The probability that Mojtaba Khamenei ceases to be de facto leader of Iran by August 31, 2026, is very low. He was installed in March 2026 with strong IRGC and clerical backing, and no credible reports of imminent removal or serious health issues have emerged in the short remaining window. Prediction markets price this outcome at around 2-4%, reflecting a consensus among informed traders that such a change is unlikely but not impossible due to tail risks.
Mojtaba Khamenei was appointed as Supreme Leader in March 2026 following his father's assassination, with strong institutional and IRGC backing ensuring regime stability. Despite some health concerns and limited public appearances, no credible reports suggest imminent removal or resignation by August 31, 2026. Prediction markets and trading volumes indicate a very low probability (around 2-3%) of leadership change by this date, reflecting the current consensus of stability in the short term.
Mojtaba Khamenei was installed as Supreme Leader in March 2026 following a rapid, IRGC-backed transition. Given the current date is August 19, 2026, and there are no credible reports of imminent regime collapse or internal coups, the likelihood of a leadership change within the remaining 12 days is extremely low. Prediction markets consistently price this outcome at approximately 4%, reflecting the high degree of institutional stability currently maintained by the regime.
The recent succession process in Iran was rapid and backed by key institutions, indicating strong regime stability. Prediction markets reflect very low probabilities (around 2-4%) for a leadership change by August 31, 2026. The base rate for such changes is historically low, and current evidence suggests no imminent upheaval.
As of August 2026, Mojtaba Khamenei remains the de facto leader of Iran following his selection by the Assembly of Experts in March 2026 after the assassination of his father, Ali Khamenei. The transition was supported by key institutions, including the IRGC, indicating a preference for stability. Although there are reports of collective decision-making involving military commanders and some health speculation, no credible signs suggest an imminent removal or resignation. Prediction markets such as Polymarket assign a ~4% probability to a leadership change by August 31, aligning with low trader expectations for sudden change.
Polymarket odds as of August 3, 2026, show 2% chance of Iran leadership change by August 31. Recent leadership transition to Mojtaba Khamenei and low near-term change expectations support low probability.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The prediction market for a NATO-Russia military clash by August 31, 2026, currently prices at ~3% on Polymarket [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/nato-x-russia-military-clash-in-2025), a highly liquid market with over $4M volume, suggesting a strongly informed crowd consensus. The event definition is strict, excluding common lower-level incidents like warning shots, drone collisions, or cyberattacks. Given current geopolitical conditions—NATO and Russia are engaged via proxies but avoid direct force-on-force—and the tight timeframe, the base rate implied by market participants is the most reliable anchor; I adopt a 3% probability, which aligns with the market and reflects the low but non-zero tail risk of a direct engagement.
Prediction markets like Polymarket, which aggregate real-money bets from informed traders, currently assign about a 16% probability to a military clash between NATO and Russia by August 31, 2026. Given the ongoing tensions but absence of direct military engagements qualifying under the market's definition, this moderate probability reflects a non-negligible risk but not a high likelihood. The market's large volume and historical accuracy lend credibility to this estimate.
While tensions between NATO and Russia remain high due to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, both sides have demonstrated a strong desire to avoid direct military escalation that could trigger Article 5. Prediction markets [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/nato-x-russia-military-clash-in-2025) and [polyautomate.org](https://polyautomate.org/prediction-odds/nato-x-russia-military-clash-by-december-31-2026-244) currently reflect a low probability for such an event, as most incidents to date have remained below the threshold of direct kinetic engagement defined in the market criteria.
The prediction market on Polymarket currently assigns a 3% probability to a NATO-Russia military clash by August 31, 2026. This low probability reflects the market's collective assessment of the geopolitical situation, which, while tense, does not currently indicate an imminent direct military confrontation. The base rate for such clashes is historically low, and the current evidence does not suggest a significant deviation from this trend.
timeout after 30000ms
Prediction markets show low implied probabilities, with the closest relevant market (by December 31, 2026) at 16.0%, and no recent direct military encounters meeting the criteria.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
The Strait of Hormuz is currently operating at roughly 2 million DWT per day versus a historical norm of 10 million, with daily transits frequently below 10 vessels—far short of the 60-ship threshold. Renewed U.S.-Iran hostilities, insurance barriers, and absence of diplomatic progress make a return to normal within 12 days extremely unlikely. Polymarket and other prediction markets show implied probabilities of only 1–2%, consistent with the near-impossible timeline.
