The question requires Iran to publicly agree to end *all* enrichment of uranium by June 30, 2026. Recent U.S.-Iran talks on June 15 focused on extending a deal, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and disposition of enriched stockpiles, but there is no credible reporting of a complete enrichment halt agreement. Polymarket odds are around 5-6% as of June 18-22, 2026, reflecting very low market belief. Given Iran's historical resistance to fully ending enrichment and the short remaining time, the probability is very low.
Given the structural diplomatic barriers, Iran's historical stance on uranium enrichment as a sovereignty issue, and the compressed timeline of less than 90 days, the likelihood of Iran publicly agreeing to end all uranium enrichment by June 30, 2026, is low. Market data and expert analysis converge around a roughly 16% chance, reflecting the difficulty of achieving a verified agreement within this timeframe.
Ending all uranium enrichment is a core pillar of Iran's nuclear policy and is viewed domestically as a matter of national sovereignty. Given the current geopolitical climate and the lack of any credible reports suggesting a shift in this fundamental stance, it is highly improbable that Iran would agree to a total cessation of enrichment by the June 30 deadline. Market sentiment, as reflected in [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/iran-agrees-to-end-enrichment-of-uranium-by-june-30) and [coinrithm.com](https://www.coinrithm.com/en/prediction-markets/polymarket/iran-agrees-to-end-enrichment-of-uranium-by-june-30), aligns with this assessment of low probability.
The prediction market on Polymarket currently assigns a 46% chance that Iran will agree to end enrichment of uranium by June 30, 2026. This probability is based on crowd-sourced trading and reflects the collective judgment of market participants. Recent diplomatic efforts, such as the U.S.-Iran talks on June 15, 2026, focused on extending a nuclear deal and reopening the Strait of Hormuz, suggest some level of engagement but do not guarantee a specific agreement on ending enrichment.
Current prediction market prices on Polymarket suggest a 16.5%–17% implied probability of Iran agreeing to end uranium enrichment by June 30, 2026, reflecting trader consensus amid high geopolitical and diplomatic barriers [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/iran-agrees-to-end-enrichment-of-uranium-by-june-30). Iran has historically treated uranium enrichment as a matter of national sovereignty, requiring Supreme Leader and Majlis approval, making a sudden reversal unlikely. The compressed timeline and lack of ongoing comprehensive negotiations further reduce the likelihood of a verified agreement by the deadline.
The market has shifting odds, with mentions of 6% and 46%, and the resolution depends on Iran's public agreement to end all uranium enrichment by June 30, 2026, with specific qualifying conditions.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Recent news (June 2026) indicates that a U.S.-Iran interim deal has been signed, but it calls for 'downblending' or diluting enriched uranium, not for surrendering the stockpile to an outside entity. The deal requires Iran to destroy its stockpile, which is distinct from transferring custody to a foreign party. The market definition explicitly excludes mere capping or reduction of enrichment levels, and the reported terms focus on dilution and destruction, not surrender to external control. No credible report shows Iran agreeing to ship its enriched uranium out of the country or place it under foreign custody. The probability is low because the specific 'surrender' condition is not met by the current agreement.
Despite recent agreements and talks between the U.S. and Iran involving uranium dilution and sanctions relief, there is no indication that Iran has agreed or is likely to agree to surrender its enriched uranium stockpile outright by June 30, 2026. Historical patterns and Iran's strategic interests suggest it will avoid fully relinquishing control over its enriched uranium, especially given the exclusion of agreements that only limit enrichment levels. Current credible sources and market sentiment strongly favor a 'No' outcome.
Recent reports indicate that a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has been signed between the U.S. and Iran, which explicitly includes a requirement for Iran to destroy or surrender its stockpile of enriched uranium. Given that this agreement has already been publicly acknowledged by officials and reported by major news outlets, the condition for a 'Yes' resolution has effectively been met.
The current negotiations and political climate suggest a low probability of Iran agreeing to surrender its enriched uranium stockpile by June 30, 2026. Key factors include the hardline stance of U.S. officials, Iran's strategic use of its uranium stockpile as a bargaining chip, and the logistical challenges of verifying and transporting the material. The recent interim deal focuses on diluting uranium rather than surrendering it, indicating a lower likelihood of a full surrender agreement.
