With only 18 days remaining until the resolution date and no major signs of imminent removal or detention of Mojtaba Khamenei reported, the probability is low. The prediction market for this specific event is trading around 7% YES, reflecting the collective assessment of traders. Additionally, the recent leadership change from Ali Khamenei to Mojtaba Khamenei may have temporarily stabilized the regime, further reducing the likelihood of a sudden change in such a short window.
Current prediction markets, which aggregate diverse information and trader sentiment, price the probability of a leadership change by June 30, 2026, at about 7%. There is no strong public indication or credible reports suggesting imminent removal or resignation of Mojtaba Khamenei before this date, and the political structure in Iran tends to favor stability in the Supreme Leader position. Therefore, the low probability reflects both the difficulty of such a change and the lack of current signals.
There is no credible evidence or reporting suggesting an imminent change in Iran's leadership. Prediction markets consistently reflect a high degree of confidence in the status quo, with the 'No' outcome trading at a significant majority, and there are no geopolitical indicators suggesting a sudden transition before the June 30, 2026 deadline.
Prediction markets like Polymarket and OddsShift currently price the probability of an Iran leadership change by June 30, 2026, at around 7%. This reflects the collective judgment of traders based on available information and recent developments. The low probability suggests that significant leadership changes are not widely expected in the near term.
The current prediction market on Polymarket prices the 'Yes' outcome at 7 cents, implying a 7% probability of a leadership change in Iran by June 30, 2026 [oddsshift.com](https://oddsshift.com/radar/iran-leadership-change-by-june-30-689-922). This is consistent with the structural stability of Iran's political system and the absence of credible public reports indicating imminent leadership change. The Supreme Leader, however, is Ali Khamenei, not Mojtaba Khamenei—Mojtaba is widely seen as a potential successor, suggesting possible confusion in the market description [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/iran-leadership-change-by). Given the conflation and lack of significant political upheaval, the probability remains low but non-zero due to health or internal dynamics.
Polymarket prices the 'Yes' outcome at 7% as of June 2026, indicating low likelihood.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The deadline is only days away, and recent evidence shows that even as prior deadlines (June 9) approached with regional tensions, no official Israeli-initiated broad airspace closure was announced. Government statements and press reports continue to focus on diplomatic measures and West Bank sanctions, not aviation restrictions. Polymarket odds for the June 9 deadline dropped to ~2% and the June 15 contract also sits very low, reflecting a clear absence of any official signal or credible reporting that Israel intends to shut down its airspace nationwide before the cutoff.
Recent market data and official statements indicate a very low likelihood of Israel initiating a major airspace closure by June 15. There have been no official signals or government statements suggesting an impending nationwide airspace shutdown, and market odds have dropped sharply to low single digits as the deadline approaches. Regional tensions have not translated into Israeli aviation restrictions, and the focus remains on diplomatic and sanction measures unrelated to airspace closure.
Current market sentiment and recent reporting indicate a very low likelihood of a nationwide airspace closure by June 15. Prediction markets have seen a sharp decline in 'Yes' probabilities as the deadline approaches, with no official government signals or aviation authority announcements suggesting such a measure is imminent. While regional tensions remain, the focus of recent diplomatic and government activity has been on sanctions and West Bank policy rather than civil aviation restrictions [global-political-spotlight.com, explorer.struct.to].
Recent market data and analysis indicate a sharp drop in the probability of Israel closing its airspace by June 15, with odds falling to around 2% as of June 9. This is due to the lack of official statements or actions from Israeli authorities indicating an imminent nationwide airspace closure. The focus of recent government statements and press reports has been on West Bank sanctions and diplomatic actions, not aviation restrictions. Additionally, the resumption of routine operations after missile sirens suggests no immediate plans for a major airspace closure.
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As of June 9, odds had dropped sharply to low single digits with no official signals of a nationwide closure, indicating low likelihood.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
As of June 12, 2026, there are no credible reports indicating that Israel and Hezbollah are nearing a permanent peace deal. The only recent agreement is a temporary 10-day ceasefire from April 16, 2026, which explicitly does not qualify as permanent. Given the deep-rooted hostilities between the two actors and the lack of any ongoing negotiations for a lasting accord, the chance of a 'permanent peace deal' being signed and formally adopted by both sides before June 30 is extremely low.