Current data shows that Strait of Hormuz traffic remains significantly below normal levels, with daily transit calls at roughly 13-22% of pre-conflict levels and no recent indication of a return to the 60-ship daily average needed to qualify as 'normal.' Ongoing U.S.-Iran tensions, blockade enforcement, and elevated risks continue to suppress traffic. Prediction markets, which aggregate informed trader sentiment, assign about a 2% chance of traffic returning to normal by August 31, 2026, reflecting the low likelihood given current geopolitical and operational conditions.
Current transit levels in the Strait of Hormuz remain significantly depressed, at roughly 13-22% of pre-conflict levels, with daily throughput far below the threshold required to reach a 7-day moving average of 60 transits. Given the ongoing U.S.-Iran naval tensions, persistent vessel attacks, and the lack of any credible de-escalation path before the August 31, 2026 deadline, it is extremely unlikely that traffic will recover to the required levels.
The current transit levels in the Strait of Hormuz are significantly below the required 60 ships per day, with recent data showing nine or fewer vessel passages on some days. Ongoing U.S.-Iran tensions, blockade enforcement, and elevated insurance premiums continue to restrict traffic. The market consensus reflects a very low probability of normalization by August 31, with Polymarket odds at 1-2%.
Current data from IMF Portwatch, cited by multiple sources including [polymarket.copilot.markets](https://polymarket.copilot.markets/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-august-31-20260702154212320) and [marketss.com](https://marketss.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-august-31-20260702154212320), shows Strait of Hormuz transits at only 13–22% of pre-conflict levels, with recent daily arrivals often below 10 ships. The 7-day moving average has not approached the required 60, and ongoing U.S.-Iran tensions, vessel attacks, and blockade enforcement continue to suppress traffic. Market-implied probabilities, while not determinative, align with this assessment, ranging from 1% to 2% as of August 2026.
Current data shows Strait of Hormuz transits are at 13-22% of pre-conflict levels with daily throughput near 2 million DWT vs historical 10 million. Market odds are around 2%, indicating low chance.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Multiple prediction market sources (Polymarket, Marketss) consistently price the probability of the 7-day moving average of transit calls reaching 60 by September 30 at 12-14%, with a strong 'No' consensus around 87%. The current odds reflect persistent disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and no clear catalyst for a rapid return to normal traffic levels within the remaining ~6 weeks. Given the market's efficient aggregation of information and the lack of recent positive news, I align with the market-implied probability.
Current prediction markets and aggregated data sources price the probability of Strait of Hormuz traffic returning to normal levels (7-day average of 60 or more transit calls) by September 30, 2026, at around 12-16%. This low probability reflects ongoing geopolitical tensions, security concerns, and disruptions in the region that have historically impacted shipping traffic. Given the lack of strong indicators for a significant improvement in traffic volume by the deadline, the probability remains low but not negligible.
Current market sentiment and available data suggest that shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz remains significantly below the threshold required for a 'Yes' resolution. Given the ongoing geopolitical tensions and the short timeframe remaining until September 30, 2026, it is highly unlikely that transit volumes will recover to the specified 7-day moving average of 60 calls.
Prediction markets consistently show low probabilities (10-24%) for the Strait of Hormuz traffic returning to normal by September 30, 2026. The base rate for such disruptions to resolve quickly is low, and no specific evidence suggests a significant improvement in the near term.
The current market-implied probability of a 'Yes' resolution is around 13-14%, as reflected on Polymarket and other prediction platforms [polymarket.com](https://pdata.world/events/polymarket/660109). This aligns with observed traffic data from IMF Portwatch, which has not recently shown a 7-day moving average reaching 60 or above. The persistence of geopolitical tensions and monitoring of shipping disruptions continues to suppress transit levels, making a return to normal traffic unlikely before September 30, 2026.
Market prices from multiple sources indicate a low probability, with implied probabilities around 12-14% for the 'Yes' outcome.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The prediction market assigns a ~2% probability to this outcome, and recent official statements from Trump and Hegseth reaffirm the blockade with no indication of an imminent suspension. With only three days left, a surprise announcement is extremely unlikely but not impossible, so a 2% probability is appropriate.
