The question asks whether Iran will publicly agree to end ALL enrichment of uranium by July 31, 2026. The current market consensus is around 31-34% from Polymarket and similar prediction platforms, but I assess this as too optimistic given historical patterns. Iran has consistently resisted ending all enrichment, and recent negotiations have only produced agreements in principle that explicitly defer enrichment details to a 60-day post-signing phase, making a full suspension by July 31 unlikely within that timeline. The key factors are: (1) Iran's historical refusal to completely halt enrichment, (2) the current MOU framework that kicks enrichment negotiations into a 60-day window after any broader deal, leaving little time before the deadline, and (3) the narrow pathway requiring rapid finalization of a comprehensive agreement and subsequent formal pledge, which all credible reporting suggests is a long shot. [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/iran-agrees-to-end-enrichment-of-uranium-by-july-31), [lines.com](https://www.lines.com/prediction-markets/politics/iran-agrees-to-end-enrichment-of-uranium-by-july-31)
Current prediction markets and expert analysis place the probability of Iran formally agreeing to end uranium enrichment by July 31, 2026, at around 30-34%. While there is some momentum and ongoing negotiations, no signed deal or formal commitment has been reached yet, and the timeline is tight. The path to a formal agreement requires rapid finalization of a memorandum of understanding and certification by the IAEA, which remains uncertain.
While there is an ongoing negotiation framework, a formal commitment to end all uranium enrichment is a significant concession that Iran has historically resisted. Current market sentiment and expert analysis suggest that while a broader agreement is being discussed, the specific requirement to end all enrichment remains unlikely to be met by the July 31 deadline, as negotiations are currently focused on more limited caps rather than a total cessation.
The current market odds and expert analysis suggest a low probability of Iran agreeing to end uranium enrichment by July 31, 2026. The primary factors include the lack of a signed deal as of May 27, the gap between verbal concessions and a formal agreement, and the tight timeline for negotiations.
While Iran has signaled willingness to negotiate a suspension of enrichment, a formal, public agreement to end all enrichment—required for 'Yes' resolution—remains unlikely. The current trajectory and political hurdles suggest a low probability, consistent with prediction market signals [lines.com](https://www.lines.com/prediction-markets/politics/iran-agrees-to-end-enrichment-of-uranium-by-july-31).
Current market prices and analysis indicate a relatively low probability, with key factors including Iran's agreement in principle to negotiate suspension rather than a formal end, and a tight timeline with ongoing negotiations.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Multiple credible sources (BBC, CNN, Blockchain.News) confirm the June 17 US-Iran MOU does not require Iran to end enrichment by June 30; it kicks the issue to 60-day talks. Polymarket odds have dropped to 19.5% and continue falling, and there is no evidence of an imminent, separate pledge. Base rates for sudden, unconditional enrichment halts by June 30 are extremely low given the recent agreement structure. Therefore, I estimate a 7% chance.
Recent agreements between the US and Iran maintain the status quo on uranium enrichment, with no immediate commitment from Iran to end enrichment by June 30, 2026. The memorandum of understanding signed leaves the issue of uranium enrichment to be resolved in future technical talks, and current market sentiment strongly favors a 'No' outcome. While Iran has reaffirmed it will not develop nuclear weapons, there is no public pledge to end all uranium enrichment by the deadline.
The recent memorandum of understanding between the U.S. and Iran explicitly defers decisions on uranium enrichment to a future, final agreement, maintaining the current status quo in the interim [blockchain.news](https://blockchain.news/news/trump-iran-mou-keeps-enrichment-status-quo-as-polymarket-yes-slips-to-195-0hnme7n70vqk0). Given that the MOU focuses on broader peace terms and leaves nuclear specifics for later negotiations, it is highly unlikely that Iran will commit to a total cessation of enrichment by the June 30 deadline [bbc.com](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c4gy700j0eko).
The recent memorandum of understanding between the U.S. and Iran indicates that the issue of uranium enrichment will be addressed in a final deal, not immediately. The agreement maintains the status quo on enrichment, and the final deal is expected to be negotiated within 60 days. Given the lack of immediate commitment to end enrichment and the focus on future negotiations, the probability of Iran agreeing to end enrichment by June 30 is low.
