timeout after 30000ms
Given the historical rarity of Article 4 invocations (only nine times since 1949) and the current geopolitical context, the probability of another invocation by August 31, 2026, is low but non-negligible. Recent invocations by Poland and Estonia in late 2025 indicate regional tensions, but no immediate new threats have been reported that would likely trigger another invocation soon. Market data also reflects a low implied probability around 7%.
While Article 4 has been invoked multiple times in recent years due to regional tensions, it remains a significant diplomatic step that is typically reserved for acute security threats. Given the current geopolitical climate and the short timeframe remaining until August 31, 2026, the likelihood of a new formal invocation is relatively low, consistent with current market sentiment.
Prediction markets suggest a low probability of another NATO Article 4 invocation by August 31, 2026, with Polymarket and PicksByOdds showing implied probabilities of 8% and 7% respectively. Historical data indicates that Article 4 has been invoked nine times since 1949, with recent invocations in 2025 by Poland and Estonia. The low market prices and the rarity of such events suggest a cautious estimate.
Article 4 has been invoked nine times since 1949, most recently in 2025 due to Russian drone and jet incursions into Poland and Estonia [nato.int](https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/introduction-to-nato/the-consultation-process-and-article-4). The recurrence of such incidents suggests a non-zero risk, but they remain relatively rare. The current prediction market implies an 8% probability, aligning with recent precedents and the ongoing but contained tensions in Eastern Europe [polymarket.copilot.markets](https://polymarket.copilot.markets/event/another-nato-article-4-byptptpt-20260726214235871).
The market implies a 7.0% probability based on current data, with historical invocations being rare.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
The likelihood of Mojtaba Khamenei ceasing to be de facto leader by August 31 is low because the regime has successfully maintained the appearance of his leadership for months despite his absence. Real-money prediction markets (Polymarket) show an ~11% probability, which I adjust downward slightly due to the short remaining timeframe and lack of credible evidence of an imminent change. The Octagon market's 2% is unreliable due to zero volume. I estimate 10% to reflect the non-zero chance of a sudden announcement or event, consistent with market consensus and historical base rates for sudden leadership changes in authoritarian regimes.
Current prediction markets and expert consensus assign a very low probability (around 2%) to Mojtaba Khamenei ceasing to be the de facto leader by August 31, 2026. Despite his lack of public appearances and some speculation about his health, institutional continuity and the regime's wartime imperative strongly favor his continued leadership in the near term. No credible reports or official announcements indicate an imminent leadership change before the deadline.
Current evidence suggests that the IRGC has consolidated power and is maintaining institutional continuity under Mojtaba Khamenei, despite his public absence. Prediction markets and expert consensus strongly favor his continued, albeit potentially symbolic, leadership through the end of 2026, with no immediate signs of an imminent transition or removal before the August 31 deadline.
The overwhelming consensus across prediction markets like Polymarket, Manifold, and Octagon suggests a very low probability of a leadership change in Iran by August 31. The markets price the probability at around 2-5%, reflecting strong institutional continuity and the IRGC's control over the government. Mojtaba Khamenei's absence from public appearances and the lack of credible reports indicating his removal or resignation further support this low probability.
Despite Mojtaba Khamenei's prolonged public absence since his March 2026 succession and speculation about his health following a February 2026 airstrike, credible reporting and prediction market consensus suggest he remains the de facto leader. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) continues to back the regime's continuity, and there is no evidence of his removal, resignation, or incapacitation recognized by credible sources. Recent reports indicate he or his proxies are still influencing key appointments, supporting the view that he retains behind-the-scenes control.
Polymarket and Octagon data show low probability for August 31, with strong consensus on institutional continuity and minimal public activity of Mojtaba Khamenei.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The base rate from prediction markets suggests a ~68% chance, which I adopt as my independent estimate. The short time horizon (4 days) and lack of a recent qualifying military action support a moderate-to-high probability, but the mention of recent escalations in the Strait of Hormuz injects some downside risk, preventing a higher figure. The market price appears to balance these factors reasonably.
