As of June 26, 2026, only four days remain before the deadline, and there are no credible reports of Iran agreeing to end all uranium enrichment. Prediction markets (Polymarket, Orrery) price the probability at 1–2%, reflecting traders' assessment that a last-minute breakthrough is extremely unlikely. Iran has never made such a sweeping concession, and recent talks have focused on limits rather than a complete halt.
Given the current geopolitical tensions and Iran's historical commitment to uranium enrichment as a strategic leverage point, it is highly unlikely that Iran will publicly agree to end all uranium enrichment by June 30, 2026. Market data from Polymarket and other prediction platforms assign a very low probability (around 1-2%) to this event, reflecting skepticism about such an agreement occurring. No credible reports or negotiations indicate a forthcoming pledge to completely cease enrichment, and partial limits do not qualify for a 'Yes' resolution.
There is no credible evidence or diplomatic indication that Iran is prepared to completely cease all uranium enrichment, a core pillar of its nuclear program. Current market sentiment and geopolitical analysis suggest that such a concession is highly unlikely within the remaining few days before the June 30 deadline.
The consensus of prediction markets suggests a very low probability of Iran agreeing to end uranium enrichment by June 30, 2026. Polymarket shows a 1% chance [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/iran-agrees-to-end-enrichment-of-uranium-by-june-30), while another source indicates a 2% chance [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/iran-agrees-to-end-enrichment-of-uranium-by-june-30). The base rate for such agreements is historically low, and there is no recent evidence of significant diplomatic progress that would suggest a sudden change in Iran's stance.
Iran has not signaled willingness to fully end uranium enrichment, and recent negotiations have only addressed limits or temporary measures. A complete public agreement to cease all enrichment by June 30, 2026, would represent a significant and unexpected shift in policy. Given the lack of credible reports indicating such a move and the consensus among prediction markets, the true probability remains very low but not zero.
Current market odds from Polymarket show varying probabilities, and while there's potential for shifts, the uncertainty around Iran's public agreement by the deadline leads to a moderate estimate.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The Polymarket on Ali Khamenei being out by June 30 has resolved to 'Yes', confirming a leadership change occurred. However, the question specifically targets Mojtaba Khamenei, who succeeded as de facto leader. A separate Polymarket on Mojtaba Khamenei being out by June 30 shows a 77% probability of 'No', indicating the market expects him to remain in power. Given no credible reports of his imminent removal, the probability of a 'Yes' resolution is low but not zero, as unexpected events could still occur before the deadline.
Current prediction markets, including Polymarket and OddsShift, price the probability of a leadership change in Iran by June 30, 2026, at around 7%. This low probability reflects the stability of the current leadership and the lack of credible reports indicating imminent removal or resignation of Mojtaba Khamenei within this timeframe. Market liquidity and trading volumes support this estimate as a consensus view among informed traders.
Current prediction markets and analysis indicate a low probability of a leadership change involving Mojtaba Khamenei by the June 30, 2026 deadline. Market data from [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/iran-leadership-change-by) and [oddsshift.com](https://oddsshift.com/radar/iran-leadership-change-by-june-30-689-922) consistently price the 'Yes' outcome at approximately 7%, reflecting a lack of credible evidence or imminent political instability suggesting such a transition.
The prediction markets on Polymarket and OddsShift indicate a low probability of a leadership change in Iran by June 30, 2026. The current odds are 7% for a 'Yes' resolution, suggesting that the market collectively assigns a 7% chance to this event occurring. This low probability is likely due to the stability of the current leadership and the lack of significant indicators pointing to an imminent change.
The current prediction market price on Polymarket is 7 cents for YES, implying a 7% probability, and this is aligned with OddsShift's fair value model [oddsshift.com](https://oddsshift.com/radar/iran-leadership-change-by-june-30-689-922). Despite some markets referencing Mojtaba Khamenei, the prevailing consensus and reporting focus on Ali Khamenei as the current Supreme Leader, and no credible reports indicate his removal or resignation as of June 2026 [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/iran-leadership-change-by). Structural support on the NO side from profitable positions further stabilizes the low probability of a leadership change before June 30.
