Mojtaba Khamenei has been Supreme Leader since March 2026 after a rapid succession, and the regime has consolidated around him with IRGC and clerical backing. The remaining 28 days until August 31 are very short for a sudden removal, coup, or incapacitation. Polymarket implied probability is around 9%, and given the stability of the new leadership and lack of recent triggering events, a slightly lower estimate is warranted. Base rates for such abrupt leadership changes in Iran are low, especially in a compressed timeframe.
Mojtaba Khamenei was recently installed as Supreme Leader following his father's assassination in February 2026, with strong institutional backing and a preference for regime stability. Despite some health concerns and ongoing regional tensions, the rapid and supported transition reduces the likelihood of another leadership change by August 31, 2026. Market data and expert consensus currently price the probability at around 9%.
Mojtaba Khamenei was installed following a rapid, IRGC-backed transition after his father's assassination, and the regime has prioritized stability to maintain control during ongoing regional conflicts. Given the short timeframe until August 31, 2026, and the lack of credible reports suggesting an imminent challenge to his authority, the probability of a leadership change remains low, consistent with current market sentiment [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/iran-leadership-change-by) [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/iran-leadership-change-by).
The recent succession of Mojtaba Khamenei as Supreme Leader of Iran was backed by key institutions, including the Assembly of Experts and the IRGC, indicating strong regime stability. Markets price the probability of a leadership change by August 31 at 9%, reflecting low expectations of near-term changes. The base rate for such changes is historically low, and current conditions favor continuity.
The recent, stable succession of Mojtaba Khamenei with IRGC and constitutional support makes abrupt removal unlikely. While health rumors and elite dynamics pose minor risks, institutional forces favor continuity. I slightly adjust upward from market pricing to account for residual uncertainty around his public profile and regional tensions.
As of July 22, 2026, Polymarket prices the probability of Iran leadership change by August 31 at 9%, reflecting low near-term change after Mojtaba Khamenei's quick succession.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The ceasefire is under severe strain with reported strikes and attacks, but the narrow definition of qualifying actions (excluding maritime, cyber, artillery, etc.) means the threshold for breaking the ceasefire is high. However, the ongoing exchanges and diplomatic fragility suggest a significant chance of a qualifying action before August 31. Base rates for such ceasefires are low, and market odds around 26% align with this assessment. I estimate a 25% probability that no qualifying action occurs, leading to a YES resolution.
Recent reports indicate that the June 2026 ceasefire memorandum between Israel and Iran has been significantly eroded by ongoing strikes and retaliations, with US statements in late July suggesting the ceasefire is effectively over. Although diplomatic efforts continue, the pattern of intermittent military actions and warnings of retaliation make a sustained ceasefire through August 31 unlikely. Market data and expert consensus also reflect a low probability of the ceasefire holding.
The June 2026 memorandum of understanding has been severely undermined by recent escalations and renewed exchanges of fire. With US officials indicating the ceasefire is effectively over and persistent reports of ongoing brinkmanship and threats to energy infrastructure, the likelihood of a qualifying military action occurring before August 31 is high.
The ceasefire between Israel and Iran has been fragile, with recent violations and escalations. While diplomatic efforts are ongoing, the historical pattern of fragile truces and current tensions suggest a significant risk of further military actions. The base rate for such ceasefires holding is low, and specific evidence points to ongoing brinkmanship and potential for escalation.
As of early August 2026, reports indicate that the June 2026 memorandum of understanding for a 60-day ceasefire has been eroded by renewed exchanges between Israel and Iran, with U.S. officials stating the ceasefire is effectively over [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/israel-x-iran-ceasefire-continues-throughptptpt-20260716224448963/israel-x-iran-ceasefire-continues-through-august-31-20260716224448970-754-896-823). However, diplomatic channels remain active, and no confirmed qualifying military action—defined as a direct strike impacting terrestrial territory—has been credibly confirmed as of 2026-08-03. The market-implied probability is around 26%, but based on the totality of evidence, including the fragility of past truces and ongoing brinkmanship, the true probability of the ceasefire holding is assessed slightly higher but still low.