Given the long-standing hostility and complex geopolitical tensions between Israel and Hezbollah, a permanent peace deal by mid-2026 remains unlikely. While ceasefires and temporary agreements have occurred, a definitive, lasting peace treaty requires significant shifts in political will and security guarantees, which have not been indicated recently. The absence of public confirmation or formal agreements so far further lowers the probability.
The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah is deeply entrenched, with historical animosity and conflicting strategic objectives that make a 'permanent' peace deal highly unlikely in the short term. Current diplomatic efforts, such as the April 2026 ceasefire, have focused on temporary de-escalation rather than a comprehensive, lasting treaty, and there is no indication of a breakthrough that would satisfy the strict criteria for a permanent end to hostilities by June 30, 2026 [explorer.struct.to](https://explorer.struct.to/markets/israel-x-hezbollah-permanent-peace-deal-by-june-30-2026).
The likelihood of a permanent peace deal between Israel and Hezbollah by June 30, 2026, is low. Historical context shows that such agreements are rare and typically require significant diplomatic breakthroughs. Current tensions and ongoing conflicts suggest that a lasting peace deal is unlikely in the near term.
The historical relationship between Israel and Hezbollah is marked by deep hostility and repeated conflict, with no prior instance of a permanent peace agreement. Recent developments, such as temporary ceasefire extensions, do not meet the threshold for a permanent deal [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/israel-x-hezbollah-permanent-peace-deal-by). Credible sources indicate ongoing tensions and strategic mistrust, making a definitive, lasting agreement unlikely by June 30, 2026. While diplomatic efforts may continue, the bar for a 'permanent' peace deal is high and not likely to be met given current trajectories.
While there have been ceasefires, a permanent peace deal between Israel and Hezbollah is highly complex and there's no strong indication of a definitive agreement by the deadline.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
A permanent peace deal between Israel and Iran by June 30, 2026, is extremely unlikely given the deep-seated hostility, ongoing proxy conflicts, and lack of any credible diplomatic process. The search results only show Polymarket prediction pages with no evidence of negotiations or political will for such an agreement. Base rates for permanent peace deals between such adversaries are near zero, and no recent developments suggest a breakthrough.
Given the longstanding hostility and deep geopolitical tensions between Israel and Iran, a permanent peace deal by mid-2026 is unlikely. There have been no recent credible reports indicating serious progress toward such a definitive agreement, and both countries maintain adversarial positions. While diplomatic breakthroughs are possible, the entrenched conflict and lack of current negotiations reduce the probability significantly.
The geopolitical relationship between Israel and Iran is characterized by deep-seated ideological hostility, proxy conflicts, and a lack of diplomatic recognition. Given the current trajectory of regional tensions and the absence of any formal diplomatic framework or ongoing high-level negotiations, the likelihood of a permanent peace treaty being signed by mid-2026 is extremely low.
The historical context of Israel-Iran relations is marked by deep-seated hostility, with no recent signs of significant diplomatic progress. Both nations have been engaged in proxy conflicts and direct confrontations, making a permanent peace deal by June 30, 2026, highly unlikely. The absence of any current negotiations or mediation efforts further reduces the probability of such an agreement being reached in the near future.
As of now, there is no indication of ongoing negotiations between Israel and Iran toward a permanent peace deal. The two nations remain deeply adversarial, with Iran supporting groups like Hezbollah and Hamas that are hostile to Israel, and Israel viewing Iran as an existential threat due to its nuclear program and rhetoric. Historical precedents for peace deals in the region (e.g., Israel-Egypt, Israel-Jordan) involved direct conflict cessation following wars or sustained diplomacy, none of which currently exist between Israel and Iran. Given the entrenched hostility and lack of diplomatic engagement, the likelihood of a permanent peace agreement by June 30, 2026, is effectively zero.
There is no current evidence of a definitive permanent peace deal being reached by the June 30, 2026 deadline, considering long-standing tensions and the need for a clear, definitive agreement.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Based on current IMF Portwatch data, the 7-day moving average of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz is significantly below 60, likely in the 30-40 range due to ongoing geopolitical tensions and shipping disruptions. With only three days remaining until the June 15 deadline, a rapid surge to 60 or above is highly improbable without an immediate and dramatic de-escalation, for which there is no evidence. Polymarket odds at ~3.4% confirm this assessment, and historical base rates for such a quick recovery are extremely low. Therefore, I estimate a 4% chance of Yes.
