Polymarket prediction markets currently price this event at 23-27% (as of June 13-17, 2026), reflecting a low but non-trivial chance. Iran has historically resisted completely halting enrichment, and the deadline is only 13 days away, making a sudden public agreement unlikely. However, the possibility of a last-minute diplomatic breakthrough or a conditional pledge cannot be ruled out, keeping the probability in the 20-30% range.
Given the current geopolitical tensions and Iran's historical reluctance to fully cease uranium enrichment, the probability of Iran publicly agreeing to end all enrichment by June 30, 2026, remains low. While there is some international pressure and potential for diplomatic agreements, no strong indications or credible reports suggest an imminent official pledge to end enrichment entirely. Market probabilities and expert consensus also reflect a low chance, around 18-38%.
The requirement for Iran to end all uranium enrichment is an extremely high bar that contradicts their long-standing strategic policy and domestic political stance. While market sentiment has fluctuated [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/iran-agrees-to-end-enrichment-of-uranium-by-june-30), [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/iran-agrees-to-end-enrichment-of-uranium-by-june-30), there is no credible diplomatic evidence or shift in Iranian state rhetoric suggesting they are prepared to abandon their nuclear program entirely by the end of June 2026.
The probability is based on the consensus of prediction markets, which show a range of 18% to 38% chance of Iran agreeing to end uranium enrichment by June 30, 2026. The base rate for such agreements is low, and there is no recent evidence of significant diplomatic progress.
The current market-implied probability on Polymarket is 23%, reflecting trader expectations based on available information [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/iran-agrees-to-end-enrichment-of-uranium-by-june-30). Geopolitical conditions, Iran's historical stance on uranium enrichment, and lack of recent breakthroughs in diplomacy suggest a low likelihood of a complete and public agreement to end all enrichment by the deadline. While negotiations could shift this probability, no strong evidence indicates an imminent policy reversal by Iran.
The outcome is uncertain with varying market odds, and there's no strong current evidence to heavily tilt the probability. Key factors include the nature of the agreement required (end all enrichment), the time frame, and the historical complexity of Iran's stance.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Mojtaba Khamenei has only recently become Supreme Leader, and historical base rates for Iranian leadership changes are extremely low over short timeframes. With only two weeks remaining until the resolution date and no credible reports of imminent removal, detention, or resignation, the probability of a change is very small. Prediction markets also price this outcome around 5%.
Current prediction markets, including Polymarket and OddsShift, price the probability of a leadership change by June 30, 2026, at around 7%. This low probability reflects the stability of the current leadership and the lack of credible reports indicating imminent removal or resignation of Mojtaba Khamenei. The market's large volume and liquidity suggest these odds are well-informed by smart money and recent information.
There is currently no credible evidence or geopolitical indication suggesting that Mojtaba Khamenei will lose his position as the de facto leader of Iran before June 30, 2026. Prediction markets consistently reflect a high degree of confidence in the status quo, with the 'No' outcome heavily favored by traders and market data [explorer.struct.to](https://explorer.struct.to/markets/iran-leadership-change-by-june-30-689-922), [polyguana.com](https://polyguana.com/market/1708133).
The prediction market on Polymarket currently assigns a 5% chance to the outcome of 'Iran leadership change by June 30' [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/iran-leadership-change-by). This low probability is supported by the fact that the lead outcome is 'No' at 97% [polyguana.com](https://polyguana.com/market/1708133). There is no significant evidence or recent developments suggesting an imminent leadership change in Iran by June 30, 2026.
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Prediction markets like Polymarket and OddsShift price the chance of Iran leadership change by June 30 at around 7%, indicating low expectation.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Prediction markets consistently price the chance of an Israeli withdrawal announcement by June 30 at 5-8%, reflecting a strong consensus that it will not occur. There is no recent news or diplomatic signal suggesting an imminent full withdrawal. Given the short remaining time (13 days) and the absence of any credible indication, the true probability is very low, around 6%.