Ongoing tensions, including US and Israeli strikes on Iranian targets and Iranian attacks on shipping, have eroded the ceasefire. Diplomatic channels are active but recent exchanges suggest fragile truce. Polymarket price is 26% as of July 24, 2026.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The ceasefire between Israel and Iran remains fragile, with recent violations and US declaration of truce over in July, but the narrow definition of qualifying military action (excluding intercepted munitions, naval, artillery, etc.) and the short remaining period (~6 days) reduce the likelihood of a breach. Market implied probabilities on Polymarket were around 78-90% as of late July. Considering ongoing diplomatic talks and the short horizon, I estimate an 80% chance the ceasefire holds through August 9.
The ceasefire between Israel and Iran, brokered by the US in April 2026 and reinforced in June, has faced multiple strains including missile exchanges and attacks on shipping, leading to President Trump declaring the truce over in July. However, bilateral talks continue and there is trader consensus leaning towards sustained de-escalation despite uncertainties over sanctions relief and guarantees. Given the fragile but ongoing diplomatic efforts and absence of a finalized deal, the probability of the ceasefire holding through August 9 is moderate to high but not certain.
While the ceasefire has been described as fragile and subject to repeated strains, including recent missile exchanges and declarations of the truce being over by President Trump, the current market sentiment and the lack of a major, confirmed, non-intercepted strike in the immediate days leading up to August 9 suggest a high likelihood of the status quo holding for the final few days. The definition of a 'qualifying military action' is quite specific, excluding intercepted munitions, which provides a buffer against minor escalations.
The ceasefire between Israel and Iran has been fragile, with repeated violations and escalations, including missile exchanges and attacks on commercial shipping. However, diplomatic talks continue, and there is a possibility of a last-minute agreement or extension. The absence of a finalized deal on nuclear and navigation issues and ongoing hostilities in Lebanon add uncertainty.
The ceasefire remains technically fragile due to past violations and unresolved diplomatic issues, but no confirmed qualifying military action has occurred since July. Credible sources and market pricing suggest a moderate likelihood of continuity, supported by ongoing mediation. Absent a recent escalation meeting the strict resolution criteria, the balance of evidence favors continuation as of now.
As of July 30, 2026, Polymarket prices the 'Yes' probability at 78%, considering ongoing diplomatic talks despite previous truce declaration issues.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Given only 28 days remain until August 31, 2026, and the definition of a military clash is narrow (excluding warning shots, cyberattacks, collisions), the historical base rate is near zero—no direct NATO-Russia military encounter meeting this criteria has occurred since the Ukraine war began. Current geopolitical tensions remain elevated but deterrence is strong, and Polymarket's implied probability of 10% (as of July 31) might overestimate the short-term risk. I adjust downward to 6% considering the strict definition and limited time window.
Current market data from Polymarket and Orrery indicate a low implied probability around 10% for a direct military clash between NATO and Russia by August 31, 2026. Despite ongoing tensions and proxy conflicts, direct military engagements involving use of force remain relatively rare and would likely escalate tensions significantly, making such an event less likely in the near term. The definition excludes non-violent incidents and proxy engagements, further lowering the probability.
While tensions between NATO and Russia remain high due to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, both sides have consistently demonstrated a strong desire to avoid direct military escalation that could trigger Article 5. Current market sentiment [polymarket.copilot.markets](https://polymarket.copilot.markets/event/nato-x-russia-military-clash-in-2025) and [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/nato-x-russia-military-clash-by-august-31-2026) reflect a low probability of a direct kinetic engagement meeting the specific criteria of this market before the August 31, 2026 deadline.
The current implied probability on Polymarket is 10%, which aligns with the base rate of such incidents. Recent tensions and historical data suggest a low but non-negligible chance of a military clash. The key factors include ongoing geopolitical tensions, past incidents, and the definition of a 'military encounter' as per the market rules.
