Given the very short remaining time (4 days) and the absence of any credible reports or official announcements of Mojtaba Khamenei's removal, resignation, or detention, the probability of a leadership change by August 31 is low. The regime has maintained continuity despite internal tensions, and no major developments signaling an imminent change have surfaced. Market probabilities around 3–9% support this assessment.
Mojtaba Khamenei became Supreme Leader in early 2026 after his father's assassination, but he remains largely absent from public view due to injuries, with a collective interim leadership in place. Clerics question his capacity and health, and the IRGC has increased influence, creating some instability. However, the regime aims to maintain continuity, and no credible reports suggest imminent removal or resignation by August 31, 2026. Market probabilities and trading volumes also indicate a low chance of leadership change by this date.
As of late August 2026, there is no credible reporting suggesting an imminent removal or resignation of Mojtaba Khamenei. While his leadership has been marked by internal questions regarding his health and the influence of the IRGC, market sentiment on platforms like Polymarket reflects a very low probability of a leadership change occurring within the final days of the month.
Mojtaba Khamenei's leadership is uncertain due to health issues and a collective interim leadership structure. However, the regime has a strong incentive to maintain stability, and no immediate signs of imminent leadership change are reported.
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Based on web search data, Polymarket has shown varying probabilities (4% as of Aug 8, 2026 and 9% as of Jul 22, 2026) for Iran leadership change by August 31, 2026. The resolution is based on a consensus of credible reporting.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Polymarket and other prediction markets currently price this event at 3-4% as of late August 2026, with the market in a disputed UMA state but no new major military clash reported. Recent incidents like drone incursions and a Russian cruise missile landing in Poland have not triggered Article 5 or escalated to direct military engagement as defined. With only a few days left until the August 31 deadline and no qualifying encounter reported, the probability remains very low.
Current prediction markets and expert analyses indicate a low probability (around 6-8%) of a direct military clash between NATO and Russia by August 31, 2026. Despite escalating tensions, drone incursions, and increased military readiness on both sides, the consensus is that Russia is likely to continue 'gray zone' tactics rather than direct force-on-force engagement, which would risk a full-scale war that Russia is assessed to want to avoid. NATO is preparing for contingencies, but no imminent direct military encounter meeting the defined criteria is expected within this short timeframe.
Despite ongoing tensions and frequent airspace incursions, there has been no confirmed direct military engagement between NATO and Russian forces that meets the specific criteria of this market (e.g., shooting down non-munition UAVs or direct exchange of fire). Market participants and prediction platforms [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/nato-x-russia-military-clash-in-2025) currently price the probability of such an event at approximately 3-4%, reflecting the strong mutual desire to avoid direct escalation despite the high-stakes environment of the Ukraine conflict.
The current market prices on platforms like Polymarket and iMarket suggest a very low probability of a NATO-Russia military clash by August 31, 2026, with prices around 3-4%. Recent intelligence assessments and ongoing tensions, such as drone incursions and missile strikes, indicate heightened risks but not an imminent direct confrontation. The lack of significant escalation in recent months supports a low probability estimate.
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Based on current Polymarket data, the implied probability of a YES resolution is 4%. There is a disputed UMA status, and ongoing non-qualifying incidents are present.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
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Current data shows that traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains severely suppressed at roughly 4-7% of pre-crisis levels, with daily transits averaging only 3-5 vessels compared to the normal 60-85. Persistent geopolitical tensions, high war-risk insurance premiums, and ongoing sanctions continue to hinder normalization. Although there are some discussions between Iran and Oman about a navigational corridor and mine-clearing, the consensus is that rapid recovery is unlikely without significant de-escalation, making a return to normal traffic levels by August 31, 2026, improbable but not impossible.
Current traffic levels are severely suppressed at 4-7% of normal capacity, with daily transits averaging only 3-5 vessels compared to the required 60. Given that the resolution date is August 31, 2026, and there are no signs of a rapid de-escalation in the ongoing conflict or a significant shift in the geopolitical landscape, it is highly improbable that traffic will return to normal levels within this timeframe.
The current geopolitical tensions and high war-risk insurance premiums have significantly reduced transit traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. The average daily transits are at 3-5 vessels, far below the normal 60-85. While there are discussions on a temporary navigational corridor, the consensus is against rapid normalization. Prediction markets like Polymarket reflect low probabilities (around 14-19%) for a return to normal traffic levels by August 31, 2026.
unparseable forecast JSON
Current transit levels are very low (3-5 vessels daily vs normal 60-85) due to geopolitical tensions, and near-term catalysts are limited, leading to low probability of reaching 60 transits by August 31.