Polymarket prices the 'Yes' outcome at 7% as of June 2026, indicating low current belief in the event.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
With only 4 days remaining until the deadline, no credible reports indicate that a permanent peace deal is imminent. The recent June 19 ceasefire is explicitly temporary and does not meet the criteria. Prediction markets reflect this skepticism, pricing the probability at 3% on Polymarket as of June 26. Structurally, Hezbollah remains a heavily armed non-state actor with no enforcement mechanism for disarmament, making a binding permanent accord extraordinarily unlikely in such a short timeframe.
Recent developments include a cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah in June 2026, which is a positive step but not a permanent peace deal. Structural challenges such as Hezbollah's armed status and political influence, lack of enforcement mechanisms for disarmament, and the compressed timeline until June 30, 2026, make a permanent peace deal unlikely. Market probabilities and expert analyses also suggest a low chance, around 11-15%.
With only a few days remaining until the June 30, 2026 deadline, the likelihood of a formal, permanent peace treaty being signed is extremely low. While a temporary ceasefire exists, the structural obstacles—including Hezbollah's disarmament and the lack of a durable political framework—remain unresolved, and current market sentiment reflects this skepticism [oddsshift.com].
The recent cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah, announced on June 19, 2026, is a positive step but does not guarantee a permanent peace deal. The market prices reflect significant skepticism, with Polymarket showing a 3% implied probability [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/israel-x-hezbollah-permanent-peace-deal-by) and OddsShift reporting a 15% probability [oddsshift.com](https://oddsshift.com/radar/israel-x-hezbollah-permanent-peace-deal-by-june-30-2026). The structural challenges, including Hezbollah's disarmament and the fragile nature of the cease-fire, make a permanent deal by June 30 unlikely.
A fresh ceasefire was announced on June 19, 2026, which may support diplomatic momentum [Time](https://time.com), and U.S. mediation efforts are ongoing [New York Times](https://nytimes.com). However, a permanent peace deal requires Hezbollah's disarmament—a major sticking point with no enforcement mechanism [Chicago Tribune](https://chicagotribune.com). Markets reflect low confidence, with Polymarket pricing at 3% [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com) and OddsShift reporting 11% [oddsshift.com](https://oddsshift.com), suggesting consensus skepticism. A short timeline and history of fragile agreements further reduce likelihood.
Low probability due to tight deadline, structural issues like Hezbollah's armament, and recent cease-fire not being a permanent deal, with market prices around 3-15%.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Multiple prediction markets show near-0% implied probability as of June 26, 2026, with just four days remaining until the deadline. The resolution criteria are stringent, requiring established control by a non-Iranian authority, not just temporary military actions. Current evidence indicates Iran continues to exercise sovereign control over Kharg Island, with no foreign ground forces present and no indications of an imminent invasion or diplomatic transfer that would meet the threshold within the remaining time.
Kharg Island remains under firm Iranian control with no current foreign ground forces present. Recent military actions have been limited to bombardments and raids, which do not meet the criteria for loss of control. The island's proximity to Iran and strong defenses make a successful occupation by another state unlikely within the short timeframe. No diplomatic developments suggest a transfer of control, and any invasion would likely result in contested control, which does not qualify as a change.
There is no evidence of an ongoing military operation aimed at occupying Kharg Island, and the logistical requirements for such an amphibious assault are immense. Furthermore, the market definition requires established, non-contested control, which is highly unlikely to be achieved within the remaining few days before the June 30 deadline. Current market sentiment and geopolitical analysis confirm that Iran maintains sovereign control over the island [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/kharg-island-no-longer-under-iranian-control-by-june-30-561-854-897) [futuresearch.ai](https://futuresearch.ai/app/p/a/kharg-island-no-longer-under-iranian-control-by-june-30).
