With only 16 days until the resolution date, Iran agreeing to end all uranium enrichment—even temporarily—requires a major and rapid diplomatic shift. Iran has historically resisted such a complete halt, using enrichment as key leverage, and no credible reports indicate an imminent breakthrough. Polymarket odds hover around 18-27% Yes, which I adjust slightly downward given the extreme nature of the demand and the very short timeline.
Given the current geopolitical tensions and Iran's historical commitment to uranium enrichment as a strategic asset, it is unlikely Iran will publicly agree to completely end enrichment by June 30, 2026. While diplomatic efforts continue, no credible reports suggest an imminent official pledge to end all enrichment. Market probabilities around 18-23% also reflect low confidence in such an agreement occurring by the deadline.
The complete cessation of all uranium enrichment is a fundamental pillar of Iran's nuclear policy and a key leverage point in its geopolitical strategy. Given the current lack of diplomatic progress toward such a comprehensive concession and the high political cost for the Iranian leadership to abandon its nuclear program entirely, it is extremely unlikely that they would agree to this by June 2026.
The market odds from Polymarket suggest a low probability of around 18-23% that Iran will agree to end uranium enrichment by June 30, 2026. Given the historical context and the current geopolitical climate, it is unlikely that Iran will make such a significant concession without substantial international pressure or a major diplomatic breakthrough.
Iran has consistently maintained its uranium enrichment program as a strategic priority, and recent diplomatic developments show no indication of a full halt. While there may be temporary negotiations or confidence-building measures, a complete and public agreement to end all enrichment—required for a 'Yes' resolution—is highly unlikely given Iran's historical stance and regional security calculus. Market odds on Polymarket suggest a range between 18% and 23%, reflecting low but non-zero expectations, which aligns with calibrated judgment [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/iran-agrees-to-end-enrichment-of-uranium-by-june-30).
The market odds vary, and there's uncertainty in diplomatic outcomes. Key factors include the market's shifting probabilities and the nature of the agreement required.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The window to June 30 is very short, and Mojtaba Khamenei appears firmly in power with no credible reports of imminent removal, detention, or resignation. Historical base rates for sudden leadership changes in Iran are minuscule, and prediction markets price it near 7%. Although not zero, the chance is extremely low.
Current prediction markets, including Polymarket and OddsShift, price the probability of a leadership change of Mojtaba Khamenei by June 30, 2026, at about 7%. There is no significant credible reporting or high-confidence external driver indicating an imminent change, and the market's liquidity and smart money activity support this low probability. Given the stability of Iran's leadership and the lack of public signals for change, a low probability is justified.
The political structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran is highly centralized and stable, with no credible reports or indicators suggesting an imminent removal or resignation of the Supreme Leader. Prediction markets and analytical models consistently reflect a very low probability of such a significant leadership change within the short remaining timeframe.
Prediction markets like Polymarket and OddsShift consistently price the probability of an Iran leadership change by June 30 at around 7%. The consensus among traders and the alignment of models with market prices suggest a low likelihood of a leadership change within the specified timeframe. The stability of the current leadership and the lack of significant recent indicators of imminent change support this low probability.
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Prediction markets like Polymarket and OddsShift currently price the probability of Iran leadership change by June 30 at around 7%.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Only 16 days remain until the deadline, and the definition of a permanent peace deal is very strict, requiring explicit and definitive language ending hostilities permanently. The current agreement is only a temporary 10-day ceasefire from April 2026, and there are no credible reports of imminent progress toward a permanent deal. Historically, Israel and Hezbollah have never reached a permanent peace agreement, making a sudden breakthrough extremely unlikely in such a short window.
Given the long-standing hostility and complex geopolitical tensions between Israel and Hezbollah, a permanent peace deal by mid-2026 appears unlikely. Recent ceasefire agreements have been temporary, and no definitive progress toward a lasting peace treaty has been publicly confirmed. The entrenched positions and history of conflict reduce the probability of a formal, permanent peace agreement within this timeframe.
The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah is deeply entrenched, with historical animosity and conflicting strategic objectives that make a formal, permanent peace treaty highly unlikely in the short term. While temporary ceasefires or de-escalation agreements are possible, the criteria for a 'permanent peace deal'—which requires a definitive, lasting end to hostilities—are extremely stringent and unlikely to be met by June 30, 2026, given the current geopolitical climate and the lack of progress toward a comprehensive settlement as noted in [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/israel-x-hezbollah-permanent-peace-deal-by).