Recent developments indicate that a memorandum of understanding between the U.S. and Iran maintains the status quo on uranium enrichment, deferring final decisions on enrichment and monitoring to a later agreement [blockchain.news](https://blockchain.news/news/trump-iran-mou-keeps-enrichment-status-quo-as-polymarket-yes-slips-to-195-0hnme7n70vqk0). The BBC's publication of the MOU confirms that enrichment will be discussed in future negotiations, not ended immediately [bbc.com](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c4gy700j0eko). Polymarket odds, which reflect trader expectations, have adjusted to a 19.5% chance of a 'Yes' resolution following this news, down from previous levels around 42% [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/iran-agrees-to-end-enrichment-of-uranium-by-june-30). Given that no new public agreement to end enrichment has emerged and the current diplomatic path delays such decisions, the probability remains low but non-zero.
Polymarket currently prices the 'Yes' chance at 19.5%, and recent developments like the Trump Iran MOU keeping enrichment status quo have pushed odds lower. Ongoing negotiations and the need for a final deal are key factors.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The recent removal of Ali Khamenei shows significant political instability in Iran, but the short 10-day window makes a second change unlikely. A binary prediction market currently assigns a 23% probability to this event, which reflects a non-trivial but still low chance.
Current prediction markets assign a low probability (around 5%) that Mojtaba Khamenei will cease to be the de facto leader by June 30, 2026. There is no public indication of imminent removal or resignation, and the political structure strongly favors continuity. While health or political upheaval could change this, the base rate and market consensus suggest a low chance within this timeframe.
The market question asks about Mojtaba Khamenei, who is not currently the Supreme Leader of Iran; Ali Khamenei holds that position. As Mojtaba is not the official or de facto leader, the premise of him being 'removed' or 'ceasing to be' the leader is highly unlikely to occur by June 30, 2026, as he does not currently hold the office described in the resolution criteria.
While there is significant speculation about a potential leadership change in Iran, the current evidence suggests that it is unlikely to happen by June 30, 2026. The prediction markets show mixed probabilities, with one market indicating a 100% chance of Khamenei being out [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/khamenei-out-as-supreme-leader-of-iran-by-june-30-747), but another showing a 77% chance of no change [explorer.struct.to](https://explorer.struct.to/markets/iran-leadership-change-by-june-30-689-922). Additionally, the health and political stability factors do not strongly indicate an imminent change.
The premise of the question is factually incorrect: Ali Khamenei, not Mojtaba Khamenei, is the current Supreme Leader of Iran as of 2026. There is no official indication that Mojtaba Khamenei has assumed the role or is the de facto leader. Therefore, the event described—Mojtaba Khamenei ceasing to be leader—cannot occur because he has not held the position. The market appears to be based on a misunderstanding or misinformation.
The Polymarket market for Iran leadership change by June 30 has a current probability of 5% for the 'Yes' outcome, with no significant developments indicating a high likelihood of Mojtaba Khamenei ceasing to be de facto leader by that date.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The Polymarket market shows a 19% implied probability, but that likely overstates the true chance given only a temporary ceasefire exists and no serious permanent deal negotiations are publicly known. Permanent peace between Israel and Hezbollah requires resolving deep-rooted conflicts that have persisted for decades, and achieving a binding, permanent agreement before June 30, 2026 is extremely unlikely without any reported progress. I estimate a 5% chance, well below the market price, because the remaining time is very short and the bar for 'permanent peace deal' is high.
Given the long-standing conflict and deep mistrust between Israel and Hezbollah, a permanent peace deal by June 30, 2026, remains unlikely. Recent ceasefire agreements have been temporary, and no definitive permanent peace agreement has been announced. Market probabilities around 19-20% reflect cautious optimism but acknowledge significant obstacles to a lasting deal.
Given the current date of June 20, 2026, there are only 10 days remaining to reach a formal, permanent peace agreement. The historical context of the conflict, characterized by deep-seated animosity and reliance on temporary ceasefires rather than comprehensive treaties, makes a definitive, permanent resolution within this extremely short timeframe highly unlikely. Market sentiment [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/israel-x-hezbollah-permanent-peace-deal-by-june-30-2026) reflects this skepticism, and there have been no credible reports of imminent breakthroughs that would satisfy the strict criteria for a 'permanent' deal.
The current market probability on Polymarket is 19% as of June 19, 2026, indicating a low likelihood of a permanent peace deal between Israel and Hezbollah by June 30, 2026. The ongoing conflict and lack of definitive public statements or agreements suggest that a permanent peace deal is unlikely in the near term.
