unparseable forecast JSON
The market for Iran closing its airspace by July 15, 2026, has already resolved to YES according to the UMA optimistic oracle and credible sources such as Reuters. Historical precedents of total closures in early 2026 and the current official confirmations confirm that a general closure has occurred within the specified timeframe.
While Iran has historically closed its airspace during periods of heightened regional tension, there is currently no credible evidence or geopolitical indicator suggesting a broad, non-weather-related closure of the Tehran FIR before July 15, 2026. Market sentiment on prediction platforms reflects a very low probability, and the lack of recent escalatory events makes a total airspace shutdown unlikely in the short term.
Recent historical data shows that Iran has closed its airspace multiple times in 2026, but these closures have been relatively short-lived and not consistent. The most recent closure was in February 2026, and there have been no indications of an imminent closure by July 15. The base rate for such closures appears to be low, and there is no specific evidence to suggest a closure is likely in the near future.
The market has been officially resolved as 'YES' by the UMA optimistic oracle, based on credible reporting from reuters.com and other primary sources, indicating that Iran initiated a general closure of its airspace within the specified timeframe. Historical data confirms the event occurred, meeting the defined criteria for a 'general closure' of commercial flights in Iranian airspace. [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-shuts-airspace-most-flights-flightradar24-says-2026-01-14/).
As of July 3, 2026, the Polymarket implied probability for 'Yes' is 100%, and there have been previous full airspace closures in 2026, meeting the market's criteria.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
The Israeli government has explicitly stated it will not withdraw all forces from Lebanon in the near term, and the current ceasefire implementation is limited to small pilot zones with delays. With less than a month until the deadline, a full withdrawal announcement is highly unlikely given the political and security conditions. Prediction markets (4-15%) align with a low probability, and I estimate 8% as a well-calibrated figure.
Current evidence indicates that Israel has no immediate plans to fully withdraw from Lebanon by July 31, 2026. Israeli leadership, including Prime Minister Netanyahu, has stated troops will remain until Hezbollah is disarmed, and the withdrawal process is expected to take weeks, starting with limited pilot zones. The political and security complexities, including Hezbollah's presence and Lebanese internal tensions, make a full withdrawal unlikely within the timeframe. Market probabilities and expert assessments also align around a low chance (~15%).
Israeli leadership, including Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Katz, has explicitly stated that troops will remain in southern Lebanon indefinitely to counter Hezbollah threats. Recent reports indicate that even limited pilot withdrawal zones are facing significant delays, and there is no indication of a broader strategic shift toward a full withdrawal by the end of July 2026. Given the stated policy of maintaining a security presence, a complete withdrawal of all ground forces is highly unlikely within the specified timeframe.
The current evidence suggests that Israel has no immediate plans to withdraw from Lebanon. Israeli officials have stated that leaving even the designated 'pilant zones' will take time, and Prime Minister Netanyahu has emphasized that troops will remain until the threat from Hezbollah is removed. The Lebanese military is also waiting for Israel to initiate the withdrawal process, indicating no imminent withdrawal. The base rate for such withdrawals is low, and the specific evidence supports this assessment.
Israeli leadership has stated troops will remain in southern Lebanon indefinitely until Hezbollah threats are neutralized, and recent reports indicate withdrawal from pilot zones will 'take time' [thenationalnews.com](https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/06/30/israel-tells-lebanon-that-leaving-pilot-zones-will-take-time/). Although a US-brokered framework exists, implementation is delayed and contingent on Lebanese forces confronting Hezbollah—a politically and militarily sensitive task. Limited tactical pullbacks have occurred, but no indication suggests full withdrawal will be announced by July 31, 2026.
Israel has stated it will remain indefinitely to counter Hezbollah, with withdrawal taking time, and market odds are around 15%.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
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There is significant speculation about Mojtaba Khamenei's public appearance, especially around the time of his father's grand funeral, but no confirmed images or videos have been released so far. The prediction market currently prices the probability at about 25%, reflecting uncertainty and lack of direct evidence. The absence of official confirmation or credible visual proof lowers the likelihood of a public appearance by July 15.
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Mojtaba Khamenei has not been seen in public since the start of the war, and there is no credible evidence or official confirmation of his public appearance. The prediction market on Polymarket assigns a 25% chance to his appearance by July 15, reflecting the uncertainty and lack of concrete information.
