timeout after 30000ms
Iran has a history of occasionally closing its airspace fully or partially due to geopolitical or military reasons, as seen in January and February 2026. However, such closures are relatively rare and usually tied to specific events. Given the current lack of immediate geopolitical escalations or announcements indicating an impending full closure by July 15, the probability remains low but non-negligible due to Iran's past behavior and regional tensions.
The market has already been officially resolved as 'YES' by the UMA optimistic oracle, which serves as the final settlement layer for this prediction market. As of July 3, 2026, the market is marked as resolved, and the consensus of reporting confirms the event has occurred.
Recent historical data shows that Iran has closed its airspace multiple times in 2026, but these closures were either partial or due to specific reasons like military drills. The current geopolitical situation does not indicate an imminent full closure of Iranian airspace by July 15, 2026. The market consensus also reflects a low probability of such an event.
Iran has previously closed its airspace during periods of high tension, but such closures are brief and reactive. With no current evidence of imminent escalation or official warnings, the base rate of such an event remains low. The 22% probability aligns with market pricing and reflects a small but non-negligible risk of escalation before July 15.
The market has resolved to 'YES' as per the UMA optimistic oracle.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
High-ranking Israeli officials (Netanyahu and Defense Minister Katz) have firmly stated that the IDF will not withdraw from Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed, calling it an indefinite policy. As of early July 2026, only minor tactical pullbacks have occurred, and no announcement of a full withdrawal is expected. Prediction markets price the chance at ~14-15%, which aligns well with the base rate of such a reversal given the strong political stance. Thus, a 15% probability is appropriate, accounting for the small chance of a last-minute diplomatic breakthrough or policy change.
Current official statements from Israeli leadership, including Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Katz, emphasize that Israeli forces will remain in Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed and northern Israeli communities are secured. Although there have been limited tactical pullbacks, no comprehensive withdrawal is planned or announced. Market data from prediction platforms also reflect a low probability (~15%) of withdrawal by July 31, 2026, consistent with the political and military stance.
The Israeli government, including Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Katz, has explicitly stated that the IDF will remain in southern Lebanon for an indefinite period until Hezbollah is disarmed and security for northern residents is guaranteed [jpost.com]. While there have been minor tactical adjustments, the official policy remains firmly against a full withdrawal, and market sentiment on platforms like Polymarket reflects this low probability [polymarket.com, orrery.me].
The current market odds on Polymarket and other prediction markets suggest a 15% chance of Israel withdrawing from Lebanon by July 31, 2026. Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Katz, have repeatedly stated that Israeli forces will remain in Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed, indicating no immediate plans for withdrawal. The lack of a clear diplomatic breakthrough or significant shift in Israeli policy supports this low probability.
Current statements from Israeli leadership, including Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Katz, emphasize that Israeli forces will remain in southern Lebanon indefinitely until Hezbollah is disarmed, which is not expected by July 31, 2026. While limited tactical withdrawals have occurred in specific areas like Dibbine, there is no indication of a full withdrawal announcement. Market pricing on Polymarket reflects a 15% implied probability, aligning with the lack of political movement toward withdrawal [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/israel-withdraws-from-lebanon-by), [hkimarket.com](https://hkimarket.com/event/israel-withdraws-from-lebanon-by/israel-withdraws-from-lebanon-by-july-31-2026), [jpost.com](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-901080).
Israeli government officials have stated troops will remain indefinitely to counter Hezbollah, and market odds are low, indicating limited likelihood of withdrawal by July 31.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
timeout after 30000ms
Mojtaba Khamenei has not been seen publicly for months following severe injuries, and no recent authentic images or videos have been released. While digital appearances count, only AI-generated or archival footage has been circulated, which do not qualify. Given the uncertainty about his health and the lack of official confirmation or credible sightings, the probability of a public appearance by July 15 remains low but not negligible.
Mojtaba Khamenei has remained out of the public eye for months following reported injuries from an airstrike, with the regime relying on written statements and AI-generated content to maintain his image. While his father's upcoming funeral on July 4 presents a high-profile opportunity for a public appearance, the regime's continued reliance on non-visual communication suggests he may be either unable or unwilling to appear, keeping the probability of a verified, authentic appearance low.
Mojtaba Khamenei has not been seen in public for several months, and there is no confirmed information about his public appearance by July 15. The lack of recent public appearances and the use of AI-generated videos for his speeches suggest a low likelihood of a public appearance by the specified date.