Mean of 4/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 4/6 valid model forecasts.
Current daily transits in the Strait of Hormuz are about 3-15 vessels, far below the 60 threshold, due to ongoing U.S.-Iran conflict, high war-risk insurance (40x normal), and no diplomatic breakthrough. With only 34 days left until September 30, 2026, a rapid return to normal traffic is extremely unlikely. The prediction market consensus of 6% aligns with this assessment.
Current data shows that daily ship transits through the Strait of Hormuz remain severely constrained at about 4-5% of normal levels due to ongoing U.S.-Iran tensions, elevated war-risk insurance premiums, and recent attacks on vessels. Diplomatic efforts have not yielded a binding agreement to reopen the strait, and the timeframe until September 30 is too short for significant normalization. Market and expert analyses converge on a low probability (~6.5%) of traffic returning to normal by the deadline.
Current transit volumes remain at approximately 4-5% of pre-crisis levels, with daily averages of 3-15 vessels compared to the required threshold of a 7-day moving average of 60. Given the persistent geopolitical tensions, elevated war-risk insurance premiums, and the lack of a formal de-escalation or corridor agreement, it is highly improbable that traffic will recover to the required levels within the remaining timeframe before September 30, 2026.
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Ongoing U.S.-Iran tensions, low daily transits (3-5 vs pre-crisis 85-140), high war-risk premiums, and limited time (42 days left) make it highly unlikely to reach a 7-day moving average of 60 by September 30.
Mean of 4/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 4/6 valid model forecasts.
As of August 27, 2026, the US has offered to lift sanctions and end the blockade in exchange for Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz, but Iran has not accepted those terms and continues to demand broader concessions. The White House explicitly stated on August 27 that no negotiations are currently underway and that all options remain on the table, while President Trump said he is 'not in a hurry' to resume talks. With only four days left until the deadline and no sign of a US announcement ending the blockade, the probability is low, though diplomatic channels (Qatar, Oman, Pakistan) remain active, leaving a small chance of a last-minute deal.
Despite ongoing diplomatic talks involving Iran, Oman, Qatar, and Pakistan aimed at reopening the Strait of Hormuz and easing tensions, Iran maintains strict conditions for lifting the blockade, including lifting all US sanctions and compensation demands. The US has offered to lift sanctions and end the blockade if Iran guarantees free passage and halts proxy attacks, but no formal agreement or official US announcement ending the blockade has been made as of late August 2026. Given the complexity, stalled negotiations, and Iran's firm demands, an official US announcement ending the blockade by August 31, 2026, seems unlikely but possible if diplomatic breakthroughs occur.
Despite ongoing diplomatic efforts involving Qatar, Oman, and Pakistan, the United States and Iran remain far apart on core demands. The White House has explicitly stated that no negotiations are currently underway, and Iranian officials continue to link the lifting of the blockade to broad concessions, including the end of the war and massive financial compensation, which the US has shown no sign of accepting. With only a few days remaining until the August 31 deadline, the lack of a formal agreement makes a definitive, official announcement ending the blockade highly unlikely.
Recent diplomatic efforts involving Qatar, Oman, and Pakistan indicate progress in negotiations between the U.S. and Iran regarding the Strait of Hormuz. The U.S. has reportedly offered to lift sanctions and end its naval blockade if Iran reopens the strait and halts attacks by regional proxies. However, Iran has not yet formally responded to these proposals, and its demands remain stringent, including the lifting of all sanctions and the release of frozen assets. The ongoing talks and the U.S.'s willingness to negotiate suggest a possibility of an announcement, but the stringent conditions set by Iran and the lack of a formal response reduce the certainty.
As of August 27, 2026, the U.S. maintains its naval blockade on Iranian ports as part of 'Operation Economic Outcast' [tbsnews.net](https://www.tbsnews.net/worldbiz/middle-east/us-offers-lift-iran-sanctions-return-reopening-strait-hormuz-report-1526286). The White House has stated there are 'no negotiations currently happening' with Iran, and all options remain on the table [iranintl.com](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202608274981). While diplomatic efforts are ongoing via mediators like Qatar, Pakistan, and Oman, no agreement has been reached, and Iran continues to demand significant concessions—including the lifting of sanctions, unfreezing of assets, and withdrawal of U.S. troops—before reopening the Strait of Hormuz [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/27/iran-qatar-hold-hormuz-talks-amid-intl-hopes-dialogue-with-us-will-resume). Given the lack of active negotiations and the high threshold for U.S. action, a formal U.S. announcement ending the blockade by August 31, 2026, is unlikely.