Mojtaba Khamenei has not been seen in public since the start of the war, and no new images or videos have been released. The only confirmation of his existence comes from a claimed private meeting with President Pezeshkian, which was not publicly documented [theweek.com](https://www.theweek.in/news/middle-east/2026/07/02/will-irans-supreme-leader-mojtaba-khamenei-emerge-speculation-mounts-ahead-of-his-fathers-grand-funeral.html). A major funeral for his father, Ali Khamenei, is set to begin on July 9 and last six days, with speculation that Mojtaba might appear, which would be his first public sighting in months [theweek.com](https://www.theweek.in/news/middle-east/2026/07/02/will-irans-supreme-leader-mojtaba-khamenei-emerge-speculation-mounts-ahead-of-his-fathers-grand-funeral.html). However, officials have not confirmed his attendance, and his continued absence suggests possible health or security concerns. While the high-profile nature of the event increases the chance of an appearance, the lack of precedent and official opacity makes a public sighting by July 15 unlikely but not impossible.
Mojtaba Khamenei has not been seen in public since the war started, with no new images/videos released. The relevant market has low 'Buy Yes' prices, indicating low expectation.
Mean of 4/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 4/6 valid model forecasts.
The Polymarket crowd, with $5.9M in volume, currently prices this at 8-10%, reflecting a low chance of recovery by July 15. Only 12 days remain, and the 7-day moving average threshold of 60 is a high bar given ongoing geopolitical disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. A sudden sustained surge in transit calls is unlikely in such a short window.
The current prediction market on Polymarket assigns about a 10% chance that Strait of Hormuz traffic will return to normal by July 15, 2026. This low probability reflects ongoing disruptions or uncertainties affecting maritime traffic in the region. Given the high trading volume and active market participation, this crowd-sourced estimate is a strong signal of the event's likelihood.
The market sentiment on Polymarket has shifted significantly toward 'No,' with current odds at approximately 8% [pdata.world](https://pdata.world/events/polymarket/591973). Given that the deadline is July 15, 2026, and there is no indication of a rapid recovery in transit volumes to the required 7-day moving average of 60, the probability of reaching this threshold in the remaining time is low.
The prediction markets on Polymarket show varying probabilities, with the most recent data indicating a 38% chance of the event occurring [polymarket.copilot.markets](https://polymarket.copilot.markets/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-15). However, considering the low base rate of such events and the lack of specific evidence suggesting a significant improvement in transit calls, I adjust the probability downward. The key factors include the current market odds and the historical data on transit calls in the Strait of Hormuz.
The current Polymarket odds indicate a roughly 8% chance that the 7-day moving average of ship arrivals in the Strait of Hormuz reaches 60 or more by July 15, 2026, based on real-time trading activity [pdata.world](https://pdata.world/events/polymarket/591973). This reflects collective market sentiment incorporating geopolitical risks, recent traffic trends, and potential disruptions. Given the high stakes and continuous information flow, the market price serves as a strong proxy for the true probability, especially with over $5.8 million in trading volume providing depth and liquidity.
The market has shown varying probabilities, but considering the criteria and uncertainty, an independent estimate is made. The 7-day moving average of 60 is the key threshold, and market dynamics are considered.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
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The current crowd-sourced market probability on Polymarket is about 27-31%, reflecting a consensus that traffic normalization by July 31, 2026, is unlikely but possible. The Strait of Hormuz is a critical maritime chokepoint, and traffic volumes depend on regional stability and shipping conditions. Given the current low market probability and the specific threshold of a 7-day moving average of 60 transit calls, the chance of reaching this level by the deadline is modest but not negligible.
The market requires a 7-day moving average of transit calls in the Strait of Hormuz to reach 60 or higher by July 31, 2026, according to IMF Portwatch data. Current market sentiment, as reflected in prediction platforms like Polymarket, suggests a low probability of this threshold being met, likely due to ongoing regional geopolitical tensions and persistent disruptions to maritime traffic. Given the short timeframe remaining and the lack of clear indicators of a rapid, sustained recovery in shipping volumes to pre-disruption levels, a 'No' outcome remains the more probable scenario.
The current crowd-sourced probability on Polymarket is around 27-31%, indicating a low likelihood of the event occurring. The key factor is the specific threshold of a 7-day moving average of transit calls equal to or above 60, which has not been met recently according to the data trends and market sentiment.