Mojtaba Khamenei has not been seen in public for months, and no verified images or videos have been released since the start of the war. While President Pezeshkian claimed a private meeting, no visual evidence has emerged [theweek.in](https://www.theweek.in/news/middle-east/2026/07/02/will-irans-supreme-leader-mojtaba-khamenei-emerge-speculation-mounts-ahead-of-his-fathers-grand-funeral.html). The upcoming funeral of his father, Ali Khamenei, is a potential catalyst for a public appearance, but his absence from recent family events, including his wife's memorial, suggests continued seclusion [dw.com](https://www.dw.com/en/will-mojtaba-khamenei-attend-his-fathers-funeral/a-77821128). Prediction markets currently assign a 25–28.5% probability to a public appearance by late July, reflecting uncertainty but low confidence in a visible appearance by July 15 [ver.watch](https://www.ver.watch/markets/2554361).
Mojtaba Khamenei has not been seen publicly for months, with unconfirmed health issues, and there is no recent authentic footage or photos, leading to a low probability.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
The Polymarket crowd, with $5.9M in volume, assigns ~8-10% probability, reflecting that the 7-day moving average of transit calls is likely well below 60 due to ongoing disruptions. With only 12 days left until July 15, a rapid recovery to the 60 threshold is improbable given the lag in the moving average and no clear signs of de-escalation.
The current prediction market odds on Polymarket assign about a 10% chance that Strait of Hormuz traffic will return to normal by July 15, 2026. This low probability reflects ongoing disruptions or uncertainties affecting maritime traffic in the region. Given the strategic importance and recent volatility in the area, a rapid return to normal traffic levels seems unlikely within this short timeframe.
The market sentiment on Polymarket has shifted significantly toward 'No', with current odds at approximately 8%. Given the proximity to the July 15 deadline and the lack of reported data indicating a return to the required 7-day moving average threshold of 60 transit calls, it is highly unlikely that traffic will recover to that level in the remaining time.
The prediction market on Polymarket shows varying probabilities, with the most recent data indicating a 38% chance of the event occurring [polymarket.copilot.markets](https://polymarket.copilot.markets/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-15). This suggests a moderate level of confidence among traders. Given the lack of specific recent data on transit calls and the potential for geopolitical factors to influence traffic, a probability of 30% seems reasonable.
The current market-implied probability is around 8–10%, with a significant downward trend from 38%, reflecting updated expectations. Given the high trading volume and reliance on objective IMF Portwatch data, the market appears well-informed. No recent data indicates a rebound to 60+ transits, and geopolitical risks continue to constrain shipping. Thus, the independent estimate aligns with the current consensus.
The Polymarket crowd-sourced probabilities have varied (10%, 38%, 8%) but an independent assessment considers the resolution criteria and limited time left, leading to a moderate probability.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The current IMF Portwatch data appears to show transit calls well below the 60 threshold, and the Polymarket crowd consensus is around 27-31%, reflecting skepticism that a rapid recovery is likely in the remaining 28 days. While U.S.-Iran diplomatic tracks could theoretically boost traffic, no concrete agreement or surge in arrivals has materialized, and base rates for such maritime recoveries suggest a low probability of crossing the specific 60-call moving average within this short window. I adjust slightly above the market price to account for the possibility of a sudden diplomatic catalyst or data revision, but the fundamental odds remain low.
The current market and expert analysis indicate a roughly 46% chance that Strait of Hormuz traffic will return to normal by July 31, 2026. This probability reflects ongoing diplomatic efforts between the U.S. and Iran, which could reduce naval disruptions and increase shipping traffic. The key data point is the IMF Portwatch 7-day moving average of transit calls reaching or exceeding 60, which is a specific and measurable threshold. Given the geopolitical uncertainty and the active negotiation track, the probability is near even but slightly favors a return to normal traffic.
The market requires a 7-day moving average of transit calls in the Strait of Hormuz to reach 60 by July 31, 2026. Current market sentiment, as reflected in [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-31) and [predictionninja.com](https://predictionninja.com/market/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-31), suggests a low probability of recovery to this specific threshold within the remaining timeframe, likely due to persistent regional geopolitical tensions affecting maritime traffic. While some platforms show higher volatility in pricing, the consensus remains skeptical of a return to the defined 'normal' level.
