timeout after 30000ms
Recent agreements between the US and Iran include commitments to negotiate nuclear issues and to down-blend enriched uranium under IAEA supervision, indicating willingness to address enrichment. However, the current agreements stop short of a definitive public pledge to end all uranium enrichment by June 30, 2026. Given ongoing negotiations and the political complexities, there is a moderate chance Iran will publicly agree to end enrichment by the deadline.
While the recent memorandum of understanding between the US and Iran [bbc.com](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crr8z4z2er9o) [cnn.com](https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/17/middleeast/us-iran-war-mou-text-intl) establishes a framework for negotiations and addresses the down-blending of existing stockpiles, it does not explicitly commit Iran to ending all uranium enrichment. The current diplomatic focus is on down-blending and future negotiations, and a total cessation of enrichment remains a highly contentious demand that Iran has historically resisted. Given the short timeframe until June 30, it is unlikely that Iran will agree to a complete halt of all enrichment activities.
While recent agreements between the US and Iran have addressed nuclear issues, including the down-blending of enriched uranium, there is no explicit commitment to end all enrichment of uranium by June 30, 2026. The agreements focus on future negotiations and a final deal, which may or may not include such a commitment. The lack of a clear, immediate pledge to end enrichment reduces the probability of a 'Yes' resolution.
Recent reports indicate that the US and Iran have signed a memorandum of understanding to end hostilities, which includes commitments to negotiate a final deal on Iran's nuclear program within 60 days [bbc.com](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crr8z4z2er9o). However, the agreement does not include an explicit pledge by Iran to end all uranium enrichment; instead, it reaffirms that Iran will not develop nuclear weapons and leaves the issue of enrichment to be discussed in future negotiations [cnn.com](https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/17/middleeast/us-iran-war-mou-text-intl). Since ending enrichment is not confirmed and only down-blending of existing stockpiles is mentioned, the threshold for a 'Yes' resolution is not met.
The Polymarket market prices this at 60¢, indicating a 60% chance. There's an ongoing 60-day negotiation period as per the US-Iran agreement, but no final public agreement to end all enrichment yet.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
A Polymarket market on Ali Khamenei being out as Supreme Leader by June 30 has already resolved to 'Yes', which almost certainly means Mojtaba Khamenei has also ceased to be de facto leader, as the two are directly linked. The separate market on Mojtaba Khamenei is priced at only 7%, but this likely reflects a lag or different interpretation, not the true probability given the confirmed change. Therefore, I assign a 95% probability that the question resolves 'Yes'.
Current prediction markets, including Polymarket and OddsShift, price the probability of a leadership change involving Mojtaba Khamenei by June 30, 2026, at around 7%. There is no strong public indication or credible reports suggesting imminent removal or resignation, and the market consensus reflects a low likelihood. Given the stability of Iran's leadership historically and the lack of recent credible signals for change, a low probability is appropriate.
Current prediction markets and analysis indicate a low probability of a leadership change for Mojtaba Khamenei by the end of June 2026. Market data from [polymarket.com](https://explorer.struct.to/markets/iran-leadership-change-by-june-30-689-922) and [oddsshift.com](https://oddsshift.com/radar/iran-leadership-change-by-june-30-689-922) consistently price the 'Yes' outcome at approximately 7%, suggesting that there is no significant evidence or expectation of an imminent transition or removal from power within this short timeframe.
The prediction markets on Polymarket and OddsShift provide a consensus probability of around 7% for the leadership change by June 30, 2026. This low probability suggests that the market participants do not expect a significant leadership change in Iran within the specified timeframe.
The current prediction market on Polymarket, which has seen $2.8M in trading volume, prices the 'Yes' outcome at 7¢, implying a 7% probability [odddshift.com](https://oddsshift.com/radar/iran-leadership-change-by-june-30-689-922). This reflects the collective assessment of traders with real financial stakes. Additionally, the structural support on the 'No' side—where 60% of holders are already profitable—makes it less likely they will sell early, reinforcing the difficulty of a leadership change occurring by the deadline. While speculation exists, there is no credible public reporting indicating imminent removal of Mojtaba Khamenei as de facto leader.