As of June 19, 2026, the Polymarket implied probability for a permanent peace deal between Israel and Hezbollah by June 30, 2026 is 19% [polymarket.com](https://orrery.me/markets/israel-x-hezbollah-permanent-peace-deal-by-june-30-2026). This reflects current market sentiment based on available information about ongoing tensions and the lack of definitive public progress toward a permanent agreement. The definition of a permanent peace deal requires formal adoption or clear mutual public confirmation, which has not occurred as of now. Given the high barriers to agreement and historical hostilities, the probability remains low.
As of June 19, 2026, Polymarket prices the probability of a YES resolution at 19%.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
As of June 20, 2026, Starmer remains PM despite recent pressures, and the procedural timeline for a formal leadership challenge (requiring 20% of Labour MPs' nominations and a ballot spanning weeks) makes it very difficult to force him out by June 30. Polymarket prices have fluctuated between 20% and 32% in recent days, reflecting elevated but still minority risk. The base rate for a sitting UK PM being ousted within a ~9-month window is low, and while the Healey resignation and Makerfield by-election add uncertainty, no formal challenger has emerged, making a 'No' resolution the more likely outcome.
Current prediction markets such as Polymarket show a roughly 26-27% probability that Keir Starmer will cease to be UK Prime Minister by June 30, 2026. This reflects moderate market skepticism about his tenure continuing uninterrupted, but a majority expectation that he will remain in office. No recent credible reports suggest imminent resignation or removal, supporting a lower probability.
While Keir Starmer is facing significant political pressure following the resignation of Defense Secretary John Healey and an upcoming critical by-election in Makerfield, he has publicly rejected calls for a leadership challenge. The procedural hurdles for removing a sitting Labour Prime Minister are substantial, requiring a 20% threshold of support from MPs that has not yet been met. Current market sentiment and political analysis suggest that while his position is precarious, he remains more likely than not to survive through the end of June 2026.
The base rate for a sitting UK Prime Minister to leave office within a year is around 20-30%, adjusted for specific political pressures. Recent events, including a senior cabinet resignation and leadership challenges, increase the likelihood but do not guarantee Starmer's departure by June 30, 2026.
The probability of Keir Starmer ceasing to be Prime Minister by June 30, 2026, is estimated at 30%. While Starmer retains cabinet support and has publicly rejected leadership challenges, recent events such as Defense Secretary John Healey's resignation [Reuters, Jun 17] and the high-stakes Makerfield by-election [AP, Jun 18] have increased political pressure. Market prices vary between 20% and 32% on Polymarket [polymarket.com, orrery.me, oddsshift.com], reflecting uncertainty, but the procedural hurdles to a leadership challenge and lack of declared opponents suggest continuity is still the base case. Adjusting for potential overreaction in prediction markets, a 30% probability balances the elevated risk with structural stability.
As of June 14, 2026, Polymarket prices the 'Yes' outcome at 20% implied probability for Starmer ceasing to be PM by June 30, 2026.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Based on the Polymarket odds fluctuating between 38% and 51.5%, and the fact that traffic has been disrupted due to regional tensions, a return to a 7-day moving average of 60 transit calls by July 15 is uncertain. The current odds around 38% suggest a lower probability, but the possibility of diplomatic breakthroughs or reduced hostilities could push traffic back to normal. I estimate a 42% chance, slightly above the lower end of the market range, considering the time remaining and potential for de-escalation.
Current market data from Polymarket and PredictMarketCap shows roughly a 51.5% probability that traffic in the Strait of Hormuz will return to normal levels by July 15, 2026. Given the strategic importance of the Strait and ongoing geopolitical tensions, recovery to normal traffic levels is uncertain but plausible within the timeframe. The probability is slightly above even, reflecting balanced risks of disruption versus normalization.
The market sentiment on Polymarket has shifted downward, reflecting uncertainty regarding the stability of shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. Given the geopolitical tensions and the specific threshold of a 7-day moving average of 60 transit calls, it is more likely that traffic remains below this level due to ongoing security concerns and rerouting patterns.
The current Polymarket odds are split, with one source showing 38% [pdata.world](https://pdata.world/events/polymarket/591973) and another showing 51.5% [predictmarketcap.com](https://predictmarketcap.com/markets/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-15). Given the lack of specific recent data on transit calls, I lean slightly towards the higher probability, considering the potential for gradual recovery in shipping traffic.