The current crowd-sourced probabilities from prediction markets like Polymarket and PredictionNinja suggest a relatively low likelihood of the event occurring, with probabilities ranging from 27% to 31%. Given the lack of specific recent data on transit calls and the historical context of the Strait of Hormuz, it is reasonable to adjust the probability slightly upwards to account for potential improvements in shipping conditions. However, the overall uncertainty and the specific threshold requirement (7-day moving average of 60 or above) keep the probability below 50%.
Base rate for chokepoint disruptions suggests prolonged risk, but diplomatic engagement provides a meaningful chance of recovery. Market prices are divergent, so I average toward 35%, reflecting moderate uncertainty and the binary nature of the threshold.
The market currently has a probability of around 27-31% for 'Yes'. Key factors include the U.S.-Iran negotiating track and the 7-day moving average threshold of 60 transit calls.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Given the current very low level of transit calls (~12/day) due to the re-closure on June 22, and the fact that the 7-day moving average is calculated from those depressed numbers, it is mathematically impossible for the average to reach 60 by July 7, 2026. Even an immediate, full reopening would require several days of extremely high traffic to raise the average, and the remaining time is insufficient. The market prices (1% on Polymarket) align with this assessment.
Current data shows that traffic in the Strait of Hormuz has significantly dropped due to recent closures, with daily ship arrivals far below the normal baseline of around 93-100 ships per day. Given the short timeframe until July 7 and the requirement of a sustained 7-day moving average of 60 or more arrivals, a rapid and sustained recovery is unlikely unless a durable ceasefire or reopening occurs immediately. Market odds and expert analysis also suggest a low probability around 9%.
The current 7-day moving average of transit calls is significantly below the threshold of 60, and given the short timeframe remaining until July 7, 2026, it is mathematically impossible for the average to reach the required level even if traffic were to resume immediately. Recent geopolitical tensions have caused a sharp decline in transit calls, and there is no indication of a rapid, sustained recovery to pre-conflict levels within the next few days.
The current Polymarket crowd-sourced probability is 1% for 'Yes' [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-7-20260625174256255). However, a Manifold user estimates a ~9% YES probability, considering the potential for a clean, durable ceasefire that could rapidly increase traffic [manifold.markets](https://manifold.markets/BillClintonBubba/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-h8dyOt6Nq9). The base rate for such a rapid recovery is low, but not impossible.
The market requires a 7-day moving average of 60+ ship transits through the Strait of Hormuz by July 7, 2026. Recent data shows traffic dropped to ~12 ships/day after Iran re-closed the strait on June 22 [manifold.markets](https://manifold.markets/BillClintonBubba/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-h8dyOt6Nq9), far below the prewar baseline of 93–100/day. Even with a rapid reopening, achieving a 7-day average of 60+ is unlikely in the remaining time. A brief rebound to ~20 ships/day occurred earlier, but sustained normal traffic has not resumed. The current Polymarket price implies only a 1% chance [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-7-20260625174256255), but a small possibility of a sudden, durable ceasefire enabling a rapid recovery keeps the probability above zero.
Current Polymarket crowd-sourced probability is 1%, and low traffic levels post-reopening make it unlikely to reach the 60 threshold by July 7.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Multiple credible sources (Anadolu, Al Jazeera, CNA, France 24) report that the next senior-level US-Iran talks are expected in Doha in the third week of July, after Khamenei's funeral. The recent July 1-2 Doha talks were technical and lower-level, not a new senior round. With only 7 days left until July 10, no credible reports indicate a senior-level meeting will occur before that date. The probability is low but not zero due to the possibility of an unexpected early convening.
Current reports indicate that the next round of US-Iran talks is expected to occur after the funeral of the late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, whose burial is scheduled for July 9, 2026. Mediators from Qatar and Pakistan have confirmed positive progress but have not announced any formal senior-level meeting before July 10. The talks held so far have been indirect and technical, not qualifying as a senior-level round. Given the timing and the statements, a formal senior-level round by July 10 is unlikely but not impossible.
While indirect technical talks are ongoing in Doha, the sources explicitly state that the next round of talks is expected to occur after the funeral of the late Supreme Leader, which is scheduled for July 9, 2026 [al-monitor.com]. Given the logistical constraints of the funeral and the fact that recent meetings have been characterized as technical rather than senior-level peace negotiations, it is highly unlikely that a qualifying senior-level round will commence by the July 10 deadline.