Polymarket prices the 'Yes' outcome at 7% as of June 2026, indicating low likelihood based on current market consensus.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
A permanent peace deal between Israel and Iran by June 30, 2026, is extremely unlikely given the deep-seated hostility, ongoing proxy conflicts, and lack of any substantive negotiations. Prediction markets consistently price this outcome at 4-12%, but those figures likely overestimate the chance given the short timeframe and the requirement for a definitive, permanent cessation of hostilities. The base rate for such a historic breakthrough in less than two weeks is near zero, and no credible reports indicate any imminent agreement.
Current market assessments and expert consensus place the probability of a permanent peace deal between Israel and Iran by June 30, 2026, at around 12%. The longstanding hostility, lack of recent significant diplomatic breakthroughs, and entrenched geopolitical conflicts make such an agreement unlikely in the near term. However, ongoing regional dynamics and potential shifts in leadership or external mediation efforts leave a small chance for a breakthrough.
The geopolitical relationship between Israel and Iran is characterized by deep-seated ideological hostility, proxy conflicts, and a lack of diplomatic recognition. Given the current trajectory of regional tensions and the absence of any formal diplomatic framework or ongoing high-level negotiations aimed at a permanent peace treaty, the likelihood of such a monumental shift occurring by June 2026 is extremely low. Market sentiment on platforms like [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/israel-x-iran-permanent-peace-deal-by) and [wyldmarkets.com](https://wyldmarkets.com/market/israel-x-iran-permanent-peace-deal-by-june-30-2026-262) reflects this consensus, pricing the event as a significant longshot.
The current market consensus on platforms like WyldMarkets and Polymarket suggests a very low probability of a permanent peace deal between Israel and Iran by June 30, 2026, with estimates around 4-12%. Given the historical context of strained relations and ongoing conflicts, this low probability is reasonable. The lack of significant diplomatic progress or high-level negotiations further supports this estimate.
The probability of a permanent peace deal between Israel and Iran by June 30, 2026, is extremely low due to deep-seated geopolitical and ideological hostilities. Despite occasional diplomatic backchannel discussions, there is no current evidence of formal negotiations toward a permanent agreement [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/israel-x-iran-permanent-peace-deal-by). Both nations maintain adversarial positions, with Iran continuing to support groups opposed to Israel, and Israel viewing Iran as an existential threat. Market sentiment, such as the 4–12% implied probability on prediction markets, reflects minimal but non-zero hope, likely driven by tail-event speculation rather than concrete developments.
Based on market data, WyldMarkets prices the chance at 4%, indicating low likelihood. A permanent peace deal requires clear, definitive agreement, which is challenging.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
As of mid-June 2026, Keir Starmer remains Prime Minister with no credible reports of imminent resignation or removal. Prediction markets show a Yes probability around 26-27% (e.g., Polymarket at 26.5%, Orrery at 20%), reflecting a low but non-zero chance of a sudden departure before the June 30 deadline. Base rates for UK prime ministers leaving office within a given year are modest, and no major scandal or leadership challenge has emerged, so the probability is best estimated near the current market consensus.
Current prediction markets show a consensus probability around 20-27% that Keir Starmer will cease to be UK Prime Minister by June 30, 2026. While Starmer has maintained leadership since 2020 and the Labour Party is currently in government, political volatility and historical turnover rates for UK Prime Ministers suggest a moderate chance of change. The markets reflect some risk of resignation or removal but overall favor continuity through mid-2026.
Keir Starmer maintains a stable parliamentary majority, and there is no immediate evidence of a leadership crisis or significant political pressure that would force his resignation before the June 30, 2026 deadline. While prediction markets have shown fluctuating sentiment, the current consensus and lack of major institutional instability suggest he is highly likely to remain in office through the specified period.
The current implied probability on Polymarket is 20% as of June 14, 2026. This reflects the latest collective view of traders and recent developments. The market's resolution will be based on credible reporting or official government announcements.
