Prediction markets currently price this event at 7% (e.g., Polymarket at 7¢, OddsShift at 7%), reflecting a strong consensus that Mojtaba Khamenei will remain in power through June 30, 2026. A related market on Ali Khamenei's removal has already resolved 'Yes', but that appears to be a different question (Ali vs. Mojtaba) and does not directly affect the probability for Mojtaba. With only 21 days left and no credible reports of imminent removal, detention, or resignation, the base rate for such a sudden leadership change in Iran is very low.
Current prediction markets, including Polymarket and OddsShift, price the probability of a leadership change involving Mojtaba Khamenei by June 30, 2026, at around 7%. This low probability reflects the stability of the current regime and the absence of strong indicators for imminent leadership change within this short timeframe. While political dynamics in Iran can be volatile, no credible reports or market signals suggest a high likelihood of change by this date.
Current prediction markets and analysis indicate a very low probability of a leadership change in Iran by June 30, 2026. With the market pricing the 'Yes' outcome at approximately 7%, there is no significant evidence or geopolitical indicator suggesting an imminent removal or resignation of the current leadership within this short timeframe.
The prediction markets on Polymarket and OddsShift provide a consensus probability of around 7% for this event. This low probability is likely due to the stability of Iran's leadership and the lack of recent credible reports indicating an imminent change in leadership. The base rate for such leadership changes in stable authoritarian regimes is historically low, and there is no specific evidence to suggest a significant deviation from this trend.
The current leadership of Iran remains stable under Ali Khamenei, not Mojtaba Khamenei, who is his son and a potential successor but not currently the Supreme Leader. The market confusion appears to stem from a mislabeling of Mojtaba as the current leader. Ali Khamenei, despite his age (85), remains in power with no credible reports of resignation, removal, or incapacitation. Succession planning is ongoing within the regime, but no transition has occurred. Base rates of leadership change in authoritarian regimes are low, and no significant internal or external pressures currently suggest an imminent change. Markets showing high 'Yes' probabilities may reflect misinformation or manipulation, as credible sources do not support an impending transition.
Polymarket prices the 'Iran leadership change by June 30?' market at 7% for 'Yes'.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Multiple prediction markets, such as Polymarket as of June 10 and June 11 2026, consistently price the probability around 7–8%. These odds reflect that no official Israeli government announcement has been made indicating a broad, nationwide airspace closure, and reports show daily life in Israel largely resuming after recent security incidents. With the deadline just a few days away and no credible signal of a qualifying closure, the chance remains low despite elevated regional tensions.
Recent market data and news reports indicate a sharp decline in the probability of Israel initiating a major airspace closure by June 15. Despite regional tensions, daily life and commercial activities in Israel have largely normalized, and no official government announcements have signaled a broad airspace shutdown. The market's current odds reflect a low likelihood of a government-ordered, broad suspension of civilian aviation within the specified timeframe.
Current market sentiment and reporting indicate that the likelihood of a broad, government-mandated closure of Israeli airspace is low as the June 15 deadline approaches. Despite regional tensions, daily life in Israel has largely normalized, and there have been no official signals or policy shifts from Israeli aviation authorities suggesting a nationwide suspension of commercial flights is imminent.
The prediction market on Polymarket shows 85% confidence that Israel will not close its airspace by June 15, which suggests a low probability of such an event. There are no recent credible reports or official statements from Israeli aviation authorities indicating an imminent or planned major closure of its airspace. The base rate for such significant airspace closures is also low, as they typically occur only under extreme circumstances like war or severe security threats, which are not currently reported.
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Recent reports indicate daily life has resumed after missile sirens and no official airspace closure notice, with market odds falling sharply.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
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Given the long-standing hostility and complex geopolitical tensions between Israel and Iran, a permanent peace deal by June 30, 2026, is highly unlikely. Current prediction markets reflect a very low probability (around 3%), indicating that traders and observers see little chance of a definitive peace agreement within this timeframe. No recent credible reports suggest significant progress toward such a deal, and the entrenched conflicts and proxy engagements make a lasting peace agreement improbable in the near term.
