As of June 10, 2026, Iran's airspace has just returned to normal after a temporary closure on June 7-8 due to missile exchanges with Israel [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-says-airspace-returns-to-normal-after-flight-restrictions-lifted/3960703). While the geopolitical situation remains tense, the recent closure was brief and already resolved, and the market's implied probability of 33% [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/iran-closes-its-airspace-by-june-30-432-786-462-866) may be elevated by recency bias. Base rates for such closures are low—Iran has only done this a few times in recent years—and with only 20 days left until the deadline, the window for a new qualifying closure is narrow. I estimate a 25% chance, slightly below the market, as the immediate crisis has de-escalated and another major closure would require a significant new trigger.
Iran has previously closed its airspace for major periods, including a total closure in January 2026 and a regional closure in April 2024, indicating precedent for such actions. However, recent partial closures and suspensions have not met the threshold for a major closure. Current market odds and lack of recent credible reports suggest a moderate chance of a major closure by June 30, 2026.
The probability of a major Iranian airspace closure remains tied to regional geopolitical tensions. While historical precedents exist for such closures during periods of heightened conflict, there is currently no specific, imminent trigger or official announcement indicating a broad suspension of commercial aviation by June 30, 2026. Market sentiment on prediction platforms like Polymarket reflects this uncertainty, hovering around 33%.
Recent events indicate that Iran has lifted flight restrictions and returned its airspace to normal operations as of June 8, 2026, following a temporary closure due to military exchanges with Israel. The likelihood of a major closure by June 30 is reduced but not zero, considering the ongoing tensions and potential for further escalations. The base rate for such closures is low, and the recent resolution suggests a return to normalcy.
Iran briefly imposed flight restrictions in early June 2026 following military exchanges with Israel, but officially resumed normal aviation operations by June 8 [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-says-airspace-returns-to-normal-after-flight-restrictions-lifted/3960703). Since then, no major closure has occurred, and the current situation reflects routine operations. The base rate of such closures is low, and while geopolitical tensions persist, the absence of recent qualifying actions or official announcements reduces the likelihood. A major closure would require a significant escalation, which is currently not indicated.
Based on Polymarket odds as of May 26, 2026, and historical context of airspace closures, an independent estimate is made.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Prediction markets currently price this event at 7% (Polymarket) to 7% (OddsShift), with $2.8M in volume, indicating strong market consensus that Mojtaba Khamenei will remain Supreme Leader through June 30, 2026. A separate Polymarket market on Ali Khamenei's removal has already resolved 'Yes', but that refers to the former Supreme Leader, not Mojtaba Khamenei, and does not imply a change for the current leader. Base rates for sudden leadership changes in Iran are very low, and no credible reports suggest imminent removal or detention of Mojtaba Khamenei.
Current prediction markets, including Polymarket and OddsShift, price the probability of a leadership change involving Mojtaba Khamenei by June 30, 2026, at around 7%. There is no strong public evidence or credible reports indicating imminent removal or resignation, and the market consensus reflects a low likelihood of such an event occurring within the timeframe.
Current prediction markets and analysis indicate a very low probability of a leadership change in Iran by the end of June 2026. There is no credible evidence or reporting suggesting that Mojtaba Khamenei is facing an imminent removal or loss of power, and market sentiment remains heavily skewed toward the status quo.
The prediction markets, particularly Polymarket, currently price the probability of a leadership change in Iran by June 30 at 7%. This low probability is supported by the lack of credible reporting or significant political upheaval suggesting an imminent change in leadership. The structural support for the 'No' side in the market also indicates a consensus that the status quo is likely to be maintained.
The current prediction market price on Polymarket is 7 cents for 'Yes', implying a 7% probability, and this is consistent across multiple tracking platforms like OddsShift [oddsshift.com](https://oddsshift.com/radar/iran-leadership-change-by-june-30-689-922). Although one source incorrectly states a 100% 'Yes' outcome [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/khamenei-out-as-supreme-leader-of-iran-by-june-30-747), this appears to be outdated or erroneous, as active markets and volume data support a 7% probability. The high volume ($2.8M) and liquidity indicate strong market confidence in this assessment. Base rates of leadership change in authoritarian regimes are low, and there is no public evidence of imminent succession or instability involving Mojtaba Khamenei.