Recent reports indicate that the US intends to maintain the naval blockade on Iran indefinitely, with Defense Secretary statements affirming ongoing enforcement and no current diplomatic talks to end the blockade. Prediction markets currently assign a very low probability (around 6%) to the blockade ending by August 22, 2026, reflecting strong market consensus and official statements. Given the political and military context, an official announcement ending the blockade by this date appears unlikely.
Recent official statements from the U.S. government, including Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and President Trump, explicitly confirm that the naval blockade is in full force and that the U.S. intends to maintain it indefinitely. With the resolution date of August 22, 2026, only days away and no signs of diplomatic progress or policy shifts, the likelihood of an official announcement terminating the blockade is extremely low.
The U.S. has recently reimposed the naval blockade on Iran and has stated it can maintain it indefinitely. The prediction market Polymarket currently assigns a very low probability (2.2%) to the blockade being lifted by August 22, 2026, reflecting the collective judgment of traders. Given the U.S. government's recent statements and actions, it is highly unlikely that the blockade will be lifted by the specified date.
As of August 19, 2026, the U.S. government has indicated it can maintain the naval blockade on Iran indefinitely, with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stating the U.S. Navy will continue rotating ships to enforce it [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-eyes-indefinite-iran-naval-blockade-oil-supply-shortfall-deepens-2026-08-13/). No official announcement to end or suspend the blockade has been made. Prediction markets reflect low odds of resolution by August 22, with Polymarket pricing the 'Yes' share at 2.2¢, implying only a 2.2% chance [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/us-announces-end-of-iranian-blockade-byptptpt-20260713152715080). Given the lack of diplomatic progress and continued U.S. military posture, an announcement before August 22 is highly unlikely.
Polymarket odds for August 22 are very low, and recent US statements indicate it may maintain the blockade indefinitely.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The combination of plummeting prediction market odds, explicit US government statements of indefinite blockade, and the extremely short remaining time makes a 'Yes' by August 31 unlikely. The market has efficiently repriced downward as the deadline approaches with no qualifying signal, and recent policy statements reinforce continuation rather than termination.
Recent market data shows a sharp decline in the probability of a US announcement ending the Iranian blockade by August 31, 2026, currently around 16%. This drop reflects the absence of any official signals or qualifying announcements from the US government as the deadline approaches, despite ongoing economic and geopolitical pressures. The US has stated it can maintain the blockade indefinitely, and no credible indications suggest an imminent policy reversal before the deadline.
As of August 19, 2026, there have been no official announcements from the U.S. government indicating an intent to end or suspend the naval blockade of Iran. Recent statements from the Department of Defense, including those from Secretary Pete Hegseth, explicitly affirm the U.S. capability and intent to maintain the blockade indefinitely. The prediction market probability has dropped significantly to 16% as the August 31 deadline approaches, reflecting a strong consensus that no such policy shift is imminent.
The probability of the US announcing the end of the Iranian blockade by August 31, 2026, is low. Recent statements from US officials indicate a commitment to maintaining the blockade indefinitely [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-eyes-indefinite-iran-naval-blockade-oil-supply-shortfall-deepens-2026-08-13/). Additionally, prediction markets like Polymarket show a significant drop in the likelihood of such an announcement, with the current probability at 16% [global-political-spotlight.com](https://www.global-political-spotlight.com/articles/polymarket/briefs/odds-of-us-announcing-end-to-iran-blockade-fall-sharply-as-aug-31-deadline-nears-and-no-qualifying-signal-appears-202608). The absence of any qualifying official announcements and the lack of relevant policy shifts further support this low probability.
As of August 19, 2026, the probability of the U.S. announcing the end of the naval blockade on Iran by August 31, 2026, has fallen to 16%, down sharply from previous levels due to the absence of any official U.S. government announcement signaling a policy shift [global-political-spotlight.com](https://www.global-political-spotlight.com/articles/polymarket/briefs/odds-of-us-announcing-end-to-iran-blockade-fall-sharply-as-aug-31-deadline-nears-and-no-qualifying-signal-appears-202608). The U.S. has stated it can maintain the blockade indefinitely, and no qualifying statements from official channels suggest an imminent end [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-eyes-indefinite-iran-naval-blockade-oil-supply-shortfall-deepens-2026-08-13/). Market dynamics reflect deadline-driven skepticism, reinforcing low expectations for a 'Yes' resolution.