The geopolitical relationship between Israel and Iran is characterized by deep-seated ideological hostility and a long-standing proxy conflict, making a formal, permanent peace treaty highly improbable in the current climate. There have been no diplomatic signals or negotiations suggesting such a breakthrough is imminent, and prediction markets [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/israel-x-iran-permanent-peace-deal-by) reflect this extreme skepticism with very low probabilities.
The prediction market on Polymarket indicates a 3% chance of a permanent peace deal between Israel and Iran by June 30, 2026. This low probability reflects the highly uncertain and complex nature of the geopolitical relationship between the two countries, with no strong indications of imminent peace negotiations or agreements.
While there are signs of diplomatic movement and a temporary ceasefire, no formal or permanent peace agreement has been confirmed by either Israel or Iran. The unresolved core issues and lack of public commitment from both governments make a permanent deal unlikely by June 30, 2026. The low market probability further supports a very low but non-zero chance.
The market currently prices the 'Yes' outcome at 3.1¢, indicating low collective belief. No strong progress or definitive agreement has been reported.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
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Kharg Island is a strategically critical oil export terminal under firm Iranian control, with no current credible reports or indications of a successful takeover by another state or force by June 30, 2026. While there have been threats and military actions, including past US strikes and threats to seize the island, actual control has not shifted and would require a clear, established transfer of authority. Prediction markets and expert consensus currently assign a low probability to Iran losing control by the deadline.
There is no current evidence of an imminent military operation or diplomatic agreement that would result in the loss of Iranian control over Kharg Island, a critical piece of national infrastructure. Prediction markets consistently reflect a low probability for this event, and the high threshold for 'actual control' established in the resolution criteria makes a 'Yes' outcome highly unlikely without a major, unforeseen escalation in regional conflict.
The probability is based on the current geopolitical context and recent threats by the U.S. to seize Kharg Island. However, the actual seizure and establishment of control by another entity by June 30, 2026, is uncertain and would require significant military action and stabilization efforts.
Iran continues to exercise primary control over Kharg Island, and no foreign force has established operational or governmental control despite rhetorical escalations. The high bar for resolution—actual and stable transfer of control—makes a 'Yes' outcome unlikely before June 30, 2026, though geopolitical tensions keep the probability non-negligible.
Kharg Island has historically been under Iranian control, and the criteria for resolving 'Yes' require actual establishment of control by another entity, which is difficult. Trump's threat is recent but past actions show limited ground troop deployment, and market odds are low.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
The market is currently trading at ~3.4% Yes on Polymarket, and given that the 7-day moving average of transit calls needs to reach or exceed 60 before June 15, 2026, the baseline expectation from the market suggests a low probability. Web search results show the market price is 3% Yes as of the retrieval date (June 11, 2026), indicating traders see very little chance of a rebound to that level in the remaining days. Historical data (not directly shown but implied by the low trading odds) suggests traffic remains well below 60, and with only 4 days left until the deadline, a rapid surge to the threshold is highly unlikely.
Current data and market sentiment indicate that the Strait of Hormuz traffic has not yet returned to the normal level of 60 or more daily transit calls, and geopolitical tensions in the region continue to pose risks to shipping traffic. Given the historical volatility and ongoing uncertainties, a return to normal traffic by June 15, 2026, is possible but unlikely within this timeframe.
Current market sentiment and available data indicate that shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz remains significantly below the threshold required for a 'Yes' resolution. Given the persistent geopolitical tensions and the current trend in transit calls, it is highly unlikely that the 7-day moving average will reach 60 by the June 15, 2026 deadline.
The current market odds on Polymarket are 1.1%, which suggests a very low probability of the event occurring. Given the lack of recent data indicating a significant increase in transit calls, and the historical context of the Strait of Hormuz, it is reasonable to align with the market consensus.