While diplomatic progress has been made, including an agreement to dilute uranium within Iran, this does not constitute surrender as defined. The requirement to place material under external custody has not been met, and no such agreement has been publicly announced. Given the political and logistical hurdles, the probability remains low but non-zero.
Polymarket and OddsShift both price the probability at 10%, with factors like Trump's shifting positions, logistical hurdles, and ongoing negotiations contributing to low likelihood.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Ali Khamenei was already removed (the earlier market resolved Yes), making Mojtaba Khamenei the new Supreme Leader. It is highly unlikely he would be removed again within the same month, as he just assumed power. Prediction markets currently price this outcome at ~5-6% (e.g., Polymarket shows 5% for June 30, and Polyspotter shows ~6¢ on Yes). Base rates for rapid removal of a newly installed leader are very low, and no major credible reports suggest imminent removal.
While the current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is advanced in age and has had health issues, the prediction market for a leadership change by June 30, 2026, assigns only about a 23% chance to this event. The political structure and loyal Assembly of Experts make an abrupt removal unlikely without extraordinary circumstances. Therefore, the probability is low but non-negligible given health concerns and potential political shifts.
Current prediction markets and political analysis indicate a very low probability of a leadership change involving Mojtaba Khamenei by June 30, 2026. While there is speculation regarding succession, there is no credible evidence or immediate political pressure suggesting his removal or resignation within this short timeframe.
The prediction market on Polymarket currently assigns a 5% probability to the event of Iran's leadership change by June 30, 2026. This low probability is supported by the fact that the next closest outcome in the market is December 31, 2026, with a 29% probability, indicating that traders believe a leadership change is more likely to occur later in the year. Additionally, the market for Khamenei's removal by June 30 has been resolved with a final outcome of 'Yes', but this seems to be an outdated or incorrect reference as it contradicts the current market data. The consensus from the active markets suggests a low likelihood of a leadership change by the specified date.
The current prediction market on Polymarket shows a 6% probability for 'Yes' on the 'Iran leadership change by June 30' market, based on real-money trading activity [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/iran-leadership-change-by-june-30-689-922). This reflects the collective judgment of informed traders. Additionally, Mojtaba Khamenei has not yet officially assumed the role of Supreme Leader, as Ali Khamenei remains in power, and there is no confirmed evidence of a leadership transition or instability indicating imminent change. The political structure in Iran is highly centralized and resistant to sudden leadership shifts, making an unexpected change unlikely before June 30, 2026.
The Polymarket market for Iran leadership change by June 30 has a current probability of 5% for the 'Yes' outcome, indicating low likelihood.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Multiple prediction markets (Polymarket, PicksByOdds) show implied probabilities around 5-14% for a withdrawal by June 30, 2026, with the most recent data (June 22) indicating ~5.5% on PicksByOdds. Israel has repeatedly extended its presence in southern Lebanon, tying withdrawal to conditions (Lebanese army deployment, Hezbollah disarmament) that are not fully met, and three previous ceasefire deadlines have been missed. The current trajectory strongly favors a 'No' resolution, with no credible recent reports of an imminent full withdrawal.
Multiple prediction markets and expert analyses indicate a low probability (around 5-15%) that Israel will fully withdraw from Lebanon by June 30, 2026. The main obstacles include unmet conditions such as Lebanese army deployment and Hezbollah disarmament, ongoing ceasefire extensions, and political complexities. Without significant changes in these factors or a sudden political shift, withdrawal by the deadline is unlikely.
Current intelligence and market sentiment indicate that the conditions for an Israeli withdrawal—specifically the deployment of the Lebanese army and the disarmament of Hezbollah—remain largely unmet as of late June 2026. With the deadline imminent and no significant reports of a full-scale withdrawal, the likelihood of a sudden, complete exit by June 30 is extremely low, as supported by [lines.com](https://lines.com/prediction-markets/politics/israel-withdraws-from-lebanon-by) and [picksbyodds.com](https://picksbyodds.com/markets/israel-withdraws-from-lebanon-by-june-30-2026/).
