in April shows willingness for short-term de-escalation but not a lasting settlement.
Given the long-standing hostility and complex geopolitical tensions between Israel and Hezbollah, a permanent peace deal by mid-2026 remains unlikely. While there have been temporary ceasefires, no definitive permanent peace agreement has been announced or appears imminent. The entrenched positions and history of conflict reduce the probability of a lasting peace deal within this timeframe.
The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah is deeply entrenched, characterized by long-standing ideological opposition and regional proxy dynamics that make a 'permanent' peace deal highly unlikely in the near term. While temporary ceasefires or de-escalation agreements are possible, the criteria for a permanent peace treaty—which requires a definitive end to hostilities—are extremely high and currently unsupported by the political climate in both entities. As noted in [explorer.struct.to](https://explorer.struct.to/markets/israel-x-hezbollah-permanent-peace-deal-by-june-30-2026), market sentiment remains heavily skewed toward 'No', reflecting the lack of diplomatic progress toward a lasting resolution.
unparseable forecast JSON
The historical relationship between Israel and Hezbollah has been marked by deep hostility and repeated conflict, with no prior instance of a permanent peace agreement. Recent developments mention only a temporary 10-day ceasefire as of April 16, 2026 [polymarket.com](https://explorer.struct.to/markets/israel-x-hezbollah-permanent-peace-deal-by-june-30-2026), which does not meet the threshold for a permanent deal. The lack of trust, ongoing regional tensions, and absence of active public negotiations toward a definitive peace framework strongly reduce the likelihood of a permanent agreement by June 30, 2026. Base rates for such breakthroughs in intractable conflicts are low, typically below 20%.
Historically, permanent peace deals between Israel and Hezbollah are rare, and as of the search date, there is no indication of a definitive agreement. The requirement for clear public confirmation or a signed written agreement adds a high bar.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Kharg Island is Iran's main oil export terminal, heavily defended and geopolitically critical. As of June 14, 2026, there are no credible reports of an ongoing invasion or imminent takeover. Polymarket prices the event at 3%, reflecting a very low assessed chance. Base rates for foreign powers seizing control of such a strategic Iranian asset within a few weeks are extremely low, and no major military buildup or diplomatic shift toward that outcome is evident. The strict definition excludes temporary disruptions, so even escalating tensions would likely not meet the threshold.
Current market data and analysis indicate a very low probability (around 3%) that Kharg Island will no longer be under Iranian control by June 30, 2026. There have been no credible reports or official statements suggesting a change in control, and the geopolitical situation around Kharg Island remains stable with Iran maintaining primary governmental and military control. Temporary disruptions or claims without actual control change do not meet the criteria for resolution as 'Yes'.
There is no credible evidence or geopolitical indication that Iran is at risk of losing control over Kharg Island, a critical piece of its oil infrastructure. The market consensus, as reflected on platforms like [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/kharg-island-no-longer-under-iranian-control-by-march-31) and [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/kharg-island-no-longer-under-iranian-control-by-june-30-561-854), consistently assigns a very low probability to this event, aligning with the lack of any ongoing military conflict or diplomatic process that would result in a transfer of sovereignty or control.
The current market odds on Polymarket indicate a very low probability (3%) of Kharg Island no longer being under Iranian control by June 30, 2026. Given the lack of recent credible reports or significant geopolitical shifts suggesting an imminent change in control, this estimate aligns with the market consensus. The base rate for such a significant territorial shift is low, and there is no specific evidence to suggest a higher probability.
Current market pricing on Polymarket reflects a 3% implied probability of Kharg Island no longer being under Iranian control by June 30, 2026 [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/kharg-island-no-longer-under-iranian-control-by-june-30-561-854). This aligns with the absence of credible reports indicating any loss of Iranian control, military action, or geopolitical shifts suggesting a change in status. The strict resolution criteria require actual established control by another authority, not temporary disruptions or claims, making a 'Yes' outcome highly unlikely barring unforeseen conflict.