Current prediction markets and expert sentiment suggest a moderately high likelihood that the ceasefire between Israel and Iran will hold through August 15, 2026. While there are ongoing regional tensions and risks of escalation, no recent qualifying military actions have been reported, and diplomatic efforts appear to be maintaining the ceasefire. However, the volatile nature of the region and potential for sudden military actions prevent a higher confidence level.
As of August 11, 2026, there have been no reports of qualifying military actions (air strikes or surface-to-surface missile strikes) between Israel and Iran that would violate the ceasefire conditions. With only four days remaining until the August 15 deadline, the likelihood of a major escalation occurring and being confirmed within this short window is low, consistent with current market sentiment.
Prediction markets like Polymarket and Frenzy Capital show high implied probabilities (73-95%) for the ceasefire continuing through August 15, indicating strong market sentiment. Recent data shows no significant military actions or escalations, and ongoing diplomatic efforts support the likelihood of the ceasefire holding. However, the volatile nature of the region and potential for unexpected events slightly reduces confidence.
Prediction markets such as Polymarket and Frenzy Capital indicate implied probabilities between 68% and 95% for the ceasefire continuing through August 15, with Polymarket's current price suggesting a 73% probability [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/israel-x-iran-ceasefire-continues-throughptptpt-20260716224448963). Recent stability and lack of qualifying military actions—defined as direct air or missile strikes impacting territory—support this assessment, though tensions in regions like the Strait of Hormuz remain a risk factor [frenzycap.com](https://www.frenzycap.com/predictions/polymarket/0x6acdc3316f0b43ca4fbc13623fc018e30f2fd20ae7b93bdc07c8193e99b0ac4d). The consensus among credible reporting and official sources will determine resolution, and no such qualifying action has been credibly reported as of the search date.
Prediction markets show a high probability of the ceasefire continuing, with Polyguana indicating 95% 'Yes' odds and no recent qualifying military actions.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
A recent incident on August 10, 2026, where NATO fighter jets shot down a drone in Latvian airspace, appears to qualify as a direct military encounter under the market's rules (shooting down a non-munition UAV). With only 20 days remaining until the August 31 deadline, this event likely triggers a YES resolution. The strong reporting and significance noted in prediction market discussions further support a very high probability, despite potential minor ambiguities in classification.
Current prediction markets price the probability of a NATO-Russia military clash by the end of 2026 at about 16%, with a much lower probability (around 0.8%) for a clash by mid-2026. Given the August 31 cutoff, the probability should be higher than mid-year but likely lower than year-end estimates. The ongoing tensions, published Russian strike lists targeting European cities, and the strategic importance of Ukraine and Black Sea regions increase risk, but nuclear deterrence and diplomatic efforts reduce the likelihood of direct military engagement.
While tensions between NATO and Russia remain high due to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, both sides have consistently demonstrated a strong desire to avoid direct military escalation that could trigger Article 5. Current prediction markets [polymarket.copilot.markets](https://polymarket.copilot.markets/event/nato-x-russia-military-clash-in-2025) and [polyautomate.org](https://polyautomate.org/prediction-odds/nato-x-russia-military-clash-by-december-31-2026-244) reflect a low probability of a direct clash, as most incidents (such as drone incursions or near-misses) are specifically excluded by the market's strict definition of a 'military encounter' involving the use of force.
The prediction markets on Polymarket currently price the odds of a NATO-Russia military clash by August 31, 2026, at 3.6%. This low probability reflects the significant deterrence posed by nuclear arsenals on both sides, as well as the historical reluctance of both NATO and Russia to engage in direct military conflict. Recent incidents, such as the downing of a drone in Latvian airspace, have not escalated into full-scale military encounters. The presence of a strike list published by Russia targeting Ukrainian companies in Europe suggests potential economic and cyber warfare but not necessarily direct military confrontation. The upcoming NATO summit in Ankara in July 2026 could be a decisive factor, but the base rate for such clashes remains low due to the high stakes involved.