The probability of Strait of Hormuz traffic returning to normal by July 31, 2026, as defined by a 7-day moving average of 60 or more transit calls in IMF Portwatch data, is assessed at 35%. While recent Polymarket odds have fluctuated between 27% and 46%, the most consistent real-time signals from [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-31) and [predictionninja.com](https://predictionninja.com/market/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-31) suggest a consensus around 27-31%. However, diplomatic talks mediated by Oman and potential de-escalation between the U.S. and Iran could improve shipping conditions. The base rate of recovery depends on verifiable data from IMF Portwatch, not sentiment, and sustained transit volumes near the threshold would be required. Given the narrow margin and geopolitical volatility, the true probability is slightly higher than current market pricing due to the possibility of rapid diplomatic progress.
Current crowd-sourced probabilities from Polymarket and PredictionNinja are around 27-31%. Diplomatic factors like U.S.-Iran negotiations could influence traffic, but the narrow threshold of 60 transit calls and approaching deadline contribute to uncertainty.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
The threshold of a 7-day moving average ≥60 is extremely unlikely to be met by July 7, given that recent traffic was around 12 ships/day after a re-closure on June 22. With only ~4 days left, even a full reopening today would require many consecutive days of very high traffic to lift the average from such a low base, which is not supported by current geopolitical conditions. Polymarket's 1% probability and Manifold's ~9% estimate align with this assessment, and I assign a slightly higher estimate to account for a remote chance of a sudden, sustained surge.
Current data shows that traffic in the Strait of Hormuz has significantly dropped due to recent closures, with daily ship arrivals around 12 compared to a pre-conflict baseline of about 93-100. Given the short timeframe until July 7 and the requirement of a sustained 7-day moving average of 60 or more, a rapid and sustained rebound is unlikely unless a durable ceasefire occurs immediately. Market odds and expert analysis also suggest a low probability, around 9%.
The current 7-day moving average of transit calls is significantly below the required threshold of 60, having dropped to approximately 12-20 ships per day following recent regional escalations [manifold.markets]. Given the short timeframe remaining until July 7, 2026, it is mathematically impossible for the 7-day moving average to recover to 60, even if a total cessation of hostilities occurred immediately, due to the inertia inherent in a moving average calculation.
The current crowd-sourced probability on Polymarket is 1% for 'Yes', indicating low market confidence. However, considering the historical data and the potential for a rapid rebound in traffic if a durable ceasefire is established, a 9% probability seems more reasonable. The key factor is the ability to achieve a sustained 7-day moving average of transit calls equal to or above 60 by July 7.
The current 7-day moving average of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz is far below the 60 threshold required for a 'Yes' resolution, with recent data showing levels around 12–20 ships per day following Iran's closure of the strait on June 22 [manifold.markets](https://manifold.markets/BillClintonBubba/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-h8dyOt6Nq9). A return to a 7-day average of 60+ would require both a rapid and sustained reopening and a dramatic increase in traffic within a narrow window before July 7. While a previous Memorandum of Understanding on June 17 briefly increased traffic, it did not reach baseline levels (~93–100/day) [manifold.markets](https://manifold.markets/BillClintonBubba/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-h8dyOt6Nq9). The Polymarket crowd currently prices 'Yes' at 1%, reflecting extreme skepticism, but a sudden ceasefire and rapid normalization could allow a brief spike, justifying a slightly higher independent estimate.
Current traffic is low, and there's limited time left to reach the 60 threshold for the 7-day moving average.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
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The US and Iran have already signed a memorandum of understanding on June 14, 2026, initiating a 60-day negotiation period toward a final deal, which is extendable. The Polymarket prediction market currently assigns a near-certain probability (close to 100%) that a final qualifying written diplomatic instrument will be signed or adopted by July 31, 2026. The official text and commitments indicate serious intent and concrete steps toward a final agreement, making a YES outcome highly likely.
The June 14, 2026, Memorandum of Understanding established a 60-day window for negotiations, which extends well beyond the July 31, 2026, deadline for this market. Given the complexity of nuclear negotiations and the requirement for a concrete, measurable, and non-conditional final agreement, it is highly unlikely that a definitive 'final deal' will be reached and formally adopted within the remaining timeframe.
The current prediction markets show a significant divergence in probabilities, with Polymarket at 100% and FRC at 4.5%. Given the official agreement announced on June 14, 2026, and the 60-day window for negotiations, the likelihood of a final deal by July 31, 2026, is uncertain. The key factors include the complexity of the negotiations, the political will of both parties, and the specific obligations required in the final deal. The base rate for such agreements is low, but the recent diplomatic efforts suggest a higher-than-average chance.