The resolution depends on IMF Portwatch reporting a 7-day moving average of at least 60 ship arrivals by June 15, 2026. Current Polymarket odds, which reflect aggregated trader beliefs, indicate a very low probability (between 1.1% and 3.4%). Given the high volume and liquidity in these markets, and assuming they are reasonably efficient, this suggests a true probability close to but slightly above the lowest observed price, leading to an independent estimate of 3.5%.
Without current data on IMF Portwatch's 7-day moving average, but considering the normal traffic levels and the market's rules, there's a moderate chance.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The current 7-day moving average of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz is significantly below 60, likely in the 40-50 range, due to ongoing geopolitical tensions and shipping disruptions. With only about 19 days left until the June 30 deadline, a sustained increase to 60 is improbable given the slow recovery trend. Polymarket odds (~16.5% Yes) and the lack of recent positive catalysts support a low probability.
Current market data from Polymarket shows a low probability (around 17%) that the Strait of Hormuz traffic will return to normal levels (7-day moving average of 60 or more transit calls) by the end of June 2026. Given ongoing geopolitical tensions and historical disruptions in the region, the likelihood remains low unless significant stabilization occurs. The market's liquidity and volume indicate active trading but consensus leans towards 'No'.
Current market sentiment and available data suggest that shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains significantly below the threshold required for a 'Yes' resolution. Given the ongoing geopolitical tensions and the specific criteria set by IMF Portwatch, it is unlikely that the 7-day moving average will reach 60 by the end of June 2026.
The current market odds on Polymarket suggest a 16.5% probability of a 'Yes' resolution, while ClearMarket indicates a 20.0% probability. Given the recent geopolitical tensions and the historical data on shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, a conservative estimate aligns with these market assessments. The key factors include the ongoing ceasefire conditions, the status of Iran talks, and the historical shipping traffic data trends.
As of the current date (2026-06-11), there is no indication from [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-end-of-june) that the 7-day moving average of ship arrivals in the Strait of Hormuz has reached or exceeded 60. The market reflects a 16.5% chance of 'Yes', suggesting low confidence in reaching the threshold. Given the lack of recent reports indicating a surge in traffic and the narrow timeframe remaining until June 30, 2026, it is unlikely the threshold will be met.
The current Polymarket odds are 60%, and the criteria (7-day moving average of transit calls ≥60) is clear with IMF Portwatch as the resolution source.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
On June 11, 2026, Trump cancelled planned strikes on Iran and stated that discussions with Iran have been approved at the highest level, promising a signing soon [france24.com](https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20260611-iran-warns-mideast-truce-practically-meaningless-after-us-strikes), [stripes.com](https://www.stripes.com/theaters/middle_east/2026-06-11/iran-ceasefire-meaningless-us-strikes-21934419.html). This indicates he is actively trying to maintain a ceasefire framework, not end it. Although Iran's foreign minister declared the ceasefire 'ineffective' [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/us-attacks-rendered-ceasefire-ineffective-irans-top-diplomat-tells-eu-foreign-policy-chief/3963979), that is an Iranian statement, not a U.S. government announcement. The market requires a clear U.S. official announcement that no ceasefire is in effect. Given Trump's latest statements and the context of ongoing negotiations, the probability that he makes such a declaration before the June 12 deadline is low, but not zero due to the volatile nature of the situation.
Recent events indicate that the ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran has effectively collapsed, with multiple U.S. strikes on Iran and strong rhetoric from both sides. Iran's top diplomat has declared the ceasefire ineffective due to U.S. attacks, and President Trump has threatened further military action, signaling a breakdown in diplomatic efforts. While no official announcement ending the ceasefire has been confirmed yet, the likelihood of Trump making a public statement to that effect by June 12 is high given the escalating conflict and his recent communication style.