The US and Iran have agreed to continue discussions and schedule the next meeting as soon as possible after the funeral of the former Iranian Supreme Leader, which is set for July 9. Both sides have shown willingness to engage in further talks, and mediators from Qatar and Pakistan are actively facilitating the process. The next round of direct talks is expected to take place in Doha in the third week of July, indicating a high likelihood of a meeting occurring by July 10.
The next round of indirect US-Iran talks is scheduled to occur after the funeral processions of the late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, which conclude on July 9 in Mashhad [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/2/us-iran-talks-in-doha-what-were-the-outcomes-and-whats-next). However, the talks themselves are not expected to begin until the third week of July [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/us-us-iran-expected-to-hold-direct-talks-in-doha-in-3rd-week-of-july-sources). Senior-level participation is anticipated only then, not before July 10. The July 2–3 Doha meetings involved only technical-level delegations, not senior representatives, and were not a new formal round of senior talks [al-monitor.com](https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/07/where-do-us-iran-talks-stand-after-doha-negotiations-what-we-know). Therefore, no qualifying senior-level meeting will have begun by July 10.
US and Iran are expected to hold direct talks in Doha in the 3rd week of July, with mediation progress and positive responses, though dependent on Khamenei's funeral timing.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
timeout after 30000ms
The US and Iran have already signed a memorandum of understanding on June 14, 2026, committing to negotiate a final deal within 60 days, extendable by mutual consent. The strong diplomatic engagement, official announcements, and the detailed framework for a final agreement increase the likelihood of a qualifying written instrument being signed or formally adopted by July 31, 2026. Prediction markets and credible sources currently assign a high probability to the deal's completion by the deadline.
While the June 14, 2026, Memorandum of Understanding established a 60-day window for negotiations, the complexity of the required 'final deal'—which must include concrete, measurable benchmarks for nuclear limitations—makes a formal agreement by July 31, 2026, highly unlikely. Current prediction markets and reporting suggest that the parties are still in the early stages of technical discussions, and the stringent requirements for a 'qualifying instrument' under the market rules are unlikely to be met within the remaining timeframe.
The United States and Iran have already announced a written diplomatic agreement on June 14, 2026, committing to negotiate a final deal within 60 days, which is extendable with mutual consent. The agreement includes specific obligations and benchmarks, such as the commitment to negotiate the final deal within the specified timeframe and the establishment of concrete, measurable benchmarks for Iran's nuclear program. The high probability is also supported by the fact that the Polymarket crowd currently believes there is a 100% chance that this event will occur [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/us-iran-nuclear-deal-by-july-31).
As of July 3, 2026, no final nuclear deal has been signed or formally adopted by the United States and Iran. The June 14, 2026, memorandum of understanding [cnn.com](https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/17/middleeast/us-iran-war-mou-text-intl) established a 60-day framework for negotiations but did not itself meet the criteria for a final deal, as it lacks specific, measurable obligations on Iran's nuclear program. Prediction markets such as FRC assign a 4.5% chance to a final deal by July 31, 2026 [researchfrc.com](https://www.researchfrc.com/prediction-markets/us-iran-final-nuclear-deal-by-20260621201254412), reflecting low confidence. Given the short remaining timeframe and absence of public progress toward a signed agreement, the probability remains very low.
There is a 60-day negotiation period from the June 14, 2026, memorandum of understanding, and the Polymarket prediction market currently has a high probability, though there are specific criteria for a qualifying instrument.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
As of July 3, 2026, Bitcoin is trading near $61,756, about $5,744 below the $67,500 target. Polymarket markets price the $67,500 level at approximately 38-39% and the $70,000 level at about 21% ([cryptoadventure.com](https://cryptoadventure.com/polymarket-traders-price-bitcoin-near-20-to-hit-70k-in-july/)). The substantial gap from current price, recent heavy ETF outflows, and bearish technical positioning (BTC below its 200-week SMA near $63,500) suggest significant upward momentum is needed. Given the short remaining time in July and these headwinds, a 30% probability is reasonable—lower than the market's ~38% due to anchoring on current weak price action and poor sentiment.
