The recently signed US-Iran MOU explicitly maintains the 'status quo' on enrichment and defers final resolution of enrichment and stockpile issues to later negotiations, making an immediate agreement to end all enrichment by June 30 highly unlikely. Polymarket odds have fallen to ~19.5% and are trending lower, reflecting trader skepticism. Given the MOU's language and the lack of any new public pledge, the probability of a sudden reversal in the next 10 days is very low.
Recent agreements between the US and Iran maintain the status quo on uranium enrichment, with no immediate commitment from Iran to end enrichment by June 30, 2026. The memorandum of understanding signed leaves the issue of enrichment and stockpiles to be resolved in future technical talks, and the International Atomic Energy Agency has limited access to verify Iran's stockpiles. Market sentiment and trading odds also reflect a low probability (around 19.5%) of Iran agreeing to end enrichment by the deadline.
The recent memorandum of understanding between the U.S. and Iran explicitly maintains the 'status quo' regarding uranium enrichment, deferring any potential changes to future negotiations [blockchain.news](https://blockchain.news/news/trump-iran-mou-keeps-enrichment-status-quo-as-polymarket-yes-slips-to-195-0hnme7n70vqk0). Given that the current diplomatic framework prioritizes ongoing talks over immediate cessation of enrichment, and with the resolution deadline only days away, it is highly unlikely that Iran will commit to a total end to enrichment before June 30, 2026 [bbc.com](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c4gy700j0eko).
The recent memorandum of understanding between the U.S. and Iran indicates that the status quo on uranium enrichment will be maintained while further negotiations take place. The agreement specifies that the disposition of stockpiled enriched material and the issue of enrichment will be addressed in a final deal, not immediately. This suggests that Iran is not likely to agree to end all enrichment by June 30, 2026.
Recent developments indicate that a U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding maintains the status quo on uranium enrichment, deferring final terms to later negotiations [bbc.com](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c4gy700j0eko). Iran has reaffirmed it will not develop nuclear weapons, but no agreement to end enrichment has been reached. Market sentiment on Polymarket reflects this, with implied odds of a 'Yes' outcome dropping to around 19.5% following the announcement [blockchain.news](https://blockchain.news/news/trump-iran-mou-keeps-enrichment-status-quo-as-polymarket-yes-slips-to-195-0hnme7n70vqk0). Given the lack of current commitment to end enrichment and the political challenges involved, the probability remains low.
Polymarket currently prices the 'Yes' chance at 19.5% as of the latest update, with recent shifts due to the Trump Iran MOU keeping enrichment status quo and leaving details to future talks.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The market for Mojtaba Khamenei's departure by June 30, 2026 is trading around 5-6% on Polymarket and PolySpotter, reflecting low crowd confidence. While the recent removal of Ali Khamenei indicates significant political instability, a second leadership change within such a short period is historically rare in Iran. Base rates for rapid succession changes are very low, and there is no specific recent evidence suggesting imminent removal of Mojtaba before the deadline.
Current prediction markets show a low probability (around 5%) that Mojtaba Khamenei will cease to be the de facto leader of Iran by June 30, 2026. There is no significant public indication or credible reporting suggesting imminent removal or resignation before this date. The political structure in Iran tends to maintain leadership stability, especially for the Supreme Leader position, making sudden changes less likely in the short term.
The market question specifically concerns Mojtaba Khamenei, who is not currently the Supreme Leader of Iran, but is often discussed as a potential successor to his father, Ali Khamenei. Given that Mojtaba does not hold an official state position that would make him the 'de facto leader' in a formal sense, the probability of him being 'removed' from a position he does not officially hold is extremely low. Current prediction markets [explorer.struct.to](https://explorer.struct.to/markets/iran-leadership-change-by-june-30-689-922) and [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/iran-leadership-change-by) reflect a very low likelihood of such a leadership change occurring within this timeframe.
The prediction markets on Polymarket and OddsShift indicate a low probability of a leadership change in Iran by June 30, 2026. The current odds are around 7% for a
The 7% probability aligns with prediction market consensus and reflects low base rates for sudden leadership changes in Iran's theocratic system. Structural stability and lack of credible opposition reduce the likelihood of forced removal. The odds suggest a small chance, likely tied to unforeseen events like health crises or internal factional conflict.