The likelihood of a permanent peace deal between Israel and Hezbollah by June 30, 2026, is low given the current state of hostilities and the lack of significant diplomatic progress. Both parties have historically been entrenched in their positions, and the recent ceasefire agreements have been temporary. The complexity of the conflict and the deep-seated animosities suggest that a permanent peace deal is unlikely in the near term.
As of mid-2026, there is no public indication that Israel and Hezbollah have reached a permanent peace deal, despite ongoing regional negotiations. The recent ceasefire extensions appear temporary in nature, such as the 10-day extension noted in April 2026, which does not meet the threshold for a permanent agreement [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/israel-x-hezbollah-permanent-peace-deal-by). Both parties have maintained hardline positions, with Hezbollah linking any peace to broader Palestinian issues and Israel demanding full disarmament of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Historical precedents and the lack of active high-level diplomacy suggest a low likelihood of a definitive breakthrough by June 30, 2026.
Historical pattern of temporary ceasefires and lack of clear indication of a definitive permanent agreement, leading to a lower probability.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
timeout after 30000ms
Current market data and expert consensus assign a very low probability (around 3%) that Kharg Island will no longer be under Iranian control by June 30, 2026. There is no significant public indication of imminent loss of control, and the island remains strategically important to Iran. Temporary disruptions or claims without established control do not count, further lowering the likelihood of a 'Yes' resolution.
There is no evidence of an imminent military conflict or geopolitical shift that would result in the loss of Iranian control over Kharg Island by June 30, 2026. The criteria for 'Yes' are extremely stringent, requiring established, non-Iranian control rather than just temporary disruption, and current market sentiment reflects a very low probability of such a significant event occurring within the short timeframe.
The current market prices on Polymarket and Orrery indicate a very low probability (around 3%) of Kharg Island no longer being under Iranian control by June 30, 2026. Given the stringent resolution criteria and the lack of significant geopolitical developments suggesting an imminent change in control, the probability remains low. The key factors include the stability of Iranian control, the high threshold for resolution, and the absence of credible reports indicating an imminent transfer of control.
The current implied probability from Polymarket is 3%, reflecting collective trader expectations [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/kharg-island-no-longer-under-iranian-control-by-march-31). The resolution criteria require actual, established control by a non-Iranian entity, not temporary actions or claims. Given Iran's firm military presence and no credible reports of foreign control or significant destabilization, the base rate of such an event remains extremely low.
As of June 10, 2026, the Polymarket implied probability for Kharg Island no longer being under Iranian control by June 30, 2026, is 3%, and there is no current evidence of actual control change meeting the strict criteria.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Current 7-day moving average of transit calls for the Strait of Hormuz is likely well below 60 due to ongoing regional disruptions. With only about 16 days remaining until the June 30 deadline, a rapid and sustained increase to reach 60 is improbable. Market odds at ~16.5% reflect this low likelihood, and independent base rates for such rapid recoveries in similar contexts are also low.
Current market data and trading odds indicate a low probability (around 17%) that the Strait of Hormuz traffic will return to normal levels (7-day average of 60 or more transit calls) by the end of June 2026. Given ongoing geopolitical tensions and historical fluctuations in traffic, a full return to normal traffic levels by that date appears unlikely but not impossible.
Current market sentiment and geopolitical conditions suggest that significant disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz are likely to persist through June 2026. Given that the 7-day moving average of transit calls has remained below the threshold of 60, and there are no immediate signs of a de-escalation that would restore shipping volumes to pre-disruption levels, the probability of reaching this target remains low.
The current market odds on Polymarket and PredictionNinja suggest a low probability of the event resolving to 'Yes', with the 'No' side being heavily favored. The key factor is the historical and current transit data from IMF Portwatch, which has not yet shown a 7-day moving average of transit calls equal to or above 60. The market's resolution depends solely on this data, and the current trend does not indicate a high likelihood of reaching the threshold by the end of June 2026.