Current prediction markets price the probability of Bitcoin reaching $67,500 in July at about 39%, reflecting moderate confidence. Bitcoin is trading near $61,756, requiring a roughly 9% increase to hit $67,500, which is plausible but not highly likely given recent volatility and downward ETF flows. The market's binary nature (any one-minute candle reaching the target) slightly increases the chance compared to sustained price levels.
Current prediction market data from platforms like Polymarket and PrediRoute indicate that the probability of Bitcoin reaching $67,500 in July 2026 is hovering between 38% and 42%. Given the high volatility of Bitcoin and the fact that the market is currently trending toward lower price targets (with high confidence in outcomes below $60,000), the likelihood of hitting the $67,500 threshold is significantly less than 50%.
Prediction markets like Polymarket and PrediRoute show that the collective wisdom of traders assigns a 38% probability to Bitcoin reaching $67,500 in July. This is based on real money being put behind these beliefs, which tends to surface accurate predictions. The current market prices and trading volumes reflect this consensus.
As of 2026-07-03, Bitcoin has not reached $67,500, and multiple prediction markets indicate low odds of it doing so in July 2026. The Polymarket for this event shows a 'Yes' share price at 42¢ [polymarket.copilot.markets](https://polymarket.copilot.markets/event/what-price-will-bitcoin-hit-in-july-2026), implying a 42% probability, while PrediRoute shows a 38% probability [app.prediroute.com](https://app.prediroute.com/en/event/what-price-will-bitcoin-hit-in-july-2026). However, current market context indicates Bitcoin is trading well below that level, with the most likely outcome being below $60,000 [polymarket.copilot.markets](https://polymarket.copilot.markets/event/what-price-will-bitcoin-hit-in-july-2026). Given the lack of strong bullish momentum and the current price trajectory, the probability is adjusted downward.
Bitcoin was trading near $61,756 as of July 3, 2026, and Polymarket traders priced a $67,500 July target at 39%, with higher targets having lower probabilities.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Trump has repeatedly stated he will attend the NATO summit in Ankara out of respect for Erdogan, and multiple credible news sources confirm his intention. The prediction market on Polymarket shows a 98% probability. While there are tensions with some European allies, the strong personal relationship with Erdogan and the prospect of announcing defense deals make a last-minute cancellation very unlikely. No reports of any change of plans have emerged as of July 3, 2026.
Multiple recent sources indicate that Donald Trump is expected to attend the NATO Summit in Ankara, Turkey, scheduled for July 7-8, 2026. Trump himself has stated he is attending out of respect for Turkish President Erdogan, with whom he has a close relationship. Prediction markets currently assign a 98% probability to his attendance, reflecting strong market and media consensus. There is no indication the event will be canceled or postponed, and Trump's attendance is seen as a significant diplomatic gesture.
President Donald Trump has explicitly confirmed his intention to attend the NATO summit in Ankara, citing his personal relationship with President Erdogan as the primary reason for his participation. Multiple credible news sources, including [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/nato-summit-trump-erdogan-bond-c3fbddc43d7f4b0b12fcc2442ee03613) and [efe.com](https://efe.com/english/other-news/2026-07-03/trump-nato-summit-tensions-europe/), report that he is traveling to the event specifically to honor his commitment to the Turkish leader, despite his general dissatisfaction with other NATO allies.
Multiple sources confirm that Donald Trump plans to attend the NATO Summit in Ankara, Turkey, on July 7-8, 2026. His attendance is driven by his close ties with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has personally requested his presence. Trump has also hinted at potential defense-related deals with Turkey, which further incentivizes his attendance. The Turkish Foreign Minister has also confirmed Trump's plans to attend the summit.
Donald Trump has publicly committed to attending the NATO summit in Ankara, citing personal respect for Turkish President Erdogan [apnews.com](https://apnews.com). Multiple sources confirm his attendance is motivated by strong personal ties, and he has indicated he will make a significant defense-related announcement during the visit. While there is bipartisan opposition in Congress to arms sales to Turkey, there are no indications of obstacles to Trump's travel. The Polymarket prediction market reflects a 98% consensus, but incorporating potential last-minute changes, a slightly more conservative estimate is warranted.