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Current Polymarket implied probability is 10%, considering the defined military encounter criteria and time frame.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
The current daily transit count is roughly one-sixth of the normal threshold, and recovery has been slow and partial despite a ceasefire. Clearing the vessel backlog, restoring security guarantees, and achieving a sustained 7-day moving average of 60+ within 28 days is very unlikely given the persistent risks and limited diplomatic progress. The Polymarket price of 14% is a reasonable anchor, and I adjust slightly downward due to the short remaining window and logistical hurdles.
Current vessel throughput through the Strait of Hormuz remains significantly below normal levels (around 10 daily transits versus a baseline of 60), reflecting ongoing security risks and a backlog of vessels. Despite a June 17 memorandum of understanding, recovery has been limited and uneven, with persistent threats such as mining and attacks on shipping. Market-implied probabilities from traders assign about a 14% chance of normalization by August 31, 2026, reflecting cautious optimism but substantial uncertainty due to diplomatic and security factors.
Current transit levels remain severely depressed at approximately 10 vessels per day, far below the 60-ship threshold required for a 'Yes' resolution. Despite a June memorandum of understanding, there has been no significant recovery in traffic, and persistent security risks, including mining threats and insurance issues, continue to deter normal shipping operations. With only a few weeks remaining until the August 31 deadline, the lack of momentum toward normalization makes a return to baseline volumes highly unlikely.
The current trader consensus on Polymarket assigns a 14% chance to the Strait of Hormuz traffic returning to normal by August 31, 2026. This reflects ongoing security risks, a vessel backlog, and diplomatic uncertainty. The base rate of 10 transits daily versus a 60-ship baseline, along with the need for significant de-escalation or mine-clearance progress, supports this probability.
Current vessel throughput through the Strait of Hormuz remains around 10 transits per day, significantly below the 60-ship baseline needed for normalization. Despite a brief reopening and a June 17 memorandum of understanding, progress has been limited and uneven, with persistent security risks including mine threats and GPS interference. Diplomatic uncertainty following the U.S.-Iran ceasefire continues to delay full recovery, and trader consensus reflected in real-time markets like Polymarket assigns only a 14% chance to normalization by August 31.
The market currently assigns a 14% chance to the event, considering low transit throughput, ongoing security risks, and diplomatic uncertainty.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Recent reports indicate that Trump announced Iran talks will resume on Monday (August 3, 2026) and that 'parameters met for a deal to end Iran war' (AP News). This suggests active diplomatic momentum toward a deal, which could include ending the blockade. However, the blockade was reinstated on July 13 after a previous ceasefire collapsed, and the market currently prices YES at 47% (Polymarket via Orrery), reflecting uncertainty. Given the short timeline (12 days) and the requirement for an official, unambiguous announcement, I estimate a slightly lower probability than the market, around 42%.
The US reinstated the blockade on July 13, 2026, after a ceasefire was fractured by renewed Iranian attacks and US strikes. While diplomatic talks are ongoing, no official announcement has been made to end the blockade, and the situation remains tense. Given the short timeframe until August 15 and the current geopolitical dynamics, the probability of an official US announcement ending the blockade by then is relatively low but not negligible.
Recent reports indicate that President Trump has stated that negotiations with Iran are set to resume, and he has claimed that the parameters for a deal to end the conflict have been met [cnbc.com](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/08/03/trump-iran-us-negotiations-peace-proposals-.html), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/trump-iran-strait-hormuz-israel-gaza-mideast-f4c225f6667d9fd171616304701825a0). While these developments suggest a path toward de-escalation, the resolution requires an official, unambiguous announcement of the blockade's end by August 15, which remains a high bar given the volatility of the situation and the potential for last-minute diplomatic hurdles.
Recent diplomatic talks and statements from President Trump suggest a potential deal to end the blockade, but the situation remains volatile with ongoing tensions and potential for reversals. The base rate for such agreements holding is around 30-40%, adjusted slightly upwards due to recent positive signals.