The probability of a direct NATO-Russia military clash by August 31, 2026, remains low due to strong nuclear deterrence and mutual escalation avoidance, despite rising tensions. Recent incidents, such as drone interceptions and Russia's publication of potential strike lists [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/nato-x-russia-military-clash-in-2025), fall short of qualifying as direct military engagements under the defined criteria. Prediction markets imply a sharply increasing risk toward mid-2026, with a 0.8% chance by June and 16% by year-end [polyautomate.org](https://polyautomate.org/prediction-odds/nato-x-russia-military-clash-by-june-30-2026), suggesting a nonlinear risk curve; interpolating this for August yields a moderate increase from June, but still below 10%.
Low market odds, nuclear deterrence reducing direct clash likelihood, and current lack of qualifying military encounters.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Historical traffic levels around 70-80 are plausible, but current geopolitical risks and the short remaining time make a recovery to a 7-day average of 60 by August 31 unlikely. Market odds of ~10% provide a reasonable baseline, and after considering the specific resolution criteria, a 10% probability is well-calibrated.
Current market data and analysis indicate a low probability (around 12%) that the Strait of Hormuz traffic will return to normal levels (7-day average of 60 or more ship transits) by August 31, 2026. This is based on recent trends and market odds consistently pricing the event as unlikely, reflecting ongoing geopolitical tensions and disruptions in the region that have suppressed traffic levels.
Current market sentiment and available data suggest that shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz remains significantly below the threshold required for a 'normal' classification as defined by the IMF Portwatch metric. Given the proximity to the August 31 deadline and the persistent geopolitical tensions affecting maritime transit, it is highly unlikely that a 7-day moving average of 60 transit calls will be achieved.
The current market odds across multiple platforms (Polymarket, Marketss, Frenzy Capital) consistently show a low probability (around 5-19%) for the Strait of Hormuz traffic returning to normal by August 31. The base rate for such an event is low, and there is no recent evidence of significant improvements in transit calls. The key factors include the historical data trends, current market sentiment, and the lack of recent positive developments in the region.
Current Polymarket odds suggest a 14–19% probability of the Strait of Hormuz reaching a 7-day moving average of 60 or more ship transits by August 31, 2026 [pdata.world](https://pdata.world/events/polymarket/660108). This reflects persistent geopolitical tensions and regional instability affecting shipping activity. While traffic may fluctuate, sustained normalization to pre-crisis levels remains uncertain due to ongoing risks in the region.
Polymarket odds show 'No' at 95%, indicating low chance of 7-day average ≥60 transits by August 31.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The deadline is only 4 days away (August 15, 2026). While an AP News article from August 11 reports that Trump says parameters are met for a deal that would end the blockade, no official announcement has been made yet. Polymarket prices for this outcome range from 18% to 32%, reflecting a low but non‑zero chance. Given the short remaining time and the need for a clear, official declarative statement, I estimate a 25% probability.
The probability is based on recent market data showing a sharp increase to about 47% chance that the US will announce the end of the blockade by August 15, 2026. This surge is driven by recent de-escalation signals, including official statements about potential deals and halting strikes, but no official announcement has yet been made. Given the short timeframe and the need for a clear, official declaration, the probability remains below 50%.
While there are ongoing mediation efforts regarding a potential ceasefire and the lifting of the naval blockade [apnews.com], no formal deal has been finalized. The current prediction market sentiment [polymarket.copilot.markets] and the short timeframe remaining until August 15, 2026, suggest that an official, definitive announcement of the blockade's termination is unlikely to occur within the next few days.
The prediction markets on Polymarket and Frenzy Capital both indicate a 18% probability of the US announcing the end of the Iranian blockade by August 15, 2026. This aligns with the recent reinstatement of the blockade by Trump on July 13, 2026, and the lack of immediate indications of a policy reversal. The market consensus suggests a low likelihood of such an announcement in the near term.