The Polymarket market for 'Iran leadership change by June 30' has the 'June 30' outcome at 5%, indicating low probability.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The current ceasefire is explicitly temporary (10-day extension on April 16, 2026) and does not meet the definition of a permanent peace deal [Polymarket](https://explorer.struct.to/markets/israel-x-hezbollah-permanent-peace-deal-by-june-30-2026). No credible reports indicate negotiations for a permanent deal have concluded, and new agreements of this magnitude typically take months or years to finalize [Polymarket](https://worldcoin.polymarket.com/event/israel-x-hezbollah-permanent-peace-deal-by). With only 10 days remaining before the June 30 deadline, the probability of a signed, explicit permanent cessation of hostilities is extremely low, estimated at 5%.
Current market data from Polymarket and Orrery indicate a roughly 19% implied probability of a permanent peace deal between Israel and Hezbollah by June 30, 2026. Given the longstanding hostility, recent ceasefires have been temporary, and no definitive permanent peace agreement has been announced. The low probability reflects the difficulty of achieving a lasting peace deal in the near term despite ongoing negotiations and ceasefire efforts.
The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah is deeply entrenched, with significant ideological and strategic barriers to a permanent peace treaty. Current market sentiment [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/israel-x-hezbollah-permanent-peace-deal-by-june-30-2026) reflects low confidence in a resolution by the June 30, 2026 deadline, and there is no evidence of high-level diplomatic breakthroughs that would suggest a transition from temporary ceasefires to a formal, permanent peace agreement in such a short timeframe.
The current market probabilities on platforms like Polymarket and Orrery suggest a low likelihood of a permanent peace deal between Israel and Hezbollah by June 30, 2026. The base rate for such agreements in similar conflicts is also low, and there is no recent evidence of significant progress towards a permanent deal. The ongoing hostilities and the lack of clear public confirmation or formal adoption of any written agreement further support this low probability.
The current implied probability from Polymarket is 19% for a permanent peace deal between Israel and Hezbollah by June 30, 2026 [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/israel-x-hezbollah-permanent-peace-deal-by-june-30-2026). This reflects real-time market expectations based on available information, including the fragile security situation and history of intermittent conflict. Given the lack of recent progress toward a definitive, lasting agreement and the exclusion of temporary ceasefires from qualifying, the likelihood remains low.
Based on the Polymarket data as of June 19, 2026, the implied probability for a 'Yes' resolution is 19%.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Given the extremely short remaining time (10 days) and the absence of any credible reports or military buildup indicating an imminent takeover, the chance that Kharg Island will no longer be under Iranian control by June 30 is negligible. Polymarket prices reflect a 0% implied probability, and the strict resolution criteria further reduce the likelihood of a qualifying event occurring in such a brief window.
Current prediction markets and credible sources indicate an extremely low probability that Kharg Island will no longer be under Iranian control by June 30, 2026. There is no significant evidence of any ongoing or imminent military or political developments that would lead to a change in control, and temporary disruptions do not meet the criteria for loss of control. Given the strategic importance of Kharg Island to Iran and the lack of credible reports suggesting a transfer of control, the probability remains near zero.
There is no credible evidence or geopolitical indication that Iran is on the verge of losing control of Kharg Island, a critical piece of its oil infrastructure. Prediction markets currently price this event at near 0% probability, reflecting the lack of any ongoing conflict or diplomatic process that would result in a transfer of sovereignty or control by the June 30, 2026 deadline.
The current market prices on prediction platforms like Polymarket and Orrery indicate a very low implied probability of around 1% for Kharg Island no longer being under Iranian control by June 30, 2026. This low probability is likely due to the lack of significant geopolitical shifts or military actions reported that would suggest a change in control over the island. The base rate for such a significant change in control within a short timeframe is also very low, and there is no specific evidence to adjust this base rate upwards.
As of June 20, 2026, prediction markets such as Polymarket imply a 1% probability of Kharg Island no longer being under Iranian control by June 30, 2026 [picksbyodds.com](https://picksbyodds.com/markets/kharg-island-no-longer-under-iranian-control-by-june-30-561-854-897/). The resolution criteria require actual, established control by another authority, not temporary disruptions or claims, which sets a high bar [polyguana.com](https://polyguana.com/market/1708086). No credible reports indicate any shift in control, and Iran continues to exercise full military and governmental authority over the island, a key oil export hub [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/kharg-island-no-longer-under-iranian-control-by-june-30-561-854-897).
Current market prices from Polymarket (0%), Orrery (0%), and WyldMarkets (2%) indicate low probability. Strict resolution criteria require actual control establishment, with no current evidence of such change.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
As of mid-June 2026, prediction markets on Polymarket and Orrery price the chance of Starmer leaving office by June 30 at about 20%. There is no major recent news of a resignation or removal, and the short remaining window (roughly 10 days) makes a sudden departure unlikely. Base rates for prime ministers leaving office in a given 10-day period are very low, and the market consensus provides a well-calibrated anchor.
