The Polymarket market for Ali Khamenei's removal has already resolved 'Yes', meaning Mojtaba Khamenei is now the Supreme Leader. The current market for Mojtaba's removal is trading at 7% on Polymarket, reflecting a consensus that a further leadership change by June 30 is unlikely. With only 17 days remaining and no credible reports of his imminent removal, the probability is low. I align with the market estimate of 7%.
Current prediction markets, including Polymarket and OddsShift, price the probability of Mojtaba Khamenei ceasing to be the de facto leader of Iran by June 30, 2026, at around 7%. This low probability reflects the stability of the current leadership and the lack of credible reports indicating imminent removal or resignation. The market volume and liquidity suggest a well-informed consensus among traders.
Current prediction markets and analytical models consistently price the probability of a leadership change for Mojtaba Khamenei by June 30, 2026, at approximately 7%. There is no credible evidence or geopolitical indicator suggesting an imminent removal or resignation of the current leadership within this very short timeframe.
The prediction market on Polymarket currently prices the probability of a leadership change in Iran by June 30 at 7%. This is supported by a consensus of credible reporting and trading activity. The base rate for such significant political changes is generally low, and there is no recent evidence suggesting imminent leadership change.
The current prediction market on Polymarket prices the 'Yes' outcome at 7 cents, implying a 7% probability of a leadership change in Iran by June 30, 2026 [Polymarket](https://explorer.struct.to/markets/iran-leadership-change-by-june-30-689-922). This is consistent across multiple tracking platforms such as OddsShift and PolySpotter, which report similar odds and note strong structural support for the 'No' side due to profitable positions held by 'No' traders [OddsShift](https://oddsshift.com/radar/iran-leadership-change-by-june-30-689-922). Although one outdated or erroneous page claims a 100% 'Yes' resolution, it contradicts active market data and appears to be a resolved or incorrect listing [Polymarket](https://polymarket.com/event/khamenei-out-as-supreme-leader-of-iran-by-june-30-747). Given the stability of the Iranian regime and lack of credible reports indicating imminent leadership change, the market-implied probability of 7% is a well-calibrated estimate.
Based on web search results, Polymarket prices the 'Yes' outcome at 7% as of June 2026.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Prediction market odds have fallen to near-zero levels as the deadline approaches, with no official statements or credible reports indicating Israel plans a major airspace closure. The market's sharp decline and lack of relevant government signals make a YES resolution extremely unlikely.
Recent market data and official statements indicate a very low likelihood of Israel initiating a major airspace closure by June 15. There have been no official signals or government statements suggesting a nationwide airspace shutdown, and market odds have dropped sharply to around 15% or lower. Regional tensions have not translated into Israeli aviation restrictions, and the focus remains on diplomatic and sanction measures rather than aviation closures.
Current market sentiment and recent reporting indicate a very low likelihood of a nationwide airspace closure by the June 15 deadline. Prediction markets have seen a sharp decline in 'Yes' probabilities as the date approaches, with no official signals or government statements from Israeli aviation authorities suggesting such a measure is imminent. The focus of recent diplomatic and security activity has been on West Bank sanctions rather than civil aviation restrictions.
The prediction market data from Polymarket indicates a strong consensus (85% No) that Israel will not close its airspace by June 15. There are no recent credible reports or official statements from Israeli aviation authorities suggesting an imminent major closure of airspace. The base rate for such significant airspace closures is low, and the market consensus supports this low probability.
The bar for a 'major closure' is high, requiring a broad, official suspension by Israel itself. Current evidence and market sentiment suggest low likelihood, and no such action has been reported. Base rates of such rare events further support a low probability.
Pricing for Israel closing its airspace by June 15 fell sharply, with odds near 2% as the deadline approached, and no official signals of a major closure.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The question asks for a permanent peace deal by June 30, 2026, which is only 17 days away. The most recent known agreement is a temporary 10-day ceasefire from April 16, 2026, which explicitly does not qualify. There is no credible reporting or official confirmation of a permanent deal being negotiated or imminent. Given the long history of conflict and the extremely short timeframe, the base rate for such a rapid, permanent resolution is near zero.
Given the long-standing hostility and complex geopolitical dynamics between Israel and Hezbollah, a permanent peace deal by mid-2026 remains unlikely. While temporary ceasefires have occurred, no definitive permanent peace agreement has been reached historically, and current tensions and regional instability reduce the likelihood of such a breakthrough soon. The requirement for explicit, formal agreements and public confirmations further lowers the probability within this timeframe.