President Trump has frequently oscillated between threatening total escalation and claiming imminent peace deals, often using social media to declare the status of negotiations. Given the current reports that the ceasefire is 'practically meaningless' [military.com](https://www.military.com/trump-calls-off-latest-threats-to-strike-iran-citing-progress-in-negotiations) and the ongoing cycle of military strikes, there is a high likelihood that Trump will issue a formal statement declaring the ceasefire over to justify further military action or to pressure Iran, especially given his pattern of erratic, high-stakes public announcements [france24.com](https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20260611-iran-warns-mideast-truce-practically-meaningless-after-us-strikes).
Recent statements from President Trump indicate progress in ceasefire talks and a call-off of planned strikes, suggesting a continued commitment to the ceasefire. However, Iran's Foreign Ministry has condemned U.S. attacks as violations of the ceasefire, which could escalate tensions. The key factors are Trump's recent statements about progress in negotiations and Iran's condemnation of U.S. actions.
On June 11, 2026, President Trump announced he was calling off planned strikes on Iran and cited progress in ceasefire talks, stating that discussions had been approved at the highest levels of Iranian leadership [stripes.com](https://www.stripes.com/theaters/middle_east/2026-06-11/iran-ceasefire-meaningless-us-strikes-21934419.html). He emphasized that final points of a deal had been approved by the U.S., Israel, and regional allies, and that the time and place for signing would be announced soon [france24.com](https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20260611-iran-warns-mideast-truce-practically-meaningless-after-us-strikes). These statements signal a move toward finalizing a deal, not terminating the ceasefire. While Iran criticized recent U.S. strikes as rendering the ceasefire 'meaningless,' it did not announce the end of the agreement, and the U.S. has not made any qualifying statement that the ceasefire is no longer in effect [apnews.com](https://www.military.com/trump-calls-off-latest-threats-to-strike-iran-citing-progress-in-negotiations). Therefore, no official U.S. announcement has been made that the ceasefire is over, and recent actions suggest efforts to preserve it.
Recent reports show Trump called off strikes but hasn't clearly announced the ceasefire is over; past unfulfilled promises and ongoing tensions affect the outcome.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
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Recent reports indicate that U.S. and Iranian negotiators have reached a tentative agreement to extend the ceasefire by 60 days and start new nuclear talks, with some details still being finalized. President Trump has claimed a 'great settlement' has been reached and suggested a signing could happen soon, though Iranian officials have been more cautious. Given the high-level approval and ongoing negotiations, it is likely the U.S. will officially announce an extension before June 30, though some uncertainty remains due to last-minute details and Iran's hesitance.
President Trump has publicly announced that a 'great settlement' has been reached with Iran and that a signing is expected as early as this weekend [rferl.org]. While Iranian officials have been more cautious, the market resolution criteria rely primarily on official U.S. government announcements, and the President's explicit statements regarding a finalized deal and the cancellation of military strikes strongly indicate that a qualifying agreement or extension will be formally announced before the June 30 deadline [rferl.org, pbs.org].
President Trump has announced a 'great settlement' with Iran, indicating a potential agreement to be signed soon. However, Iranian officials have not confirmed this, and there are reports of ongoing negotiations and changes in positions. The U.S. has canceled planned strikes and is reportedly close to finalizing a deal, but the lack of official confirmation from Iran and the history of fluctuating statements suggest uncertainty.
While Trump has made public claims of a deal, no official U.S. government statement confirming a ceasefire extension or new agreement has been issued. The lack of Iranian confirmation and ongoing negotiations suggest the deal is not yet finalized. Given the high bar for resolution (official U.S. announcement), and the current status as tentative, the probability is above 50% but remains uncertain due to political and diplomatic volatility.
There is a tentative deal reported by PBS News that includes a ceasefire extension, and Trump announced a potential agreement, but Iran's response is mixed. An official US announcement is needed, so there's a significant chance but not certain.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
With only 4 days left until the June 15 deadline, no permanent peace deal has been signed or publicly confirmed by both the US and Iran. The existing MOU remains unsigned, and prediction markets price the probability around 13.5%, but given the stringent requirements for a permanent end to hostilities and the lack of any such agreement, the true probability is even lower. Base rates for such rapid, comprehensive deals are near zero, and the window is too short for the necessary diplomatic and legal steps.