Current prediction markets and odds strongly indicate a very low probability of Israel fully withdrawing ground forces from Lebanon by June 30, 2026. Historical context shows Israel has maintained a military presence in Lebanon for security reasons, and no credible announcements or plans for complete withdrawal have emerged. Market prices imply about a 5.5% chance, which aligns with the geopolitical and security complexities involved.
Current geopolitical conditions and the lack of any credible signals regarding a full withdrawal of Israeli ground forces from Lebanon suggest that a complete withdrawal by June 30, 2026, is highly unlikely. Prediction markets consistently reflect this sentiment, with implied probabilities for a 'Yes' outcome remaining in the low single digits.
The prediction market data from Polymarket indicates a low probability of Israel withdrawing from Lebanon by June 30, 2026. The current odds suggest only an 8% chance of this outcome, reflecting the collective view of traders. Given the lack of official announcements or credible reports supporting an imminent withdrawal, this low probability seems reasonable.
The current market odds at 8% reflect low trader confidence in a withdrawal by June 30, 2026 [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/israel-withdraws-from-lebanon-by). No official Israeli announcement has been made, and the security situation along the Lebanon border remains tense due to active conflict with Hezbollah. These factors make a full withdrawal unlikely within the timeframe.
Implied probability from prediction markets is 5.5% based on contract prices.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The current Polymarket price is 16% as of June 17, 2026, but market prices can be biased. A permanent peace deal between Israel and Hezbollah is historically extremely rare given deep enmity and unresolved regional issues; the recent April 2026 ceasefire was explicitly temporary, and only 13 days remain until the deadline. No credible reports indicate a formal, permanent agreement is imminent, so the true probability is slightly below the market price.
Given the long-standing hostility and complex geopolitical tensions between Israel and Hezbollah, a permanent peace deal by mid-2026 remains unlikely. Current market data and expert assessments place the probability around 16%, reflecting skepticism about a definitive peace agreement within this timeframe. Temporary ceasefires and negotiations have occurred, but no clear, lasting peace deal has been announced or is imminent.
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The current implied probability on Polymarket is 16%, indicating low market confidence in a permanent peace deal by June 30, 2026. Given the ongoing hostilities and the lack of definitive public statements or agreements, this probability seems reasonable. The key factors include the current state of negotiations, the willingness of both parties to commit to a permanent ceasefire, and the broader geopolitical context.
The current Polymarket implied probability is 16%, reflecting trader expectations [polymarket.com](https://worldcoin.polymarket.com/event/israel-x-hezbollah-permanent-peace-deal-by). However, recent small increases in the price suggest slight optimism. Given the historical intransigence between Israel and Hezbollah, the lack of ongoing formal negotiations, and the high bar for a 'permanent' deal as defined, the base rate for such an outcome remains low. Still, regional diplomacy involving the US and Lebanon may slightly elevate chances above market levels in the short term.
As of June 17, 2026, the Polymarket implied probability for a 'Yes' is 16%.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Based on web search results, prediction markets like Polymarket and WyldMarkets price the chance of a permanent peace deal by June 30, 2026 at 4-12%, with the most liquid market showing 4%. There are no credible reports of any such agreement being reached or even imminent. Given the deep-seated geopolitical tensions and the extremely short remaining timeframe (13 days), the true probability is very low, likely around 4%.
Given the long-standing hostility and deep geopolitical tensions between Israel and Iran, a permanent peace deal by June 30, 2026, remains highly unlikely. Current prediction markets and collective assessments place the probability very low (around 4-12%), reflecting the absence of significant diplomatic breakthroughs or incentives for both parties to formalize peace imminently. The complexity of regional conflicts and mutual distrust further reduce the chance of a definitive peace agreement within this timeframe.
The geopolitical relationship between Israel and Iran is characterized by deep-seated ideological hostility, proxy conflicts, and a lack of diplomatic recognition. Given the current escalation of tensions and the absence of any formal diplomatic framework or ongoing high-level negotiations aimed at a permanent peace treaty, the likelihood of such a monumental shift occurring by mid-2026 is extremely low.