Current data and market sentiment indicate that shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains significantly disrupted due to ongoing geopolitical tensions and security concerns in the region. The threshold of a 7-day moving average of 60 or more transit calls has not been met recently, and there are no strong indications of imminent normalization by June 15, 2026. Given the strategic importance and volatility of the area, a rapid return to normal traffic levels is unlikely within this timeframe.
Current market sentiment and available data indicate that shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz remains significantly below the threshold required for this market to resolve as 'Yes'. Given the persistent geopolitical tensions and the current trend in transit calls, it is highly unlikely that the 7-day moving average will reach 60 by the June 15, 2026 deadline.
The market currently gives this outcome a 1% probability, reflecting geopolitical shipping constraints. The resolution depends on IMF Portwatch data, which is the authoritative source for this market.
While the threshold of 60 arrivals is achievable under normal conditions, persistent regional instability and low current traffic levels make it unlikely. However, de-escalation or improved reporting could allow a temporary spike, giving a small but non-negligible chance of meeting the threshold before June 2026.
Current market odds are heavily skewed towards 'No', and there's no clear indication of a quick return to normal traffic levels as defined by the 7-day moving average of at least 60 by June 15.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The Polymarket prediction market currently shows a 16.5% chance of YES, reflecting strong trader skepticism that the 7-day moving average of transit calls will reach 60 by June 30, 2026. Given ongoing geopolitical tensions in the region and the fact that traffic has not yet recovered to that threshold as of mid-June, the market-implied probability is a reasonable anchor. However, a slight upward adjustment to 17% accounts for the possibility of a sudden diplomatic breakthrough or a temporary surge in traffic, though such an outcome remains unlikely.
Current market data from Polymarket shows a low probability (around 16.5%) that the Strait of Hormuz traffic will return to normal levels (7-day moving average of 60 or more transit calls) by the end of June 2026. Given ongoing geopolitical tensions and disruptions in the region, along with the current low market confidence, the probability remains low but not negligible.
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical global chokepoint, and current geopolitical tensions in the Middle East have led to sustained disruptions in maritime traffic. Given the persistent nature of these regional conflicts and the structural shifts in shipping routes, it is unlikely that traffic volumes will return to the specified threshold of a 7-day moving average of 60 arrivals by the end of June 2026. Market sentiment on prediction platforms also reflects a strong skepticism toward a return to 'normal' levels within this timeframe.
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical maritime chokepoint, and its traffic levels can be influenced by geopolitical tensions and global trade patterns. The threshold of a 7-day moving average of 60 transit calls is relatively high, suggesting that significant traffic recovery is needed. Given the current geopolitical climate and historical traffic patterns, there is a moderate chance of meeting this threshold by the end of June 2026.
The current market odds on Polymarket reflect a 16.5% chance of the 7-day moving average of ship arrivals in the Strait of Hormuz reaching 60 or more by June 30, 2026, based on IMF Portwatch data [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-end-of-june). This low probability suggests persistent concerns about regional tensions, rerouting of vessels, or ongoing disruptions affecting traffic levels. The threshold of 60 arrivals is meaningful, and failure to reach it would indicate continued below-normal traffic, consistent with recent trends of caution in one of the world’s key energy chokepoints.
Based on current odds and the requirement for a 7-day moving average of at least 60, the likelihood is low.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Multiple authoritative sources (Reuters, AP, Straits Times) on June 12 report that a US-Iran peace memorandum is close to being signed, possibly as soon as June 14, with Vice President Vance attending. The terms reportedly include a ceasefire extension, reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and sanctions relief. President Trump and Iranian officials have both stated a deal is near. Given the market resolves on a US announcement (not implementation) and the reported signing would clearly qualify, the probability is high. However, past failed negotiations and Trump's history of premature claims introduce some risk, so I set the probability at 0.85 rather than higher.
Multiple credible sources report that the US and Iran are close to signing a peace memorandum or ceasefire extension by mid-June, with a likely signing date around June 14 in Geneva. US officials, including Vice President Vance, have indicated significant progress and imminent agreement, and the deal reportedly includes terms consistent with a ceasefire extension. Given the proximity to the deadline and the strong official signals, it is highly likely the US will officially announce an extension or new agreement by June 30.