Prediction markets currently assign a low probability to Israel withdrawing from Lebanon by June 30, 2026. The implied probabilities from various sources range from 5.5% to 14.5%, indicating a consensus that a withdrawal is unlikely. Key factors include the lack of met withdrawal conditions, such as Lebanese army deployment and Hezbollah disarmament, as well as the history of missed deadlines and ongoing ceasefire extensions.
The Israeli government has consistently conditioned withdrawal on Lebanese army deployment and Hezbollah disarmament, which remain unmet. Recent ceasefire extensions suggest continued IDF presence. While a sudden diplomatic breakthrough or internal Lebanese shift could enable withdrawal, current evidence points to low likelihood. Prediction market odds, though not determinative, align with a low but non-zero probability.
Current market odds from multiple sources show very low implied probabilities, around 5.5% to 14.5%, with ongoing IDF presence and unmet withdrawal conditions.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Multiple prediction markets (Polymarket, Orrery, WyldMarkets) show the probability at 0–3% as of June 20–22, 2026, with no recent news suggesting any foreign force has taken or is about to take control of Kharg Island. The island is Iran's most critical oil terminal, heavily militarized, and the definition of 'no longer under Iranian control' requires sustained, primary control by another state—far beyond a raid or temporary disruption. Given the extremely short remaining time (8 days) and absence of any credible reports or official statements indicating such a change, the true probability is near zero, though not exactly zero due to tail-risk scenarios like a sudden negotiated transfer or unexpected military collapse.
Current market data and consensus reporting indicate a very low probability that Kharg Island will no longer be under Iranian control by June 30, 2026. There have been no credible reports or official statements suggesting a change in control, and the island remains strategically important to Iran. Temporary disruptions or claims without established control do not qualify, further reducing the likelihood of a 'Yes' resolution.
There is no credible evidence or geopolitical indication that Iran is at risk of losing control over Kharg Island, a critical piece of its oil infrastructure, by the end of June 2026. Prediction markets currently reflect a near-zero probability of this event occurring, and the criteria for 'Yes' require a significant, unlikely change in sovereignty or military occupation that has not materialized. Given the lack of ongoing conflict or diplomatic pressure suggesting such a transfer, the probability remains extremely low.
The current market prices on Polymarket and WyldMarkets indicate a very low probability (0-3%) of Kharg Island no longer being under Iranian control by June 30, 2026. There is no recent credible reporting or significant geopolitical developments suggesting an imminent change in control of the island. The base rate for such a significant shift in control without prior indications is very low.
Current prediction markets show implied probabilities between 0% and 2% for Kharg Island no longer being under Iranian control by June 30, 2026 [Polymarket](https://explorer.struct.to/markets/kharg-island-no-longer-under-iranian-control-by-june-30-561-854), [WyldMarkets](https://wyldmarkets.com/market/kharg-island-no-longer-under-iranian-control-by-june-30-561-854-897), [PicksByOdds](https://picksbyodds.com/markets/kharg-island-no-longer-under-iranian-control-by-june-30-561-854-897/). The island remains a critical Iranian oil export hub with strong military presence, and no credible evidence suggests active challenges to Iran’s control. The high bar for resolution—requiring actual, established control by another authority—further reduces likelihood.
Market prices on Polymarket and WyldMarkets are very low, and the resolution requires actual control, making it unlikely.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
According to an AP News report dated June 22, 2026, Keir Starmer has announced he is stepping down as Labour leader and will leave office within weeks, remaining caretaker until a successor is chosen. This announcement alone resolves the market to 'Yes' immediately, per the market rules. Polymarket odds surged to 91% by June 20 as the resignation became nearly certain, and the formal announcement has now confirmed the event. There is no realistic chance this announcement is reversed or that Starmer remains in office past June 30.
Recent market data from Polymarket shows a strong consensus with a 91% implied probability that Keir Starmer will cease to be Prime Minister by June 30, 2026. This is supported by credible reporting of his announced resignation and internal party pressures, indicating a high likelihood of his departure within the timeframe.
Credible reporting from the Associated Press confirms that Prime Minister Keir Starmer has officially announced his intention to step down as leader of the Labour Party and leave office. As the announcement has already occurred, the condition for the market to resolve to 'Yes' has been met.