Current information indicates that no permanent peace deal has been signed or definitively confirmed by both the US and Iran as of early June 2026. The market price for a 'Yes' outcome is low (~13.5%), reflecting skepticism about a deal being reached by the June 15 deadline. Temporary ceasefires or ongoing negotiations do not meet the criteria, and the Memorandum of Understanding remains unsigned, reducing the likelihood of a permanent peace deal within the short remaining timeframe.
With the June 15, 2026 deadline only days away, there is no evidence of a breakthrough in negotiations. Current reports indicate a persistent deadlock regarding uranium enrichment and other key issues, and prediction markets have seen a decline in the probability of a 'Yes' outcome as the deadline approaches without a signed memorandum of understanding.
The current market price for a permanent peace deal between the US and Iran by June 15, 2026, is at 13.5%, indicating a low probability of such an agreement being reached. The key factors include the ongoing deadlock on the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) awaiting Trump's signature and the historical context of US-Iran relations, which have been marked by significant tensions and a lack of recent progress towards a permanent peace deal.
As of 2026-06-11, no official permanent peace deal between the U.S. and Iran has been signed or formally adopted, despite ongoing diplomatic activity. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) reportedly awaits signature by former President Trump, but as of [orakll.com](https://orakll.com/article/june-15-iran-deal-holds-13-5-as-mou-awaits-trump-signature), it remains unsigned with only days remaining before the June 15 deadline. Given the lack of public confirmation from both governments and the high bar for a 'permanent' agreement—excluding temporary arrangements—it is highly unlikely a qualifying deal will be finalized and confirmed by 11:59 PM ET on June 15, 2026.
Based on market data from Orakll, the YES probability is currently 13.5¢, implying a ~13.5% chance. The key factors include the market's pricing, the requirement for a permanent deal explicitly ending hostilities, and the deadline.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The current Polymarket prediction for a US-Iran nuclear deal by June 30 is about 20%, while a similar market with a July 31 deadline is at 41%. This suggests traders see a meaningful chance of a deal in the next month but not as likely in the shorter window. With only about 19 days remaining, no official announcement has been made, and negotiations typically face significant hurdles; the base rate for such high-stakes nuclear agreements being reached within a narrow time frame is low. Considering the absence of a breakthrough in public reporting, I estimate a 25% probability.
Current prediction markets show a low to moderate probability (around 20-34%) for a US-Iran nuclear deal by June 30, 2026, reflecting ongoing diplomatic challenges and the complexity of reaching a mutual agreement. While negotiations continue and a deal is possible, significant political and strategic obstacles remain, making a deal less likely but not impossible.
The geopolitical climate between the United States and Iran remains highly strained, with significant domestic political hurdles in the U.S. and deep-seated mistrust in Iran. While prediction markets like [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/us-iran-nuclear-deal-by-june-30) suggest a low probability, the possibility of a limited, informal, or 'de-escalation' agreement remains a non-zero factor, though a formal nuclear deal by June 2026 is unlikely given the current lack of diplomatic momentum.
The prediction markets show varying probabilities, with Polymarket at 20% [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/us-iran-nuclear-deal-by-june-30) and another source at 34% [polymarket.copilot.markets](https://polymarket.copilot.markets/event/us-iran-nuclear-deal-by-june-30). The higher probability for a similar event by July 31 at 55% [polymarket.copilot.markets](https://polymarket.copilot.markets/event/us-iran-nuclear-deal-by-july-31) suggests a slight increase in likelihood over time. Given the current geopolitical climate and historical challenges in reaching such agreements, a mid-range estimate of 30% seems reasonable.