The market currently prices a 16% chance, with a sharp decline in odds over the past week due to no qualifying announcement and the approaching August 31 deadline. The US has stated it can maintain the blockade indefinitely, and there's been no recent official communication about ending it.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
After the expiration of the June 2026 MOU without a follow-up agreement, the risk of a US strike on Iran is elevated, but the definition of a qualifying military action is restrictive (only direct airstrikes or missile strikes on Iranian territory). Low-intensity strikes, cyber ops, and intercepted munitions do not count. Polymarket prices for the Sep 30 continuation are around 56%, which aligns with a neutral-to-slightly-optimistic view. Given the diplomatic stalemate and Iran's assertive posture, I assign a 55% probability that no such qualifying action occurs by Sep 30, meaning the ceasefire continues.
Current market data from Polymarket shows a 78% probability that the US-Iran ceasefire will continue through September 30, 2026. The ceasefire is based on a memorandum of understanding that expired in mid-August 2026 without extension, and while tensions remain high with no active negotiations, no qualifying US military action against Iran has been reported so far. The risk of resumed strikes exists but has not materialized, supporting a relatively high chance the ceasefire holds through the end of September.
The June 2026 memorandum of understanding has expired without a formal extension, and diplomatic channels are currently at a standstill. While market sentiment on prediction platforms like [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/id/event/us-ceasefire-against-iran-continues-throughptptpt) has fluctuated, the lack of active negotiations and the ongoing regional tensions suggest a heightened risk of escalation. However, given the specific definition of 'qualifying military action'—which excludes many forms of conflict like cyber operations or naval skirmishes—the threshold for a 'No' resolution remains high, keeping the probability of a continued ceasefire slightly above neutral.
The current market odds on Polymarket suggest a 56% chance of the ceasefire continuing through September 30, which aligns with the collective wisdom of traders. However, the expiration of the June 17, 2026, 60-day memorandum of understanding and the lack of active negotiations or extensions indicate a high risk of resumed hostilities. The key factors include the absence of new diplomatic breakthroughs, disputes over Hormuz access, and elevated tensions between the U.S. and Iran.
As of mid-August 2026, the 60-day memorandum of understanding from June 17 has expired without extension, and both U.S. and Iranian officials indicate no active negotiations, citing violations and disputes over the Strait of Hormuz and regional operations [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/us-ceasefire-against-iran-continues-throughptptpt). Market odds show declining confidence in a sustained ceasefire, with the probability of continuation through September 30 at approximately 53% across multiple language versions of Polymarket. Absent new diplomatic breakthroughs, the risk of renewed military action remains elevated, but no strike has yet occurred.
Market probabilities have been decreasing, with recent data showing around 56% chance by September 30. The ceasefire expired, diplomatic talks are stalled, and low-intensity conflicts persist.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Based on the current market structure — Bitcoin trading near $65k+ and the high-probability dip to $62.5k — a drop to $55k represents a severe, low-probability event. The most liquid prediction market prices this at ~2.2%, and historical volatility supports a probability in the 2-4% range. Given the short remaining time and the required magnitude of decline, a 3% estimate is appropriately calibrated.
Prediction markets on Polymarket currently assign about a 14.5% chance that Bitcoin will dip to $55,000 in August 2026 based on Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute candle lows. This relatively low probability reflects market participants' collective view that such a dip is possible but not highly likely, considering Bitcoin's recent price trends and volatility. Given the large trading volume and liquidity in this market, the odds are a reliable indicator of the event's likelihood.
The current market sentiment on Polymarket, which aggregates trader expectations, places the probability of Bitcoin dipping to $55,000 in August at approximately 14.5% [predictmarketcap.com]. Given that Bitcoin's price volatility is a key driver for such dips and current market data suggests a lower likelihood of reaching this specific support level within the remaining days of August, the 14.5% estimate aligns with current market-based forecasts.
The current market odds on Polymarket suggest a 14.5% chance of Bitcoin dipping to $55,000 in August, which aligns with the base rate for such a significant dip. The broader market sentiment and recent trends indicate a higher likelihood of Bitcoin staying above $55,000, as seen by the 90.5% odds of it dipping to $62,500. Historical data and recent price movements also support a more stable or upward trend rather than a sharp decline to $55,000.