Polymarket data for 'Iran leadership change by June 30?' (focused on Mojtaba Khamenei) shows a 5% probability for the 'Yes' outcome.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Major airspace closures by a state are rare events, typically triggered by imminent security threats (e.g., missile attacks) or large-scale military operations. As of June 10, 2026, there are no credible reports of an imminent, broad-scale threat to Israeli airspace that would necessitate a full civilian closure by June 15. Polymarket odds show ~85% probability of 'No', reflecting informed market participants' assessment. While regional tensions exist, the specific, high bar of a 'major closure' initiated by Israel within the next five days makes a Yes outcome unlikely.
Recent reports indicate that despite regional tensions and missile sirens linked to Iran, daily life and commercial activities in Israel, including aviation, have largely resumed without any official announcement of a broad airspace closure. Market odds have sharply decreased for a major Israeli airspace shutdown by June 15, reflecting the absence of government signals and normalization of routine activities. While regional risks remain elevated, the specific likelihood of Israel initiating a major airspace closure by the deadline appears low.
Israeli authorities have explicitly shifted their policy to prioritize keeping Ben Gurion Airport operational despite ongoing regional conflicts, aiming to prevent the economic and psychological impact of airspace closures [calcalistech.com]. While the security situation remains volatile, the current strategic doctrine favors maintaining civilian aviation unless an extreme, existential threat necessitates a total shutdown [calcalistech.com]. Given the short timeframe until June 15 and the stated intent to avoid automatic closures, a 'No' resolution is significantly more likely [explorer.struct.to].
Based on the current geopolitical situation and the lack of recent major conflicts or threats that would necessitate a major closure of Israeli airspace, the probability is relatively low. The base rate for such closures is low, and there is no specific evidence suggesting an imminent closure.
As of early June 2026, despite regional tensions involving Iran and missile alerts in Israel, there has been no official announcement from Israeli aviation authorities of a major airspace closure. Reports indicate that daily life and commercial activity, including aviation, have largely resumed across Israel, including in Tel Aviv [AP News](https://apnews.com). The definition of a 'major closure' requires a broad, government-ordered suspension of commercial aviation, which has not occurred. Markets have reacted to the absence of official action, with odds of a closure falling sharply. While geopolitical risks persist, the lack of government movement toward a shutdown and the resilience of current operations reduce the likelihood of a closure by June 15.
Recent reports indicate Israel has been keeping airspace open despite attacks, with daily life resuming and no official major closure notice. The market requires a broad, Israel-initiated closure, which hasn't materialized.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Given the complete absence of any reported peace talks, the entrenched hostility between Israel and Iran, and the extremely short remaining time (20 days), the chance of a formal permanent peace deal being signed and publicly confirmed by both governments by June 30, 2026, is negligible. Polymarket odds of ~3% are already low, and independent assessment suggests even that may be optimistic.
Given the long-standing hostility and deep geopolitical tensions between Israel and Iran, a permanent peace deal by June 30, 2026, is highly unlikely. Current prediction markets reflect a very low probability (around 3%) for such an agreement, indicating that traders and analysts see little chance of a definitive peace deal in this timeframe. No recent credible reports suggest significant progress toward a permanent peace agreement, and the complex regional dynamics further reduce the likelihood.
The geopolitical relationship between Israel and Iran is characterized by deep-seated ideological hostility and a long-standing proxy conflict, making a formal, permanent peace treaty highly improbable in the current climate. There are no ongoing diplomatic negotiations or public signals suggesting a shift toward normalization or a cessation of hostilities, and prediction markets [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/israel-x-iran-permanent-peace-deal-by) reflect this extreme skepticism.
The current market odds on Polymarket suggest a 3% chance of a permanent peace deal between Israel and Iran by June 30, 2026. This low probability reflects the high level of uncertainty and the historical context of strained relations between the two countries. The lack of significant diplomatic progress or public statements indicating a path to peace further supports this low probability.