As of June 10, 2026, the implied probability on Polymarket is 3%, and there's no significant evidence of Kharg Island changing control by the resolution date under the strict criteria.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The prediction market currently shows a 16.5% chance of YES, reflecting that the 7-day moving average of transit calls is well below the 60 threshold and has not recovered to that level since disruptions began. With only about two weeks left until the resolution date, a rapid and sustained increase to 60 is unlikely given the ongoing geopolitical tensions and shipping disruptions in the region. The market price serves as a strong aggregated signal, and absent new evidence of a major de-escalation, the probability remains low.
Current market data and trading odds indicate a low probability (around 17%) that the Strait of Hormuz traffic will return to a 7-day moving average of 60 or more transit calls by the end of June 2026. Given ongoing geopolitical tensions and historical fluctuations in traffic, a full return to normal levels by that date appears unlikely but not impossible.
Current market sentiment and geopolitical conditions suggest that significant disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz are likely to persist through June 2026. Given the low probability reflected in prediction markets and the ongoing regional instability, it is unlikely that the 7-day moving average of transit calls will reach the threshold of 60 by the end of the month.
The current market odds on Polymarket suggest a 17% chance of the event resolving to 'Yes', indicating that the Strait of Hormuz traffic is unlikely to return to normal by the end of June 2026. This low probability is likely due to ongoing geopolitical tensions and historical data trends in the region.
While current market odds suggest a ~16.5% chance, I slightly adjust upward to 0.18 due to base rate considerations: shipping traffic has shown resilience in past crises, and a return to 60+ transits is plausible if no major new escalation occurs. However, persistent regional tensions make a full normalization uncertain before June 2026.
The market currently has high odds of 'No' and without evidence of a quick increase in transit calls to reach the 60 threshold by end of June, the probability is low.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The initial two-week ceasefire expired over a month ago, and no official statement explicitly declaring it over has been issued. The market resolves only if such a statement is made by June 15, and barring a last-minute press release or Truth Social post, the status quo of silence strongly favors 'No.' Base rates for such specific, time-bound official announcements on a dormant topic are very low.
The ceasefire between the US and Iran was agreed upon in early April 2026 as a temporary two-week measure. Given the short duration and the current lack of any official statements from Trump or the US government explicitly ending the ceasefire by June 15, it is unlikely that a formal announcement declaring the ceasefire over will be made by that date. Additionally, announcements of violations or breaches do not qualify, and no credible reports indicate such a definitive termination announcement is imminent.
The temporary two-week ceasefire established in early April 2026 has long since expired by the June 15, 2026, deadline. Because the market requires an explicit, official announcement that no ceasefire is in effect, and the original agreement was only for two weeks, it is unlikely that the administration would issue a formal, specific declaration terminating a non-existent or expired agreement at this late stage. Most diplomatic communication would likely focus on current status rather than retroactively terminating a short-term agreement from two months prior.
The ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran was agreed upon on April 7–8, 2026, and is temporary. Given the historical context of U.S.-Iran relations and the nature of temporary ceasefires, there is a moderate chance that the ceasefire could be announced as over by June 15. However, the specific conditions for resolution require a public and official announcement, which adds uncertainty.
The ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran was agreed upon in early April 2026 for a two-week period, and there is no public indication as of June 14, 2026, that Donald Trump or the U.S. government has announced its termination [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/trump-announces-us-x-iran-ceasefire-over-byptptpt-20260607232555290). The absence of any qualifying official statement from Trump, the U.S. government, or military suggests the ceasefire commitment remains nominally in place or has transitioned quietly without a definitive announcement of its end. Base rates on geopolitical de-escalation and the lack of escalation reports further reduce the likelihood of a public termination announcement before June 15.