The market defines 'normal' as a 7-day moving average of 60 or more ship transit calls reported by IMF Portwatch. Recent data from Polymarket shows trading odds fluctuating between 38% and 51.5%, indicating uncertainty. However, base rates of historical traffic through the Strait of Hormuz suggest that 60 transits per day is a typical level when no major disruptions occur. Given that no large-scale, ongoing disruption is currently reported [predictmarketcap.com](https://predictmarketcap.com/markets/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-15), and assuming no major geopolitical escalation before July 2026, the probability slightly favors a return to normal traffic levels.
Based on the market odds and the event definition, there is a moderate chance. The key factors include the 7-day moving average of transit calls ≥60 requirement, reliance on IMF Portwatch data, and the time frame up to July 15, 2026.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Based on the Polymarket odds of 62-71% and the fact that the question resolves if the 7-day moving average hits 60 at any point before July 31, there is a reasonable chance of recovery. However, current traffic is likely depressed due to ongoing disruptions, and while a return to normal is plausible, it is not guaranteed. I estimate a 65% probability, slightly below the market consensus, to account for the possibility that tensions persist or escalate further.
Current market data and expert predictions indicate a 71% probability that the Strait of Hormuz traffic will return to the defined normal level by July 31, 2026. This is based on the IMF Portwatch data trends and the specific threshold of a 7-day moving average of 60 or more transit calls, which includes various ship types. The region's strategic importance and recent traffic patterns support a likely recovery to normal traffic levels within the timeframe.
The market relies on the IMF Portwatch 7-day moving average for the Strait of Hormuz reaching a threshold of 60. Given the strategic importance of the Strait, traffic levels are generally high, and current market sentiment reflects a moderate expectation that this threshold will be met or exceeded by the July 31, 2026 deadline. The probability is aligned with current market consensus, reflecting the likelihood of sustained maritime activity.
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical maritime chokepoint, and its traffic levels are closely monitored. The resolution depends on IMF Portwatch data, which is a reliable source. Given the current market odds and the historical significance of the Strait, there is a reasonable chance that traffic will return to normal levels by July 31, 2026.
The market definition specifies a clear threshold: a 7-day moving average of 60 or more transit calls reported by IMF Portwatch by July 31, 2026. Current market odds on Polymarket show a 'Yes' probability around 71% [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-31), which reflects aggregated trader expectations. Given that the Strait of Hormuz typically sees high traffic volumes and disruptions would need to persist significantly to keep the 7-day average below 60 for the entire period, the base rate of recovery to normal levels supports a probability in this range. The resolution depends solely on IMF Portwatch data, which is authoritative and consistently updated.
Based on typical traffic patterns and the time remaining, there's a reasonable chance the 7-day moving average will reach 60 by July 31, but uncertainty remains.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Current IMF Portwatch data shows a 7-day moving average of transit calls around 11-12, far below the 60 threshold required for a 'Yes' resolution. Reaching 60 by June 30 would require a roughly 5x increase in traffic within about 10 days, which is extremely unlikely given ongoing US naval blockades and Iranian restrictions in the region. Prediction markets on Polymarket and Manifold price this at 12-22%, reflecting the consensus that a rapid normalization is not feasible.
Current market data and expert sources indicate a low probability (around 22%) that the Strait of Hormuz traffic will return to a 7-day average of 60 or more ship arrivals by the end of June 2026. The region remains unstable with ongoing geopolitical tensions and stalled negotiations, which continue to disrupt shipping traffic. The tight timeline and recent trends in shipping data support a cautious outlook for normalization within this short period.
Current market sentiment and geopolitical conditions suggest significant doubt regarding a return to normal shipping volumes in the Strait of Hormuz by the end of June 2026. With the resolution deadline approaching and persistent instability in the region, the likelihood of reaching the required 7-day moving average of 60 transit calls remains low, consistent with current prediction market pricing.
The current 7-day moving average of transit calls is approximately 11-12, which is significantly below the required 60. Historical data shows a pre-conflict average of 75-125, and the current average is around 9 ships per day. The World Bank predicts that transit will not return to pre-aggression levels until late 2026, making it unlikely to reach the required threshold by the end of June 2026.
The current Polymarket odds indicate a 22% probability of the Strait of Hormuz traffic returning to a 7-day moving average of 60 or more ship arrivals by June 30, 2026 [polymarket.com](https://pdata.world/events/polymarket/375597). This reflects market sentiment based on available information, including ongoing geopolitical tensions and the fragility of ceasefire agreements. The significant gap between the June contract (22%) and the December contract (86%) suggests that traders believe normalization is unlikely within the tight June window but more probable later in the year [clearmarket.fyi](https://clearmarket.fyi/events/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-end-of-june/).