The absence of diplomatic engagement, combined with longstanding adversarial relations, makes a permanent peace deal highly unlikely by June 30, 2026. The 3% implied by Polymarket [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/israel-x-iran-permanent-peace-deal-by) aligns with the lack of evidence for a breakthrough, suggesting only minimal chance of an unexpected resolution.
The market on Polymarket currently assigns a very low probability, with 'Yes' priced at 3.1¢, indicating a 3% chance.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Base rates from prediction markets show a consistent 0-6% for earlier deadlines and 15.5% for June 30, but these markets often overestimate tail risks. The strict criteria require a full, unambiguous transfer of control, which is extremely unlikely given Iran's heavy military presence and the island's economic importance. No current news indicates any such development is imminent, so the true probability is well below the market price, around 5%.
Kharg Island is a strategically important oil terminal under firm Iranian control, and there is no current indication of imminent loss of control. Prediction markets assign a low probability (around 15.5%) to Iran losing control by June 30, 2026, reflecting the high geopolitical stakes and Iran's likely efforts to maintain control. Temporary disruptions or claims without actual control transfer do not count, and no credible reports suggest a negotiated settlement or military takeover is imminent.
The probability of Iran losing control of Kharg Island, a critical oil terminal, remains low as there is no current evidence of an imminent military invasion or occupation by a foreign power. Prediction markets [predictmarketcap.com](https://predictmarketcap.com/markets/kharg-island-no-longer-under-iranian-control-by-june-30-561) reflect this skepticism, with the 'Yes' outcome consistently trading at low probabilities. Given the strict resolution criteria requiring established, non-temporary control by a third party, the likelihood of such a significant geopolitical shift occurring by June 30, 2026, is minimal.
The current prediction market odds on Polymarket suggest a 15.5% probability of Kharg Island no longer being under Iranian control by June 30, 2026. This aligns with the base rate for such geopolitical shifts, which are typically low without significant ongoing conflict or international intervention. The strategic importance of Kharg Island and the lack of recent major conflicts or negotiations involving its control further support this probability.
Iran maintains strong military and governmental control over Kharg Island, a critical node for its oil exports. While regional tensions could theoretically escalate, the threshold for 'no longer under control' requires sustained, established foreign or opposing authority, which is unlikely by June 30, 2026. The prediction market consensus around 15.5% [predictmarketcap.com](https://predictmarketcap.com/markets/kharg-island-no-longer-under-iranian-control-by-june-30-561) aligns with a low but non-zero risk of major conflict or seizure, which I slightly adjust upward for tail risks.
Polymarket currently prices the chance of Kharg Island no longer being under Iranian control by June 30, 2026, at 15.5%.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
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Current market data and analysis indicate a very low probability (around 5%) that the Strait of Hormuz shipping traffic will return to a 7-day moving average of 60 or more arrivals by June 15, 2026. The region has experienced ongoing disruptions and geopolitical tensions that have suppressed traffic levels, and no strong evidence suggests a near-term normalization to pre-disruption levels. The market sentiment and volume also reflect skepticism about a quick recovery in traffic volume.
Current market sentiment and available data indicate that shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz remains significantly below the threshold required for a 'Yes' resolution. Given the persistent geopolitical tensions and the current trend in transit calls, it is highly unlikely that the 7-day moving average will reach 60 by the June 15, 2026 deadline.
The current market odds on Polymarket are 1.1%, which suggests a very low probability of the event occurring. Given the lack of recent data indicating a significant increase in transit calls, and the historical context of shipping disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, it is reasonable to align with the market consensus.
While the current market price suggests a ~3% chance, I slightly adjust upward to 5% based on base rates of shipping resuming during lulls in conflict. However, the requirement for a 7-day average of 60+ ships implies sustained normalcy, which is unlikely given persistent regional instability. The IMF Portwatch data remains the definitive source, and no evidence suggests traffic has yet met the threshold.