While prediction markets like Polymarket price the 'Yes' outcome at around 20%, suggesting low but non-trivial risk, there is no current evidence of political instability or leadership challenge sufficient to force Starmer out before June 30, 2026. Adjusting slightly upward for inherent political volatility, the true probability is estimated at 21%.
Based on the latest market data, the Orrery market shows a 20% implied probability for Starmer being out by June 30, 2026.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The current 7-day moving average of transit calls is likely well below 60, as the June 15 market resolved No and the end-of-June market remains uncertain. With only 26 days until July 15, recovery to 60 is possible but not highly probable given ongoing geopolitical tensions in the region. Polymarket odds for July 15 stand at 38%, which I adjust slightly downward to 35% due to the recent 16pp drop in confidence and lack of clear positive catalysts.
Current market data from Polymarket and PredictMarketCap shows roughly even odds around 50% for the Strait of Hormuz traffic returning to normal by July 15, 2026. Given ongoing regional conflicts causing disruptions such as GPS jamming and AIS spoofing, but also considering the strategic importance of the Strait and efforts to maintain shipping traffic, a slightly above 50% probability reflects moderate uncertainty with a slight tilt towards normalization.
The ongoing regional conflict continues to disrupt maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, with reports of GPS jamming and AIS spoofing complicating data accuracy on platforms like IMF Portwatch [manifold.markets](https://manifold.markets/HillaryClinton/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-P2ZghLz5Q8). Given the persistent geopolitical instability and the volatility in shipping patterns, it is unlikely that transit volumes will consistently reach the required 7-day moving average of 60 calls by the July 15 deadline.
The current Polymarket odds are around 38-51.5% for the Strait of Hormuz traffic to return to normal by July 15, 2026. Given the ongoing conflict in the region and reports of GPS jamming and AIS spoofing, there is significant uncertainty. The base rate for such disruptions is high, but the market's mixed odds suggest a moderate probability of recovery.
The IMF Portwatch data is the definitive source for resolution, requiring a 7-day moving average of 60 or more ship arrivals. Current Polymarket odds show a range from 38% to 51.5%, indicating uncertainty but some bullish sentiment. Given that the market has time until July 15, 2026, and considering potential volatility in the region and data revisions, the probability is set slightly above 0.50 to reflect a narrow edge toward normalization, based on base rates of historical traffic and the incentive for stakeholders to maintain flow. [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-15), [pdata.world](https://pdata.world/events/polymarket/591973), [predictmarketcap.com](https://predictmarketcap.com/markets/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-15)
Based on Polymarket odds (38-51.5%) and ongoing regional conflict affecting traffic and data accuracy, with resolution dependent on IMF Portwatch's 7-day moving average of transit calls ≥60.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The threshold of 60 transit calls (7-day moving average) is a moderate benchmark, roughly around normal traffic levels. The market was created at a time when traffic was likely depressed due to regional tensions, but with time for conditions to ease by the end of July. Current Polymarket odds sit at ~71% Yes, but after [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-31) and [predictionninja.com](https://predictionninja.com/market/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-31) confirm the definition, I weigh geopolitical uncertainties and recent traffic data not fully shown in these summaries. There is a meaningful chance that the moving average either stays just below 60 or only reaches that level after data revisions, but the 6-week window and signs of gradual improvement push the probability slightly above 50%.
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical maritime chokepoint, and recent data and market predictions suggest a moderate to strong likelihood of traffic returning to normal levels (7-day moving average of 60 or more transit calls) by July 31, 2026. Current market odds range from about 62% to 71% yes, reflecting some uncertainty but overall optimism about recovery. Given the importance of the strait and the monitoring by IMF Portwatch, it is reasonable to assign a probability slightly below the higher market odds to account for potential disruptions or data revisions.
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical global maritime chokepoint, and while geopolitical tensions often cause fluctuations in shipping, the volume of transit calls typically remains high due to the necessity of oil and commodity exports. Given that the threshold of 60 is a 7-day moving average, it is likely that standard operational volatility or a temporary surge in shipping activity will allow the metric to hit this level at some point before the end of July 2026.