Multiple credible sources, including the Associated Press and Reuters, report that the U.S. and Iran are on the verge of a significant peace agreement, with a potential signing date as early as June 14 in Geneva. High-level officials from both sides have publicly signaled that a deal is imminent, and President Trump has expressed optimism regarding the finalization of terms. Given the proximity to the June 30 deadline and the advanced state of negotiations, a formal announcement of a new agreement or ceasefire extension is highly probable.
Recent reports indicate that the U.S. and Iran are close to signing a memorandum that includes a ceasefire extension. President Trump's statements and the ongoing negotiations in Geneva suggest a high likelihood of an official announcement by June 30. However, past instances of similar declarations not materializing slightly temper the probability.
Multiple credible sources, including [straitstimes.com](https://www.straitstimes.com/world/middle-east/us-iran-peace-memorandum-could-be-signed-on-june-14-in-geneva-source-says) and [military.com](https://www.military.com/us-and-iran-are-close-to-a-deal-to-end-their-war-officials-say), report that a U.S.-Iran peace memorandum is close to being signed, with a potential ceremony in the coming days. The U.S. Vice President and President have made strong public statements indicating a deal is imminent, and key terms are reportedly finalized. While no official U.S. announcement of a ceasefire extension or new agreement has yet occurred, the convergence of high-level signals and reporting suggests a qualifying announcement is likely before June 30.
Recent credible reports indicate US and Iran are close to a deal with potential June 14 signing, suggesting a high likelihood of a qualifying US announcement before June 30.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Multiple credible reports indicate a memorandum to halt hostilities could be signed as soon as June 14 in Geneva, with both US and Iranian officials signaling finalization of language and high-level attendance (Vance and Qalibaf). President Trump stated the deal is approved by Iran's Supreme Leader and that signing could occur 'over the weekend in Europe.' However, the deal is described as a 'memorandum' and Iran insists it does not cede control of the Strait of Hormuz, and the exact language must explicitly indicate a permanent end to military hostilities to meet the market criteria. Given the advanced stage of negotiations and public statements from both sides, a signed agreement is likely but not certain, and the precise wording remains a key ambiguity.
Despite ongoing diplomatic efforts and some temporary ceasefire agreements, there is no current indication of a definitive, permanent peace deal between the US and Iran. Historical tensions, regional conflicts, and the complexity of negotiations make a lasting agreement by mid-2026 unlikely. Temporary ceasefires or progress statements do not meet the criteria for a permanent peace deal.
While there are reports of a potential memorandum being finalized for signing on June 14 in Geneva [straitstimes.com], the negotiations involve significant, complex demands from both sides, including Iranian requirements for a cessation of hostilities in Lebanon and US demands regarding nuclear non-proliferation. Given the short timeframe remaining until the June 15 deadline and the history of last-minute diplomatic hurdles, there is a substantial risk that the deal will either fail to be finalized or fall short of the 'permanent peace' criteria required for a 'Yes' resolution.
Recent reports indicate that a memorandum between the US and Iran to halt their war could be signed as soon as June 14, 2026, in Geneva. The language of the memorandum is being finalized, and key demands from both sides, such as the waiving of sanctions on Iran's oil and the unfreezing of Iranian assets, are being addressed. However, the exact terms and whether both governments will publicly confirm a definitive agreement remain uncertain.
The absence of formal negotiations, combined with the deeply entrenched hostilities and the lack of political will on both sides, makes a permanent peace deal highly unlikely by the deadline. The temporary ceasefire does not constitute progress toward a lasting agreement, and no credible pathway to such a deal has emerged as of mid-2026.
There is a potential for a deal to be signed by June 14, 2026, as per reports, but it's still being finalized and needs to meet criteria of explicit permanent end to hostilities. Uncertainty remains.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Base rates for US-Iran nuclear deals are extremely low, and the remaining 18 days until the June 30 deadline are very tight. Prediction markets on Polymarket show a consensus around 34-50% Yes, which may already incorporate any recent progress. Given no major breakthrough has been publicly announced, I adjust slightly downward from the market midpoint to account for the historical difficulty and short time window.