Current market odds show a very low probability of the 7-day moving average reaching 60 by June 15, with Yes at 3.4%.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
The Polymarket odds show a strong No sentiment at ~83.5% as of the search date, suggesting the 7-day moving average of transit calls is currently well below the 60 threshold. With only about 20 days remaining until the end of June, a rapid increase to a sustained average of 60+ seems unlikely without a significant de-escalation in regional tensions, for which no concrete evidence was found in the search results. The IMF Portwatch data is the sole resolution source, and the current trend appears unfavorable for a Yes outcome.
Current market data from Polymarket shows a low probability (around 17%) that the Strait of Hormuz traffic will return to a 7-day moving average of 60 or more ship arrivals by the end of June 2026. Given the strategic importance of the strait and ongoing geopolitical tensions, traffic has been disrupted and rerouting remains common, making a full return to normal levels by that date unlikely but not impossible.
The current market sentiment and geopolitical climate suggest that significant disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz are likely to persist, making a return to a 7-day moving average of 60 transit calls unlikely by the end of June 2026. Given the ongoing regional tensions and the reliance on IMF Portwatch data, the probability of reaching this threshold remains low based on current trends.
The current market prices and historical data suggest a low probability of the Strait of Hormuz traffic returning to normal by the end of June 2026. The Polymarket and ClearMarket data indicate a significant skepticism, with prices around 20-42% for a 'Yes' resolution. The key factors include the ongoing geopolitical tensions, the tight timeline for normalization, and the historical shipping data trends.
The current market pricing across platforms like Polymarket and ClearMarket reflects a consensus probability of around 17-20% for a 7-day moving average of ship arrivals reaching 60 or more by June 30, 2026, based on IMF Portwatch data. Geopolitical tensions in the region, including fraying ceasefires and stalled Iran talks, create uncertainty and increase the risk of disruptions. Additionally, rerouting of vessels due to security concerns and the tight timeline make a sustained return to pre-conflict traffic levels unlikely, though not impossible, before the deadline.
No current data indicates the 7-day moving average of transit calls will reach 60, but no clear evidence of it not reaching 60 either.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The US-Iran ceasefire was agreed on April 7-8, 2026, for an initial two-week period, and as of June 10, 2026, it appears to still be in effect with no official US announcement that it is over. The market requires a clear, official statement that no ceasefire is in effect, not merely the expiration of a prior term. While tensions remain, the absence of any such announcement in the final days before June 12 makes a 'Yes' resolution unlikely, though not impossible if a sudden diplomatic breakdown occurs.
The current ceasefire between the US and Iran was agreed upon in early April 2026 as a temporary two-week measure to de-escalate hostilities. There has been no public official announcement from Donald Trump or the US government explicitly stating that the ceasefire is over or no longer in effect by June 12. Given the short timeframe and the political sensitivity, an official termination announcement is less likely before June 12, though the risk remains due to ongoing tensions.
The market requires an explicit, official announcement from the U.S. government or President Trump that the ceasefire is no longer in effect. Given the current date is June 10, 2026, and the deadline is June 12, 2026, there is a very narrow window for such a specific, formal declaration to occur, especially since mere reports of violations or breaches do not qualify under the market rules.
The ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran was agreed upon on April 7–8, 2026, and is set to last for two weeks. As of the current date, there have been no official announcements indicating that the ceasefire has ended or been violated. The likelihood of a ceasefire ending within the specified timeframe is moderate, considering the historical context of U.S.-Iran relations and the potential for escalations. However, the absence of recent credible reports or official statements suggesting an imminent end to the ceasefire suggests a lower probability.
As of the latest information, a temporary ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran was agreed upon in early April 2026 and was set to last two weeks. There has been no official announcement from President Trump, the U.S. government, or the military stating that the ceasefire is no longer in effect. Public statements or credible reports confirming a formal end to the ceasefire commitment have not emerged. Given the absence of any qualifying announcement by June 12, 2026, and the high bar for resolution (requiring explicit statements), the likelihood of a 'Yes' resolution is low [Polymarket](https://polymarket.com/event/trump-announces-us-x-iran-ceasefire-over-byptptpt-20260607232555290).