Keir Starmer is facing significant political pressure, including the resignation of a senior cabinet member and potential leadership challenges. However, no formal challenge has materialized yet, and he retains support among key allies. The upcoming Makerfield by-election could be a critical factor, but the timeline for a leadership contest is uncertain.
Recent developments, including Defense Secretary John Healey's resignation and mounting pressure from within Labour, have increased speculation about Keir Starmer's leadership [Reuters](https://reuters.com), but no formal challenge has yet emerged. The upcoming Makerfield by-election is a key indicator, with a potential loss possibly triggering a leadership contest [AP](https://apnews.com). While market prices on Polymarket have fluctuated, recent odds around 32% [OddsShift](https://oddsshift.com) align with a moderate chance of resignation or removal. Base rates for mid-term prime ministerial turnover in the UK are low, but internal party dynamics and erosion of support suggest non-trivial risk.
Keir Starmer has resigned as Prime Minister, which triggers the market to resolve 'Yes' as he ceased to be PM within the specified period.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The Polymarket odds have dropped to 38% as of the search date, reflecting a significant decline from earlier levels. This suggests that current IMF Portwatch data shows the 7-day moving average of transit calls is well below 60 and has not been trending upward strongly enough to reach that threshold by July 15. Given the short remaining time and the lack of a clear recovery signal, the probability of hitting the 60-call threshold is low.
Current market data from Polymarket and PredictMarketCap shows roughly a 51.5% probability that Strait of Hormuz traffic will return to normal levels by July 15, 2026. Given the strategic importance of the Strait and ongoing geopolitical tensions, traffic normalization is uncertain but plausible if regional stability improves. The probability is close to even, reflecting balanced risks and potential for recovery in shipping traffic.
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical maritime chokepoint, and traffic levels are highly sensitive to geopolitical tensions in the region. While market sentiment has fluctuated, the threshold of 60 transit calls as a 7-day moving average requires a sustained level of activity that may be hindered by ongoing security concerns or regional instability through mid-July 2026. Given the current volatility and the reliance on specific IMF Portwatch data, there is a significant chance that traffic remains below this threshold.
The current Polymarket odds for this event are 51.5%, indicating a near-even chance of the Strait of Hormuz traffic returning to normal by July 15, 2026. This probability is based on the 7-day moving average of transit calls reaching or exceeding 60, as reported by IMF Portwatch. The market's resolution criteria and the recent trading volume support this estimate.
The market definition specifies that a 7-day moving average of transit calls reaching 60 or more by July 15, 2026, as reported by IMF Portwatch, results in a 'Yes' resolution. Current Polymarket odds show a trading price around 51.5% [predictmarketcap.com](https://predictmarketcap.com/markets/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-15), indicating substantial market belief in this outcome. While recent headlines suggest volatility in the region, the baseline traffic levels and the long timeframe until resolution support a slightly above 50% chance, incorporating both geopolitical risks and the tendency of such markets to reflect aggregated informed expectations.
Based on Polymarket odds ranging from 38% to 51.5% and no additional data, a midpoint estimate is used.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
timeout after 30000ms
Current shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is about 12 ships per day on a 7-day moving average, far below the 60 needed to be considered 'normal.' Pre-conflict levels were 75-125 ships daily, so traffic would need to increase roughly fivefold within about 7 weeks. Given ongoing US naval blockades, Iranian restrictions, and structural diversion of shipping routes, a rapid return to normal levels by June 30, 2026, is unlikely. Expert market prices and World Bank forecasts also support a low probability of recovery by this date.
The current 7-day moving average of transit calls is significantly below the required threshold of 60, hovering around 11-12 calls per day. Given the structural shifts in shipping routes and the persistence of regional tensions, a fivefold increase in traffic within the remaining timeframe is highly improbable.
The current market odds on Polymarket are at 22% [pdata.world](https://pdata.world/events/polymarket/375597), and ClearMarket shows a similar sentiment with a 20% probability [clearmarket.fyi](https://clearmarket.fyi/events/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-end-of-june/). Given the recent geopolitical tensions and the tight timeline, it is unlikely that shipping traffic will return to normal by the end of June 2026.
Current 7-day moving average of transit calls is around 11–12, far below the 60 threshold needed. Pre-conflict levels were 75–125, but structural shifts like shipping diversions and ongoing geopolitical risks persist. The World Bank expects no return to normal levels until late 2026, and even a rapid diplomatic resolution would not close the gap by June 30. Reaching the target would require a near-impossible 5x increase in traffic within a short window.