The current Polymarket odds suggest a 62% probability of this event happening, which is a strong indicator. The Strait of Hormuz is a critical maritime chokepoint, and its traffic is closely monitored. The resolution depends on IMF Portwatch data, which is a reliable source. Given the historical importance and the current market sentiment, a 65% probability seems reasonable.
The market definition specifies a clear threshold: a 7-day moving average of 60 or more ship arrivals reported by IMF Portwatch by July 31, 2026. Current market pricing on Polymarket shows a 71% probability of a 'Yes' resolution [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-31), which reflects aggregated trader expectations based on recent shipping data trends. Given that the market is actively trading and resolution depends solely on an objective, publicly verifiable data source, the current implied probability aligns with a well-informed consensus. While geopolitical risks could affect traffic, the threshold has not yet been breached, but the probability remains substantial due to baseline traffic levels and recovery trends.
Based on the market odds and the defined criteria of a 7-day moving average of transit calls of 60 or above from IMF Portwatch by July 31, 2026.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
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Current shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is significantly below the 60-ship threshold, with a 7-day moving average around 11-12 ships. Achieving a 5x increase in traffic within about 7 weeks is highly unlikely given ongoing geopolitical tensions, naval blockades, and structural diversions of shipping routes. Expert analyses and market prices also suggest a low probability of normalization by the end of June 2026.
Current transit data from IMF Portwatch shows a 7-day moving average significantly below the required threshold of 60, hovering near 12. Given the structural shift in shipping routes and the time required for insurance and risk premiums to normalize even in the event of a sudden diplomatic breakthrough, a 5x increase in traffic within the remaining days of June is highly improbable.
The current Polymarket odds suggest a 22% chance of the event resolving to 'Yes' [pdata.world](https://pdata.world/events/polymarket/375597). Given the Strait of Hormuz's strategic importance and the potential for geopolitical disruptions, a conservative estimate slightly higher than the market odds seems reasonable. The base rate for such disruptions is low, but the potential for unexpected events justifies a small upward adjustment.
Current 7-day moving average of transit calls is around 12, far below the 60 threshold needed for resolution. Pre-conflict levels were 75–125, but traffic has collapsed due to ongoing geopolitical tensions and naval blockades. Reaching 60 would require a fivefold increase within a short timeframe, which is unlikely given structural shipping diversions (e.g., to Salalah/Sohar) and slow risk-reassessment cycles. Market pricing and World Bank forecasts suggest recovery is not expected until late 2026.
Market odds from Polymarket and ClearMarket indicate a low probability, with Polymarket at 22% and ClearMarket at 20%.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
A US-Iran diplomatic meeting was explicitly scheduled for June 19 but was cancelled on the same day per multiple credible sources, with Iran's delegation reportedly delayed due to the Israel-Lebanon conflict. With only about 48 hours left before the market deadline and no announced rescheduled meeting, the chance of a new in-person diplomatic meeting materializing and being publicly acknowledged by June 21 is extremely low. Base rates for last-minute diplomatic face-to-face meetings after such a high-profile cancellation are near-zero, so I estimate the probability at roughly 3%.
Recent scheduled talks between the US and Iran in Switzerland were abruptly cancelled due to regional conflicts and political tensions, indicating a low likelihood of a diplomatic meeting occurring by June 21, 2026. Although an initial peace deal was signed, ongoing hostilities and the cancellation of planned negotiations reduce the probability of an in-person diplomatic meeting within the short timeframe.
The scheduled diplomatic talks in Switzerland, which were intended to implement the recent US-Iran peace agreement, were abruptly cancelled on June 19, 2026, due to ongoing regional instability and tensions involving Israel and Hezbollah. Given that today is June 19 and the deadline is June 21, there is insufficient time to reschedule and conduct an in-person diplomatic meeting, especially as the primary reason for the cancellation remains unresolved.
The scheduled diplomatic meeting between the US and Iran in Switzerland was abruptly called off due to ongoing military conflicts and political tensions. While both countries have signed an initial peace deal and committed to further talks within 60 days, the immediate cancellation of the meeting suggests significant hurdles to arranging an in-person diplomatic meeting by June 21, 2026.