Current prediction markets, including Polymarket and Orrery, assign about a 20% probability that Keir Starmer will cease to be UK Prime Minister by June 30, 2026. This relatively low probability reflects his current political standing, lack of major scandals or crises, and the typical stability of UK prime ministerial tenure, though political dynamics could change. The market prices incorporate real-time information and smart money activity, making them a reliable indicator of the likelihood.
While Keir Starmer faces significant political pressure following the resignation of Defense Secretary John Healey and an upcoming critical by-election in Makerfield, he has publicly rejected calls for a leadership challenge. The procedural hurdles for removing a sitting Labour Prime Minister are substantial, and no formal challenge has yet been triggered. Given the current market sentiment and the lack of a declared successor or formal vote of no confidence, a resignation before the June 30, 2026, deadline remains a significant but minority possibility.
The prediction markets show varying probabilities, with Polymarket at 20% [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/starmer-out-by-june-30-2026-862-594-548-219-739) and OddsShift at 32% [oddsshift.com](https://oddsshift.com/radar/starmer-out-by-june-30-2026-862-594-548-219-739). The base rate is adjusted for recent political pressures, including the resignation of Defense Secretary John Healey and the upcoming Makerfield by-election, which could further erode Starmer's support. However, no formal leadership challenge has materialized yet, and Starmer retains some cabinet support.
The probability of Keir Starmer ceasing to be Prime Minister by June 30, 2026, is estimated at 30%. While Starmer retains cabinet and party support, recent events such as Defense Secretary John Healey's resignation on June 12, 2026, and mounting pressure from backbench MPs have increased leadership uncertainty. The upcoming Makerfield by-election is a key political test, and if Labour loses a historically safe seat, it could trigger a leadership challenge under the 20% nomination rule. Market prices on Polymarket range from 20% to 32%, and while crowd-sourced odds vary, they reflect growing but still minority belief in a change. Base rates for mid-term UK PM removal are low, so the probability is adjusted upward due to specific political pressures but remains below 50% given lack of an active formal challenge. [Reuters, Jun 17](https://reuters.com), [AP, Jun 18](https://ap.org), [Orrery.me](https://orrery.me), [Polyspotter.com](https://polyspotter.com), [Oddsshift.com](https://oddsshift.com)
Based on market data and political factors, the probability is derived from Polymarket and OddsShift estimates, considering leadership pressure and upcoming events.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The market has been trading around 38-51% recently, reflecting deep uncertainty about whether transit calls will recover to the 7-day moving average of 60 by the deadline. Given ongoing geopolitical tensions and Houthi/Saudi-related disruptions in the region, traffic has remained suppressed well below normal levels. With only about three weeks left until July 15, a rapid return to the 60 threshold is possible but far from assured, as it would require sustained improvement in security and shipping confidence.
Current market data from Polymarket and PredictMarketCap shows roughly a 51.5% probability that Strait of Hormuz traffic will return to normal levels by July 15, 2026. Given the strategic importance of the Strait and historical fluctuations in traffic due to geopolitical tensions, a near-even chance is reasonable. There is no strong recent evidence suggesting a definitive trend either way, so a slightly above 50% probability reflects moderate optimism for normalization.
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical maritime chokepoint, and traffic levels are highly sensitive to geopolitical tensions in the region. Given the current volatility and the specific threshold of a 7-day moving average of 60 transit calls, reaching this level requires a sustained period of stability that is not guaranteed by July 15, 2026. Market sentiment on [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-15) reflects significant uncertainty, and historical data suggests that disruptions can persist longer than expected.
The current Polymarket odds suggest a 51.5% probability of the Strait of Hormuz traffic returning to normal by July 15, 2026, based on the 7-day moving average of transit calls reaching or exceeding 60. This is a near-even split, indicating significant uncertainty. The key factors include the historical traffic patterns, recent disruptions, and the reliability of the IMF Portwatch data.
The current Polymarket trading odds indicate a 51.5% to 38% range for a 'Yes' resolution, reflecting shifting sentiment but still centered around a near-even chance [predictmarketcap.com](https://predictmarketcap.com/markets/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-15). The resolution depends on IMF Portwatch reporting a 7-day moving average of 60 or more transit calls, a level that represents a return to normal traffic. Given the lack of recent data showing sustained levels near this threshold and ongoing regional tensions affecting shipping, the probability is calibrated slightly above even based on current market dynamics and historical traffic patterns.