The ceasefire expired by June 15, but there's no current indication of an official announcement from Trump, US government, or military. The base rate is low as no such announcement has been made yet.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
President Trump has explicitly stated a deal is scheduled to be signed on June 14, 2026, and that the Strait of Hormuz will open immediately after, which would constitute a qualifying announcement of a new ceasefire framework or extension. While Iran's foreign ministry has contradicted this timeline, the market resolves based solely on U.S. government statements, and Trump's direct, public claim of a scheduled signing meets the criteria. The pattern of past missed deadlines (e.g., April 21 extension) introduces some uncertainty, but the specificity and proximity of the current claim make a 'Yes' more likely than not.
There is strong evidence that a ceasefire extension or new agreement is imminent, with President Trump and other officials indicating a deal is close and possibly to be signed soon. However, no official U.S. government announcement confirming the extension or new framework has yet been made, and Iran's statements suggest some delays. Given the high likelihood of an announcement before June 30 but some uncertainty about timing and official confirmation, a 75% probability is appropriate.
President Trump has publicly stated that a peace deal is scheduled to be signed, and multiple international sources, including the Prime Minister of Pakistan, have indicated that a final agreement is imminent. While there is some discrepancy between U.S. and Iranian officials regarding the exact timing, the high level of diplomatic activity and the explicit commitment from the U.S. administration to a signing event strongly suggest a formal announcement will occur before the June 30 deadline.
Recent statements from President Trump and other officials indicate a high likelihood of a peace deal or ceasefire extension being announced soon. Trump's announcement that a deal is scheduled to be signed on Sunday, along with Pakistan's prime minister's statement that a deal is likely to be finalized within the next 24 hours, strongly suggest that an official announcement is imminent. However, Iran's foreign ministry has indicated that the deal would not be signed on Sunday, introducing some uncertainty.
timeout after 30000ms
There are claims from Trump and Pakistan of an imminent Iran peace deal, but Iran has shown some initial contradiction. The existence of a draft deal adds to potential, but uncertainty remains.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Polymarket data from multiple sources shows the crowd-sourced probability at about 64-66% as of mid-June 2026, reflecting active negotiation momentum. With only ~16 days until the deadline, the absence of a major public breakdown and continued diplomatic engagement suggest a moderately high chance (slightly above the market price) of a last-minute deal, though historical base rates for such complex nuclear agreements indicate a non-trivial risk of failure.
Current prediction markets, which aggregate diverse information and expert opinions, assign about a 64% probability to a US-Iran nuclear deal being reached by June 30, 2026. This reflects ongoing diplomatic efforts and the possibility of a multilateral agreement including both parties. While uncertainties remain due to geopolitical tensions and negotiation complexities, the market consensus suggests a better-than-even chance of an official agreement.
While prediction markets show significant interest, the geopolitical climate between the U.S. and Iran remains highly strained, with deep-seated mistrust and conflicting regional priorities. Achieving a formal, publicly announced nuclear agreement by mid-2026 requires a level of diplomatic breakthrough that currently lacks momentum, making a 'No' outcome more probable than a 'Yes'.
The prediction market on Polymarket currently assigns a 64% chance of a US-Iran nuclear deal by June 30, 2026 [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/us-iran-nuclear-deal-by-june-30). This crowd-sourced probability reflects the collective judgment of traders reacting to new developments and information. The market's continuous updates and the significant volume of trading suggest a well-informed consensus. Adjusting slightly for potential overconfidence in prediction markets, I estimate a 65% probability.
While the current market price implies a 64% chance [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com), I slightly discount this due to historical difficulty in finalizing U.S.-Iran deals and the lack of active high-level diplomacy as of mid-2026. However, the possibility of a last-minute breakthrough or framework agreement keeps the probability above 50%. Adjusting for base rates and political risks, I estimate a 62% chance.
The current crowd-sourced probability from the prediction market is 64% for a 'Yes' resolution by June 30, 2026.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Trump's June 11 statement explicitly says the Strait of Hormuz will be reopened upon signing a finalized deal, which he indicated would happen 'shortly.' Given the deadline is June 30, and the deal appears close to finalization, a formal announcement lifting the blockade is highly probable within the remaining two weeks. The market odds (~30%) seem too low given this recent development.