Current 7-day moving average of transit calls is ~12, needing a 5x increase in 53 days. World Bank predicts return to pre-aggression levels by late 2026, and structural route diversions exist.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Base rate: Iran has initiated qualifying major closures twice in the past ~2 years (April 2024 and January 2026), suggesting a moderate but not high frequency. However, with only 10 days remaining until the deadline and no recent credible reports of an imminent closure, the likelihood is low. The Polymarket implied probability of ~10% as of June 16 aligns with this assessment, though I adjust slightly upward to 12% to account for the possibility of a sudden escalation given ongoing regional tensions.
Recent market data and analysis indicate a low likelihood of Iran initiating a major airspace closure by June 30, 2026. While Iran has closed its airspace in the past for political or military reasons, the current information and market sentiment suggest no imminent broad closure is expected in this timeframe. The definition of a major closure is strict, and no credible reports or official warnings point to such an event occurring soon.
While Iran has historically closed its airspace during periods of heightened regional tension, such as in January 2026 and April 2024, these events are typically reactive to specific military escalations. As of late June 2026, there is no widespread reporting of an imminent, large-scale military conflict or directive that would necessitate a broad, non-weather-related closure of major Iranian airports before the June 30 deadline. Given the short remaining timeframe, the probability of such a significant event occurring is relatively low.
Iran has a history of closing its airspace for political and military reasons, but such closures are not frequent. Recent examples include a total closure in January 2026 and a partial closure in April 2024. However, these events are not common, and there is no current indication of an impending closure. The base rate for such closures is low, and without specific evidence pointing to an imminent closure, the probability remains relatively low.
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As of the search date, there is no current indication of Iran initiating a major airspace closure by June 30 that meets the market's criteria. The market requires a broad, non-weather-related suspension affecting at least two specified airports, and no such recent developments are evident.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
The signed MOU between the US and Iran explicitly states that the strait will be toll-free for 60 days and defers any future transit regime to discussions with Oman and Gulf states—it does not constitute US agreement to Iranian fees. US officials including Trump and Vance have publicly insisted the strait will remain toll-free and open. With the June 30 deadline just days away and no definitive US announcement or formal agreement accepting fees, the probability is very low. The 11% Polymarket price reflects some speculative uncertainty, but the available evidence strongly supports a No resolution.
Current information indicates that the US, under Trump, has signed a memorandum of understanding with Iran that includes toll-free passage through the Strait of Hormuz for an initial 60 days, with future transit fees undecided and subject to further negotiations. The US has publicly insisted on a toll-free status, while Iran has set up a body to administer transit fees, suggesting potential future charges. No definitive US agreement to accept Iranian transit fees has been announced, making a 'Yes' outcome unlikely by the June 30 deadline.
The Trump administration has publicly and consistently maintained that the Strait of Hormuz must remain toll-free [newindianexpress.com]. While Iran has expressed an intent to charge 'maritime service fees' [newindianexpress.com] and the recent MOU contains vague language regarding future administration [foreignpolicy.com], there is no indication that the U.S. has agreed to these fees. Given the administration's stated priority of keeping the strait open and free of charges, a formal agreement to accept such fees by June 30 is unlikely.
The U.S. has publicly stated that the Strait of Hormuz will be toll-free under the Iran deal, with Vice President JD Vance explicitly mentioning a long-term toll-free agreement. However, Iran's foreign ministry has indicated that it will charge maritime service fees, not tolls. The ambiguity in the terms and the potential for future negotiations suggest a low but non-zero probability of Trump agreeing to some form of transit fees.
The US has publicly stated that the Strait of Hormuz will be toll-free under the recent Iran deal, with Vice President Vance emphasizing a 'toll-free way for the long term' [newindianexpress.com](https://www.newindianexpress.com/world/2026/Jun/16/us-says-hormuz-to-be-toll-free-under-iran-deal). However, Iran claims it can charge 'maritime service fees', creating ambiguity [newindianexpress.com](https://www.newindianexpress.com/world/2026/Jun/16/us-says-hormuz-to-be-toll-free-under-iran-deal). The signed MOU only guarantees no charges for 60 days and defers long-term arrangements to future talks involving Oman and Gulf states [foreignpolicy.com](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/06/18/iran-deal-mou-hormuz-shipping-oil/). While the US position opposes fees, the door is left open for Iran to pursue a new transit regime after the initial period. Given the conflicting statements and unresolved long-term framework, a low but non-zero probability accounts for potential negotiation outcomes before June 30.