The market resolution requires a 7-day moving average of ship arrivals at or above 60 as reported by IMF Portwatch before June 30, 2026. Current trading odds on Polymarket show the 'Yes' probability around 16.5%, reflecting low market confidence [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-end-of-june). Geopolitical tensions in the region historically disrupt traffic, and recent data does not indicate a sustained return to pre-disruption levels. Base rates of similar markets and the specificity of the data source suggest limited likelihood of meeting the threshold.
Based on current Polymarket odds and the market's reliance on IMF Portwatch data showing a 7-day moving average of at least 60, the probability is low.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The US-Iran ceasefire was a temporary two-week agreement announced in early April 2026, so by mid-June it has likely expired or been replaced by a broader framework. However, the resolution criteria require an explicit official announcement that no ceasefire is in effect, not merely expiration. Given the volatile nature of US-Iran relations and Trump's tendency to make definitive statements, there is a moderate chance he or the administration will issue such a declaration, but it is more likely they will either let it lapse quietly or announce a new agreement that maintains a halt to hostilities, which would not qualify. Base rates for such explicit 'ceasefire over' announcements in similar geopolitical contexts are low, around 20-30%.
The ceasefire between the US and Iran was agreed upon in early April 2026 as a temporary two-week measure. Given the short duration and the current lack of any official statements from Trump or the US government explicitly ending the ceasefire by June 15, it is unlikely that a formal announcement terminating the ceasefire commitment will be made by that date. Additionally, announcements of violations or breaches do not qualify, and no credible reports indicate an official termination announcement is imminent.
The ceasefire was established in April 2026 for a two-week period, which has long since expired. Since the market requires an explicit, official announcement that no ceasefire is in effect, and given that the original agreement has already lapsed, it is highly unlikely that the administration would issue a formal, specific declaration terminating a non-existent or expired agreement at this late stage. The criteria for a 'Yes' resolution are strict and require an active, formal termination statement, which is improbable given the current timeline.
The ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran was agreed upon on April 7–8, 2026, and is temporary, lasting two weeks. Given the nature of the conflict and the political climate, there is a moderate chance that the ceasefire could be announced as over by June 15, 2026. However, the likelihood is tempered by the fact that both parties have an incentive to extend or maintain the ceasefire to prevent further escalation.
The ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran was agreed upon in April 2026 as a temporary two-week measure, but there is no public indication as of June 14, 2026, that President Trump or the U.S. government has officially declared it over or that there is no longer any commitment in effect [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.copilot.markets/event/trump-announces-us-x-iran-ceasefire-over-byptptpt-20260607232555290). While Trump could make such an announcement at any time, the absence of recent escalatory statements or military actions suggests continued de-escalation. The bar for a 'Yes' resolution requires an explicit declaration that the ceasefire is no longer in effect, not just expiration or violations, which has not occurred.
The ceasefire expired by June 15, but the market requires an explicit announcement of termination. No such announcement is indicated in available information.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Trump has repeatedly claimed a deal is imminent, and recent statements (June 11-13) suggest high-level approval, but no official U.S. announcement of a ceasefire extension or new agreement has been made. Iran's foreign ministry contradicted the June 14 signing timeline, and past patterns show Trump's optimism often outpaces actual agreements. Given the June 30 deadline and the need for a clear U.S. statement, the probability is moderate but below even, as a last-minute deal remains possible but not certain.
Recent statements from President Trump and credible reports indicate that a peace deal with Iran is close to being finalized, with a signing expected imminently. Trump has canceled strikes and mentioned that the deal has been approved at the highest levels, suggesting a strong likelihood of an official announcement extending or renewing the ceasefire. However, Iran's foreign ministry has not confirmed the signing date, and some details remain unresolved, so there is some uncertainty.
President Trump has publicly stated that a peace deal is imminent and scheduled for signing, with significant international diplomatic momentum and reports of a draft agreement being finalized [cnbc.com](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/11/trump-iran-strikes-deal.html), [euronews.com](https://www.euronews.com/2026/06/12/iran-says-deal-with-us-closer-than-ever-as-trump-warns-tehran-to-get-act-together). While there have been past instances of optimism without a final deal, the high-level involvement and specific claims regarding the signing suggest a high likelihood of a formal announcement before the June 30 deadline.