The Polymarket and Frenzy Capital prediction markets currently reflect an 18% probability of the U.S. announcing the end of the Iranian blockade by August 15, 2026 [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.copilot.markets/event/us-announces-end-of-iranian-blockade-byptptpt-20260713152715080), [frenzycap.com](https://www.frenzycap.com/predictions/polymarket/0xa055e1cf533c2fcb1f1c89c20c41c8aa25526dcf27c3ff6be69c230fd8898282). This aligns with the lack of official U.S. government announcements indicating a policy shift, despite tentative ceasefire discussions mentioned by AP News [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/trump-iran-strait-hormuz-israel-gaza-mideast-f4c225f6667d9fd171616304701825a0). The reinstatement of the blockade by Trump on July 13, 2026, and absence of subsequent de-escalation signals make a resolution before August 15 unlikely.
The market for a US announcement by August 15 has a current implied probability of 32%, with ongoing mediation but no deal reached yet, and the blockade was reinstated on July 13.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
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Despite the initial memorandum of understanding signed on June 14, 2026, which set a 60-day negotiation period toward a final deal, the complexity of US-Iran relations and the stringent requirements for a qualifying final deal make a signed or formally adopted instrument by August 18, 2026, unlikely. Current market data and reporting indicate only a 3% chance of such a final deal being reached and signed by the deadline, reflecting ongoing diplomatic challenges and the difficulty of meeting all specified criteria for the final agreement.
unparseable forecast JSON
The initial memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the U.S. and Iran sets a 60-day period for negotiations, which began on June 14, 2026. The MOU includes commitments to negotiate a final deal but does not specify concrete obligations limiting Iran's nuclear program. The final deal must be signed or formally adopted by both parties by August 18, 2026, and must include specific, measurable benchmarks. Given the complexity of the negotiations and the need for concrete agreements, the probability of a final deal being signed by the deadline is relatively low.
The 60-day negotiation window from the June 14 MOU is nearing its end, and no final deal has been publicly signed or adopted by both the U.S. and Iran as of August 11, 2026. Given the absence of official confirmation or release of a qualifying text with specific, measurable nuclear limits, and the short time remaining, the probability of a qualifying agreement being finalized by the deadline is low.
The market has a low probability of 3% as per current odds, and the qualifying instrument requires specific, measurable nuclear restrictions, which is a high bar.
Mean of 4/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 4/6 valid model forecasts.
The challenge requires defeating four bosses (Ender Dragon, Wither, Elder Guardian, Warden) in a single hardcore world without either player dying, which is extremely difficult. In 2024, a similar but easier challenge (only the Ender Dragon) took 105 hours and 42 deaths. The 2026 run has already accumulated 26 deaths in the first few days, and the 10-day limit (by August 17) is tight. Base rates from the previous attempt and the added difficulty of three extra bosses suggest a low probability of success within the timeframe.
Based on the 2024 attempt, Kai Cenat and IShowSpeed took over 5 days and 42 deaths to defeat only the Ender Dragon, which was the critical path boss. The 2026 challenge requires defeating four bosses in the same hardcore world without dying, which is significantly more difficult. Given the high difficulty, the permadeath rule, and the need to complete all four bosses on the same seed within 10 days, the probability of success by August 17 is low but not negligible, considering their gaming skills and experience.
The challenge is extremely difficult, requiring both players to survive simultaneously in a single Hardcore world while defeating four distinct bosses, including the Warden, which is notoriously dangerous. Given their previous 2024 run took five days just to defeat the Ender Dragon alone, completing all four bosses within the 10-day window (ending August 17) is highly ambitious and prone to frequent resets due to the permadeath mechanic.
The challenge is significantly harder than their previous attempt, with three additional bosses and the risk of permadeath. Their 2024 run took 105 hours and 42 deaths, and this attempt includes more complex and dangerous bosses. However, their experience and determination could help them succeed within the 10-day window.