The likelihood of Kharg Island falling out of Iranian control by June 30, 2026, is extremely low. The current conflict has not involved ground occupations, and no foreign forces are present on the island. Iran continues to reinforce the island and maintain control over its operations. The stringent resolution criteria require actual establishment of control by another entity, which is highly unlikely in the remaining 21 days.
As of June 26, 2026, Kharg Island remains under Iranian control, with no evidence of foreign forces establishing military or governmental control. Recent activity has been limited to U.S. aerial bombardments and naval operations, which do not meet the resolution criteria [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/kharg-island-no-longer-under-iranian-control-by-march-31). Satellite imagery shows continued oil operations, indicating ongoing Iranian sovereignty [futuresearch.ai](https://futuresearch.ai/app/p/a/kharg-island-no-longer-under-iranian-control-by-june-30). An amphibious invasion would be highly complex and time-consuming, and U.S. officials have not indicated plans to occupy the island. With only four days remaining until resolution, the probability of a complete and established transfer of control is negligible.
Current market prices and analysis indicate low likelihood. Strict control requirements, short timeframe, and no imminent foreign ground occupation make it unlikely.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The 7-day moving average of transit calls is currently estimated well below 60 (likely in the 30-40 range). Reaching the threshold of 60 requires sustained daily counts of around 60 for at least a week, but recent single-day improvements to 20-30 vessels are far from that and the moving average dampens spikes. With only about 19 days remaining, the steep ramp needed makes this outcome unlikely. Polymarket odds of 38% appear too optimistic given the base rate of such rapid recoveries.
Current data and expert analysis indicate that the Strait of Hormuz traffic is recovering but remains below the threshold of a 7-day moving average of 60 transit calls needed to be considered 'normal.' The recovery is gradual and skewed towards certain operators, with projections suggesting a best-case scenario close to but not reaching the required level by July 15, 2026. Given these factors and the current market odds, a probability of around 38% reflects the moderate chance of normalization by the deadline.
While there have been recent signs of increased transit activity in the Strait of Hormuz, reaching a 7-day moving average of 60 transit calls by July 15 requires a sustained and rapid recovery that exceeds current projections. Analysts suggest that while traffic is improving, the ramp-up to pre-crisis levels is likely to be gradual, and the 7-day moving average mechanism acts as a buffer against short-term spikes, making the threshold difficult to hit within the remaining timeframe.
The current Polymarket odds suggest a 38% chance of the event occurring, which aligns with the recent increases in transit calls. However, the 7-day moving average requirement of 60 transit calls is still a significant hurdle given the current data and projections. The recent increases in traffic are positive but may not be sufficient to meet the threshold by July 15.
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Based on current Polymarket odds and the need for a 7-day moving average of transit calls to reach 60, the probability is estimated at 38%.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Current market odds on Polymarket are at 52% Yes as of June 26, 2026, reflecting a balanced view. The threshold of a 7-day moving average of 60 transit calls is a moderate bar, and while recent disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have depressed traffic, geopolitical tensions could ease or shipping patterns could recover, making a return to that level plausible but not certain by July 31. The short remaining window (about 5 weeks) and the fact that traffic would need to sustain an uptick to push the moving average above 60 support a probability near the current market consensus.
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical maritime chokepoint, and traffic levels have fluctuated due to geopolitical tensions and regional conflicts. Current data sources like IMF Portwatch track ship arrivals, and the market consensus suggests a moderate to high chance (around 52-71%) that traffic will return to the defined normal level (7-day average of 60 or more) by July 31, 2026. Given the strategic importance and ongoing efforts to stabilize the region, a 65% probability reflects a balanced view accounting for potential disruptions and recovery trends.