The historical and current geopolitical tensions between Israel and Hezbollah are deeply entrenched, making a formal, permanent peace treaty highly unlikely in the near term. While temporary ceasefires or de-escalation agreements are possible, the criteria for a 'permanent' peace deal are stringent and require a level of diplomatic normalization that currently lacks political support on both sides. Market sentiment [explorer.struct.to](https://explorer.struct.to/markets/israel-x-hezbollah-permanent-peace-deal-by-june-30-2026) reflects this skepticism, with a strong bias toward 'No'.
The likelihood of a permanent peace deal between Israel and Hezbollah by June 30, 2026, is low. The conflict has been ongoing for decades, and recent ceasefires have been temporary. The Polymarket data shows a 72% probability of 'No', indicating market sentiment leans heavily towards no agreement. Historical context and current geopolitical tensions further support this low probability.
The absence of active negotiations, the temporary nature of recent ceasefires, and deep-seated hostilities suggest a low likelihood of a permanent peace deal by June 30, 2026. While de-escalation efforts exist, none meet the threshold for a definitive, lasting agreement as defined.
As of now, there is no strong indication of a definitive, permanent peace deal between Israel and Hezbollah that would meet the criteria by June 30, 2026. Previous ceasefires were temporary, and no clear progress towards a lasting agreement is evident.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Prediction market data from multiple platforms including Orrery, Polymarket, and others consistently show a very low implied probability (around 3-15%) as of June 10-13, 2026, reflecting the high bar for 'control' defined in the resolution criteria, which excludes temporary raids or disruptions. No credible reports suggest that Iran has lost or is about to lose primary governmental or military control over Kharg Island. Given only 17 days remain until the deadline and the lack of any significant military buildup or diplomatic shift indicating an imminent change of control, the true probability is well under 5%.
Kharg Island is a strategically important oil terminal under firm Iranian control, and there is no current credible indication or geopolitical development suggesting Iran will lose control by June 30, 2026. Prediction markets and expert consensus place the probability very low, around 3%, reflecting the high difficulty and geopolitical cost of such a change in control. Temporary disruptions or claims do not count, and no evidence points to an actual transfer of control or occupation by another power.
The loss of control over Kharg Island, a critical Iranian oil terminal, would represent a massive escalation in regional conflict, likely requiring a full-scale invasion or a major geopolitical collapse that is not currently supported by evidence. Prediction markets [orrery.me](https://orrery.me/markets/kharg-island-no-longer-under-iranian-control-by-june-30-561-854) and [explorer.struct.to](https://explorer.struct.to/markets/kharg-island-no-longer-under-iranian-control-by-june-30-561-854) consistently price this event at a very low probability, reflecting the high threshold for 'control' defined in the market criteria.
Given the current geopolitical situation and the lack of significant military or diplomatic developments indicating an imminent change in control of Kharg Island, the probability remains low. The base rate for such a significant shift in control within the given timeframe is minimal, and there is no specific evidence to suggest otherwise.
Kharg Island remains under firm Iranian control as of mid-2026, serving as a critical hub for Iran's oil exports and defended by robust military infrastructure. The resolution criteria require not just disruption but a complete transfer of primary governmental or military control to another authority, which is highly unlikely absent a major armed conflict or invasion—neither of which is currently indicated. Prediction markets such as Polymarket reflect this low likelihood, with implied probabilities around 3% [orrery.com](https://orrery.me/markets/kharg-island-no-longer-under-iranian-control-by-june-30-561-854).
Based on current market data showing low implied probabilities and the strict control criteria requiring actual establishment of control, the likelihood is low.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The market odds on Polymarket are around 3-4% for a Yes resolution, reflecting the current geopolitical constraints on shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. The threshold of a 7-day moving average of 60 transit calls is a significant recovery from recent disruptions, and with only two days left until the June 15 deadline, it is highly unlikely that traffic has already rebounded to that level or will do so in such a short window. No recent news indicates a sudden normalization of traffic, and the IMF Portwatch data would need to show a sharp and immediate increase to meet the criterion.