The prediction markets on Polymarket and WyldMarkets indicate a low probability of a permanent peace deal between Israel and Iran by June 30, 2026, with Polymarket showing 10% and WyldMarkets showing 12%. The low probability reflects the significant geopolitical challenges and historical context of the conflict, as well as the lack of recent high-level diplomatic breakthroughs.
The current market-implied probability on WyldMarkets is 12% [wyldmarkets.com](https://wyldmarkets.com/market/israel-x-iran-permanent-peace-deal-by-june-30-2026-262), and Polymarket shows a 10% price for the 'June 30' outcome [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/israel-x-iran-permanent-peace-deal-by), suggesting a consensus view around 10-12%. This aligns with the extremely low base rate of permanent peace agreements between long-standing adversarial states without significant pre-existing diplomatic engagement. No recent diplomatic breakthroughs or high-level negotiations between Israel and Iran have been reported, and geopolitical tensions remain high. Given the lack of movement toward reconciliation and the stringent definition of a 'permanent peace deal', the probability remains low but non-zero due to potential unforeseen diplomatic shifts.
Based on market data from WyldMarkets showing a 12% chance of a permanent peace deal by June 30, 2026, and Polymarket's odds, this is a low probability.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Based on current news and prediction market data, there is no evidence of any military or diplomatic development that would lead to Kharg Island falling under non-Iranian control by June 30, 2026. The island is a critical strategic asset for Iran, and any such change would require a major conflict or negotiated transfer, neither of which appears imminent. Market implied probabilities of 1–3% align with a very low but non-zero chance, accounting for tail risks like a sudden breakthrough in negotiations or a rapid military operation.
Current market data and expert consensus assign a very low probability (around 3%) that Kharg Island will no longer be under Iranian control by June 30, 2026. There is no significant public indication of imminent loss of control, and the island remains strategically important to Iran. Temporary disruptions or claims without actual control transfer do not qualify, and no credible reports suggest such a transfer is likely soon.
There is no credible evidence or geopolitical indication that Iran is at risk of losing control over Kharg Island, a critical piece of its oil infrastructure, by the end of June 2026. Prediction markets consistently reflect a very low probability of this event, and the threshold for 'losing control' is high, requiring established occupation rather than mere military disruption.
The prediction markets Polymarket, Orrery, WyldMarkets, and PicksByOdds all show very low implied probabilities (2-3%) for Kharg Island no longer being under Iranian control by June 30, 2026. This suggests a consensus among traders that such an event is highly unlikely. Given the lack of credible reporting or significant geopolitical shifts indicating an imminent change in control, the base rate for this event remains very low.
As of mid-June 2026, prediction markets such as Polymarket and Orrery indicate a consensus probability of around 3% for Kharg Island no longer being under Iranian control by June 30, 2026 [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/kharg-island-no-longer-under-iranian-control-by-june-30-561-854-897). There are no credible reports of military action, political upheaval, or diplomatic developments suggesting a transfer of control. Given Iran's strong military presence and the strategic importance of the island, a sudden change in control is highly unlikely without clear, verifiable evidence, which is currently absent.
Market prices from Polymarket, Orrery, and WyldMarkets indicate low expectation, and strict control criteria make it hard to change.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The threshold of 60 transit calls is substantially above recent levels (which appear to have been depressed), and with only about four weeks remaining it seems unlikely traffic will rebound that strongly. Polymarket odds recently dropped to ~38% Yes but are still short of a true independent estimate; market prices can be subject to momentum and thin liquidity. Base rates for such quick rebounds in geopolitical choke-point disruptions are low, so I assign only a 20% chance.
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical chokepoint for global oil and shipping traffic, and disruptions have occurred in the past due to geopolitical tensions. Current market data from Polymarket shows probabilities fluctuating around 38% to 51.5%, indicating uncertainty. Given the strategic importance and ongoing regional tensions, a 50% probability reflects balanced uncertainty about whether traffic will return to normal levels by July 15, 2026.
Current market sentiment and recent volatility in the Strait of Hormuz suggest significant uncertainty regarding shipping volumes. Given that the 7-day moving average of transit calls must reach 60, and current trends show a decline in confidence, the probability of reaching this threshold by July 15 is estimated to be lower than a coin flip.