The Polymarket contract for this event currently prices the probability of Bitcoin dipping to $55,000 in August at 14.5% [predictmarketcap.com](https://predictmarketcap.com/markets/will-bitcoin-dip-to-55k-in-august-2026). This reflects real-money trading activity and serves as a strong indicator of market-implied probability. Additionally, Bitcoin would need to fall approximately 30% from current levels (~$80,000) to reach $55,000, which is unlikely without a major macroeconomic shock. The low trading volume in related markets suggests limited conviction in a sharp dip.
The Polymarket market for Bitcoin dipping to $55,000 in August currently has 14.5% odds, based on real trader activity and the resolution criteria of Binance 1-minute candles.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
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Prediction markets and trading volumes indicate a roughly 70-73% probability that United Russia (ER) will gain the most seats in the 2026 Russian parliamentary election. United Russia's entrenched institutional advantages, control over administrative resources, and historical dominance in prior elections strongly support this outcome. While some uncertainty remains due to potential geopolitical or domestic shifts, structural barriers and current market consensus favor United Russia.
United Russia maintains absolute control over the Russian political system, including the administration of elections, candidate vetting, and the suppression of genuine opposition. Given the structural advantages, the use of state resources, and the historical precedent of the party securing a dominant majority in the State Duma, it is virtually certain that they will retain the most seats in the 2026 election. While some sources discuss potential shifts in popularity, these do not translate into a loss of parliamentary dominance in a managed electoral environment [polymarket.com, intellinews.com].
United Russia (ER) has a strong historical advantage in Russian parliamentary elections, supported by institutional control and limited opposition participation. Prediction markets overwhelmingly favor ER, with Polymarket showing a 99% implied probability [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/russia-parliamentary-election-winner) and other sources showing similar high probabilities [predictioncircle.com](https://predictioncircle.com/event/which-party-will-gain-most-seats-in-russian-parliamentary-election) [worldeventtrading.com](https://www.worldeventtrading.com/predictions/which-party-will-gain-most-seats-in-russian-parliamentary-election-odds-2026-09-20). The base rate of ER winning is very high, and specific evidence from prediction markets and political analysis supports this.
United Russia is highly favored to win the most seats in the 2026 Russian parliamentary election due to its control over administrative resources, electoral processes, and media, as well as the suppression or exclusion of genuine opposition [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/russia-parliamentary-election-winner). While prediction markets show some variation—ranging from 69% to 99%—the consensus reflects structural advantages that make a United Russia plurality or majority highly likely [lines.com](https://www.lines.com/prediction-markets/elections/which-party-will-gain-most-seats-in-russian-parliamentary-election). Minor fluctuations in market prices may reflect trader sentiment, but do not outweigh the institutional dominance of United Russia.
United Russia has strong institutional advantages, high market probabilities, and limited disruption factors, leading to a high likelihood of gaining the most seats.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
The Polymarket prediction market for this exact event shows an 18-19% probability, reflecting collective knowledge of current fundamentals. Given the lack of imminent bullish catalysts and the recent dovish supply outlook, this market price is a strong anchor. I adopt a 0.19 estimate, closely aligned with the market odds.
Current prediction markets, which aggregate real-money bets from informed traders, assign about a 19% probability that WTI Crude Oil will hit $95 or higher in August 2026. This relatively low probability reflects expectations of moderate oil prices due to factors like increased OPEC+ output and easing geopolitical tensions, as seen in July 2026 when WTI did not reach $95. Given these market-based forecasts and recent trends, a 19% chance is a reasonable estimate.
Current market sentiment and trading data from prediction platforms like Polymarket and Worldstreet indicate a probability of approximately 18-19% for WTI Crude Oil reaching $95 in August 2026. Given that we are already well into August, the window for such a significant price spike is narrowing, and there is no immediate geopolitical or supply-side catalyst currently driving prices toward that level.
The current market consensus from prediction platforms like Polymarket and Worldstreet suggests a probability of around 19% for WTI Crude Oil to hit $95 in August 2026. Given the historical volatility and recent trends in oil prices, this estimate seems reasonable. However, considering potential geopolitical risks and supply disruptions, I slightly adjust the probability to 16%.