Although a framework agreement was signed, the only scheduled in-person diplomatic meeting has been cancelled due to regional conflict, and no alternative meeting has been announced. With only two days remaining and tensions rising, the probability of convening a qualifying meeting before the deadline is very low.
The Polymarket market resolved to 'No' and there was an abrupt cancellation of scheduled talks, making a meeting by June 21, 2026, unlikely.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The Polymarket prediction market for this event is currently trading at 100% implied probability as of June 16, 2026, indicating that a qualifying major closure has already occurred or is considered certain. The market description explicitly cites the January 2026 total closure of Iranian airspace as a qualifying example, and that event happened before the June 30 deadline. Given that the market has already resolved to 100% on Polymarket, the probability of a YES resolution is extremely high.
Recent market data and historical patterns indicate that while Iran has closed its airspace in the past (notably in January 2026 and April 2024), such closures are rare and typically linked to specific geopolitical or security events. Current information from multiple sources shows a low probability of a major airspace closure by June 30, 2026, with some markets pricing the chance at around 10%. There is no current credible indication or official announcement suggesting an imminent broad closure within the specified timeframe.
Market data from [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/iran-closes-its-airspace-by-june-30-432-786-462-866-468) indicates that this event has already resolved to 'Yes' via the UMA optimistic oracle, reflecting a consensus that a qualifying closure has occurred. Given the high confidence in the resolution mechanism and the specific criteria provided, the probability is extremely high.
Iran has a history of closing its airspace for political or military reasons, as seen in January 2026 and April 2024. However, such closures are not frequent and typically tied to specific events. Given the lack of recent tensions or announcements suggesting an imminent closure, the probability is relatively low. The base rate for such events is also low, with only a few instances in recent years.
While Iran has precedent for major airspace closures during crises, no qualifying event has occurred in the past month despite military drills and regional tensions. The absence of recent qualifying closures, combined with the narrow remaining time window, suggests a low but non-zero probability. The 0.15 estimate reflects a slight uptick from base rates due to ongoing regional instability, but not enough to justify a higher likelihood.
As of June 16, 2026, the implied probability on Polymarket and Orrery markets is 100%, and there are no factors indicating a failure to meet the closure criteria.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The recently signed MOU explicitly postpones the enrichment issue to a subsequent final deal and commits to down-blending existing stockpiles, which contradicts agreeing to continued enrichment. No further definitive announcement has been made. Base rates for such last-minute reversals are very low, yielding an estimate around 3%.
Despite ongoing negotiations and a memorandum of understanding signed between the US and Iran that includes nuclear issues, Trump has historically taken a hardline stance against Iran's nuclear enrichment. The recent peace deal and discussions indicate some willingness to negotiate, but definitive acceptance of continued uranium enrichment by Iran by Trump is unlikely by the June 30 deadline. Market sentiment also strongly favors a 'No' outcome.
The recently signed Memorandum of Understanding [vpm.org] explicitly defers the issue of uranium enrichment to future negotiations for a 'final deal' [bbc.com]. Because the current agreement only commits both parties to discuss the issue and does not provide definitive US acceptance or authorization of continued enrichment, it does not meet the market's criteria for a 'Yes' resolution by the June 30 deadline.
While a preliminary agreement has been signed between the US and Iran, the issue of uranium enrichment is explicitly stated to be part of ongoing negotiations over the next 60 days. The current agreement only commits to down-blending existing enriched uranium and does not definitively agree to continued enrichment. Given the historical stance of the Trump administration against Iranian nuclear enrichment and the conditional nature of the current agreement, it is unlikely that a definitive agreement on continued enrichment will be reached by June 30.
As of June 19, 2026, the implied probability on Polymarket is 7%, reflecting low market expectations [Polymarket](https://polymarket.com/event/what-iranian-demands-will-trump-agree-to-by-june-30). A recent initial peace deal signed by Trump and Iran does not permit continued enrichment; instead, it requires down-blending of enriched uranium under IAEA supervision and leaves the nuclear program for further negotiation, with Trump insisting Iran not develop nuclear weapons [bbc.com](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crr8z4z2er9o). Given Trump's stated position against Iranian nuclear weapons and the current agreement's lack of acceptance of continued enrichment, the likelihood of definitive agreement by June 30 is very low.