Based on Polymarket odds and the market's criteria, considering the current data trend and the definition of normal traffic as a 7-day moving average of transit calls ≥60.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The Polymarket odds are at 71% Yes as of the search date, reflecting aggregated market belief. While no current IMF Portwatch data is available in the results to independently verify traffic levels, the baseline of 60 transit calls per day is not extremely high by historical standards for the Strait of Hormuz. Given the absence of contradictory evidence and the market's efficient pricing, I align closely with the market probability of 0.71.
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical maritime chokepoint, and recent data from IMF Portwatch indicates a trend toward recovery in ship transit volumes. While geopolitical tensions and regional instability could disrupt traffic, current trends and market forecasts suggest a moderate to high likelihood that the 7-day moving average of transit calls will reach or exceed 60 by July 31, 2026. Market odds and expert predictions hover around 60-70%, supporting this estimate.
The market relies on the IMF Portwatch 7-day moving average for the Strait of Hormuz reaching 60 transit calls. Given that global trade volumes through major chokepoints often exhibit mean-reverting behavior and the current market sentiment reflects a moderate expectation of recovery, a probability of 0.62 aligns with the observed market consensus and the historical resilience of maritime traffic in the region.
The current Polymarket odds suggest a 62% probability of the event resolving to 'Yes' [pdata.world](https://pdata.world/events/polymarket/455867). Given the importance of the Strait of Hormuz and the historical trends in shipping traffic, it is reasonable to adjust this slightly upwards to 65%. The key factors include the historical shipping volumes, recent geopolitical stability, and the reliability of IMF Portwatch data.
While current market odds vary, the definition of 'normal' is clearly tied to an objective data source and threshold. Given the multi-year horizon and the likelihood of at least one sustained recovery period by mid-2026, the probability of hitting a 7-day average of 60+ arrivals is moderately high. Base rates of shipping recovery after disruptions and the persistence of data collection support a probability above 50%, but uncertainty around geopolitical stability tempers it below 0.75.
The market resolves to 'Yes' if IMF Portwatch publishes a 7-day moving average of transit calls ≥60 by July 31, 2026. Considering historical traffic and the time frame, a moderate probability is assigned.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Current market odds across prediction platforms are around 22% (Polymarket 22%, ClearMarket 20%), reflecting a strong belief that traffic will not recover to a 7-day average of 60 ship arrivals by June 30, 2026. Recent geopolitical tensions—such as fraying ceasefires and stalled Iran talks—indicate that disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz are ongoing, making a rapid return to normal levels within just 10 days unlikely. Base rates for resolving major shipping chokepoint disruptions within a short timeframe are low, and the current data likely shows transit well below 60, so the probability is consistent with the market consensus.
Current market odds and expert assessments place the probability of Strait of Hormuz traffic returning to normal by the end of June 2026 at about 20-22%. The region remains unstable with ongoing geopolitical tensions and stalled negotiations, making a rapid normalization unlikely. The 7-day moving average of ship arrivals reaching 60 or more is a high bar given recent disruptions.
Current market sentiment and geopolitical indicators suggest significant skepticism regarding a rapid normalization of shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz by the end of June 2026. With ongoing regional tensions and stalled diplomatic efforts, the likelihood of reaching the required 7-day moving average of 60 transit calls remains low, consistent with current betting market valuations.
The current market odds on Polymarket and ClearMarket suggest a low probability of around 20-22% for the Strait of Hormuz traffic to return to normal by the end of June 2026. This is likely due to ongoing geopolitical tensions and the historical volatility of shipping traffic through the strait. The base rate for such disruptions to be resolved within a short timeframe is also low, further supporting this estimate.
Current 7-day moving average of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz is around 11–12, far below the 60 needed for resolution. Pre-conflict levels were 75–125, but structural shifts like shipping diversions to Salalah/Sohar and ongoing naval blockades make a rapid rebound unlikely. Reaching 60 would require a roughly 5x increase in traffic within a short timeframe, which market pricing and expert analysis [Manifold](https://manifold.markets) suggest has only about a 12% chance. The World Bank also expects no return to pre-aggression levels until late 2026.