The question asks whether a US-Iran nuclear deal will be publicly announced by June 30, 2026. As of the current date (2026-06-11), no such agreement has been officially announced, and multiple sources including [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/us-iran-nuclear-deal-by-june-30) indicate that the market-implied probability is around 34%, reflecting low confidence among traders. Geopolitical tensions, lack of recent diplomatic breakthroughs, and the absence of high-level negotiations suggest that a deal is unlikely in the remaining time window. Given the narrow timeframe and high barriers to agreement, the true probability remains low.
Current market odds on Polymarket range from 20-34% and there has been recent mention of progress in negotiations, leading to an adjusted probability.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Trump has publicly stated a 'settlement' has been reached and that the Strait will open upon signing, with talks advanced to the 'highest level.' However, his past pattern of false starts and last-minute breakdowns lowers confidence. Given the explicit linkage to a signing event and the short remaining time, I assign a 65% chance of a qualifying announcement before the deadline.
Given the recent announcement of the blockade by President Trump in April 2026 and ongoing tense negotiations with Iran, it seems unlikely that the blockade will be lifted and officially announced by June 30, 2026. While there are talks of a settlement and some progress, the blockade is stated to remain in full force until a transaction is finalized, with no clear indication that such a deal will be reached and announced by the deadline. The probability is adjusted upward slightly due to ongoing negotiations and pressure for a resolution, but the short timeframe and current stance reduce the likelihood.
President Trump has explicitly linked the continuation of the naval blockade to the finalization of a 'transaction' or settlement with Iran. Recent reports indicate that negotiations are at an advanced stage, with the President signaling that a deal is imminent and that the blockade will be lifted once the agreement is signed. Given the high-level diplomatic activity and the stated intent to resolve the conflict, there is a strong likelihood that a formal announcement will occur before the June 30 deadline.
Recent statements from President Trump indicate ongoing negotiations with Iran regarding the Strait of Hormuz, with potential for a settlement that could include lifting the blockade. However, past negotiations have been volatile, and the blockade remains in place as of the latest updates. The probability reflects the likelihood of a formal announcement based on current diplomatic efforts and historical patterns.
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Trump has shown a pattern of shifting between threats and negotiations on Iran. The pending settlement could lead to a blockade announcement, but there's uncertainty around the timeline.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.
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Recent market data shows a sharp increase in the probability of Project Freedom being restarted, driven by official US signals of planned operations against Iran and coordinated allied statements condemning Iranian activities. Although no definitive announcement has been made yet, the operational context around the Strait of Hormuz and increased US maritime activity suggest a high likelihood of a formal restart announcement before June 30, 2026.
Recent official signals from the U.S. Department of War and Department of State regarding planned operations against Iran, combined with heightened regional maritime activity, have led to a significant surge in market expectations. While no formal announcement has been made yet, the aggressive rhetoric and coordinated allied messaging suggest that a formalization of maritime security measures, potentially under the 'Project Freedom' banner or a substantially equivalent program, is highly probable before the June 30 deadline.
Recent signals from the U.S. Department of War and State Department indicate heightened tensions with Iran and potential military operations, which could necessitate the restart of Project Freedom. The market odds have surged to 95%, reflecting this heightened likelihood. However, no definitive announcement has been made yet, so I adjust slightly downward to account for the possibility that the signals may not lead to an explicit restart announcement.
While there has been no definitive announcement restarting Project Freedom, recent signals from the U.S. government—including statements about planned operations against Iran [uswardepartment.com](https://uswardepartment.com) and a joint statement with allies on countering IRGC threats [state.gov](https://state.gov)—have increased tensions and military posture in the region. Additionally, a recent uncrewed vessel rescue operation near the Strait of Hormuz highlights active U.S. maritime involvement [arstechnica.com](https://arstechnica.com). Although CENTCOM has denied the program's resumption [gcaptain.com](https://gcaptain.com), the administration has acknowledged covert support for ship transits, suggesting a gray-zone effort that could escalate into a formal announcement before June 30.
Polymarket odds are at 95%, with recent US/Iran operation signals and allied statements driving repricing, though no definitive announcement yet.
Mean of 5/6 valid model forecasts.