As of the search date, there is no indication of a qualifying announcement from Trump, the U.S. government, or military. No such announcement has been made by June 12.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
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Recent reports indicate that the U.S. and Iran have been close to finalizing an extension of the ceasefire, with ongoing negotiations and a pending decision from President Trump. However, no official announcement has yet been made, and there are still unresolved issues and demands causing delays. Given the history of near-agreements and the current diplomatic momentum, there is a moderate to high chance of an official U.S. announcement by June 30, but uncertainty remains due to the lack of final confirmation.
While reports indicate that negotiators have been close to a deal for some time, the process has been marked by significant friction, with President Trump publicly expressing hesitation and Iran criticizing U.S. demands as 'excessive' [nbcnews.com]. The lack of a finalized agreement despite multiple high-level meetings suggests that while a deal is possible, the political hurdles and the tendency for last-minute delays make a formal announcement by the June 30 deadline uncertain.
Recent reports indicate that the U.S. and Iran are close to finalizing a deal to extend the ceasefire, with both sides having agreed to the terms of a truce deal. However, final approval and official announcements from both sides are still pending, and there are ongoing negotiations and adjustments to the draft text. The U.S. has specific demands that Iran must meet, and there are delays in finalizing the agreement.
Although there are strong indications that the U.S. and Iran are nearing a deal, as of June 10, 2026, no qualifying announcement has been made. The lack of a finalized agreement, combined with public disagreements over terms and no official U.S. statement, suggests significant uncertainty. Base rates for last-minute diplomatic breakthroughs in high-stakes conflicts suggest a non-trivial chance, but not a likely one.
As of the search date, there is no confirmed US announcement of a ceasefire extension or new agreement. Ongoing disputes over demands and delays in finalizing the deal make a June 30 announcement unlikely.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
As of June 10, 2026, only five days remain until the deadline, and no credible reports indicate a signed or formally confirmed permanent peace deal. The current state is a temporary ceasefire, which explicitly does not qualify. The high diplomatic hurdles and short timeframe make a permanent agreement extremely unlikely.
Despite ongoing tensions and intermittent negotiations between the US and Iran, a permanent peace deal explicitly ending military hostilities has not been achieved historically and remains difficult due to deep-seated geopolitical conflicts, mutual distrust, and regional proxy dynamics. While diplomatic efforts and temporary ceasefires occur, the likelihood of a definitive, lasting peace agreement by mid-2026 is low given current trends and the complexity of issues involved.
The geopolitical relationship between the United States and Iran remains deeply adversarial, characterized by fundamental ideological differences, regional proxy conflicts, and a lack of diplomatic trust. Given the current date of June 10, 2026, and the requirement for a formal, permanent peace treaty or equivalent definitive agreement by June 15, 2026, it is highly improbable that such a monumental diplomatic breakthrough could be negotiated, finalized, and publicly confirmed in the remaining five days.
The likelihood of a permanent peace deal between the US and Iran by June 15, 2026, is low due to the complex geopolitical dynamics and historical context of tensions. While there have been recent ceasefire agreements, these are temporary and do not indicate a lasting resolution. The requirement for a formal, signed agreement or clear public confirmation from both governments adds another layer of uncertainty.
The probability of a permanent peace deal between the U.S. and Iran by June 15, 2026, remains low due to deep-seated geopolitical tensions, lack of trust, and conflicting strategic interests [predictionninja.com](https://predictionninja.com/market/us-x-iran-permanent-peace-deal-by-june-15-2026-734-856-129). While diplomatic talks may continue, recent developments such as a temporary ceasefire extension do not meet the threshold for a permanent agreement [polyspotter.com](https://polyspotter.com/market/us-x-iran-permanent-peace-deal-by-june-15-2026-0xd86a8). The requirement for explicit, mutual, and lasting cessation of hostilities makes a definitive deal unlikely within this timeframe.
No current evidence of a finalized deal, and high historical tensions make a quick agreement unlikely within the timeframe.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The Polymarket prediction market currently prices the chance of a deal at roughly 20-32%, reflecting trader skepticism. With only 20 days remaining until the June 30 deadline and no public announcement of a final agreement, the window is very tight. While negotiations could theoretically conclude quickly, the historical difficulty of US-Iran nuclear talks and the lack of recent positive signals make a deal unlikely. I estimate a 25% probability, slightly below the market midpoint, to account for the short remaining time and absence of concrete progress.