Given the recent announcement of the blockade on April 12, 2026, and the ongoing high tensions in the region, it seems unlikely that the blockade will be lifted and officially announced by June 30, 2026. However, there is some possibility of diplomatic progress or a deal that could lead to an official lifting announcement within this timeframe, especially since Trump mentioned the blockade would remain until a transaction is finalized. The probability is therefore low but not negligible.
Recent reports indicate that a deal between the U.S. and Iran is in the final stages of being settled, with President Trump explicitly stating that the blockade will remain in effect only until the transaction is finalized [cnbc.com]. Given that the agreement is described as being at the highest level and awaiting finalization, it is highly probable that a formal announcement regarding the lifting of the blockade will occur before the June 30, 2026 deadline.
Recent statements by President Trump indicate that a deal with Iran is close to finalization, which would include the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. However, the blockade remains in place until the deal is signed. Given the proximity to the resolution date and the likelihood of a deal being finalized, there is a significant chance of an announcement being made.
While diplomatic progress has been announced, Trump has clearly stated the blockade remains active until final deal signing. No qualifying public announcement lifting the blockade has been made as of June 14, 2026. Given the requirement for an explicit, official statement and the lack thereof so far, the probability remains low but non-zero, as a formal announcement could still occur before June 30.
As of June 11, 2026, Trump stated the naval blockade will remain until transaction finalization, but no explicit announcement of lifting by June 30 has been made. There's uncertainty around the timing of finalization and the need for a clear official statement.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Recent polls (Opinium 46-41, Survation 43-40) consistently show Andy Burnham leading Robert Kenyon by 3-6 percentage points, despite Reform's national surge. Burnham's strong personal brand in Greater Manchester gives him a structural advantage in this Labour-held seat. While Kenyon has a realistic chance given Reform's local strength and tight polls, the polling average and Burnham's incumbency advantage suggest about a 75% chance for Burnham, leaving Kenyon with roughly 25%.
Current polling and prediction markets show Robert Kenyon as a strong contender but trailing Andy Burnham. Polls indicate a close race with Kenyon around 39-41% and Burnham around 46-49%. Market prices and expert analysis suggest Kenyon has a significant chance but is not the favorite, with factors like Burnham's personal vote and local popularity favoring Labour. However, Reform UK's rising support and potential campaign dynamics keep Kenyon's chances substantial.
Recent polling from [pollcheck.co.uk](https://www.pollcheck.co.uk/by-elections/makerfield) shows a tight race between Labour's Andy Burnham and Reform UK's Robert Kenyon, with polls consistently placing Kenyon within a few percentage points of Burnham. While Burnham benefits from high personal name recognition as the Mayor of Greater Manchester, the national trend of declining Labour support and Reform UK's strong local performance in the 2024 general election make this a highly competitive contest. Given the margin of error and the volatility of by-elections, a victory for Kenyon is a significant possibility, though Burnham remains the slight favorite.
The most recent polls show Robert Kenyon (Reform UK) trailing Andy Burnham (Labour) by a narrow margin, with Burnham leading by 5 percentage points in the latest Opinium poll (46% to 41%) [pollcheck.co.uk](https://www.pollcheck.co.uk/by-elections/makerfield). However, Reform UK has shown significant growth in the area, and Kenyon's campaign could benefit from anti-Labour sentiment and tactical voting. The base rate for by-elections can be volatile, and Kenyon's strong showing in previous elections suggests a competitive race.
Recent polling and prediction markets suggest a highly competitive race. A June 2026 Opinium poll shows Andy Burnham (Labour) leading with 46% to Robert Kenyon's (Reform UK) 41% [pollcheck.co.uk](https://www.pollcheck.co.uk/by-elections/makerfield), while Survation has it 43-40 [pollcheck.co.uk](https://www.pollcheck.co.uk/by-elections/makerfield). Prediction markets imply a 39% chance for Kenyon [lines.com](https://www.lines.com/prediction-markets/elections/makerfield-by-election-winner), consistent with current odds. Burnham’s strong personal vote in Greater Manchester is a key counterweight to Reform’s local momentum.