No ongoing US-Iran talks, US has 'all options on table' stance, and Iran's demands remain high, making an August 31 announcement unlikely.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The June 2026 US-Iran ceasefire has expired and both sides accuse each other of violations, but no major US military strike on Iranian territory has occurred in recent weeks. The US has shifted to economic pressure and a naval blockade, while Iran pursues separate shipping arrangements with Oman and Qatar. With only 4 days left until August 31 and no active escalation, the base rate of a qualifying strike in this short window is low, consistent with the 87% market price on Polymarket [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/us-x-iran-ceasefire-continues-through-august-31).
The ceasefire between the US and Iran, established in June 2026, has effectively ended with President Trump declaring it over by early July. However, no qualifying US military strikes against Iran have occurred recently, and the situation remains tense but without direct military escalation. Diplomatic efforts via Oman and Qatar continue, and the market price at 87% reflects a strong but not certain likelihood that no qualifying US military action will occur through August 31.
With only a few days remaining until the August 31 deadline, the absence of recent major military escalations and the current diplomatic efforts involving regional intermediaries suggest a high likelihood that no qualifying US military action will occur. While the formal ceasefire has expired, the lack of active, large-scale kinetic exchanges makes a sudden, qualifying strike against Iranian territory within this very short timeframe statistically unlikely.
The ceasefire has held without major military exchanges in recent weeks, but tensions remain high due to unresolved issues like navigation, sanctions, and nuclear programs. The absence of active negotiations and mutual accusations of violations suggest a fragile situation. The US has shifted to economic pressure and a naval blockade, while Iran seeks alternative arrangements, indicating a desire to avoid direct conflict. However, the lack of a formal extension and persistent disagreements leave room for escalation.
Although the ceasefire framework has collapsed, the absence of recent qualifying military actions, combined with both sides avoiding direct escalation through alternative diplomatic and economic channels, supports continued de facto restraint. The high market price reflects low expectations of a sudden strike in the final days, and no resolution-source-credible reports indicate an imminent attack.
The market currently prices the probability at 87%, with no major new US-Iran military exchanges in recent weeks. However, unresolved issues leave a small risk of escalation.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The ceasefire extension confirmed by Pakistani mediators and public consent from both the US and Iran strongly reduce the likelihood of a US strike on Iranian territory by Sep 30. Although underlying tensions remain (Hormuz legislation, naval blockade), the absence of any recent qualifying action and the market's near-unanimous pricing (96-100%) suggest a very high probability of continuation. I adjust from base rates of ceasefire durability to 0.98, accounting for tail risks from unforeseen escalations.
The ceasefire between the US and Iran, brokered through Pakistan's Islamabad MOU, has been extended beyond August 17, 2026, with both sides publicly consenting to continuation through September 30. While the market prices near certainty for continuation, ongoing tensions such as the US naval blockade and Iran's parliamentary legislation on the Strait of Hormuz create risks of escalation. However, Pakistan's mediation and the lack of a better alternative to the ceasefire framework support a high likelihood of the ceasefire holding through the specified date.
The US-Iran ceasefire, mediated by Pakistan through the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, has shown resilience, with both nations formally agreeing to extend the arrangement beyond August 17, 2026. While underlying tensions regarding the Strait of Hormuz and legislative friction persist, the current diplomatic momentum and the high cost of a direct military escalation make a qualifying US strike against Iranian territory before September 30 unlikely.
The ceasefire has been extended with public consent from both the US and Iran, and Pakistan's mediation has shown resilience. However, the Strait of Hormuz dispute and Iran's parliamentary legislation remain potential triggers for conflict.
The ceasefire remains intact as of late August 2026, with both the US and Iran having signaled agreement to extend it. No qualifying military action has occurred, and recent market and geopolitical signals suggest strong incentives to avoid escalation. However, unresolved disputes over the Strait of Hormuz and potential legislative actions in Iran introduce non-zero risk of breakdown before September 30.
The US and Iran have formally extended the ceasefire, and Pakistan's mediation has kept them at the table. While there are unresolved issues like the Strait of Hormuz dispute, the main trigger for 'No' is a qualifying military action, which hasn't occurred as of now.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The Polymarket probability of 41.5% provides a market-based anchor. Given Bitcoin is trading near the $75,000 level after a recent rally, a quick dip to exactly $75,000 in the remaining days is plausible but not guaranteed. The window is short, so I adjust slightly upward to 0.42 as a calibrated point estimate.