Current prediction markets, which aggregate diverse information and trader sentiment, assign about a 20% chance to a US-Iran nuclear deal by June 30, 2026. Given the complex geopolitical tensions, stalled negotiations, and historical difficulties in reaching such agreements, the low probability reflects significant obstacles. However, ongoing diplomatic efforts and the possibility of a multilateral deal keep the chance above zero.
The current geopolitical climate remains characterized by significant distrust and ongoing tensions between the United States and Iran, making a formal, publicly announced nuclear agreement highly unlikely by the June 30, 2026, deadline. While prediction markets currently reflect a 20% probability, there is no evidence of active, high-level diplomatic breakthroughs that would suggest a shift toward a formal accord in the near term.
The prediction market Polymarket currently assigns a 20% chance to this event, which is a crowd-sourced probability based on real-time trading. This suggests a low likelihood of a US-Iran nuclear deal by June 30, 2026, reflecting the current market sentiment and available information.
The current prediction market odds on Polymarket and Bitget Wallet suggest a consensus probability of around 20% for a US-Iran nuclear deal by June 30, 2026 [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/us-iran-nuclear-deal-by-june-30). This reflects the ongoing diplomatic challenges, lack of recent breakthroughs, and historical difficulty in sustaining agreements on Iran's nuclear program. While negotiations may continue, significant political and strategic hurdles remain on both sides, making a publicly announced agreement within the timeframe unlikely but not impossible.
Current prediction market odds (Polymarket, PredictionNinja) are around 20%, with tight time remaining and ongoing regional tensions.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The Polymarket odds suggest ~85% belief in restart, but the US military has explicitly denied restarting Project Freedom as of late May 2026 (Iran International, June 2026). However, recent reports describe a quiet, nameless equivalent effort advising ships, which could satisfy the 'substantially equivalent program' criterion if formally acknowledged. Given Trump's vacillation—he announced Project Freedom, then withdrew—and the denials followed by ambiguous coordination, there is a chance of a formal announcement by June 30, but the track record tempers probability to ~0.72.
There is no current official announcement from Donald Trump, the U.S. government, or military confirming the restart of Project Freedom by June 30, 2026. Recent reports indicate the U.S. military denies having restarted the project, despite some media claims of assistance to vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. Given the lack of definitive statements and the requirement for explicit announcements, the probability remains low.
While the administration is engaging in 'quiet' coordination with commercial shipping to facilitate transit through the Strait of Hormuz, official sources have explicitly denied the restart of 'Project Freedom' [straitstimes.com, iranintl.com]. The administration appears to favor low-profile, non-definitive assistance over a formal, public military initiative that could provoke further conflict with Iran [straitstimes.com]. Given the explicit denials and the preference for avoiding a formal announcement, a definitive restart of the program by June 30 is unlikely.
The U.S. military has denied restarting Project Freedom, despite earlier reports suggesting otherwise. The administration has adopted a more discreet approach to protecting vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, but there has been no definitive announcement of restarting Project Freedom. The lack of a formal announcement and the limited movement of ships through the strait suggest a lower probability of a restart by June 30.
As of now, there has been no definitive announcement from Donald Trump, the U.S. government, or the military about restarting Project Freedom or a substantially equivalent program by June 30, 2026. While there are reports of quiet coordination with commercial ships [straitstimes.com](https://www.straitstimes.com/world/middle-east/us-looks-to-unblock-strait-of-hormuz-with-quiet-version-of-project-freedom) and conflicting claims about naval assistance [iranintl.com](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202605260538), CENTCOM has explicitly denied restarting escorts or Project Freedom [iranintl.com](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202605260538). The lack of an official, unambiguous announcement—required for resolution—makes a 'Yes' outcome unlikely, despite elevated market odds.
As of the search, there's no definitive announcement of Project Freedom restart, but there's a quiet version. Time left and potential for official statements contribute to the probability.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.