The current market odds on Polymarket suggest a 51.5% probability that the Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by July 15, 2026. This is based on the 7-day moving average of transit calls reaching or exceeding 60. The market's resolution criteria and the recent trading volume support this probability.
The probability is estimated based on current Polymarket odds, which reflect aggregated trader expectations. Multiple sources report odds around 51.5% to 52% for a 'Yes' resolution, indicating a slight lean toward the 7-day moving average of transit calls reaching 60 or more by July 15, 2026. While market prices are not perfect predictors, they incorporate real-time information and are a strong proxy for consensus probability. The resolution depends solely on IMF Portwatch data, which is authoritative and specific, reducing ambiguity.
Based on the market criteria and available information, there is a moderate chance the 7-day moving average of transit calls will reach 60 by July 15.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The Polymarket odds are at 22% as of June 17, 2026, reflecting informed trader expectations that the 7-day moving average of transit calls will not reach 60 by June 30. With only 13 days left and current traffic likely depressed due to regional instability, a rapid recovery to the threshold is improbable. Base rates for such disruptions suggest normalization typically takes weeks to months, not days.
Current market data and trading odds indicate a low probability (around 20-22%) that Strait of Hormuz traffic will return to normal levels by the end of June 2026. Ongoing geopolitical tensions, stalled Iran talks, and a fraying ceasefire reduce the likelihood of a quick normalization. The 7-day moving average threshold of 60 transit calls is a high bar given recent disruptions.
Current geopolitical tensions in the region remain elevated, and market sentiment as reflected in prediction platforms indicates significant skepticism regarding a return to normal shipping volumes by the end of June 2026. While a recovery is possible, the short timeframe and the persistence of regional instability suggest that reaching the required 7-day moving average of 60 transit calls is unlikely within this window.
The current market odds on Polymarket and other prediction platforms suggest a low probability of the Strait of Hormuz traffic returning to normal by the end of June 2026, with odds around 20-22%. The key factors include the recent geopolitical tensions and the historical data on shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. The low market odds reflect the uncertainty and potential delays in resolving the issues affecting shipping traffic.
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Under normal circumstances, the Strait of Hormuz typically has a high volume of traffic, and there's no indication of significant disruptions preventing a 7-day moving average of at least 60 by end-June. The market relies on IMF Portwatch data which is the specified source.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Based on Polymarket data showing a 3-7% probability and the fact that Kupiansk remains heavily contested with only incremental Russian gains, the chance of full municipal capture by June 30 is very low. The short remaining time (13 days) and entrenched Ukrainian defenses make a rapid breakthrough highly improbable. A negotiated settlement is also unlikely to materialize and be implemented by the deadline. Therefore, I estimate a 4% probability of a Yes resolution.
Current prediction markets and expert analyses place the probability of Russia capturing all of Kupiansk by June 30, 2026, at around 7%. This low probability is due to the entrenched Ukrainian defenses, incremental Russian advances, and the short timeframe remaining. A rapid and complete capture would require a significant and sudden collapse of Ukrainian control, which is currently not indicated by available data or market sentiment.
The current military situation in the Kupiansk sector is characterized by attritional, incremental fighting rather than rapid breakthroughs. Given that the deadline is imminent and the city remains a heavily contested urban zone with entrenched Ukrainian defenses, a complete capture of the entire municipality by June 30, 2026, is highly unlikely according to current battlefield assessments and market sentiment [lines.com](https://www.lines.com/prediction-markets/politics/will-russia-capture-all-of-kupiansk-by).
The market data from Polymarket indicates a very low probability of Russia capturing all of Kupiansk by June 30, 2026, with prices suggesting a 3-7% chance. The key factors include the contested status of Kupiansk, incremental Russian advances, and the short timeframe remaining. Historical data and current military assessments support the low probability.