The 2024 attempt took over 100 hours and five days to defeat only the Ender Dragon, with 42 total deaths. The 2026 challenge is harder, requiring three additional bosses never completed in prior streams. Starting on August 7, 2026, they would need to complete all objectives by August 17 (10 days), but historical performance suggests low likelihood. No evidence confirms they have started or are progressing as of 2026-08-11. Given the difficulty and no confirmed progress, the probability of success by August 17 is low.
They started on August 7, the 2024 run took over 4 days for one boss, and they need to beat three more in a single world with permadeath, making it unlikely to finish by August 17.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
timeout after 30000ms
Current market data and forecasts indicate that WTI crude oil prices are expected to average around $65–70 per barrel in late 2026, with Brent crude forecasted at $74. Although geopolitical tensions around the Strait of Hormuz have added a risk premium and caused intraday swings near $83, the broader supply outlook and production increases weigh against sustained prices at or above $85. Given these factors, there is a moderate but not high chance that WTI will hit $85 at any point during August 2026.
As of mid-August 2026, WTI Crude Oil futures have been trading near $83 per barrel, driven by a risk premium associated with geopolitical tensions in the Strait of Hormuz. Given that the price is already within a few dollars of the $85 threshold and volatility remains elevated due to ongoing regional instability, there is a high likelihood of an intraday spike reaching $85 before the end of the month.
The current market consensus on Polymarket and PredictMarketCap suggests a high probability of WTI Crude Oil reaching $85 in August 2026, with odds around 68.5% to 91%. Geopolitical tensions, particularly around the Strait of Hormuz, have been driving intraday price swings near $83, indicating potential for further increases. Additionally, historical data and market volatility support the likelihood of reaching this price level.
unparseable forecast JSON
Polymarket currently shows around 68.5-69.5% odds, and geopolitical tensions like those around the Strait of Hormuz contribute to upward pressure, though EIA projections have some bearish factors.
Mean of 4/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 4/6 valid model forecasts.
Current WTI crude oil prices are around $83 per barrel, and Polymarket markets assign a 13% probability to hitting $95 in August 2026. The $95 level is about 14% above current prices, requiring a significant geopolitical or supply shock. While Strait of Hormuz tensions provide some upside risk, EIA forecasts of rising global supply and moderating demand create a strong base rate against such a spike. The 13% market-implied probability seems reasonable given the short remaining time in August and the large price gap.
Current market data and prediction markets assign about a 13-20% probability that WTI Crude Oil futures will hit $95 or higher during any trading session in August 2026. Prices are currently around $83 with geopolitical tensions sustaining a risk premium, but broader bearish pressures from rising supply and expected inventory builds weigh against a spike to $95. Given these mixed factors, a 20% probability reflects moderate chance of a short-term spike to $95 in August 2026.
As of mid-August 2026, WTI Crude Oil is trading near $83 per barrel [polymarket.com]. While geopolitical tensions in the Strait of Hormuz provide a risk premium, market consensus and EIA projections point toward rising global supply and moderating inventory draws, which act as bearish headwinds against a spike to $95 [polymarket.com]. Given that the price would need to jump over 14% in the remaining weeks of August without a major new supply shock, a probability of 18% reflects the low likelihood of such a rapid, sustained move.
The current market consensus on Polymarket and PredictMarketCap suggests a probability of around 20-34% for WTI to hit $95 in August 2026. Adjusting for geopolitical tensions, supply projections, and recent price volatility, a slightly higher probability of 25% is estimated.
While geopolitical risks support higher prices, bearish fundamentals like rising supply and inventory builds make a surge to $95 unlikely. However, short-term spikes above $95 are possible, giving a moderate probability of 28% based on current conditions and market sentiment.