Trump has stated he will attend the NATO Summit out of respect for Erdogan, despite tensions with European allies.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Multiple prediction markets (Polymarket at ~10%, PredictionNinja at 8%, PredictionPulse at ~8%) consistently assign a low probability to a 25-basis-point hike at the July 2026 FOMC meeting. The current economic environment shows moderating inflation and a Fed holding rates steady, with no major recent data indicating an imminent tightening. Given the strong consensus and base rates, the true probability is estimated around 0.10.
Current prediction markets and trading volumes strongly indicate that the probability of a 25 bps rate increase after the July 2026 Fed meeting is very low, around 8-10%. The consensus among market participants is that the Fed will likely maintain current rates, reflecting expectations of no change. This is supported by high liquidity and volume in markets favoring no increase, and the absence of recent signals suggesting a rate hike.
Market data from multiple prediction platforms, including Polymarket and PredictionPulse, consistently show a strong consensus that the Federal Reserve will maintain current interest rates at the July 2026 meeting. The probability of a 25 basis point increase is currently priced between 8% and 10%, reflecting the market's expectation that the FOMC will hold rates steady.
The majority of prediction markets indicate a very low probability of a 25 bps interest rate increase by the Fed after the July 2026 meeting. Polymarket shows a 10% probability for a 25 bps increase [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/fed-decision-in-july-181), while other sources like WyldMarkets and PredictionNinja also reflect low probabilities of 23% [wyldmarkets.com](https://wyldmarkets.com/market/will-the-fed-increase-interest-rates-by-25-bps-after-the-july-2026-meeting) and 78% [predictionninja.com](https://predictionninja.com/market/will-the-fed-increase-interest-rates-by-25-bps-after-the-july-2026-meeting) respectively. The consensus among these markets suggests a strong expectation of no change in interest rates.
Prediction markets across multiple platforms show a consensus probability of a 25 bps rate hike in July 2026 between 7% and 10%, with Polymarket at 9.7% [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/fed-decision-in-july-181), WyldMarkets at 23% but with less liquidity, and PredictionPulse at 7.2% [predictionpulse.io](https://predictionpulse.io/market/polymarket/polymarket-will-the-fed-increase-interest-rates-by-25-bps-after-the-july-2026-meeting). The Federal Reserve's current stance and market expectations favor holding rates steady due to stable inflation and economic conditions, making a hike unlikely but not impossible. I adjust slightly upward from the median market price to account for potential volatility in inflation data closer to the meeting.
Prediction markets show low probabilities for a 25 bps increase, with leading outcomes favoring no change.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Multiple prediction markets (Polymarket, WyldMarkets) consistently price a 'no change' outcome at 88–93% as of July 3, 2026, just 25 days before the FOMC meeting. These markets have high volume and a strong track record of accuracy. No recent economic data or Fed communications suggest a rate change is likely, and the base rate for holds at FOMC meetings is high. I assign 0.90, slightly below the market midpoint to account for residual uncertainty.
Current prediction markets and trading platforms show a strong consensus around a 90% probability that the Fed will keep interest rates unchanged after the July 2026 meeting. This is based on the latest market prices, liquidity, and volume, reflecting collective expectations of traders who closely follow Fed communications and economic indicators. The Fed's decision depends on inflation, growth, and labor market conditions, but the prevailing view is that no change is likely at this meeting.
Prediction markets consistently show a high degree of confidence that the Federal Reserve will maintain current interest rates during the July 2026 FOMC meeting. Aggregated market data from multiple platforms, including Polymarket and WyldMarkets, indicates that 'No change' is the overwhelming consensus, with implied probabilities ranging from 86% to 93%. Given the lack of significant economic indicators suggesting an emergency or surprise shift, the market expectation remains heavily anchored on stability.
Prediction markets like Polymarket and WyldMarkets show high confidence (90-93%) that there will be no change in Fed interest rates after the July 2026 meeting. These markets aggregate the collective judgment of traders, who are incentivized to be accurate. The consistency across different platforms and the high trading volume suggest strong market consensus.
Prediction markets aggregate diverse trader insights and currently assign an 88–93% probability to no change in rates, with Polymarket’s main contract at 90%. This reflects strong market consensus that the Fed will hold steady in July 2026, consistent with forward guidance and current economic expectations.
Crowd-sourced probabilities from Polymarket and WyldMarkets show high odds of no change in Fed interest rates, with multiple markets indicating around 86-93% chance.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Backfilled at launch from stored round-time inputs: 0.8 x market price + 0.2 x consensus of 6/6 valid model forecasts.