Current data from IMF PortWatch shows extremely low transit levels through the Strait of Hormuz, with only 2 vessels transiting on June 7, 2026, which is about 2% of the typical pre-crisis volume of 94 vessels per day. The crisis pressure remains extreme, and despite some diplomatic progress, Iran's restrictions and ongoing security concerns make a rapid return to normal traffic levels (7-day average of 60 or more) by June 15 unlikely. Given the short timeframe and current conditions, the probability of traffic returning to normal by that date is very low.
Current market sentiment and geopolitical conditions suggest that shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz remains significantly constrained. Given that the 7-day moving average threshold of 60 is a specific statistical target that has not been met, and with the resolution date of June 15, 2026, approaching, the likelihood of a sudden, sustained return to 'normal' traffic levels as defined by IMF Portwatch is very low.
The market resolves to 'Yes' if the 7-day moving average of transit calls reaches 60 or above. Given the current data and historical trends, it is unlikely that this threshold will be met by June 15, 2026, based on the low probability indicated by the market odds and the lack of recent data suggesting a significant increase in transit calls.
While the current market odds suggest a ~3% chance, historical base rates of shipping traffic and potential de-escalation over the next two years provide some upward adjustment. However, persistent regional instability and the strict reliance on IMF Portwatch data—excluding unreported vessels—limit the likelihood of sustained traffic reaching the 60-threshold. Therefore, an independent estimate of 8% reflects low but non-negligible chances of normalization by June 15, 2026.
Based on the current odds (3.4% Yes on Polymarket) and the market's definition of requiring a 7-day moving average of transit calls ≥60 from IMF Portwatch, the probability is low.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The current 7-day moving average of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz is well below the 60 threshold, likely in the 40-50 range, due to ongoing regional tensions and disruptions. With only about 17 days left until the June 30 deadline, a rapid and sustained recovery to 60 or above is unlikely given the lack of clear de-escalation signals. Polymarket odds (~16.5% Yes) and the short remaining timeframe support a low probability, though a sudden diplomatic breakthrough or data revision could still push the average above 60.
Current market data and trading odds indicate a low probability (around 17%) that the Strait of Hormuz traffic will return to normal levels (7-day moving average of 60 or more transit calls) by the end of June 2026. Given ongoing geopolitical tensions and historical fluctuations in traffic, a full return to normal traffic volume by that date appears unlikely but not impossible.
Current market sentiment and available data suggest that shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz remains significantly below the threshold required for a 'Yes' resolution. Given the ongoing geopolitical tensions and the specific metric defined by IMF Portwatch, it is unlikely that a 7-day moving average of 60 transit calls will be reached by the end of June 2026 without a major de-escalation or shift in global trade patterns.
The current market odds on Polymarket suggest a 16.5% probability of the event resolving to 'Yes' [predictionninja.com](https://predictionninja.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-end-of-june). This low probability is likely due to ongoing geopolitical tensions and disruptions in the region, which have historically affected shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. The base rate for such disruptions is relatively high, and there is no recent evidence to suggest a significant improvement in the situation by the end of June 2026.
The current prediction market odds on Polymarket show a 16.5% probability of the Strait of Hormuz traffic reaching a 7-day moving average of 60 or more transit calls by June 30, 2026 [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-end-of-june). This reflects aggregated trader expectations based on available geopolitical and shipping data. Given the ongoing regional tensions and historical disruption patterns, sustained normalization of traffic to pre-crisis levels remains uncertain. The market's liquidity and volume suggest a reasonably informed consensus, which I treat as a strong base rate indicator.
Current market odds show low expectation, and without positive trends indicated, the likelihood of reaching a 7-day moving average of 60 is low.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Recent reports from June 12-13, 2026 indicate Trump claimed a peace deal would be signed on June 14, but Iran denied it. The Polymarket for a similar question by June 12 resolved at 0% (see [wyldmarkets.com](https://wyldmarkets.com/market/us-announces-new-iran-agreementceasefire-extension-by-june-12-2482)). However, with 17 days left until June 30 and basic terms reportedly agreed (see [euronews.com](https://www.euronews.com/2026/06/12/iran-says-deal-with-us-closer-than-ever-as-trump-warns-tehran-to-get-act-together)), the chance of a formal U.S. announcement of an extension or new framework is moderately likely, though past false claims temper confidence.