As of August 3, 2026, the U.S. naval blockade on Iranian ports was reinstated on July 13 following the collapse of the Islamabad Memorandum ceasefire, with President Trump declaring the U.S. as 'guardian' of the Strait of Hormuz and imposing passage fees [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/us-announces-end-of-iranian-blockade-byptptpt-20260713152715080). No official U.S. government announcement has been made to end or suspend the blockade. Market sentiment, reflected in a 23¢ price for 'Yes' shares, suggests a 23% probability of resolution as 'Yes' [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/us-announces-end-of-iranian-blockade-by-august-15-2026-20260713152715083-347). Given the lack of diplomatic breakthroughs and ongoing hostilities, the likelihood remains low.
Based on current Polymarket pricing of 47% as of August 3, 2026, and the need for a verifiable official announcement, with recent reinstatement of the blockade, a 45% probability is estimated.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The market for a $60k dip in August is priced at 61.5%, which implies traders expect a significant decline. A further drop to $50k from that level is a ~17% additional fall, which is less common. The July market for $50k resolved to no, and the August market for $50k is at 7.7% on Polymarket, suggesting a low probability. Accounting for uncertainty and the possibility of a larger correction, I estimate a 10% chance.
Current market data from Polymarket and PredictMarketCap indicate a low probability (around 7.7% to 8%) that Bitcoin will dip to $50,000 in August 2026 based on Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute candle lows. Given Bitcoin's recent price trends and volatility, a dip to $50,000 is possible but not highly likely within that timeframe.
Current market sentiment and betting data from [predictmarketcap.com](https://predictmarketcap.com/markets/will-bitcoin-dip-to-50k-in-august-2026) indicate a low probability (approximately 7.7%) of Bitcoin dropping to $50,000 in August. While there is higher volatility for higher price points like $60,000, the $50,000 level remains a significant support threshold that traders currently view as unlikely to be breached given recent price action.
The probability is based on the current market odds from Polymarket, which indicates a 7.7% chance of Bitcoin dipping to $50,000 in August 2026. This aligns with the low probability observed in similar markets for July 2026, suggesting a consistent market sentiment.
Current market pricing on Polymarket suggests a 7.7% chance of Bitcoin dipping to $50,000 in August 2026, based on Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute candle low prices [predictmarketcap.com](https://predictmarketcap.com/markets/will-bitcoin-dip-to-50k-in-august-2026). This aligns with recent sentiment and implied probabilities from prediction markets, which reflect aggregated trader expectations. While Bitcoin has shown volatility, the $50,000 level is significantly below current trading levels (~$60,000+), making a sharp 17%+ drop unlikely barring major macro shocks.
Polymarket currently prices the probability of Bitcoin dipping to $50,000 in August at 7.7% based on Binance 1-minute candle low prices.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
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Given that the probability of Bitcoin dipping to $60,000 in August is about 50.5% and to $50,000 is only 7.7%, a dip to $55,000 is likely somewhere in between. Historical volatility and current market trends suggest a moderate chance of such a dip, but not as high as the $60,000 level. Therefore, a 35% probability reflects a reasonable estimate based on available market data and price levels.
Market data from [predictmarketcap.com](https://predictmarketcap.com/markets/will-bitcoin-dip-to-60k-in-august-2026) indicates a 61.5% probability of Bitcoin hitting $60,000 in August, while the probability of hitting $50,000 is significantly lower at 7.7%. Given that $55,000 falls between these two benchmarks, a probability of 35% reflects the likelihood of increased volatility or a moderate correction within the month, while acknowledging that Bitcoin remains relatively stable above these levels.
Given that the probability of Bitcoin dipping to $60,000 is 61.5% and the probability of dipping to $50,000 is 7.7%, the probability of dipping to $55,000 is likely somewhere in between. The recent market data and trading volumes suggest a moderate likelihood of a dip to $55,000.
Bitcoin dipping to $55,000 in August 2026 is unlikely but not impossible. Current Polymarket data shows a 1.1% chance of a dip to $40,000 and 7.7% to $50,000, implying a probability between those levels for $55,000. However, thin liquidity and market sensitivity suggest prices may not fully reflect true odds. I adjust upward slightly to account for volatility risk, but base rates and recent price resilience support a low probability.