Polymarket currently assigns 20% odds, with geopolitical tensions providing some upward pressure but EIA supply projections creating bearish headwinds.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Polymarket prediction markets, which have a strong track record, currently price a 25 bps hike at only 6% (from polyautomate.org) and 41% for a hike in the broader 'Fed Decision in September?' market, but the specific 25 bps hike market shows 6% YES. Recent weak July employment data has tempered expectations for tightening, and inflationary pressures are balanced by labor market softness, making a hike unlikely. The consensus among traders is that no change is the most probable outcome, with a 25 bps hike having a low implied probability.
Current prediction markets, particularly Polymarket, assign a very low probability (around 6%) to the Fed increasing interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting. These markets aggregate real-time trader sentiment and have a strong track record of accuracy, especially close to the event date. Given the consensus and the Fed's recent cautious stance on rate hikes, the likelihood of a 25 bps increase is quite low.
Prediction markets and historical data from [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/fed-decision-in-september) and [explorer.struct.to](https://explorer.struct.to/markets/will-the-fed-increase-interest-rates-by-25-bps-after-the-september-2026-meeting) indicate a very high consensus that the Federal Reserve will not increase interest rates by 25 basis points in September 2026. Market participants overwhelmingly favor other outcomes, such as a rate decrease, making an increase highly improbable.
The current market consensus, as reflected in prediction markets like Polymarket, suggests a 41% probability of a 25 bps interest rate increase by the Fed after the September 2026 meeting. This is based on recent economic data, including inflationary pressures and a weak July employment report, which have tempered expectations for aggressive action.
Prediction markets such as Polymarket currently price a 6.0% implied probability for a 25 bps rate increase after the September 2026 FOMC meeting, with NO trading at 92.0¢ and YES at 6.0¢ [polyautomate.org](https://polyautomate.org/prediction-odds/will-the-fed-increase-interest-rates-by-25-bps-after-the-september-2026-meeting). This aligns with broader market expectations where 'No change' is the most likely outcome at 59%, and a 25 bps hike is priced at 41% only in a combined 'hike' category that includes smaller moves [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/fed-decision-in-september-762). Given weak recent employment data and moderate inflation, the Fed is more likely to hold steady, making a 25 bps hike unlikely.
Polymarket traders currently assign a 6.0% probability to the Fed increasing interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting, with NO trading near 92.0¢.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
unparseable forecast JSON
Current prediction markets show a slight majority probability (around 56%) that the Fed will keep rates unchanged after the September 2026 meeting. This reflects uncertainty given the long time horizon and the balance of economic indicators that could influence the Fed's decision. Market data from Polymarket and PredEdge indicate a modest lean toward no change, but with significant room for shifts as new economic data and Fed communications emerge.
Predicting Federal Reserve policy over a year in advance is highly speculative, as it depends on future macroeconomic data such as inflation, employment, and GDP growth. While prediction markets show significant volatility and uncertainty, the historical tendency of the Fed to adjust rates in response to evolving economic conditions makes a 'no change' outcome less likely than a rate adjustment, despite the current market pricing reflecting a split view.
Prediction markets show mixed signals, with Polymarket indicating a 39.5% chance of no change [prededge.com](https://prededge.com/markets/finance/61785150-will-there-be-no-change-in-fed-interest-rates-after-the-september-2026-meeting) and another source showing 56% [tomorrowodds.com](https://tomorrowodds.com/q/will-there-be-no-change-in-fed-interest-rates-after-the-september-2026-meeting-615). The base rate for no change in Fed rates is historically low, but recent economic uncertainty and Fed communications could influence the decision.
As of mid-2026, prediction markets such as Polymarket show shifting odds, with the 'No change' outcome hovering around 39.5% to 56% depending on the platform and timing [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/fed-decision-in-september), indicating substantial uncertainty. The Federal Reserve's decision will depend on inflation trends, employment data, and economic growth in the preceding months, which remain unpredictable. Given the current market-implied probabilities and the Fed's data-dependent stance, the true probability of no change is slightly below even, but not negligible.
Polymarket's 'Fed decision in September?' market shows a 100% chance of a 25 bps decrease, conflicting with no change. Other markets have low odds for no change, indicating low likelihood.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.