Market odds from Polymarket and ClearMarket are low, and there's no strong indication of a quick return to 60 ship arrivals by end of June.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Current prediction markets (Polymarket, Lines, Simplefunctions) price a YES outcome at 3%–7%, reflecting strong consensus that Russia will not capture all of Kupiansk by June 30. The city remains heavily contested with no signs of imminent Russian breakthroughs; capturing the entire municipality within the next eight days would require a tactical surprise and a collapse of Ukrainian defenses. Base rates of such rapid urban captures in this war are extremely low, and no credible intelligence suggests a negotiated handover is imminent. Given the tight deadline and static front lines, a probability closer to 4% is appropriate.
Current market data and expert analysis indicate a very low probability (around 7%) that Russia will capture all of Kupiansk by June 30, 2026. The city remains contested with entrenched Ukrainian defenses, and Russian advances have been incremental rather than rapid or sweeping. The short timeline and historical attritional fighting suggest a full capture is unlikely within this period.
The current military situation in the Kupiansk sector remains characterized by attritional, incremental fighting rather than a rapid breakthrough. Given that the deadline is imminent and there is no evidence of a sudden collapse in Ukrainian defensive lines, the probability of Russia achieving full control of the municipality by June 30, 2026, is extremely low. Market sentiment and expert analysis consistently reflect this assessment.
The market consensus on Polymarket indicates a very low probability of Russia capturing all of Kupiansk by June 30, 2026, with prices suggesting a 3-7% chance. This aligns with the current military situation where Kupiansk remains a contested urban zone with entrenched Ukrainian defenses and incremental Russian advances. The short timeframe of less than three months further reduces the likelihood of a complete capture.
As of June 2026, Kupiansk remains under Ukrainian control with no indication of imminent Russian capture. The ISW map [isw.live](https://isw.live) shows the city not shaded red, and Russian advances have been incremental and contested. Market pricing on Polymarket at $0.07 for YES reflects a consensus probability of around 7% [lines.com](https://www.lines.com/prediction-markets/politics/will-russia-capture-all-of-kupiansk-by), consistent with low likelihood given entrenched Ukrainian defenses and lack of recent breakthroughs.
The market currently prices the probability at 7% due to incremental advances, contested status, and a near-term deadline.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The MOU signed in mid-June explicitly provides for 60 toll-free days, contradicting an agreement to permanent Iranian fees. No public statement from Trump or the US government definitively accepts such charges, and Polymarket odds sit at ~3.6% Yes. Given the high bar for explicit acceptance and the very short time remaining, the probability of a Yes resolution by June 30 is extremely low.
Current market data and expert analysis indicate a low probability (around 11%) that Trump or the U.S. government will definitively agree to Iranian transit fees in the Strait of Hormuz by June 30, 2026. The recent memorandum of understanding allows toll-free passage for 60 days but leaves future transit fees ambiguous, with strong U.S. insistence on free passage and Iran's intention to potentially impose fees. No definitive agreement or public acceptance has been announced, and the political and strategic stakes make such an agreement unlikely in the near term.
Current diplomatic efforts and the existing Memorandum of Understanding explicitly prioritize the free and open status of the Strait of Hormuz, with the U.S. administration maintaining a firm stance against Iranian-imposed tolls. Market sentiment on platforms like Polymarket reflects a very low expectation of such an agreement, and there is no indication of a shift toward accepting these fees before the June 30 deadline.
The current market odds on Polymarket and Orrery suggest a very low probability of Trump agreeing to Iranian transit fees in the Strait of Hormuz by June 30. The 14-point memorandum of understanding signed by the U.S. and Iran is vague about future transit fees, indicating that the issue is still under negotiation. The Trump administration has historically insisted on a free and open Hormuz, while Iran has shown intentions to impose fees. Given the lack of definitive agreement and the historical stance of the U.S., the probability remains low.