The threshold of 60 transit calls is a specific metric defined by IMF Portwatch. Given the geopolitical volatility in the region, shipping traffic remains sensitive to security concerns, but historical data suggests that transit volumes often fluctuate near these levels. A probability slightly above 50% reflects the likelihood that standard commercial activity will recover sufficiently to meet this threshold before the July 31 deadline, despite ongoing regional tensions.
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical maritime chokepoint, and its traffic levels are closely monitored. Recent market predictions and historical data suggest a significant chance of traffic returning to normal levels by July 31, 2026. The ongoing U.S.-Iran negotiations and potential agreements could positively impact transit calls, supporting a higher probability of the market resolving to 'Yes'.
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The market resolves based on IMF Portwatch's 7-day moving average of transit calls reaching 60. With no current data provided, a moderate probability is assigned considering the nature of the event.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Current IMF Portwatch 7-day moving average is around 12 (as of April 19, 2026), far below the 60 threshold. Pre-conflict normal was 75–125, so reaching 60 requires roughly a 5x increase in traffic within about 7 weeks while US naval blockade and Iranian restrictions remain in force. Polymarket traders assign ~42% chance to the average being 40–60 by end of June, but the specific 7d MA ≥60 threshold is even harder to hit; a derived estimate from Manifold was 12% YES. The World Bank predicts no return to pre-aggression levels until late 2026. Thus, the probability is low.
Current 7-day moving average of ship arrivals in the Strait of Hormuz is around 11-12, far below the 60 threshold needed to consider traffic 'normal.' Pre-conflict levels were 75-125, so reaching 60 requires a roughly 5x increase in traffic within about 7 weeks, which is unlikely given ongoing US naval blockade and Iranian restrictions. The World Bank and market data also suggest a slow recovery, with the 7-day average expected to cross only about 30 in the near term, not 60 by June 30.
While there is a reported diplomatic framework agreement, the transition from current low transit levels (5-10 ships) to a 7-day moving average of 60 is a significant logistical hurdle. Even with political de-escalation, shipowner caution, insurance premiums, and the time required to restore normal maritime operations make reaching the 60-ship threshold by June 30, 2026, unlikely in such a short timeframe.
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The current 7-day moving average of ship arrivals is only around 12, far below the 60 threshold. A rapid fivefold increase in traffic by June 30, 2026, is highly improbable due to persistent geopolitical tensions, naval blockades, and structural rerouting of shipping. Even with a sudden diplomatic resolution, insurance markets and shipping logistics would take weeks to adjust, making a rebound to 60+ unlikely in the timeframe.
Recent US-Iran diplomatic progress offers potential, but current transit levels are very low, and there's uncertainty about resumption speed.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Bitcoin needs a ~10.7% decline in 17 days, which is plausible given recent volatility (already hit $59,100) and persistent selling pressure from ETF outflows and macro headwinds. However, the required move is still large and time is limited, so I lean slightly below the market consensus of 43-44%, estimating 40%.
Current prediction markets and analysis indicate about a 43-44% chance that Bitcoin will dip to $57,500 or lower in June 2026. The current price is around $64,000, requiring a roughly 10.7% drop, which is plausible given recent volatility and macroeconomic factors such as Federal Reserve rate policies and institutional outflows. Historical base rates for such dips are lower, but recent market conditions and volatility support a near coin-flip probability.
As of late June 2026, Bitcoin's price remains within a range where a dip to $57,500 is statistically plausible given the asset's historical volatility. Market sentiment on prediction platforms like Polymarket [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/will-bitcoin-dip-to-57pt5k-in-june-2026-623-575) reflects a probability near 57%, suggesting that while the dip is not guaranteed, it is considered a likely event before the month concludes on July 1st.
The current Bitcoin price is around $64,410, which is 10.7% above the target of $57,500. Historical data and market predictions suggest a significant but not overwhelming chance of a dip to this level, with various sources citing probabilities ranging from 43% to 57%. The recent trend and market conditions indicate a possible downward movement, but it is not guaranteed.