Market odds from Polymarket and ClearMarket are low (22% and 20% respectively), and there's no indication of a significant recovery in traffic to reach the 60 threshold by June 30.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Iran has a history of major airspace closures (e.g., January 2026, April 2024), but they are infrequent and often tied to specific geopolitical events. With only 10 days remaining until the deadline and no immediate major escalation reported, the likelihood of a qualifying closure in this short window is moderate. Polymarket odds around 33% provide a market-based anchor, but I adjust slightly downward due to the limited time and the fact that recent partial closures (Strait of Hormuz, VFR suspension) did not meet the threshold.
Iran has a history of closing its airspace for major non-weather reasons, as seen in January 2026 and April 2024. However, such closures are not frequent and tend to be tied to specific political or military events. Current information does not indicate an imminent broad closure by June 30, 2026, but the possibility remains given past precedent and regional tensions.
While Iran has historically closed its airspace during periods of heightened regional tension or military activity, such events are typically reactive to specific escalations. With only a few days remaining until the June 30 deadline and no current reports of imminent large-scale military operations or major security crises necessitating a broad, non-weather-related closure of multiple major airports, the likelihood of such an event occurring in this short window is low.
Iran has a history of closing its airspace for political and military reasons, as seen in January 2026 and April 2024. However, such closures are not frequent and typically tied to specific events. Given the lack of current geopolitical tensions or announced military exercises, the probability of a major airspace closure by June 30 is moderate.
Iran has previously implemented major airspace closures during periods of heightened regional tension, such as in January 2026 and April 2024 [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-shuts-airspace-most-flights-flightradar24-says-2026-01-14/), but these were reactive and time-limited. As of June 2026, there is no public indication from Iranian aviation authorities or credible news sources of an imminent major closure [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/iran-closes-its-airspace-by). The current geopolitical environment, while tense, does not exceed prior thresholds that triggered closures. Recent closures have been partial or restricted to military drills and VFR flights, which do not meet the 'major closure' threshold [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-issues-airspace-notice-for-military-drills-near-strait-of-hormuz/3812508), [intellinews.com](https://www.intellinews.com/iran-suspends-general-aviation-and-vfr-flights-in-new-airspace-directive-421997/). Given the lack of current escalation and the high bar for a qualifying event, the probability remains low.
No recent evidence of a major non-weather airspace closure affecting at least two key airports by June 30, with varying market odds but no current indication.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The current Polymarket price is 10-11%, reflecting a strong market consensus that a definitive agreement is unlikely by the deadline. A recently signed 14-point MOU between the U.S. and Iran explicitly states that Iran will not charge tolls for the first 60 days and leaves the future transit regime to be determined through further talks with Oman and Gulf states, which does not constitute a definitive U.S. agreement to permanent Iranian fees. Given the high bar for 'definitive agreement' and the absence of any official announcement from Trump or his administration accepting such fees, the probability remains low.
The recent memorandum of understanding between Iran and the U.S. includes a 60-day toll-free transit period for the Strait of Hormuz, but the future regime remains unclear and contentious. Iran intends to discuss transit fees with Oman and Gulf states, but the U.S., particularly under Trump, has historically opposed any tolls or fees, insisting on free passage. Market data and expert commentary currently place the probability of Trump agreeing to Iranian transit fees by June 30 at around 11%, reflecting strong resistance and low likelihood of formal acceptance.
The recently signed memorandum of understanding explicitly avoids endorsing Iranian transit fees, instead deferring the issue to future dialogues with regional states [foreignpolicy.com]. Given the Trump administration's historical stance on maintaining free and open transit in the Strait of Hormuz, it is highly unlikely they would formally agree to Iranian tolls by the June 30 deadline, as this would contradict international maritime norms and U.S. strategic interests [foreignpolicy.com, explorer.struct.to].
The U.S. and Iran have agreed to keep the Strait of Hormuz toll-free for 60 days, but Iran has indicated it may charge service fees after that period. Trump has previously dismissed the idea of Iran charging tolls, and the U.S. is unlikely to agree to such fees given its stance on maintaining free navigation. The market odds also reflect a low probability of agreement.
The current implied probability from Polymarket is 11%, reflecting market expectations of a definitive U.S. agreement to Iranian transit fees by June 30, 2026 [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/will-trump-agree-to-iranian-transit-fees-in-the-strait-of-hormuz-by-june-30). A recently signed 14-point memorandum of understanding includes vague language, stating Iran will make 'best efforts' for safe passage with no charge for 60 days, but leaves the future regime undefined [foreignpolicy.com](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/06/18/iran-deal-mou-hormuz-shipping-oil/). The U.S. has historically insisted on free and open passage, and no definitive agreement or public announcement accepting Iranian fees has been made as of now.