Current evidence suggests the U.S. has not agreed to Iranian transit fees, and President Trump has instead threatened to impose U.S.-controlled tolls if a final deal is not reached [thehill.com](https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5932836-trump-threatens-strait-of-hormuz-tolls/). The interim agreement explicitly states that Iran will not charge fees for 60 days, with future arrangements to be discussed with Oman and Gulf states, not unilaterally imposed [foreignpolicy.com](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/06/18/iran-deal-mou-hormuz-shipping-oil/). Market pricing on Polymarket implies a 11% probability, reflecting low expectations of a definitive U.S. agreement by the deadline [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/will-trump-agree-to-iranian-transit-fees-in-the-strait-of-hormuz-by-june-30).
Current Polymarket price is 11%, Trump threatened tolls if no deal, MOU has 60 days toll-free, so low probability.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
As of June 22, 2026, WTI crude oil is trading well below $100, and with only about 8 trading days left in June, a spike to $100 is highly unlikely. Market odds on Polymarket are around 3%, reflecting this low probability. No major catalysts are evident to drive a sudden $20+ rally in the remaining days.
Current prediction markets and trading data indicate a very low probability (~3%) that WTI Crude Oil will hit $100 in June 2026. This low probability reflects current market expectations, supply-demand fundamentals, and historical price trends, which do not support a significant price spike to $100 within that timeframe.
Current market sentiment and historical price trends for WTI Crude Oil suggest that reaching $100 per barrel in June 2026 is highly unlikely. The low probability reflects the significant gap between current market expectations and the $100 threshold, as indicated by low trading interest in this outcome on prediction platforms.
The current market prices on prediction platforms like Polymarket and Orrery suggest low probabilities (around 3-5%) for WTI Crude Oil to hit $100 in June 2026. Historical data and current geopolitical and economic factors do not strongly indicate a significant price surge to $100 in the near term. However, considering potential geopolitical tensions, supply disruptions, or economic crises, there is a non-negligible chance of such a price spike.
The current trading price on Polymarket is 3.1%, which reflects the market's collective probability estimate of the event occurring [predictmarketcap.com](https://predictmarketcap.com/markets/will-wti-reach-100-in-june-2026-823). This low probability suggests that traders expect WTI crude oil is very unlikely to reach $100 in June 2026, likely due to stable supply conditions, moderate demand forecasts, and lack of immediate geopolitical or supply shocks. While market prices are not perfect predictors, they incorporate diverse information and are often well-calibrated for liquid markets like this one.
Current market odds from Polymarket and Orrery are low, with no strong indicators of a significant shift in WTI to hit $100 in June 2026.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Prediction markets currently price a ~80-86% chance of no change, which aligns with the Fed's recent pattern of holding rates steady. The economic backdrop—sticky inflation, solid employment—suggests the FOMC will maintain the current rate at the July 2026 meeting. While a surprise cut or hike is possible, the base rate and market consensus strongly favor no change.
Current prediction markets show an 80% probability that the Fed will keep interest rates unchanged after the July 2026 meeting, reflecting market consensus and expectations based on recent Fed behavior and economic conditions. The Fed's recent trend has been cautious with rate changes, and the market's liquidity and volume indicate strong confidence in no change.
Market sentiment and historical patterns suggest a high likelihood of the Federal Reserve maintaining current interest rates during the July 2026 meeting. Prediction markets currently reflect a strong consensus for 'no change,' and given the typical pace of FOMC policy adjustments, maintaining stability is the most probable outcome unless significant economic shocks occur.
The current market consensus, as reflected by Polymarket and other prediction platforms, suggests a high probability (around 75-80%) that the Federal Reserve will keep interest rates unchanged after the July 2026 meeting. This is based on recent economic data trends, including stable inflation and labor market conditions, as well as the Fed's historical tendency to maintain rates in a stable economic environment.
Current market pricing from Polymarket shows an 80% implied probability of no change in the Fed's interest rates after the July 2026 meeting, based on trader expectations [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com). The Federal Reserve typically makes rate changes in 25-basis-point increments, and the resolution criteria specify that no change means the upper bound of the target federal funds rate remains unchanged. Given the current forward guidance and historical precedent of data-dependent decision-making, a hold is the most likely scenario barring significant economic shifts before 2026.
Polymarket traders currently price the chance of no change at 80-86%, and there's no major conflicting information. The resolution depends on the FOMC statement, which is the key source.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.