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Current Bitcoin price is around $61,500-$64,410, needing a ~6.5% drop to $57,500. Multiple prediction markets show varying probabilities (43%-54.1%), and factors like spot ETF outflows and Fed rate concerns influence the outlook.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
The interim US-Iran MoU signed in late June explicitly suspends any Iranian transit fees for 60 days of negotiations, and US Secretary of State Rubio has publicly and definitively rejected the idea of allowing such fees ([aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/24/rubio-says-iran-cannot-charge-tolls-in-hormuz-what-we-know)). With only four days remaining before the June 30 deadline and the US firmly opposed, the chance of an explicit, definitive agreement by the Trump administration within that window is negligible. Polymarket pricing at 2% confirms this extremely low probability.
Current evidence strongly indicates that Trump and the U.S. government are opposed to accepting Iranian transit fees in the Strait of Hormuz. Trump has publicly vowed that there will be no tolls imposed by Iran, and instead floated the idea that the U.S. might impose tolls itself. Legal experts and international law also suggest that fees on transit passage through natural straits like Hormuz are not lawful. There is no indication of any definitive agreement or acceptance by the U.S. to Iran's fees, and the market prices this event at about 2%.
The Trump administration and Secretary of State Marco Rubio have explicitly and repeatedly rejected the legality and acceptability of Iranian transit fees in the Strait of Hormuz, citing international law regarding transit passage [aljazeera.com, gcaptain.com]. President Trump has publicly stated that Iran is not seeking such tolls, and the current interim agreement specifically excludes them [gcaptain.com, apnews.com]. Given the firm public stance against these fees and the short timeframe remaining until June 30, it is highly improbable that the U.S. will reverse its position to formally agree to such charges.
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Recent statements by President Trump and the interim agreement confirm that Iran is not currently charging tolls and has communicated it is not seeking them. The U.S. has opposed Iran's toll authority through sanctions, and international law does not support such fees in straits used for international navigation. Given the political, legal, and diplomatic barriers, the likelihood of a definitive U.S. agreement to Iranian transit fees before June 30 is extremely low.
Polymarket currently prices the 'Yes' probability at 2%, and there are strong opposing signals from the US side including official statements rejecting Iran's right to charge tolls.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
WTI crude oil is currently trading well below $100, and the June 2026 contract is nearing expiration with no signs of a spike to that level. The prediction market shows a 0% probability for $100 being hit in June, and the frontrunner outcome is $90, indicating the market sees $100 as extremely unlikely. Given the short remaining time in June and the lack of any major supply disruption or demand shock, the chance of a 1-minute candle hitting $100 is very low.
Current prediction markets show a roughly even split on whether WTI Crude Oil will hit $100 in June 2026, with Polymarket indicating about a 53% chance. The price of oil is influenced by many volatile factors including geopolitical events, supply constraints, and demand fluctuations. Given the current market sentiment and historical volatility, a moderate probability slightly above 50% is reasonable.
As of June 26, 2026, the month is nearly over and WTI Crude Oil prices have remained significantly below the $100 threshold throughout the period. Given the current market conditions and the limited time remaining in the month, it is statistically impossible for the price to reach $100.
The current market consensus and historical data suggest that WTI Crude Oil prices have been volatile but have not consistently reached $100 in recent years. The geopolitical and economic conditions in mid-2026 will be crucial. Given the current trends and the lack of immediate catalysts for a significant price surge, the probability is moderate.
Current prediction markets such as Polymarket show a 53% probability of WTI Crude Oil reaching $100 in June 2026, based on real-time trading activity and sentiment [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.copilot.markets/event/what-price-will-wti-hit-in-june-2026). This reflects aggregated trader expectations under defined contract rules tied to Pyth data for 1-minute candle highs. While macroeconomic factors like supply, demand, and geopolitics are key drivers, the market-implied probability serves as a strong base rate for the true likelihood.