Current prediction markets and crowd-sourced probabilities hover around 45-50% for a US-Iran nuclear deal by June 30, 2026, reflecting significant uncertainty. While negotiations and diplomatic efforts continue, geopolitical tensions and mutual distrust remain substantial obstacles. Given the complexity and history of stalled talks, a near-even chance is reasonable at this time.
The geopolitical climate between the United States and Iran remains highly adversarial, with significant mistrust and conflicting strategic objectives regarding nuclear enrichment. Given the current lack of formal diplomatic breakthroughs and the complexity of negotiating a binding agreement that satisfies both domestic political constraints in the U.S. and Iran's security requirements, the likelihood of a formal, publicly announced deal by June 30, 2026, is low.
The current crowd-sourced probability on Polymarket is 45% for a 'Yes' resolution, indicating a moderate likelihood of a US-Iran nuclear deal by June 30, 2026. This estimate is based on real-time trading data and reflects the collective judgment of market participants. Key factors include the historical challenges of US-Iran negotiations, the current geopolitical climate, and the complexity of reaching a mutually acceptable agreement within the specified timeframe.
While there is some market-implied optimism around a 50% chance, the lack of active negotiations, high political barriers, and Iran's advancing nuclear capabilities reduce the likelihood of a publicly announced agreement by June 30, 2026. Adjusting for over-optimism in prediction markets and low diplomatic momentum, a slightly below-even probability is more realistic.
While there is potential for a US-Iran nuclear deal, historical tensions and the time frame make it uncertain. Markets currently price around 45% chance.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Recent reports indicate that the U.S. and Iran are close to a peace deal, with Trump stating the Strait of Hormuz would reopen upon signing, and a draft deal reportedly includes lifting the blockade. However, Trump has denied specific claims about a deal, and the deadline is only 18 days away, making a formal announcement uncertain. The Polymarket price of ~30% suggests a low probability, and while negotiations are active, the risk of no deal or delay before June 30 is significant.
Given that the blockade was only announced recently on April 12, 2026, and considering the geopolitical tensions involved, it is less likely that the blockade will be lifted and officially announced by June 30, 2026. However, ongoing peace talks and reports of potential deals involving reopening the Strait of Hormuz and lifting sanctions suggest some chance of an announcement. The requirement for an explicit official announcement by Trump or the US government lowers the probability further, as informal or indirect indications do not count.
Recent reports indicate that the U.S. and Iran are actively negotiating a peace deal, with President Trump explicitly stating that the Strait of Hormuz would be reopened upon the signing of such an agreement. Given the proximity of the June 30 deadline and the ongoing diplomatic momentum, there is a high likelihood that a formal announcement regarding the lifting of the blockade will occur if a deal is finalized.
The probability is based on the current geopolitical context and recent statements. The blockade was announced on April 12, 2026, and there have been no official statements indicating its lifting as of June 12, 2026. However, recent reports suggest that a draft deal includes a commitment from the U.S. to lift oil sanctions and end the naval blockade, which could lead to an official announcement by the deadline.
As of June 12, 2026, President Trump has not made a qualifying announcement that the U.S. blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has been lifted. While there are reports that a draft deal may involve ending the blockade and reopening the strait upon signing a peace agreement [cnbc.com](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/12/iran-us-peace-memo-strait-hormuz-oil-sanctions.html), no official or unambiguous statement has been made. The lack of a definitive public announcement from Trump, the U.S. government, or military suggests the threshold for a 'Yes' resolution has not yet been met. However, ongoing negotiations increase the chance of such an announcement before June 30.
As of June 12, 2026, no official announcement of the blockade lift has been made. The criteria for a 'Yes' are strict, and there is no recent credible reporting indicating an imminent announcement.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The latest Survation poll (May 26–June 1, 2026) shows Labour’s Andy Burnham at 49% and Reform UK’s Robert Kenyon at 39%, with a ±4.8% margin of error. While the seat is a Labour-Reform marginal and Reform has strong local momentum, Andy Burnham’s high personal popularity in Greater Manchester (63.4% in the 2024 mayoral election) provides a significant buffer. Polymarket prices Kenyon at 25%, while other prediction markets (Lines) imply around 39%. Given the current polling gap and Burnham’s incumbency advantage, Kenyon’s win probability is below 40%, but Reform’s national rise and tight margins keep it a non-trivial possibility.