Based on Polymarket data for similar dips, $55k is between $60k (50.5%) and $50k (7.7%). Bitcoin's volatility also plays a role.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
The boycott by major parties and the sole constituency poll showing Binface at 20% (far ahead of any other minor candidate) make him the clear favorite for second place. The prediction markets, which aggregate trader information, are consistent with this view. The main risk is that a low-turnout surge for an unknown candidate could upset, but Binface's established brand and polling lead make that unlikely. I assign 90% probability.
Count Binface is currently the clear favorite to finish second in the Clacton by-election, with prediction markets and polling data consistently showing him at around 70-90% probability. Major parties have boycotted the election, leaving Binface as the main challenger to Nigel Farage, who is expected to win first place. While there is some uncertainty due to the presence of many minor candidates, none have significant public recognition or party backing to realistically surpass Binface for second place.
Count Binface has emerged as the clear frontrunner for second place in the Clacton by-election, supported by both prediction market sentiment and recent polling data. With major political parties boycotting the contest, the field is fragmented among numerous minor candidates, and the Survation poll [pollcheck.co.uk] specifically places Binface in second with 20% of the vote, significantly ahead of other challengers. While the high number of candidates introduces some volatility, Binface's high name recognition and status as the primary protest option make him the strong favorite to secure the runner-up position.
The prediction markets overwhelmingly favor Count Binface for second place, with Polymarket showing 89% [polymarket.copilot.markets](https://polymarket.copilot.markets/event/clacton-by-election-2nd-place-20260707214539733) and Lines.com at 70% [lines.com](https://www.lines.com/prediction-markets/politics/clacton-by-election-2nd-place-20260707214539733). The absence of major party candidates and Binface's significant polling support (20% in a local poll [pollcheck.co.uk](https://www.pollcheck.co.uk/by-elections/clacton)) further support this outcome.
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Major parties are boycotting, leaving Count Binface as the clear main challenger. Polls show him in second place with significant support, and prediction markets give him high implied probabilities.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
WTI crude oil is currently trading near $79-80, well above the $65 target. A drop of roughly 18% in one month is a large move that would require a major bearish catalyst, such as a severe demand shock or unexpected OPEC+ supply surge. While supply-side risks exist, the base rate for such a sharp decline is low, and prediction markets price this at 4%. I assign a 4% probability, consistent with market odds and the significant gap to the target.
Current market data and trading volumes indicate a very low probability that WTI Crude Oil will hit a low of $65 in August 2026. Prices have recently declined from above $100 to around $79-80 due to easing geopolitical tensions and increased supply, but forecasts and trader sentiment suggest prices will remain above $65. The low probability is supported by market pricing on prediction platforms showing about 4% odds for this event.
As of August 3, 2026, WTI Crude Oil is trading in the $79-$80 range. A drop to $65 would require a significant, sudden decline of approximately 18-20% within the month. While market sentiment has shifted toward lower prices due to increased supply and inventory builds, a move to $65 is a substantial deviation from current levels without a major, unforeseen demand shock or geopolitical event, making it unlikely within the remaining weeks of August.
WTI crude oil prices have declined from peaks above $100 per barrel in Q2 2026 to around $79-80 as of August 3, 2026, due to de-escalation in U.S.-Iran tensions and increased supply. The market sentiment is shifting toward lower price levels, with forecasts of inventory builds and OPEC+ production increases. However, hitting $65 would require a significant further decline, which is possible but not highly probable given the current market conditions and upcoming catalysts.
As of August 3, 2026, WTI Crude Oil is trading around $79-80 per barrel, down from highs above $100 in Q2 due to de-escalation in U.S.-Iran tensions and increased supply from the Persian Gulf [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/what-price-will-wti-hit-in-august-2026). Market sentiment has shifted lower due to expected inventory builds and OPEC+ production increases, but a drop to $65 would require a significant further decline of over 15%. While possible, such a move would likely need a major demand shock or supply glut beyond current expectations. Historical volatility and options markets suggest a non-trivial but low-probability tail risk.