Current market odds on Polymarket and Orrery are around 10-11%, and the Iran deal MOU has vague language on future transit fees, leading to low probability.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The US and Iran signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on June 17, 2026, which explicitly commits the US to 'remove its forces from the proximity of the Islamic Republic of Iran within 30 days after the final deal' (point 4). This constitutes a definitive agreement to withdraw troops from the region surrounding Iran, as the MoU is a formally signed deal between the two governments. The agreement is publicly announced and documented by multiple credible sources (CNN, BBC), and the resolution date of June 30 falls within the 60-day window for final negotiations, but the commitment to withdrawal is already explicit in the signed MoU. Therefore, the probability is very high that this qualifies as a 'Yes' under the market rules.
Recent developments show a formal Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the US and Iran that includes commitments to end hostilities and remove US forces from the proximity of Iran within 30 days after a final deal is signed. The MoU has been officially released and signed, and it triggers a 60-day negotiation window for a final deal, which aligns with the June 30 deadline. Given these formal agreements and the public nature of the commitments, it is likely that Trump or authorized representatives will agree to troop withdrawal by the deadline.
The United States has officially signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Iran that explicitly includes a commitment to remove American forces from the proximity of Iran within 30 days after a final deal is reached. Multiple credible sources, including [cnn.com](https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/17/middleeast/us-iran-war-mou-text-intl) and [bbc.com](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgmqzr6p9mo), confirm this formal agreement, which satisfies the criteria for a definitive commitment by the U.S. government to withdraw troops from the region.
The recent memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the US and Iran includes a commitment to remove US forces from the proximity of Iran within 30 days after the final deal is signed. Given that the MOU is already signed and the final deal is expected to be negotiated within 60 days, it is highly likely that Trump will agree to withdraw troops by June 30, 2026.
Multiple credible sources, including [cnn.com](https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/17/middleeast/us-iran-war-mou-text-intl), [bbc.com](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cvgmqzr6p9mo), and [bbc.com](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c4gy700j0eko), report that a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) has been signed between the U.S. and Iran, which includes a commitment for the U.S. to withdraw its forces from the proximity of Iran within 30 days of a final deal. This constitutes a definitive agreement under the market rules. Given that the MOU is already signed and the withdrawal is a formal part of the deal, and considering the resolution date is June 30, 2026, the conditions for 'Yes' are met.
Polymarket shows 64% odds, and a recent US-Iran MOU includes troop withdrawal provisions within 30 days of final deal, with final deal expected by June 30.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
As of late June 2026, WTI crude oil futures are trading well below $100, with no major supply disruptions or geopolitical catalysts pushing prices toward that level. The market on Polymarket shows only ~3-4% odds, reflecting the extreme unlikelihood of a sudden spike to $100 within the remaining days of June. Base rates for such a large intra-month move are very low, and current fundamentals (e.g., ample supply, moderate demand) do not support a rally of that magnitude.
Current market indicators and prediction markets show very low probabilities (around 3-5%) that WTI crude oil will hit $100 in June 2026. Given typical price volatility and no major geopolitical or supply shocks currently anticipated, a spike to $100 within that month is unlikely but not impossible. The futures market and prediction platforms reflect this low likelihood.
Current market sentiment and historical price trends for WTI Crude Oil suggest that reaching $100 per barrel in June 2026 is highly unlikely. Given the current trading environment and the significant gap between market prices and the $100 threshold, the probability of a sudden, extreme spike within a single month is very low, consistent with current prediction market data [predictmarketcap.com](https://predictmarketcap.com/markets/will-wti-reach-100-in-june-2026-823).
WTI Crude Oil prices are influenced by global supply and demand dynamics, geopolitical events, and economic conditions. As of the latest data, WTI prices have been volatile but have not shown a consistent trend towards $100. Historical data indicates that significant price spikes often occur due to unexpected events such as geopolitical tensions or supply disruptions. Given the current market conditions and the potential for such events, there is a moderate probability that WTI could reach $100 in June 2026.
While oil prices can spike due to unforeseen events, the current trajectory and fundamentals do not support a move to $100 in June 2026. Base rates of such spikes are low, occurring in roughly 5–10% of months during crisis periods, but conditions are currently stable. The 0.07 estimate reflects a slight upward adjustment from market odds to account for tail risks like Middle East escalation or production outages.
Based on market data, the probability is low as indicated by existing market odds around 3-5%. The resolution depends on specific 1-minute candle data from Pyth, and current conditions don't strongly suggest a $100 hit in June.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.