The $95 WTI target in August 2026 is unlikely due to reduced geopolitical risks and modest supply increases. Prediction markets, which aggregate informed trader sentiment, consistently price this event at around 19%, reflecting low but non-negligible odds. This aligns with current fundamentals suggesting stable or declining prices.
Polymarket currently assigns a 19% probability to WTI hitting $95 in August 2026, considering market dynamics and resolution criteria.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
All available evidence from prediction markets and economic data points to an extremely low probability of a 25 bps rate increase. Markets assign near-zero odds, and the economic backdrop of moderating inflation and mixed labor data makes a hike highly unlikely. A small tail risk (<2%) is included for unforeseen shocks such as a sudden inflation spike or hawkish pivot.
Current prediction markets, which aggregate the views of informed traders, price the probability of a 25 bps rate increase after the September 2026 Fed meeting at about 28%. This reflects a consensus leaning towards no increase, supported by recent economic data and Fed communications indicating a cautious approach to rate hikes. The Fed's recent actions and market expectations suggest a low likelihood of a rate increase at this meeting.
Current prediction market data from [kresmion.com](https://kresmion.com/odds/will-the-fed-increase-interest-rates-by-25-bps-after-the-september-2026-meeting-649) indicates that the probability of a 25 bps rate increase is approximately 28%. Market sentiment heavily favors either a rate cut or no change, reflecting broader economic expectations that the Federal Reserve is more likely to maintain or ease policy rather than tighten it in the current environment.
The current Polymarket odds suggest a 28% probability of a 25 bps increase in interest rates after the September 2026 meeting, with the NO outcome at 72%. This reflects the collective market sentiment and recent economic data, including a strong June jobs report and Fed officials' cautious stance on rate changes. The base rate for rate increases is low, and recent market trends and expert opinions support a higher likelihood of no change or a decrease.
As of August 18, 2026, prediction market [Polymarket](https://polymarket.com) prices the probability of a 25 bps rate increase after the September 2026 FOMC meeting at 28%, reflecting real-money trader consensus. Recent trends show declining odds from 40% a week prior, suggesting weakening expectations for a hike. Broader market indicators, including expectations for rate cuts earlier in 2026, imply a dovish bias, making a rate increase less likely unless inflation or labor data unexpectedly reaccelerates.
Based on current market data from Polymarket as of August 18, 2026, the probability of the Fed increasing interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting is 28%.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The labor market remains strong, and the Fed has signaled caution. Although some market participants anticipate a cut, the base rate for no change is elevated. The Polymarket price of 70% is a reasonable aggregate, and I adjust slightly downward from pure market price to account for potential overreaction, but the evidence supports a high probability of no change.
Current prediction markets, such as Polymarket, price the probability of no change in Fed interest rates after the September 2026 meeting at about 70-71%. This reflects a consensus among traders and analysts that the Fed is likely to hold rates steady at that meeting, considering recent economic data and Fed communications. The market has shown some fluctuation but remains strongly in favor of no change, supported by the Fed's cautious approach and the resolution rules that default to 'no change' if no statement is released.
Current prediction market data from [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/fed-decision-in-september) and [kresmion.com](https://kresmion.com/odds/will-there-be-no-change-in-fed-interest-rates-after-the-september-2026-meeting-615) indicates a strong market consensus that the Federal Reserve will implement a 25 basis point rate cut in September 2026. While the 'No change' outcome is currently priced at approximately 29%, the prevailing economic sentiment and market positioning heavily favor a rate adjustment, making a 'No change' outcome less likely.
Prediction markets like Polymarket and Kresmion show a consistent probability of around 70% for no change in Fed interest rates after the September 2026 meeting. This reflects the collective judgment of traders who consider economic indicators, Fed statements, and recent trends. The base rate for Fed rate changes is typically low, and recent economic data suggests a cautious approach by the Fed.
As of mid-August 2026, prediction markets assign approximately a 70% probability to no change in the Fed's interest rates after the September 2026 meeting, reflecting current trader consensus. While economic conditions could shift before the meeting, the market's real-time aggregation of information suggests a substantial likelihood of rate stability. Given the lack of contradictory official guidance and the typical Fed caution in uncertain economic environments, this estimate is well-calibrated.
Prediction markets like Polymarket and Kresmion currently price the probability of no change in Fed interest rates after the September 2026 meeting at around 70-71% as of August 2026.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Logit blend: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.