As of June 17, 2026, Russian forces have not captured all of Kupiansk, and the ISW map continues to show Ukrainian control over key parts of the municipality [struct.to](https://explorer.struct.to/markets/will-russia-capture-all-of-kupiansk-by-june-30). The Polymarket odds, reflecting real-money trading, assign a 7% probability to a Russian capture by June 30, 2026, indicating strong consensus among informed participants that this outcome is unlikely [lines.com](https://www.lines.com/prediction-markets/politics/will-russia-capture-all-of-kupiansk-by). Russian advances in the region have been incremental, and no recent breakthroughs suggest a rapid takeover of the entire city before the deadline.
The market on Polymarket has a 7% probability, with thin volume and a sub-90-day deadline, indicating low likelihood.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The recently signed 60-day MOU between Trump and Iran does not include explicit US acceptance of continued Iranian uranium enrichment; it focuses on de-escalation and verification of non-weaponization. With only 13 days left and no definitive agreement on enrichment, the base rate of such a concession under Trump is very low, and Polymarket odds (~17%) align with a low probability. I estimate 12% to account for a slim chance of a last-minute deal explicitly allowing enrichment.
Given the current political climate and historical US-Iran relations, especially under Trump, it is unlikely that Trump will agree to Iran's continued uranium enrichment by June 30, 2026. While there is some engagement such as the recent memorandum of understanding to ease tensions, definitive acceptance of uranium enrichment by the US remains highly contentious and improbable. Market data and trading odds also reflect a low probability around 17%.
While the U.S. and Iran have entered a 60-day ceasefire and are engaged in negotiations, the current focus is on down-blending existing highly enriched uranium and freezing the program, rather than formalizing a right to enrich. Given President Trump's historical 'maximum pressure' stance and the short timeframe remaining until June 30, it is highly unlikely he will explicitly grant Iran the right to continue enrichment in a formal agreement by that date.
The current market odds on Polymarket suggest a low probability of 17.4% [predictmarketcap.com](https://predictmarketcap.com/markets/will-trump-agree-to-iranian-enrichment-of-uranium-by-june-30). Historical context and recent reports indicate that while negotiations are ongoing, Trump's administration has been cautious about Iran's nuclear program, with no definitive agreements announced as of the latest information [the-independent.com](https://www.the-independent.com/news/world/middle-east/trump-iran-us-peace-deal-war-strait-of-hormuz-b2971511.html). The base rate for such agreements is low, and specific evidence does not strongly suggest a change in stance.
As of June 17, 2026, while the U.S. and Iran have extended a ceasefire and agreed to open nuclear talks [axios.com](https://www.axios.com/2026/06/14/us-iran-ceasefire-extended-hormuz-reopen-trump), there has been no definitive agreement or public announcement by Donald Trump or any authorized U.S. representative accepting Iran's continued uranium enrichment. The ongoing negotiations aim to reach a technical agreement within 60 days, but no final deal has been formalized. Markets like Polymarket imply a 9% probability, but no conclusive evidence of agreement exists yet, and Trump has not signaled acceptance.
Polymarket currently shows a 17.4% probability for 'Yes', and there's no additional new information to significantly change this estimate.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Multiple credible sources report that a U.S.-Iran memorandum signed on June 19, 2026, includes a commitment to withdraw U.S. forces from the region, contingent on a final deal within 60 days. However, U.S. officials have stated that troops will remain during the 60-day negotiation period and that reductions will only occur after a final agreement. While the deal explicitly contemplates withdrawal, the question requires an 'agreement to withdraw troops by June 30'—the current framework is a conditional commitment, not a definitive, immediate withdrawal order. Given Trump's public statements and the signed memorandum, there is a high probability that a formal agreement to withdraw is reached by the deadline, but the conditionality and 60-day timeline introduce some uncertainty.
Recent reports indicate that although a deal between the US and Iran has been signed, the US plans to maintain its current troop levels in the Middle East during a 60-day negotiation period. Official statements emphasize that troop reductions are contingent on a final deal, which has not yet been reached. Given the current stance and the short timeframe until June 30, a formal agreement to withdraw troops by that date seems unlikely.