Recent statements from President Trump and other officials suggest a high likelihood of a new Iran agreement or ceasefire extension being announced by June 30. Trump has repeatedly indicated that a deal is imminent, and there is a consensus among multiple sources that the signing is expected soon. However, past statements have not always led to immediate action, so there is some uncertainty.
President Trump has made multiple public statements indicating that a deal is effectively agreed upon and pending finalization, including cancelling planned military strikes based on the claimed approval of the agreement by all parties [cnbc.com](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/11/trump-iran-strikes-deal.html). He announced that the deal is scheduled to be signed imminently, with specific claims that the Strait of Hormuz will open immediately upon signing [euronews.com](https://www.euronews.com/2026/06/12/iran-says-deal-with-us-closer-than-ever-as-trump-warns-tehran-to-get-act-together). Although Iran has not confirmed the timing, the U.S. government's position, as expressed by the President, constitutes a strong signal of an impending official announcement. Given the precedent of Trump treating conceptually approved deals as finalized and the high-level nature of the claims, the probability of a qualifying U.S. announcement before June 30 is high, even if the deal is not yet fully implemented.
Trump has claimed a peace deal is close with a signing imminent, and there's a draft deal mentioned. However, there's some uncertainty with Iran's initial statement on the Sunday signing. But the US has cancelled strikes, indicating progress.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Prediction markets currently price this event around 55-64%, reflecting a moderately favorable outlook but significant uncertainty. The deadline is only 16 days away, and while negotiations have been ongoing, no official announcement has been made yet. The base rate for such complex diplomatic agreements being finalized in a short window is low, but the market consensus provides a reasonable anchor.
Current prediction markets and crowd-sourced probabilities place the chance of a US-Iran nuclear deal by June 30, 2026, around 55-64%. Given ongoing diplomatic efforts and the historical complexity of such agreements, a moderate probability around 60% reflects both the potential for breakthrough and the significant challenges remaining.
While prediction markets show significant interest, the geopolitical climate between the U.S. and Iran remains highly strained, with deep-seated mistrust and conflicting regional priorities. Achieving a formal, publicly announced nuclear agreement by June 2026 requires a level of diplomatic breakthrough that currently lacks momentum, making a 'No' outcome more probable than the market's current optimistic pricing.
The prediction markets show a consensus probability around 55-64% for a US-Iran nuclear deal by June 30, 2026. This suggests a significant chance of an agreement, considering the ongoing diplomatic efforts and the historical context of nuclear negotiations between the two countries.
The current prediction market odds on Polymarket show a range between 55% and 64% for a US-Iran nuclear deal by June 30, 2026, indicating moderate confidence among traders [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/us-iran-nuclear-deal-by-june-30). While diplomatic progress is possible, especially under renewed negotiation efforts, significant political and strategic hurdles remain on both sides, including verification, sanctions relief, and regional security concerns. Given the base rate of past nuclear diplomacy and the current geopolitical environment, a deal is plausible but not assured, leading to a calibrated estimate of 60%.
Current crowd-sourced probabilities from Polymarket, PredictionNinja, and Struct.to range around 55-64%, with no significant new developments mentioned, so a midpoint estimate is used.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Trump has publicly stated that a deal with Iran is finalized pending signing and that the Strait of Hormuz blockade will be lifted upon signing, with signing expected within days. Given the 16-day window until the June 30 deadline and the high market probability (~73%), the chance of a qualifying announcement is substantial. However, there is residual risk of delays or failure to finalize, so the probability is slightly above market consensus at 0.75.
Given that the blockade was announced on April 12, 2026, and that the blockade is intended to remain in full force until a finalized transaction or deal is signed, the likelihood of an official announcement lifting the blockade by June 30, 2026, is relatively low but not negligible. The recent high-level negotiations and approvals suggest a possibility of a deal soon, but no definitive announcement has been made yet. The requirement for an explicit, official statement further lowers the probability, as informal reports or leaks do not count.
President Trump has publicly stated that a deal with Iran is 'subject to finalization' and that the blockade will be lifted as soon as the transaction is signed. Given that the administration has already reached a high-level agreement in principle, it is highly probable that the formal signing and the subsequent announcement to lift the blockade will occur before the June 30, 2026, deadline.