Current market data from Polymarket shows the leading outcome for WTI in June 2026 is $90, indicating low likelihood of hitting $100. Key factors include market pricing and resolution criteria based on Pyth data.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Current market aggregates (Polymarket ~18%, WyldMarkets ~23%) assign a low probability to a 25 bps hike, reflecting strong consensus that the Fed will hold rates steady at the July 2026 meeting. Economic fundamentals—moderating inflation, stable labor market, and recent Fed guidance favoring a wait-and-see approach—support a low likelihood of a hike. Base rates for a rate increase during a period of policy easing or pause are historically low. I independently estimate ~15% probability, slightly below market midpoints, to account for the possibility of a surprise while remaining anchored by the prevailing dovish outlook.
Current prediction markets and trading odds strongly favor no change in interest rates after the July 2026 Fed meeting, with probabilities around 81-94% for no increase and only about 18-23% for a 25 bps hike. This consensus reflects expectations of stable monetary policy given the economic outlook and Fed communications so far.
Market sentiment across multiple prediction platforms, including [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/fed-decision-in-july-181) and [predictionpulse.io](https://predictionpulse.io/market/polymarket/polymarket-will-the-fed-increase-interest-rates-by-25-bps-after-the-july-2026-meeting), strongly favors no change in interest rates, with implied probabilities for a 25 bps hike ranging from roughly 6% to 18%. Given the current economic consensus and the lack of significant market movement toward a hike, a 25 bps increase is viewed as a low-probability event.
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While prediction markets vary slightly, the consensus is that a rate hike in July 2026 is unlikely. Polymarket's 18% for a 25 bps increase is the highest signal, but others show much lower odds. Aggregating these, and accounting for market inefficiencies and rounding rules, a 15% probability balances the disparate signals and reflects the low but non-zero chance of a hike due to unexpected economic data.
Prediction markets like Polymarket and WyldMarkets show low probabilities for a 25 bps rate hike in July 2026, with Polymarket at ~18% and WyldMarkets at 23%.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
The consensus among prediction markets and economic forecasts points strongly to no change at the July 2026 FOMC meeting. Inflation remains above the Fed's target, and the labor market is cooling only gradually, so the Fed is expected to maintain its current rate as it waits for more progress. The base rate of 'hold' decisions in similar economic conditions is high, and market-implied probabilities around 80% reflect that.
Current prediction markets, which aggregate diverse trader insights and information, assign about an 81% probability that the Fed will keep interest rates unchanged after the July 2026 meeting. This high probability reflects expectations of a stable economic outlook or a pause in rate adjustments by the Federal Reserve at that time.
Market sentiment and historical patterns suggest a high likelihood of the Federal Reserve maintaining current interest rates during the July 2026 meeting. Prediction markets consistently price this outcome at 80-86%, reflecting a consensus that the FOMC will likely pause adjustments to the federal funds rate at that time.
The prediction markets on Polymarket consistently show high probabilities (80-86%) for no change in Fed interest rates after the July 2026 meeting. This suggests a strong consensus among traders that the Fed will maintain the current rates. The key factor is the collective market sentiment reflected in these prediction markets, which often aligns with expert forecasts and economic indicators.
Prediction markets such as Polymarket show the probability of no change in the Fed interest rate after the July 2026 meeting is priced around 81%, based on real-time trading activity [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/fed-decision-in-july-181). This reflects the current consensus among traders who incorporate macroeconomic data, Fed guidance, and inflation trends into their expectations. While market prices are not perfect predictors, they are efficient aggregators of dispersed information and serve as a strong base rate for long-term rate expectations. Given the lack of strong evidence for imminent policy shifts as of mid-2026, and assuming current trends hold, a hold decision is the most likely outcome.
Crowd-sourced probabilities from Polymarket indicate a high likelihood, with odds ranging around 80-86%.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.