As of July 3, 2026, no final nuclear deal has been signed or formally adopted by the United States and Iran. While a memorandum of understanding (MOU) was announced on June 14, 2026, establishing a 60-day framework for negotiations, the terms of a final deal remain under discussion. The MOU itself does not meet the criteria for a final deal, as it lacks specific, measurable obligations limiting Iran's nuclear program and is explicitly a precursor to negotiations. Prediction markets such as FRC indicate a 4.5% chance of a final deal by July 31, 2026, reflecting low confidence among informed traders [researchfrc.com](https://www.researchfrc.com/prediction-markets/us-iran-final-nuclear-deal-by-20260621201254412). Given the short timeframe remaining and the complexity of reaching a concrete agreement, the probability of a final, qualifying instrument being adopted by the deadline is very low.
As of the search, the market on ResearchFRC has a 4.5% probability for a US-Iran final nuclear deal by July 31, 2026, considering the 60-day negotiation period and specific qualifying requirements.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
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Current prediction markets on Polymarket and PrediRoute show that the probability of Bitcoin reaching $67,500 in July 2026 is around 28-29%, reflecting moderate skepticism among traders. The market has significant trading volume, indicating informed and active participation, but the price target is relatively high compared to recent trends, lowering the likelihood. Given the volatility of Bitcoin and the market's collective wisdom, a probability below one-third is reasonable.
Current market data from prediction platforms like [polymarket.copilot.markets](https://polymarket.copilot.markets/event/what-price-will-bitcoin-hit-in-july-2026) and [app.prediroute.com](https://app.prediroute.com/en/event/what-price-will-bitcoin-hit-in-july-2026) indicates that the probability of Bitcoin reaching $67,500 in July 2026 is currently estimated at approximately 28-35%. Given the inherent volatility of cryptocurrency and the current market sentiment, this reflects a cautious outlook on Bitcoin hitting that specific price threshold within the month.
The current leading outcome on Polymarket is '↓ 60,000' at 100%, indicating a strong consensus that Bitcoin will not reach $67,500 in July. The next closest outcome is '↑ 62,500' at 82%, further suggesting a low probability of reaching $67,500. Additionally, the trading volume and market activity support this consensus, with significant trading volume and engagement from the Polymarket community.
Prediction markets on Polymarket and PrediRoute indicate a 28% to 35% chance of Bitcoin reaching $67,500 in July 2026, based on real-time trading activity. These odds reflect the collective assessment of market participants using Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute high prices as the resolution source [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.copilot.markets/event/what-price-will-bitcoin-hit-in-july-2026). The current price trajectory and volume suggest moderate but not strong conviction in a breakout to that level.
The leading outcome in the Polymarket prediction market is '↓ 60,000' at 100%, indicating a downward trend, and there's no strong indication of Bitcoin reaching $67,500 in July.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
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Multiple credible sources confirm that Donald Trump plans to attend the NATO Summit in Ankara, Türkiye, on July 7-8, 2026. Despite his previous criticisms of NATO, Trump has stated he will attend, and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has also confirmed his attendance. Prediction markets currently assign a very high probability (around 98%) to his attendance, reflecting strong market confidence. Given the consistency of these reports and the proximity of the event, the probability is high but not absolute due to potential unforeseen changes.
Multiple credible sources, including official statements from the administration and reporting from major news outlets, confirm that President Trump has explicitly stated his intention to attend the NATO summit in Ankara. His personal relationship with President Erdogan and the strategic importance of the summit, despite his public criticisms of the alliance, make his attendance highly probable.
Multiple high-level sources, including Trump himself, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, have confirmed Trump's attendance at the NATO summit in Ankara. Trump's close relationship with Turkish President Erdogan and his past commitments to the event further support this likelihood.
Multiple credible sources, including statements from Secretary of State Marco Rubio and President Trump himself, confirm that Trump will attend the NATO summit in Ankara on July 7-8, 2026. Trump's close relationship with Turkish President Erdogan and his public remarks indicating he will 'do something' to make Erdogan 'very happy' further reinforce the likelihood of attendance. While Trump has expressed frustration with NATO, high-level confirmation and diplomatic context make his attendance highly probable. The summit is confirmed to proceed as scheduled.
Multiple sources confirm Trump will attend, including his own statement, confirmation from Rubio, and a prediction market with 98% odds.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Multiple prediction markets (Polymarket at 91%, Lines at 90%) and Manifold consistently show NVIDIA with ~90% implied probability, supported by its AI-driven market cap leadership through June 2026 where it resolved at 98%. The historical base rate for top companies to lose the lead within a month is low, and no evident catalyst (e.g., earnings miss, regulatory shock) has emerged. However, thin market volume and the non-trivial gap narrowing with Apple/Microsoft warrant a slight discount from market consensus to 88% for calibration.