Market data from Polymarket shows a 41.5% probability that Bitcoin will dip to $75,000 in August 2026 based on real-money trading odds. Recent price action includes a rally near $75,000 driven by institutional flows and regulatory clarity, but volatility and market dynamics still allow for a significant dip below that level.
As of late August 2026, Bitcoin has recently surged toward the $75,000 level, driven by institutional inflows and regulatory optimism. Given that the market is currently trading near this threshold, volatility in the final days of August makes a brief dip to or below $75,000 a plausible scenario, consistent with current market sentiment and betting odds.
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Bitcoin reached near $75,000 by August 23, 2026, indicating strong upward momentum driven by institutional ETF inflows and regulatory optimism [predictmarketcap.com](https://predictmarketcap.com/markets/will-bitcoin-dip-to-75k-in-august-2026). However, a dip to $75,000 or lower requires a pullback from those levels. Given current price action and market sentiment, a temporary dip is plausible but not guaranteed. The Polymarket implied probability of 41.5% aligns closely with a well-calibrated assessment [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/what-price-will-bitcoin-hit-in-august-2026/will-bitcoin-dip-to-70k-in-august-2026).
Polymarket currently has a 41.5% probability for Bitcoin dipping to $75,000 in August, and Bitcoin surged to near $75,000 by August 23, which may influence the outcome.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
With only a few days left in August and Bitcoin trading far below $90k, the chance of a single 1-minute candle hitting that level is very low. Base rates for such a large move in such a short period are minimal, and the market-implied probability of ~7% aligns with this assessment.
Current market data from Polymarket and Orrery indicate a low probability around 6.5-7% that Bitcoin will reach $90,000 in August 2026. The market has shown a slight downward trend in probability recently, and the high trading volume suggests active market interest but skepticism about such a high price point within the month. Given Bitcoin's historical volatility but current market sentiment, a 7% probability is a reasonable estimate.
With only a few days remaining in August 2026, Bitcoin would need a significant and rapid price appreciation to reach $90,000. Current market sentiment and betting platforms like Polymarket [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/will-bitcoin-reach-90k-in-august-2026) and [predictmarketcap.com](https://predictmarketcap.com/markets/will-bitcoin-reach-90k-in-august-2026) reflect a very low probability of this occurring, consistent with the lack of major bullish catalysts in the final days of the month.
The current market probability on Polymarket and Orrery is around 7%, indicating a low likelihood. The market for Bitcoin reaching $100,000 in August is priced at 0%, suggesting that $90,000 is also considered highly unlikely. The heavy trading volume and low probability indicate strong market consensus against this outcome.
As of August 27, 2026, Bitcoin has not reached $90,000, and the current market-implied probability on Polymarket is 7% [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/will-bitcoin-reach-90k-in-august-2026). The odds for nearby price targets suggest a steep decline in probability above $80,000, with only 1% for $80,000 [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/will-bitcoin-reach-80k-in-august-2026) and 0% for $100,000 [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/will-bitcoin-reach-100k-in-august-2026), indicating low market expectation. Given the lack of recent price momentum and the narrow time window remaining, the likelihood of a sudden 30%+ surge is low.
Current market probabilities on Polymarket are around 6.5-7%, and key factors include the resolution criteria based on Binance 1-minute candles and the time remaining in August.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Current polling aggregates and prediction markets consistently show Lula leading both first and second rounds, with Bolsonaro trailing by 4-6 percentage points. While the gap has narrowed, Lula retains a structural advantage as the incumbent. Given the polling data and market consensus, Bolsonaro's chance of winning is around 35%, reflecting a plausible but less likely outcome.
Current polling data and prediction markets show Flávio Bolsonaro trailing Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva but maintaining a strong second place. Lula holds a consistent lead in polls and prediction markets, with Bolsonaro narrowing the gap but still behind. Given the historical trend of Lula's structural advantage and the prediction market assigning about a 35% chance to Bolsonaro winning, the probability of Bolsonaro winning is moderate but less likely than Lula.
While Flávio Bolsonaro has emerged as the primary challenger to incumbent President Lula, current polling consistently shows him trailing by a margin that, while narrowing, remains outside the margin of error in most surveys [reuters.com](https://reuters.com/world/americas/lula-retains-lead-over-flavio-bolsonaro-ahead-of-brazil-election-datafolha-shows-2026-08-21), [aljazeera.com](https://aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/15/lula-holds-slim-lead-over-flavio-bolsonaro-ahead-of-brazil-election). Prediction markets currently price his victory at approximately 35%, reflecting the competitive nature of the race but acknowledging Lula's structural advantage as the incumbent [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/brazil-presidential-election).