Recent reports indicate that President Trump has announced a deal with Iran, which includes the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz once the deal is finalized. However, the blockade remains in place until the signing of the agreement. Given the timeline and the need for an explicit announcement, there is a reasonable chance that Trump will make the required statement by June 30, 2026, but uncertainties in the finalization process warrant a probability below 0.70.
On June 11, 2026, President Trump announced that the Iran conflict has been settled 'subject to finalization,' with the Strait of Hormuz to reopen upon deal signing, and that scheduled military strikes were cancelled [cnbc.com](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/11/trump-iran-strikes-deal.html). While the naval blockade remains until finalization, the announcement signals imminent resolution. Given the high-level approval and planned signing, a formal announcement lifting the blockade by June 30 is likely. Markets pricing a 73% 'Yes' [struct.to](https://explorer.struct.to/markets/will-donald-trump-announce-that-the-united-states-blockade-of-the-strait-of-hormuz-has-been-lifted-by-june-30-2026) appear underestimating the momentum toward resolution.
As of June 14, 2026, while a deal to settle the Iran situation is pending with a signing in days, no official announcement of the US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz being lifted has been made. There is still time until June 30, but no confirmed qualifying announcement yet.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The latest Survation poll (May 26–June 1, 2026) shows Andy Burnham leading Robert Kenyon 49% to 39%, a 10-point gap, with the margin of error around ±5%, meaning Kenyon could still win if there is a late swing or if turnout models favor Reform UK. However, Burnham is a highly popular local figure with strong name recognition in Greater Manchester, and the right-wing vote is split between Kenyon and Restore Britain (8%). Prediction markets price Kenyon’s win probability between 25% and 39%, and given the polling evidence and Burnham’s advantage, a 30% chance is a reasonable independent estimate.
Current prediction markets and polling data indicate that Robert Kenyon has a significant chance to win, with probabilities around 25-39%. Polls show a close race between Kenyon and Andy Burnham, with some polls even showing Kenyon leading locally. However, Burnham's strong personal vote and mayoral popularity provide a counterbalance, making Kenyon's win plausible but not favored.
While Andy Burnham remains the frontrunner due to his strong personal brand and mayoral track record, recent polling shows a very tight race. The Opinium poll [pollcheck.co.uk](https://www.pollcheck.co.uk/by-elections/makerfield) indicates a 46%-41% split, which is within the margin of error, suggesting that Robert Kenyon has a realistic path to victory if Reform UK successfully mobilizes their base and capitalizes on anti-incumbent sentiment.
The most recent polls show Robert Kenyon (Reform UK) trailing Andy Burnham (Labour) by a narrow margin, with Burnham leading by 5 percentage points in the latest Opinium poll (46% to 41%) [pollcheck.co.uk](https://www.pollcheck.co.uk/by-elections/makerfield). However, Reform UK has shown significant growth in the area, and Kenyon's campaign could benefit from anti-Labour sentiment and tactical voting. The base rate for by-elections can be volatile, and Kenyon's strong showing in previous elections suggests a competitive race.
Polls and prediction markets indicate a close race, with Robert Kenyon (Reform UK) trailing Andy Burnham (Labour) by a few percentage points. A recent Opinium poll shows Burnham at 46% and Kenyon at 41% [pollcheck.co.uk](https://www.pollcheck.co.uk). Prediction markets assign Kenyon a 39% chance, reflecting competitive dynamics [lines.com](https://www.lines.com). Burnham's strong personal vote from his mayoral win counters Reform UK's local momentum, but national trends favor Reform. The race is tight, but not decisively in Kenyon's favor.
Based on recent polls and market odds, Robert Kenyon has a significant but not overwhelming chance. Polls show him close to Andy Burnham, and market probabilities range from 25% to 39%.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Based on Polymarket data, the YES price is approximately 7% with over $1.2 million in volume, indicating strong market consensus that Russia will not capture all of Kupiansk by June 30. The city remains heavily contested, and Russian advances in the area have been incremental rather than sweeping. With only 16 days until the deadline, the probability of a complete collapse of Ukrainian defenses and full municipal capture is very low. I adjust slightly below the market to 6% to account for the possibility of a negotiated settlement, but that also seems unlikely on this short timeline.