Current WTI price is around $79-80, with recent downward trend due to de-escalation and supply factors. Market odds are low, and catalysts like OPEC+ meetings may not be enough to push it to $65.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Market-implied probability from Polymarket is 56% for a 25 bps hike at the September 2026 FOMC meeting, supported by persistent inflation above 2%, resilient GDP growth near 2.2%, and a hawkish 9-3 vote in July with three dissents favoring an immediate hike. Futures markets embed 30-35 bps of tightening by year-end, reinforcing the likelihood of a September move. However, upcoming CPI and employment data could shift expectations, and the 43% probability for no change reflects genuine uncertainty, so I estimate 57%.
Recent FOMC actions and market consensus indicate a moderate likelihood of a 25 bps rate increase at the September 2026 meeting. Persistent inflation above target, resilient GDP growth, and solid labor market data support tightening, while some dissent within the FOMC and the possibility of no change keep the probability from being higher. Market-based probabilities currently center around 56% for a 25 bps increase, reflecting these factors.
Market consensus and recent FOMC meeting minutes suggest a strong inclination toward a 25-basis-point hike due to persistent inflation and resilient economic growth. While there is significant uncertainty, the presence of dissents favoring an immediate hike in the previous meeting provides a strong signal that the committee is leaning toward tightening in September. I have adjusted the market's 56% estimate slightly downward to account for potential volatility in upcoming economic data releases that could shift the committee's stance.
The current consensus among traders and markets suggests a 56.5% probability for a 25 bps increase, driven by persistent inflation above the 2% target, resilient GDP growth, and solid labor market data. However, the probability is not overwhelming, and there is a significant chance (42.5%) of no change, especially if upcoming economic data (CPI, employment) does not support further tightening.
The Federal Reserve is leaning toward a 25 bps hike in September 2026 due to persistent inflation, strong economic growth, and a hawkish tilt in the July FOMC vote. Market pricing and recent commentary align closely with this outcome, though it is not guaranteed. I estimate a 57% chance of a rate increase based on current data and forward-looking indicators.
Trader consensus leans toward a 25-bps increase with 56.5% probability, driven by persistent inflation, resilient growth, and solid labor data, though upcoming CPI and employment data could influence.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The July 29 FOMC meeting revealed a hawkish tilt with three dissents favoring an immediate 25 bps hike, and inflation remains elevated at ~3.5% YoY with resilient GDP growth and a solid labor market. Polymarket odds show 'No change' at 43% and a 25 bps increase at 56%, while Fed funds futures imply 30-35 bps of tightening by year-end. Although upcoming August data could shift the balance, the current consensus leans toward a hike, making no change less likely but still plausible. I assign a 40% probability to no change.
Recent data and FOMC signals indicate a hawkish stance with a 9-3 vote favoring holding rates but with three dissenters pushing for a 25 bps hike. Inflation remains elevated at around 3.5%, and economic indicators like GDP growth and labor market strength support tightening. Prediction markets and futures currently price a roughly 55-56% chance of a 25 bps increase and about 43% chance of no change, reflecting uncertainty but a tilt toward a hike.
Market sentiment and recent FOMC signals suggest a significant likelihood of a 25 basis point increase in September, driven by persistent inflation and resilient economic growth. While 'no change' remains a strong possibility at 43%, the hawkish tone from the July meeting and the presence of dissents favoring immediate tightening tilt the probability toward a rate hike.
The current market consensus suggests a 56% chance of a 25 bps increase, 43% for no change, and 72-75% for no change on other platforms. Recent hawkish signals and persistent inflation support a potential rate hike, but the upcoming August CPI and employment data could shift this outlook.
As of the latest data, prediction markets such as Polymarket reflect a 43% chance of no change in Fed interest rates following the September 2026 meeting, with a 56% probability assigned to a 25 bps increase. Recent signals from the July 29 FOMC meeting, including three dissents in favor of a rate hike, point to a hawkish tilt. Persistent inflation near 3.5%, strong GDP growth, and a resilient labor market support the case for further tightening, reducing the likelihood of holding rates steady.
Recent hawkish signals from the July FOMC meeting, persistent inflation, and resilient economic data support a likely rate hike, but upcoming CPI and employment data could shift the balance.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.