The current polling data and prediction markets suggest that Flávio Bolsonaro is trailing Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva by a significant margin. Polls show Lula consistently leading with around 39-41% of the vote, while Bolsonaro is around 33-37%. Prediction markets like Polymarket and FRC indicate a 35% chance of Bolsonaro winning the election, which aligns with the polling data. The key factors include Lula's consistent lead in polls, Bolsonaro's narrowing but still significant gap, and the historical trend of runoff elections in Brazil.
Current polls show a tight race, but Lula consistently leads in both first-round and runoff scenarios, with Bolsonaro within striking distance. Prediction markets, which aggregate diverse information, assign Bolsonaro about a 35% chance, aligning with polling trends and uncertainty in a polarized electorate. Given Lula's slight edge and historical advantage as incumbent, Bolsonaro remains the underdog.
Current polls show Lula leading Bolsonaro, with market odds (Polymarket, FRC) also favoring Lula. Bolsonaro trails in both first-round and simulated runoff scenarios.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Recent labor market softening (July net loss of 23,000 jobs, unemployment at 4.1%) and cooling wage growth have shifted expectations toward a hold at the September 15-16 FOMC meeting. While elevated inflation from energy disruptions prompted three dissents for a hike in July, subsequent inflation prints and most economist polls favor steady policy through year-end. Polymarket prices the YES outcome at 31-33%, but given the mixed data and proximity to midterms, I estimate a slightly lower probability of 25% for a 25 bps increase.
Prediction markets such as Polymarket currently price the probability of a 25 bps rate increase after the September 2026 FOMC meeting at about 31%. This reflects market consensus and incorporates recent Fed officials' comments, including some calls for immediate hikes, but overall suggests a low likelihood of an increase given current economic conditions and the Fed's recent decisions to hold rates steady.
Current prediction market data from [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/will-the-fed-increase-interest-rates-by-25-bps-after-the-september-2026-meeting-649) and [kresmion.com](https://kresmion.com/odds/will-the-fed-increase-interest-rates-by-25-bps-after-the-september-2026-meeting-649) indicates a 31% probability for a 25 bps rate hike. While some officials like Neel Kashkari have advocated for hikes, the broader market consensus remains that a 'no change' outcome is significantly more likely as the September meeting approaches.
Recent labor market data shows softening, with a net loss of 23,000 jobs in July and an unemployment rate of 4.1%, which suggests a lower likelihood of a rate hike. However, elevated inflation readings due to energy price pressures have kept a 25 bps increase in play for some participants. Most economists forecast steady policy through year-end, but there is still a possibility of a rate hike if price pressures reaccelerate before the September meeting.
Base rate from current market consensus is around 31%, but recent hawkish commentary introduces some upward pressure. However, declining prices over the past month suggest weakening conviction in a rate hike. Adjusting slightly above market price to account for potential tightening bias, but remain cautious given lack of strong macro data indicating urgency.
As of August 27, 2026, Polymarket prices the event at 31% implied probability.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The July FOMC meeting resulted in a 9-3 vote to hold rates, with dissents favoring a hike, indicating a divided committee. Recent July PCE data showed inflation at 3.7% year-over-year, above the 2% target, supporting a hawkish tilt, but the July employment report showed a loss of 23,000 jobs and unemployment at 4.1%, signaling labor market cooling. Polymarket prices for 'no change' are around 69-71%, reflecting market consensus that the Fed will hold steady, though the risk of a 25 bps hike remains significant given inflation persistence and hawkish dissents.
Current prediction markets and expert consensus indicate a strong likelihood of no change in Fed interest rates at the September 2026 meeting, with probabilities around 69-79%. Inflation remains above target but labor market cooling and recent job losses suggest the Fed may hold rates steady. The Fed's data-dependent approach and recent communications emphasize patience, supporting a no-change decision unless unexpected inflation or labor market shifts occur.
Recent economic data, particularly the contraction in the July employment report and a 4.1% unemployment rate, has significantly cooled expectations for further rate hikes, despite persistent inflation concerns. While some FOMC members remain hawkish due to sticky PCE readings, the consensus in prediction markets [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/fed-decision-in-september-762?r=kirillspe) and [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/will-there-be-no-change-in-fed-interest-rates-after-the-september-2026-meeting-615) currently favors a pause as the most likely outcome for the September meeting.
The base rate for no change in Fed interest rates is high, with recent FOMC decisions and market expectations favoring a hold. However, the probability is adjusted slightly downward due to the possibility of unexpected inflation data or labor market shifts.
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Current market pricing on Polymarket shows a 69% implied probability of no change, balancing factors like sticky inflation and labor market conditions.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.