Recent polls show Robert Kenyon close to Andy Burnham, with factors like Reform UK's rise and Burnham's personal vote balancing. Market odds are around 25-39%.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The deadline is only 16 days away, and capturing the entire municipality of Kupiansk would require a rapid and complete military advance. Current battlefield reports indicate slow Russian gains, and the area remains heavily contested with entrenched Ukrainian defenses. The high liquidity prediction market reflects strong consensus at 7% YES, which aligns with the low likelihood of a major breakthrough in such a short time.
Current prediction markets and expert analysis place the probability of Russia capturing all of Kupiansk by June 30, 2026, at about 7%. This low probability is due to the entrenched Ukrainian defenses, incremental Russian advances, and the short time frame remaining. The market consensus, supported by over $1.2 million in trading volume, strongly favors that Russia will not achieve full control by the deadline.
The current military situation in the Kupiansk sector remains characterized by attritional warfare rather than rapid breakthroughs. Given the short timeframe remaining until the June 30, 2026, deadline and the lack of evidence suggesting a sudden collapse of Ukrainian defensive lines, it is highly improbable that Russia will achieve full control of the entire municipality as defined by the ISW map criteria.
The market data and recent military assessments indicate a very low probability of Russia capturing all of Kupiansk by June 30, 2026. The Polymarket contract shows a 7% probability, reflecting the consensus of traders who have moved significant capital. The key factors include the contested status of Kupiansk, incremental Russian advances, and the short timeframe remaining.
As of June 14, 2026, Kupiansk remains under Ukrainian control with no indication of full Russian capture. The ISW map [ISW](https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375) shows only partial Russian advances, and the city is still contested. Market pricing on Polymarket reflects a 7% chance of full capture by June 30 [lines.com](https://www.lines.com/prediction-markets/politics/will-russia-capture-all-of-kupiansk-by), aligning with low likelihood given entrenched Ukrainian defenses and slow Russian progress. With less than two weeks remaining, a rapid, complete takeover is highly improbable.
The Polymarket market indicates a 7% probability, with thin volume and a sub-90-day deadline, reflecting low expectations for Russia to capture all of Kupiansk by June 30.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The UK has prepared warships (RFA Lyme Bay, HMS Dragon) for a mine-clearing mission in the Strait of Hormuz, but official statements emphasize deployment only after a US-Iran peace deal. As of June 14, 2026, no such deal has been finalized, and no transit through the narrowest portion has been reported. With only 16 days remaining, the probability of a confirmed transit is low, though not impossible if a deal materializes quickly. The Polymarket odds (92% No) align with this assessment.
The UK has already deployed the RFA Lyme Bay, a mine-hunting ship, towards the Strait of Hormuz and is preparing to send at least one missile-loaded warship to protect it. While the actual transit depends on a peace deal and operational decisions, the UK's active preparations and public statements indicate a high likelihood of warship transit through the Strait by June 30, 2026.
While the UK has prepared the RFA Lyme Bay and other naval assets for a potential mine-clearing mission in the Strait of Hormuz, official statements emphasize that this deployment is contingent upon a finalized peace agreement between the U.S. and Iran. Given that such a deal remains pending and the mission is described as 'still in doubt,' it is unlikely that a transit will occur before the June 30, 2026, deadline unless diplomatic progress accelerates significantly.
The UK has expressed readiness to deploy naval assets to the Strait of Hormuz, including the RFA Lyme Bay and HMS Dragon, for mine-clearing operations. However, the deployment is contingent on a peace deal between the US and Iran, which is still pending. The UK's involvement is part of a broader Anglo-French initiative to secure the strait, but the timing and conditions of the deployment remain uncertain.
timeout after 30000ms
The UK's mine-clearing mission to the Strait of Hormuz is pending a peace deal, and there is no confirmed transit through the strait. No official confirmation or overwhelming credible reporting of a warship transit has been provided.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.