While there is strong indication that a peace deal and ceasefire framework between the US and Iran is close to being finalized, with President Trump and other officials signaling imminent agreements, no official US government announcement explicitly extending or renewing the ceasefire has been made as of June 13, 2026. Past patterns of delayed or unconfirmed deals and the complexity of finalizing terms reduce the likelihood of a qualifying announcement by June 30.
While Iran has expressed caution and stated that no final decision has been reached, President Trump has publicly claimed that a deal is imminent and that top Iranian leadership has approved it [straitstimes.com, euronews.com]. Given the high-level diplomatic activity, the involvement of mediators like Pakistan, and the strong political incentive for the US administration to secure a breakthrough before the June 30 deadline, the likelihood of a formal announcement of a new agreement or extension is high [euronews.com].
Recent statements from US President Donald Trump and other officials indicate that a peace deal with Iran is imminent, with Trump stating it is scheduled to be signed soon. However, Iran's foreign ministry has indicated that the deal will not be signed immediately, suggesting some uncertainty. The high probability is based on the repeated claims of a deal being finalized and the involvement of multiple parties in the negotiations.
As of June 13, 2026, President Trump has stated that a deal with Iran has been approved at the highest levels and that strikes have been cancelled, indicating significant progress [cnbc.com](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/11/trump-iran-strikes-deal.html). Pakistan's Prime Minister also indicated finalization within 24 hours, and a draft agreement reportedly includes a 60-day negotiation period following a signing [euronews.com](https://www.euronews.com/2026/06/12/iran-says-deal-with-us-closer-than-ever-as-trump-warns-tehran-to-get-act-together). However, Iran's foreign ministry has not confirmed the signing, and past optimism has not led to formal announcements, introducing uncertainty. While a public U.S. announcement by June 30 is plausible given the momentum, it is not guaranteed due to unresolved details and potential diplomatic delays.
Recent claims of a deal being close exist, but past unfulfilled promises by Trump and lack of confirmed official announcement by June 30 limit the probability.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
The deadline is only two days away (June 15, 2026), and no credible reports indicate a permanent peace deal is imminent. The existing ceasefire is explicitly temporary and does not qualify. Historical US-Iran tensions and the high bar for a formal, permanent agreement make a breakthrough within this short window extremely unlikely.
Current market data and analysis indicate a low probability of a permanent peace deal between the US and Iran by June 15, 2026. Despite ongoing negotiations and temporary ceasefires, no definitive, lasting agreement has been announced, and the market prices reflect skepticism about a permanent resolution within the timeframe.
Current market data and political analysis suggest a low probability of a formal, permanent peace treaty being signed by the June 15, 2026 deadline. While there is ongoing diplomatic activity, the requirement for a definitive, lasting end to hostilities—rather than a temporary ceasefire or memorandum—remains a high bar that has not been met by the involved parties.
The likelihood of a permanent peace deal between the US and Iran by June 15, 2026, is low. Historical tensions and the complexity of the geopolitical landscape suggest that such a deal is unlikely. The recent ceasefire extensions and ongoing negotiations indicate progress, but not a definitive, permanent agreement. The high 'No' percentage on Polymarket (85%) also reflects market skepticism about the likelihood of a permanent deal by the specified date.
The historical relationship between the U.S. and Iran has been marked by deep mistrust and recurring tensions, with no precedent for a permanent peace deal. Despite occasional diplomatic engagements, structural and ideological barriers remain high. The mention of only a temporary ceasefire as recently as April 2026 [predictionninja.com](https://predictionninja.com/market/us-x-iran-permanent-peace-deal-by-june-15-2026-734-856-129) suggests that lasting agreements are not currently in place. Given the stringent criteria requiring explicit, permanent cessation of hostilities and formal adoption or public confirmation by both governments, the likelihood of such a deal by June 15, 2026, is very low.
While there have been some ceasefire announcements, the strict criteria for a permanent peace deal (explicit end to hostilities) and lack of strong current positive indicators make a YES resolution challenging.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Prediction markets currently show a 62-68% chance of a deal by June 30, but these often reflect optimism during active negotiations. Historically, US-Iran nuclear talks have repeatedly failed to meet deadlines due to deep mistrust and domestic political hurdles in both countries. With only about two weeks left, no public agreement has been announced, and the remaining time is very short to finalize a complex multilateral deal, making a 'No' resolution more likely than the market suggests.