Current prediction markets and expert analysis indicate a very low probability (around 7%) that Russia will capture all of Kupiansk by June 30, 2026. The city remains contested with entrenched Ukrainian defenses, and Russian advances have been incremental rather than rapid or sweeping. The short timeline of less than three months further reduces the likelihood of a complete Russian capture by the deadline.
The current military situation in the Kupiansk sector remains characterized by attritional, incremental fighting rather than rapid breakthroughs. Given that the deadline is imminent and the city remains a heavily contested urban zone with entrenched Ukrainian defenses, a complete capture of the entire municipality by June 30, 2026, is highly unlikely. Market sentiment and current battlefield trends [lines.com](https://lines.com/prediction-markets/politics/will-russia-capture-all-of-kupiansk-by) strongly support the 'No' outcome.
The market data and recent trends indicate a very low probability of Russia capturing all of Kupiansk by June 30, 2026. The Polymarket contract shows a 7% probability, reflecting significant real capital backing this assessment. Key factors include the contested status of Kupiansk, incremental Russian advances, and the short timeframe remaining.
The current market price on Polymarket implies a 7% probability of Russia capturing all of Kupiansk by June 30, 2026, reflecting real-money trader consensus [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com). Kupiansk remains under contested status with entrenched Ukrainian defenses, and Russian advances have been incremental rather than decisive [lines.com](https://www.lines.com). A full capture would require a rapid and unlikely military breakthrough within a narrow timeframe, which current battlefield trends do not support.
The Polymarket market prices the probability of Russia capturing all of Kupiansk by June 30, 2026, at 7%, with thin volume and a sub-90-day deadline pointing to a low likelihood.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The UK has publicly committed to a mine-clearing mission in the Strait of Hormuz and is preparing the RFA Lyme Bay and supporting warships like HMS Dragon for deployment, but official statements stress that actual transit through the strait will only occur after a peace deal is reached. As of mid-June 2026, a final peace agreement is not yet implemented, and limited commercial traffic is still trickling through without a formal clearance operation. While the UK is positioned and willing, the required political condition (peace deal) has not been met, making a full warship transit before the June 30 deadline possible but not highly likely. The Polymarket price suggests ~8% chance, but I assign a higher probability because the UK's naval assets are already en route and a last-minute peace breakthrough is plausible.
The UK has prepared and deployed the RFA Lyme Bay, a mine-hunting ship, along with at least one missile-loaded warship to the region, indicating a high likelihood of transit through the Strait of Hormuz. While the UK has stated that mine-clearing operations will only commence after a peace deal with Iran, the presence of these vessels and the strategic importance of the strait make it probable that UK warships will transit the strait by June 30, 2026. Official confirmation or credible reporting of such transit is likely given the public nature of these deployments.
While the UK has prepared the RFA Lyme Bay and other naval assets for a potential mine-clearing mission in the Strait of Hormuz, official statements emphasize that this deployment is contingent upon a peace deal between the U.S. and Iran. Given the current deadlock and the fact that the mission is explicitly described as pending, the likelihood of a transit occurring before the June 30, 2026, deadline remains low unless diplomatic conditions shift significantly.
The UK has expressed readiness to deploy naval assets to the Strait of Hormuz, including the RFA Lyme Bay and HMS Dragon, for mine-clearing operations. However, the deployment is contingent on a peace deal between the US and Iran, which is still pending. The UK's involvement is part of a broader Anglo-French initiative to secure the strait, but the timing and conditions of the deployment remain uncertain.
The UK is preparing a mine-clearing mission in the Strait of Hormuz led by the RFA Lyme Bay, with potential escort by warships like HMS Dragon [kxnews.com](https://www.kxnet.com/news/national-news/ap-britains-navy-prepares-to-clear-mines-in-the-strait-of-hormuz-while-waiting-for-a-peace-deal/). The mission is contingent on a peace deal with Iran, but preparations are advanced and deployment is expected once hostilities subside. The presence of warships for protection during transit would qualify as a warship transit under the market definition [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/which-countries-will-send-warships-through-the-strait-of-hormuz-by-june-30). Given the high strategic importance and ongoing readiness, the probability of transit by June 2026 is substantial but not certain due to diplomatic dependencies.
The UK has a mine-hunting ship preparing to sail to the Persian Gulf, but deployment is conditional on a peace deal and it's unclear if they will transit the strait. No confirmed transit yet.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.