While a memorandum has been signed between the U.S. and Iran, current reports from [stripes.com](https://www.stripes.com/theaters/middle_east/2026-06-16/us-troops-iran-deal-hormuz-21981384.html) and [thenyledger.com](https://thenyledger.com/politics/us-wont-move-troops-despite-signed-iran-deal-as-doubts-linger-over-tehrans-next-move/) explicitly state that the U.S. intends to maintain its current force posture during the 60-day negotiation period. The agreement only 'contemplates' a reduction in forces upon the finalization of a future deal, which does not meet the criteria for a definitive agreement to withdraw by June 30.
The current evidence suggests that while there is a tentative deal between the US and Iran, the US has not committed to an immediate withdrawal of troops. The deal includes a 60-day negotiation period, during which the current force posture will remain in place. Trump has indicated that military forces will stay in the region during negotiations, and any reduction in forces is contingent upon a final deal. The key factors include the 60-day negotiation period, the lack of immediate troop withdrawal commitments, and the conditional nature of any future troop reductions.
Trump has publicly framed a two-to-three-week timeline for concluding military operations, aligning with the June 30 deadline [lines.com](https://www.lines.com/prediction-markets/politics/trump-announces-end-of-military-operations-against-iran-by). The U.S. and Iran signed a memorandum that includes plans for force reduction upon final agreement, though current troop levels remain unchanged during 60-day negotiations [thenyledger.com](https://thenyledger.com/politics/us-wont-move-troops-despite-signed-iran-deal-as-doubts-linger-over-tehrans-next-move/). A formal commitment to withdraw is contingent on Iran fulfilling nuclear and regional commitments, introducing uncertainty. However, the existence of a structured deal and Trump's political incentive to declare victory support a moderate probability of agreement by the deadline.
US officials have stated military forces will remain in the region during the 60-day negotiation period after the deal signing, with no immediate withdrawal. Trump has also suggested he would resume military operations if talks fail.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Current market odds for WTI hitting $65 in June are around 6% (from Polymarket/Orrery), suggesting low probability. As of mid-June 2026, recent WTI prices have been in the high $60s to low $70s range, making a drop to $65 plausible but not the base case. The active month contract (likely July or August) will trade through month-end, so about 13-14 trading days remain. A 15% probability accounts for tail risk of a sharp selloff (e.g., macro shock, inventory surprise), but consistent with market-implied probabilities and current price levels.
Current market sentiment and data from prediction markets indicate a low probability (around 6%) that WTI Crude Oil will hit a low of $65 in June 2026. This reflects expectations of relatively stable or higher prices due to ongoing supply constraints and demand factors. Historical volatility and recent price trends support a low chance of such a significant dip within the specified timeframe.
Current market sentiment and historical price trends for WTI Crude Oil suggest that a drop to $65 is unlikely in the near term. Given that the current price is significantly higher, reaching $65 would require a major, unforeseen negative shock to global oil demand or a sudden, massive supply surplus, which is not currently priced into the futures market.
The probability is low because the market consensus on Orrery suggests only a 6% chance of WTI hitting $65 in June 2026. Additionally, the market for WTI hitting $60 in June 2026 is even lower at 2%, indicating a strong consensus that prices are unlikely to drop that low. The base rate for such significant price movements is typically low, and the specific evidence from market predictions supports this.
Current WTI crude oil prices are significantly above $65, and market expectations for mid-2026 do not suggest a collapse to that level barring a major demand shock or supply glut. While volatility exists, a drop to a 1-minute low of $65 or below in June 2026 would require an extreme event, such as a global recession or geopolitical resolution leading to oversupply. Historical price floors in recent years have generally remained above $70 in normal market conditions. Base rates for such sharp declines are low, and forward curves suggest stability above $75. Therefore, while possible, the likelihood is low. [polymarket.com](https://explorer.struct.to/markets/will-wti-crude-oil-wti-hit-low-65-in-june), [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/will-wti-crude-oil-wti-hit-low-65-in-june-765-291-626)
Based on typical market volatility and lack of strong downward trend indicators, the probability of WTI hitting a low of $65 in June 2026 is moderate.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.