Current prediction markets assign a roughly 62-68% chance of a US-Iran nuclear deal by June 30, 2026, reflecting moderate optimism based on ongoing diplomatic efforts and the potential for a JCPOA-style agreement. While negotiations have faced setbacks, the strategic interests of both parties and international pressure support the likelihood of reaching an official agreement before the deadline.
Despite ongoing diplomatic interest, the geopolitical climate between the United States and Iran remains highly strained, with significant domestic political hurdles in both nations preventing a formal, publicly announced nuclear agreement. While prediction markets show some volatility, the lack of concrete progress toward a formal framework suggests that a breakthrough by the June 30, 2026, deadline is unlikely.
The prediction markets show a consensus probability around 62-68% for a US-Iran nuclear deal by June 30, 2026. This suggests a significant likelihood of an agreement, though not a certainty. The high trading volume and active participation indicate that traders are actively assessing the situation, which supports a moderate to high probability of a deal being reached.
While the prediction market [polymarket.com](https://polymarket.com) suggests a 62–68% chance, I adjust slightly downward due to structural barriers: lack of high-level talks, mutual distrust, and political constraints in both countries. However, the possibility of a last-minute diplomatic breakthrough—especially if regional conflicts escalate—keeps the probability above 50%. Base rates are low, but the resolution window is still open and incentives for de-escalation exist.
Current crowd-sourced probabilities from Polymarket range around 62-68%, indicating a moderate chance. The market's shifting odds based on new info and the defined resolution criteria are key factors.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Trump announced a deal with Iran on June 11, 2026, stating the Strait of Hormuz blockade will be lifted upon finalization, with signing expected within days. Given the explicit commitment and the short remaining window until June 30, a formal announcement lifting the blockade before the deadline is highly likely. However, there is a non-trivial risk of delays or last-minute breakdowns, so I assign 0.80.
Given that the blockade was announced recently in April 2026 and the U.S. has stated the blockade will remain in full force until a final deal is signed, it is unlikely but possible that an official announcement lifting the blockade will occur by June 30, 2026. The ongoing negotiations with Iran and regional stakeholders suggest a potential resolution, but the timeline remains uncertain. Therefore, a moderate low probability is assigned.
Recent reports indicate that a deal between the U.S. and Iran is in the final stages of being settled, with President Trump explicitly stating that the naval blockade will remain in effect only until the transaction is finalized. Given that the signing is expected within days, it is highly probable that an official announcement regarding the lifting of the blockade will occur before the June 30, 2026, deadline.
Recent statements by President Trump indicate that a deal with Iran is close to finalization, which would likely include the lifting of the blockade. However, the exact timing and formal announcement remain uncertain, and past actions suggest that such announcements are not guaranteed.
On June 11, 2026, President Trump announced that discussions with Iran have been approved at the highest levels and that scheduled military strikes are cancelled, indicating progress toward a deal [cnbc.com](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/11/trump-iran-strikes-deal.html). He stated the Strait of Hormuz will reopen upon signing, but emphasized the naval blockade remains in effect until finalization. Given the timeline and the requirement for a formal announcement by June 30, 2026, there is a strong signal of intent but no definitive lift yet. The probability reflects moderate confidence that finalization and a qualifying public announcement will occur before the deadline, based on the momentum indicated.
There is no clear indication of an imminent official announcement by the June 30 deadline, and the time since the initial blockade announcement is short with no recent signs of a lift announcement.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Trump's initial Project Freedom was quickly scrapped after provoking Iran and straining a ceasefire. The US military is now using a quiet, unnamed coordination effort, explicitly denying a restart of Project Freedom. While Polymarket shows high odds (~86%), this likely overstates the chance of a definitive announcement by June 30, given the administration's shift to deniable operations and the high bar for a 'substantially equivalent' public program. Base rates for such rapid policy reversals are low, and the current evidence suggests the US prefers informal measures over a formal relaunch.
While there is ongoing U.S. military activity and coordination to protect commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, there has been no definitive announcement from Donald Trump, the U.S. government, or military explicitly restarting Project Freedom or a substantially equivalent program. Recent reports indicate a quieter, less public approach rather than a formal restart, and official denials of Project Freedom's resumption reduce the likelihood of a qualifying announcement by June 30, 2026.