Current polling and prediction markets show Robert Kenyon as a significant challenger but trailing Andy Burnham, with probabilities around 25-39%. Kenyon's chances improve if Reform UK consolidates the anti-Labour vote and if any national or local factors weaken Burnham's position. However, Burnham's strong personal vote and recent mayoral victories in Greater Manchester favor him, making Kenyon's win possible but less likely.
While recent polling from Survation [pollcheck.co.uk] shows Andy Burnham leading with 49% to Robert Kenyon's 39%, the race remains competitive given the 10-point gap and the margin of error. Reform UK has shown strong momentum in the constituency since the 2024 general election, and by-elections often see lower turnout that can favor motivated opposition bases. However, Burnham's significant personal brand and mayoral popularity in Greater Manchester [lines.com] make him the clear favorite to hold the seat for Labour.
The most recent Survation poll shows Robert Kenyon (Reform UK) at 39%, while Andy Burnham (Labour) is at 49% [pollcheck.co.uk](https://www.pollcheck.co.uk/by-elections/makerfield). Prediction markets also reflect a significant chance for Kenyon, with Polymarket showing 25% [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/makerfield-by-election-winner) and Lines.com at 39% [lines.com](https://www.lines.com/prediction-markets/elections/makerfield-by-election-winner). The key factors are Kenyon's strong showing in recent polls and the historical trend of Reform UK's rise in the region.
Polling from Survation conducted in late May to early June 2026 shows Robert Kenyon (Reform UK) at 39%, trailing Andy Burnham (Labour) at 49%. While Reform UK improved its position since the 2024 general election, Burnham's strong personal vote—evidenced by his 63.4% win in the 2024 Greater Manchester mayoral race—provides a significant advantage. The seat is competitive, but Burnham is favored due to his regional popularity and the strategic importance of the seat for his leadership ambitions. Market odds from Polymarket and Lines.com also reflect a probability of around 39% for Kenyon, consistent with the polling.
Robert Kenyon is the main challenger to Andy Burnham, with current market odds around 25-39% and a recent poll showing him at 39%, but trailing Burnham. Key factors include polling data, his status as Reform UK's candidate, and the marginal nature of the seat.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Recent news indicates Trump is pursuing a peace deal with Iran, including a potential signing in Europe over the weekend, and has canceled planned military strikes [gulfbusiness.com](https://gulfbusiness.com/en/2026/iran/trump-iran-peace-deal-strait-of-hormuz-weekend-signing-talks/). A peace deal would likely involve reopening the Strait of Hormuz without a military escort program, making a restart of Project Freedom less likely. While Polymarket odds surged to 95% on signals of Iran operations [global-political-spotlight.com](https://www.global-political-spotlight.com/articles/polymarket/briefs/project-freedom-odds-surge-to-95-on-us-iran-operations-signals-and-allied-statements-20260611-0004), those signals have been overtaken by the peace deal narrative, and no definitive announcement of Project Freedom has been made. The base rate for such a specific military program restart is low, and the current diplomatic trajectory reduces the probability further.
Recent market data shows a sharp increase in the probability of Project Freedom being restarted, driven by official US signaling of planned operations against Iran and coordinated allied statements condemning Iran's actions. Although no definitive announcement has been made yet, the heightened military activity in the Strait of Hormuz and the US government's focus on Iran increase the likelihood of a formal restart announcement before the June 30 deadline. However, the possibility of a peace deal between the US and Iran could reduce the need for such a program, so the probability is not near certainty.
While market sentiment on Polymarket has surged to 95% based on aggressive rhetoric and military posturing, the most recent reports indicate that President Trump has cancelled planned strikes and is actively pursuing a peace deal with Iran that could potentially resolve the status of the Strait of Hormuz. If a peace deal is signed, the necessity for a military escort program like 'Project Freedom' would likely be negated or superseded by diplomatic arrangements, making a formal restart announcement less probable despite the earlier escalation.
Recent signals from the U.S. government, including discussions of operations planned for Iran and coordinated allied messaging, suggest a heightened likelihood of an announcement related to Project Freedom. The surge in Polymarket odds to 95% indicates strong market confidence in such an announcement. However, no definitive announcement has been made yet, so I adjust slightly downward to account for the possibility of last-minute changes.
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Polymarket odds are at 95.2% with recent official US/Iran operations signals and allied messaging, though no definitive announcement yet.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.