NVIDIA currently holds the largest market capitalization globally, supported by strong AI semiconductor revenue and enterprise demand for its GPUs. Prediction markets and recent contract prices imply about an 89-91% probability that NVIDIA will retain this position through July 31, 2026. No significant negative catalysts or macro shocks are evident that could cause a major valuation shift within the short resolution window.
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NVIDIA has consistently held the largest market capitalization heading into July 2026, with prediction markets assigning it an 89.5% probability of retaining this position through July 31. The company's strong performance in AI semiconductor revenue and sustained enterprise demand for its GPUs provide a solid fundamental basis for its valuation. While Apple and Microsoft are the most credible challengers, no immediate catalysts suggest a significant shift in market leadership within the specified timeframe.
NVIDIA currently holds the largest market capitalization and is strongly favored to retain it through July 31, 2026. Prediction markets at [lines.com](https://www.lines.com/prediction-markets/finance/largest-company-end-of-july-20260624192302727) and [Polymarket](https://polymarket.copilot.markets/event/largest-company-end-of-july-20260624192302727) assign probabilities of 89.5% and 91% respectively, reflecting strong consensus. Fundamental drivers include sustained demand for AI chips, multi-year cloud provider contracts, and no immediate macro or earnings risks evident.
NVIDIA has strong fundamentals in AI semiconductors, multi-year cloud commitments, and market probabilities from sources like Lines.com and Polymarket support its retention of market cap leadership.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Multiple prediction markets (Polymarket, WyldMarkets, PredictionPulse) consistently price a 25 bps hike at 6-9%, reflecting strong consensus that the Fed will hold rates steady in July 2026. The current economic environment shows no urgent inflationary pressure or growth surge that would necessitate a hike, and the Fed has signaled a patient stance. While a small tail risk exists from unexpected data surprises, the aggregated market probability of ~9% is a well-calibrated estimate.
Current prediction markets and trading data consistently show a low probability (around 9%) that the Fed will increase interest rates by 25 bps after the July 2026 meeting. The consensus among market participants is that the Fed is more likely to keep rates unchanged, reflecting expectations of stable monetary policy at that time.
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Prediction markets like Polymarket and WyldMarkets show a very low probability (around 9%) of the Fed increasing interest rates by 25 bps after the July 2026 meeting. This reflects a strong consensus among market participants that no change is likely. The reasoning aligns with the current economic outlook and Fed communications, which suggest a stable rate environment.
Multiple prediction markets, including Polymarket and WyldMarkets, show a consensus probability between 8.6% and 9% for a 25 bps rate hike by the Fed after the July 2026 meeting [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/fed-decision-in-july-181), [predictionninja.com](https://predictionninja.com/market/will-the-fed-increase-interest-rates-by-25-bps-after-the-july-2026-meeting). The overwhelming market expectation is for no change, with 'No change' priced at around 91%, reflecting current economic outlooks and Fed guidance suggesting rate stability. While market prices are not perfect forecasts, they aggregate diverse information and are well-calibrated over time, making them a strong base rate indicator.
Market probabilities from Polymarket show a 9% chance of a 25 bps rate increase, with 'No change' at 91%, indicating low likelihood.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
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Prediction markets such as Polymarket and WyldMarkets currently assign a high probability (around 88-93%) to the event that there will be no change in Fed interest rates after the July 2026 meeting. These markets aggregate diverse trader information and have shown good accuracy historically. Given the strong consensus and the lack of contrary signals, the probability of no change is high.
Prediction markets, which aggregate information from a large pool of participants, consistently assign a high probability (around 90-93%) to the Federal Reserve maintaining the current interest rate levels at the July 2026 meeting. Given the lack of significant economic indicators suggesting an immediate, unexpected shift in policy, the market consensus remains strongly in favor of no change.
The prediction markets on Polymarket and WyldMarkets show a strong consensus that there will be no change in Fed interest rates after the July 2026 meeting, with probabilities ranging from 86% to 93%. The high trading volumes and the consistency across different markets suggest a strong market expectation of no change.
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Multiple prediction markets show high probabilities of no change in Fed interest rates after the July 2026 meeting, reflecting crowd-sourced sentiment.
Mean of 4/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 4/6 valid model forecasts.