While the administration is engaging in 'quiet' coordination with commercial shippers to facilitate transit through the Strait of Hormuz, they have explicitly denied restarting 'Project Freedom' or formal escort programs [straitstimes.com]. Given the administration's previous decision to scrap the initiative due to regional tensions and the current preference for non-public, informal coordination, a formal, definitive announcement of a restart by June 30 is unlikely [straitstimes.com, iranintl.com].
The U.S. military has denied restarting Project Freedom explicitly, and there is no official announcement from Trump or the U.S. government about restarting it. However, there are reports of the U.S. military coordinating with commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz, which could be seen as a precursor to a formal announcement.
Recent reports indicate conflicting information, but official U.S. military sources have denied restarting Project Freedom or conducting vessel escorts in the Strait of Hormuz [iranintl.com](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202605260538). While the Wall Street Journal cited officials saying assistance had resumed, CENTCOM explicitly labeled escort reports as 'FALSE' and clarified that while coordination occurs, no formal escort program is active [straitstimes.com](https://www.straitstimes.com/world/middle-east/us-looks-to-unblock-strait-of-hormuz-with-quiet-version-of-project-freedom). The absence of a definitive public announcement from Trump or U.S. government sources, combined with official denials, makes a formal restart unlikely. Base rates of military program reinstatements without clear policy signals also remain low.
While there was a report of a restart, the US denied it, and the current effort is quiet without a definitive announcement. However, Polymarket odds are high.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.
Recent credible reporting from both Newsweek and AP (via KXNET) indicates that the UK has prepared a mine-clearing mission involving RFA Lyme Bay and warships like HMS Dragon, but it explicitly states the deployment is contingent on a peace deal with Iran. As of mid-June 2026, no peace agreement has been finalized, and a US official confirmed no mines have been found/destroyed, suggesting full transit clearance has not occurred. While the UK vessel is sailing toward the Gulf, an actual transit through the narrow Strait of Hormuz before June 30 depends on rapid diplomatic resolution—which appears unlikely given the current deadlock. The 92% No on Polymarket reflects the market's low confidence, and my own assessment places the chance somewhat higher due to the ships' imminent arrival and possibility of a last-minute deal, but still well below 50%.
The UK has prepared naval assets, including the RFA Lyme Bay and accompanying warships, for potential deployment to the Strait of Hormuz, primarily for mine-clearing and escort missions. However, deployment is contingent on a peace agreement with Iran, which remains unresolved, and the UK has not yet confirmed any transit through the strait. Given the strategic importance and ongoing tensions, a transit is plausible but not certain by the deadline.
While the UK has deployed the RFA Lyme Bay and expressed intent to lead a mine-clearing operation in the Strait of Hormuz, official statements emphasize that this deployment is contingent upon a finalized peace agreement between the U.S. and Iran. Given the current diplomatic deadlock and the fact that the operation is strictly defensive and conditional, it is unlikely that a transit will occur before the June 30, 2026, deadline unless a significant breakthrough in negotiations happens rapidly.
The UK has prepared and is ready to deploy warships, including the RFA Lyme Bay and HMS Dragon, for a mine-clearing mission in the Strait of Hormuz. The deployment is contingent on a peace agreement between the U.S. and Iran, which is reportedly close to finalization. The UK's Armed Forces Minister has indicated that the mission will proceed once hostilities cease, suggesting a high likelihood of transit through the Strait of Hormuz by June 30, 2026.
The UK is actively preparing for a potential deployment to the Strait of Hormuz, with the RFA Lyme Bay being readied for a mine-clearing mission as part of an international effort led by the UK and France [kxnet.com](https://www.kxnet.com/news/national-news/ap-britains-navy-prepares-to-clear-mines-in-the-strait-of-hormuz-while-waiting-for-a-peace-deal/). However, the deployment is contingent on a peace agreement being reached, and it remains unclear whether mines are even present or if the mission will proceed. While warships like the HMS Dragon are expected to support the operation, transit through the Strait itself depends on post-conflict conditions and insurance requirements for commercial shipping. Given the conditional nature of the mission and ongoing uncertainty, the probability is substantial but not guaranteed.
The UK's mine-clearing mission to the Strait of Hormuz is dependent on a peace deal, which is not finalized. There is no confirmed transit of UK warships through the strait's narrowest portion, and no overwhelming credible reporting of such a transit.
Mean of 6/6 valid model forecasts.