Polymarket and Orrery markets show an 11% implied probability. The MOU has vague terms on future transit regimes, with US insisting on free passage and Iran wanting fees, creating uncertainty.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The US and Iran signed a 14-point MOU on June 17, 2026, which explicitly commits the US to remove its forces from the proximity of Iran within 30 days after a final deal. Per the resolution criteria, this is a definitive agreement made before June 30, regardless of when withdrawal begins. The commitment is formally included in a signed deal, as confirmed by multiple news sources, making it extremely likely the resolution will be YES.
A recent 14-point Memorandum of Understanding between the US and Iran includes commitments to end hostilities, lift the naval blockade within 30 days, and remove US forces from the proximity of Iran within 30 days after a final deal is signed. The MoU has been officially released and signed, and it commits to negotiating a final deal within 60 days, which aligns with the June 30 deadline. Given these formal commitments and the public nature of the agreement, it is highly likely that Trump or authorized representatives will agree to withdraw troops by the deadline.
The recently signed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the United States and Iran explicitly includes a commitment for the US to remove its forces from the proximity of Iran within 30 days after a final deal is reached [cnn.com](https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/17/middleeast/us-iran-war-mou-text-intl). While the final deal is still being negotiated, the MOU itself constitutes a formal, public commitment by the US government to this withdrawal, satisfying the criteria for an agreement to withdraw troops as defined in the market rules [bbc.com](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgmqzr6p9mo).
The US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MOU) released by CNN and BBC News outlines a commitment to withdraw US forces from the proximity of Iran within 30 days after the final deal is signed. The MOU is set to be formally signed on June 20, 2026, and the final deal is expected to be negotiated within 60 days. Given the timeline and the commitments in the MOU, it is highly likely that the US will agree to withdraw troops from the region surrounding Iran by June 30, 2026. The key factors include the formal signing of the MOU, the 30-day withdrawal timeline post-final deal, and the political incentives for the US to declare victory and end military operations.
On June 20, 2026, the U.S. and Iran released a 14-point Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that includes a commitment for the U.S. to remove its forces from the proximity of Iran within 30 days of the final deal's signing [BBC News](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cvgmqzr6p9mo). The MoU was formally signed, triggering a 60-day negotiation window for a final deal, which will be endorsed by a UN Security Council resolution [CNN](https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/17/middleeast/us-iran-war-mou-text-intl). Given that the withdrawal is contingent on the final deal, but the agreement to withdraw is already part of a binding MoU, and considering Trump’s political incentive to declare victory by June 30, it is highly likely the U.S. has already agreed to the withdrawal as part of this deal.
The US-Iran MOU commits to removing forces from Iran's proximity within 30 days of the final deal, which is likely within the June 30 window. Trump's timeline and incentives support this.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
As of June 20, 2026, WTI crude oil is trading well below $100 (likely in the $70–80 range), and no significant spike has occurred in the first 20 days of June. With only about 10 trading days remaining, a sudden surge to $100 would require an extreme, unforeseen catalyst (e.g., major supply disruption or geopolitical shock), which is unlikely given current market conditions. Polymarket odds of ~3–4% align with this assessment, and base rates for such large monthly moves are low.
Current market sentiment and futures prices indicate a low probability of WTI crude oil reaching $100 in June 2026. Most prediction markets and trading platforms show odds around 3-5%, reflecting expectations of stable or moderately lower prices rather than a spike to $100. While geopolitical or supply shocks could change this, the base rate and current data suggest a low chance.
Current market sentiment and technical analysis for WTI Crude Oil suggest that a move to $100 in June 2026 is highly unlikely. Given the current price levels and the lack of significant geopolitical or supply-side shocks that would drive such a rapid, sustained increase, the probability of hitting this threshold remains very low, consistent with current prediction market data.
The probability is based on historical volatility and current geopolitical factors. WTI crude oil has shown significant price swings in the past, but reaching $100 in June 2026 is not guaranteed. Geopolitical tensions, supply disruptions, and economic recovery could drive prices up, but market stability and increased production could cap prices below $100.
The $100 WTI threshold is significantly above current prices and recent trends. Base rates of oil price spikes suggest such moves are rare and typically driven by major shocks. Given the absence of strong fundamental or geopolitical catalysts in 2026, the probability remains low, though not zero due to tail risks.
WTI Crude Oil's price in June 2026 is uncertain. Current market odds are low, and without major supply disruptions or demand surges, it's unlikely to hit $100.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.