As of the search date, the preliminary agreement does not include US acceptance of continued uranium enrichment, and the final deal is still in negotiation. No definitive agreement meeting the criteria has been announced.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
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The recent Memorandum of Understanding between the US and Iran includes a commitment by the US to remove its forces from the proximity of Iran within 30 days after the final deal is signed. The MOU was signed recently, and the US has publicly committed to this withdrawal timeline. Additionally, Trump's own stated timeline for ending operations aligns with a June 30 announcement. While some uncertainty remains due to conditions like Iran's demands regarding Lebanon and ongoing regional tensions, the formal agreement and public commitments strongly support a withdrawal agreement by June 30.
The recently released Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the United States and Iran explicitly includes a commitment to withdraw US forces from the proximity of Iran. Point 4 of the agreement, as reported by multiple sources, states that the United States undertakes to remove its forces from the surrounding areas within 30 days after the final deal, and the MOU itself serves as a formal, signed commitment to this diplomatic framework.
The US and Iran have signed a memorandum of understanding that includes a commitment to negotiate a final deal within 60 days. The agreement specifies that the US will remove its forces from the proximity of Iran within 30 days after the final deal is signed. Given the timeline and the commitments made in the agreement, it is highly likely that Trump will agree to withdraw troops from the Iranian region by June 30.
Recent reports from [cnn.com](https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/17/middleeast/us-iran-war-mou-text-intl) and [bbc.co.uk](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cvgmqzr6p9mo) confirm that a U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding has been signed, which includes a commitment for the U.S. to withdraw its forces from the proximity of Iran within 30 days of the final deal. This agreement is part of a formal deal, satisfying the condition of a definitive commitment. Given that the MOU has been publicly released and includes specific language on troop withdrawal, and assuming the final deal is endorsed within the 60-day window, it is highly likely the U.S. will have agreed to withdraw troops by June 30, 2026.
The US-Iran MOU includes a commitment to remove US forces from the proximity of Iran within 30 days after the final deal, with formal signing imminent and a 60-day negotiation window, increasing the likelihood of fulfillment by June 30.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Multiple prediction markets (Polymarket, WyldMarkets) consistently price 'no change' at 80-93% with significant volume, reflecting strong market consensus that the Fed will hold rates steady at the July 2026 meeting. Current economic conditions and recent Fed commentary support a pause, though there is always a non-trivial chance of a surprise move, so a high but not extreme probability is appropriate.
Current market data from multiple prediction platforms shows a strong consensus that the Federal Reserve will keep interest rates unchanged after the July 2026 meeting, with probabilities ranging from 80% to 93%. Given the Federal Reserve's recent cautious approach to rate changes and the absence of strong economic signals suggesting a rate adjustment, it is highly likely that rates will remain steady.
Market sentiment and current economic forecasting models strongly favor a 'no change' outcome for the July 2026 FOMC meeting. Prediction markets consistently show high probabilities (ranging from 80% to 93%) for this outcome, reflecting a consensus that the Federal Reserve will likely maintain the current target federal funds rate during this period.
The majority of prediction markets, including Polymarket and WyldMarkets, show high probabilities (ranging from 80% to 93%) that there will be no change in Fed interest rates after the July 2026 meeting. This consensus suggests a strong market expectation of no change, likely based on current economic conditions and Fed communications.
Multiple prediction markets indicate a high probability of no change in Fed interest rates after the July 2026 meeting. The odds across platforms like Polymarket and WyldMarkets range from 80% to 93%, suggesting strong consensus among traders. While these reflect crowd sentiment rather than a guaranteed outcome, they are informative about current expectations based on available economic data and Fed guidance. Adjusting slightly for market overconfidence and the possibility of unforeseen economic shifts, an independent estimate of 85% is well-calibrated and reasonable.
Market odds from Polymarket (80-86%) and WyldMarkets (93%) indicate high likelihood of no change, with FOMC meeting scheduled for July 28-29, 2026.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.